Socrates: But is everything that is right also holy (A]r ou]n kai\ pa=n to\ di/kaion o3sion)? Or is all which is holy right (h2 to\ me\n o3sion pa=n di/kaion), and not all which is right holy (to\ de\ di/kaion ou0 pa=n o3sion), but part of it holy (a0lla\ to\ me\n au0tou= o3sion) and part something else (to\ de/ ti kai\ a1llo;)?
Euthyphro: I
can’t follow you, Socrates (Ou0x e3pomai, w} Sw&kratej, toi=j legome/noij).
Socrates: And
yet you are as much younger than I (Kai\ mh\n newtero/j mou ei] ou0k
e0la/ttoni) as you are
wiser (h2
o3sw| sofw&teroj);
but (a1ll’), as I said (o9 le/gw), you are indolent (trufa|=j) on account of your wealth of wisdom
(u9po\
plou/tou th=j sofi/aj).
But exert yourself, my friend (a0ll’ w} maka/rie, cuntei/ne sauto/n); for it is not hard to understand
what I mean (kai\ ga\r ou0de\ xalepo\n katanoh=sai o4 le/gw). What I mean is the opposite of
what the poet said (le/gw ga\r to\ e0na/ntion h2 o9 poihth\j e0poi/hsen), who wrote (o9 poih/saj): “Zeus the creator (Zh=na de\ to/n q’ e1rcanta), him who made all things (kai\ o4j ta/de
pa/nt’ e0fu/teusen), thou wilt not name (ou0k e0qe/leij
ei0pei=n); for where fear
is (i3na
ga\r de/oj), there also
is reverence (e1nqa kai\ ai1dwj).” Now I disagree with the poet. (e0gw_ ou]n tou/tw| diafe/romai tw~| poih/th|) Shall I tell you how (ei1pw soi o3ph|;)?
Euthyphro: By
all means (Pa/nu ge).
Socrates: It
does not seem to me true that (Ou0 dokei= moi ei]nai) where fear is (i3na de/oj), there also is reverence (e1nqa kai\ ai1dwj); for many who fear diseases and
poverty and other such things (polloi\ ga/r moi dokou=si kai\ no/souj kai\ peni/aj
kai\ a1lla polla\ toiau=ta dedio/tej) seem to me to fear (dedie/nai me/n), but not to reverence at all these
things (ai0dei=sqai
de\ mhde\n tau=ta) which
they fear (a4 dedi/asin).
Don’t you think so too (ou0 kai\ soi\ dokei=;)?
Euthyphro:
Certainly (Pa/nu ge).
Socrates:
But I think that where reverence is (A0ll’ i3na ge
ai0dw&j), there also
is fear (e1nqa kai\ de/oj ei]nai); for does not everyone who has a feeling of reverence and
shame about any act (e0pei\ e1stin o3stij ai0dou/memo/j ti pra=gma kai\
ai0sxuno/menoj) also
dread and fear the reputation of wickedness (ou0 pefo/bhtai/ te kai\ de/doiken a3ma
do/can ponhri/aj;)?
Euthyphro:
Yes, he does fear (De/doike me\n ou]n).
Socrates:
Then it is not correct to say (Ou0k a1r’ o0rqw~j e1xei
le/gein) “where fear is,
there also is reverence (i3na ga\r de/oj, e1nqa kai\ ai0dw&j).” On the contrary, where reverence
is, there also is fear (a0ll’ i3na me\n ai0dw&j, e1nqa kai\ de/oj); but reverence is not everywhere
where fear is (ou0 me/ntoi i3na ge de/oj, pantaxou= ai0dw&j), since, as I think, fear is more
comprehensive than reverence (e0pi\ ple/on ga\r, oi]mai, de/oj ai0dou=j); for reverence is a part of fear (mo/rion gar
a0dw_j de/ouj), just as
the odd is a part of number (w#sper a0riqmou= peritto/n), so that it is not true that where
number is, there also is the odd (w#ste ou0x i3na
per a0riqmo/j, e1nqa kai\ peritto/n), but that where the odd is, there also is number (i3na de\
peritto/n, e1nqa kai\ a0riqmo/j). Perhaps you follow me now (e3pei ga/r pou nu=n ge;)?
Euthyphro:
Perfectly (Pa/nu ge).
Socrates: It
was something of this sort that I meant before, when I asked (To\ toiou=ton
toi/nun kai\ e0kei= le/gwn h0rw&twn) whether where the right is there also is holiness (a]ra i3na
di/kaion, e1nqa kai\ o3sion), or where holiness is, there also is the right (h2 i1na me\n
o3sion, e1nqa kai\ di/kaion); but holiness is not everywhere where the right is (i3na de\
di/kaion, ou0 pantaxou= o3sion), for holiness is a part of the right (mo/rion ga\r tou= dikai/ou to\
o3sion). Do you agree to
this, or do you dissent (ou3tw fw~men h2 a1llwj soi dokei=;)?
Euthyphro: No
(Ou0k), I agree (a0ll’ ou3tw); for I think the statement is
correct (fai/nei ga/r moi o0rqw~j le/gein).
Socrates: Now observe the next point (O#ra dh\ to\
meta\ tou=to). If
holiness is a part of the right (ei0 ga\r me/roj to\ o3sion tou= dikai/ou), we must (dei= dh\ h9ma=j), apparently (w#j e1oiken), find out (e0ceurei=n) what part of the right holiness is
(to\
poi=on me/roj a2n ei1h tou= dikai/ou to\ o3sion). Now if you asked me about one of the things (ei0 me\n ou]n su/
me h0rw/taj ti) I just
mentioned (tw~n nu=n dh/),
as, for example (oi[on), what part of number the even was (poi=on me/roj e0sti\n a0riqmou= to\
a1rtion), and what kind
of a number it was (kai\ ti/j w@n tugxa/nei ou3toj o9 a0riqmo/j) I should say (ei]pon a1n), “that which is not indivisible by
two (o3ti
o4j a2n mh\ skalh\noj h]|),
but divisible by two (a0ll’ i0soskelh/j)”; or don’t you agree (h2 ou0 dokei= soi;)?
Euthyphro: I
agree (E!moige).
Socrates: Now
try in your turn to teach me (Peirw~ dh\ kai\ su\ e0me\ ou3tw dida/cai) what part of the right holiness is
(to\
poi=on me/roj tou= dikai/ou o3sio/n e0stin,), that I may tell Meletus (i1na kai\ Melh/tw| le/gwmen) not to wrong me any more (mhke/q’ h9ma=j a0dikei=n) or bring suits against me for
impiety (mh\d a0sebei/aj gra/fesqai), since I have now been duly instructed by you (w(j i9kanw~j h1dh
para\ sou= memaqhko/taj)
about what is, and what is not, pious and holy (ta/ te eu0sebh= kai\ o3sia kai\
ta\ mh/).
Euthyphro:
This then is my opinion (Tou=to toi/nun e1moige dokei=), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), that the part of the right which has
to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness (to\ me/roj tou=
dikai/ou ei]nai eu0sebe/j te kai\ o3sion, to peri/ th\n tw~n qew~n qerapei/an), and that the remaining part of the
right is that which has to do with the service of men (to\ de\ peri\
a0nqrw&pwn to\ loipo\n ei]nai tou= dikai/ou me/roj).
Socrates: I
think you are correct, Euthyphro (Kai\ kalw~j ge/ moi, w} Eu0qu/fron,
fai/nei le/gein); but
there is one little point about which I still want information (a0lla\ smikrou=
tinoj e1ti e0ndeh=j ei]mi),
for I do not yet understand what you mean by “attention (th\n ga\r
qerapei/an ou1pw suni/hmi h3ntina onoma/zeij).” I don’t suppose you mean (ou0 ga/r pou le/geij ge) the same kind of attention to the
gods which is paid to other things (oi[ai/ per kai\ ai9 peri\ ta\ a1lla
qerapei=ai/ ei0sin, toiau/thn kai\ peri\ qeou/j). We say (le/gomen ga/r pou), for example (oi[on fame/n), that not everyone knows how to
attend to horses (i3ppouj ou0 pa=j e0pi/statai qerapeu/ein), but only he who is skilled in horsemanship
(a0lla\
o9 i9ippiko/j), do we
not (h]
ga/r;)?
Euthyphro:
Certainly (Pa/nu ge).
Socrates: Then
horsemanship is an art of attending to horses (H( ga/r pou i9ppikh\ i3ppwn
qerapei/a)?
Euthyphro:
Yes (Nai/).
Socrates: And
not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman (Ou0de/ ge ku/naj pa=j
e0pi/statai qerapeu/ein, a0lla\ o9 kunhgetiko/j).
Euthyphro: That
is so (Ou3tw).
Socrates: Then
the huntsman’s art is the art of attending to dogs (H( ga/r pou
kunhgetikh\ kunw~n qerapei/a)?
Euthyphro: Yes
(Nai/).
Socrates: And
the oxherd’s art is that of attending to oxen (H( de\ bohlatikh= bow~n).
Euthyphro: Certainly
(Pa/nu
ge).
Socrates:
And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you
mean, Euthyphro?
Euthyphro:
Yes (Nai/).
Socrates:
Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end (Ou0kou=n
qerapei/a ge pa=sa tau0to\n diapra/ttetai)? I mean something like this (oi[on toio/nde): It aims at some good or benefit to
the one to whom it is given (e0p’ a0gaqw~| tini/ e0sti kai\ w)felei/a|
tou= qerapeuome/nou), as
you see that horses (w#sper o9ra=|j dh/ o3ti i3ppoi), when attended to by the horseman’s
art (u9po\
th=j i3ppikh=j qerapeuo/menoi) are benefited (w)felou=ntai) and made better (kai\ belti/ouj gi/gnontai); or don’t you think so (h2 ou0 dokou=si/
soi;)?
Euthyphro: Yes,
I do (E1moige).
Socrates: And
dogs are benefited by the huntsman’s art (Kai\ oi9 ku/nej ge/ pou u9po\ th=j
kunhgetikh=j) and oxen
by the oxherd’s (kai\ oi9 bo/ej u9po\ th=j bohlatikh=j) and everything else in the same way
(kai\
ta]lla pa/nta w(sau/twj)?
Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which
is cared for (h2 e0pi\ bla/bh| oi1ei tou= qerapeuome/nou th\n qerapei/an ei]nai;)?
Euthyphro: No,
by Zeus, I do not (Ma\ Di/’ ou0k e1gwge).
Socrates: Then
holiness (H} ou]n kai\ h9 o9sio/thj), since it is the art of attending to the gods (qerapei/a ou]sa
qew~n), is a benefit to
the gods (w)fe/leia/ te/ e0sti qew~n), and makes them better (kai\ belti/ouj tou\j qeou\j poiei=;)? And you would agree (kai\ su\ tou=to
cugxwrh/saij a1n) that
when you do a holy or pious act (w(j e0peida/n ti o3sion poih=|j) you are making one of the gods
better (belti/w
tina\ tw~n qew~n a0perga/zei;)?
Euthyphro: No,
by Zeus, not I (Ma\ Di/’ ou0k e1gwge).
Socrates:
Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that it is what you meant (Ou0de\ ga\r e0gw&,
w} Eu0qu/fron, oi]mai/ se tou=to le/gein). Far from it (pollou= kai\ de/w). But I asked what you meant by
“attention to the gods” (a0lla\ tou/tou dh\ e3neka kai\ a0nhro/mhn, ti/na pote\
le/goij th\n qerapei/an tw~n qew~n) just because I did not think you meant anything like that (ou0x h9gou/meno/j
se toiau/thn le/gein).
Eythyphro: You
are right, Socrates (Kai\ o0rqw~j ge, w} Sw&kratej); that is not what I mean (ou0 ga\r
toiau/thn le/gw).
Socrates:
Well (Ei]en), what kind of attention to the gods
(a0lla\
ti/j dh\ qew~n qerapei/a)
is holiness (ei1h a2n h9 o9sio/thj;)?
Euthyphro:
The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters (H{|per, w} Sw&kratej,
oi9 dou=loi tou\j despo/taj qerapeu/ousin).
Socrates: I
understand (Manqa/nw). It is,
you mean, a kind of service to the gods (u9phretikh/ tij a1n, w(j e1oiken, ei1h
qeoi=j)?
Euthyphro: Exactly
(Pa/nu
me\n ou]n).
Socrates: Now
can you tell me (E!xeij ou]n ei0pei=n) what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce
(h9
i0atroi=j u9pretikh\ ei0j ti/noj e1rgou a0pergasi/an tugxa/nei ou]sa
u9phretikh/;)? Is it not
health (ou0k
ei0j u9giei/aj oi1ei;)?
Euthyphro:
Yes (E!gwge).
Socrates: Well
then (Ti/
de/;); what is it which
the art that serves shipbuilders serves to produce (h9 nauphgoi=j u9phretikh\
ei0j ti/noj e1rgou a0pergasi/an u9phretikh/ e0stin;)?
Euthyphro:
Evidently, Socrates, a ship (Dh=lon o3ti, w} Sw&kratej, ei0j ploi/ou).
Socrates:
And that which serves housebuilders serves to build a house (Kai\ h9
oi0kodo/moij ge/ pou ei0j oi0ki/aj)?
Euthyphro:
Yes (Nai/).
Socrates:
Then tell me, my friend (Ei0pe\ dh/, w} a1riste); what would the art which serves the gods serve to
accomplish (h9de\ qeoi=j u9phretikh\ ei0j ti/noj e1rgou a0pergasi/an u9phretikh\
a2n ei1h;)? For it is
evident that you know (dh=lon ga\r o3ti su\ oi]sqa), since you say you know more than any other man
about matters which have to do with the gods (e0peidh/per ta/ ge qei=a ka/llista/
ge fh\|j ei0de/nai a0nqrw&pwn).
Euthyphro: And
what I say is true, Socrates (Kai\ a0lhqh= ge le/gw, w} Sw&kratej).
Socrates:
Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me (Ei0pe\ dh\ pro\j Dio/j), what is that glorious result (ti/ pote/ e0stin
e0kei=no to\ pa/gkalon e1rgon) which the gods accomplish (o4 oi9 qeoi\ a0perga/zontai) by using us as servants (h9mi=n
u9phre/taij xrwme/noi;).
Euthyphro:
They accomplish many fine results, Socrates (Polla\ kai\ kala/, w}
Sw&kratej).
Socrates: Yes, and so do generals, my friend (Kai\ ga\r oi9
strathgoi/, w} fi/le);
but nevertheless (a0ll’ o3mwj), you could easily tell the chief of them (to\ kefa/laion
au0tw~n r9a|di/wj a2n ei1poij), namely, that they bring about victory in war (o3ti ni/khn e0n
tw~| pole/mw| a0perga/zontai). Is that not the case (h2 ou1;)?
Euthyphro: Of course (Pw~j d’ ou1;).
Socrates: And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine
results; but still the chief result of their work is the food from the land (Polla\ de/ g’, oi]mai, kai\ kala\
kai\ oi9 gewrgoi/, a0ll’ o3mwjto\ kefa/laion au0tw~n e0stin th=j
a0pergasi/aj h9 e0k th=j gh=j trofh/),
Euthyphro: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).
Socrates: But how about the many fine results the gods
accomplish (Ti/ de\ dh/; tw~n pollw~n kai\ kalw~n, a4 oi9 qeoi\ a0perga/zontai)? What is the chief result of their
work (ti/
to\ kefa/laio/n e0sti th=j e0rgasi/aj;)?
Euthyfro: I told you a while ago, Socrates (Kai\ o0li/gon soi
pro/teron ei]pon, w} Sw&kratej), that it is a long task to learn accurately all about these
things (o3ti
plei/onoj e1rgou e0sti\n a0kribw~j pa/nta tau=ta w(j e1xei maqei=n). However, I say simply (to/de me/ntoi soi
a9plw~j le/gw) that when
one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods (o3ti e0a\n me\n
kexarisme/na tij e0pi/sthtai toi=j qeoi=j le/gein te kai\ pra/ttein), in praying and sacrificing (eu0xo/meno/j te
kai\ qu/wn), that is
holiness (tau=t’ e0sti ta\ o3sia), and such things bring salvation to individual families (kai\ sw~|zei ta\
toiau=ta tou/j te i0di/ouj oi1kouj) and to states (kai\ ta\ koina\ tw~n po/lewn); and the opposite of what is
gratifying to the gods is impious (ta\ d’ e0nanti/a
tw~n kexarisme/nwn a0sebh=), and that overturns and destroys
everything (a4 dh\ kai\ a0natre/pei a3panta kai\ a0po/llusi).
Socrates: You might. If you wished, Euthyphro have answered
much more briefly the chief part of my question (H} polu/ moi dia\ braxute/rwn, w}
Euqu/fron, ei0 e0bou/lou, ei]pej a2n to\ kefa/laion w{n h0rw&twn). But it is plain that you do not
care to instruct me (a0lla\ ga\r ou0 proqu/mo/j me ei] dida/cai, dh=loj ei]). For now (kai\ ga\r nu=n), when you were close upon it (e0peidh\ e0p’ au0tw~| h]sqa) you turned aside (a0petra/pou); and if you had answered it (o9 ei0 a0pekri/nw), I should already have obtained
from you all the instruction I need about holiness (i9kanw~j a2n h1dh
para\ sou= th\n o9sio/thta e0memaqh/kh). But, as things are (nu=n de/), the questioner must follow the one questioned (a0na/gkh ga\r
to\n e0rw~nta tw~| e0rwme/nw| a0kolouqei=n) wherever he leads (o3ph| a2n e0kei=noj u9pa/gh|). What do you say the holy or
holiness, is (ti/ dh\ au] le/geij to\ o3sion ei]nai kai\ th\n o9sio/thta)? Do you not say that it is a kind
of science of sacrificing and praying (ou0xi\ e0pisth/mhn tina\ tou= qu/ein te
kai\ eu1xesqai;)?
Euthyphro: Yes (E!gwge).
Socrates: And sacrificing is making gifts to the gods (Ou0kou=n to
qu/ein dwrei=sqai/ e0sti toi=j qeoi=j) and praying is asking from them (to\ d’ eu1xesqai
ai0tei=n tou\j qeou/j;)?
Euthyphro: Exactly, Socrates (Kai\ ma/la, w} Sw&kratej).
Socrates: Then holiness, according to this definition, would
be a science of giving and asking (E0pisth/mh a1ra ai0th/sewj kai\ do/sewj qeoi=j
o9sio/thj a2n ei1h e0k tou/tou tou= lo/gou).
Euthyphro: You understand perfectly what I said, Socrates (Pa/nu kalw~j, w}
Sw&kratej, cunh=kaj o4 ei]pon).
Socrates: Yes, my friend, for I am eager for your wisdom (E)piqumhth\j ga\r
ei]mi, w} fi/le, th=j sh=j sofi/aj), and give my mind to it (kai\ prose/xw to\n nou=n au0th=|), so that nothing you say shall fall
to the ground (w#ste ou0 xamai\ pesei=tai o3 ti a2n ei1ph|j). But tell me (a0lla/ moi le/con), what is this service to the gods (ti/j au3th h9
u9phresi/a e0sti\ toi=j qoi=j;)? Do you say it is asking from them (ai0tei=n te fh\|j au0tou/j) and giving to them (kai\ dido/nai
e0kei/noij;)?
Euthyphro: Yes (E!gwge).
Socrates: Would not the right way of asking be to ask of them
what we need from them (A]r’ ou]n ou0 to\ o0rqw~j ai0tei=n a2n ei1h, w{n
deo/meqa par’ e0kei/nwn, tau=ta au0tou\j ai0tei=n;)?
Euthyphro: What else (A0lla\ ti/;)?
Socrates: And the right way of giving (Kai\ au] to\
dido/nai o0rqw~j), to
present them with what they need from us (w{n e0kei=noi tugxa/nousi deo/menoi par’ h9mw~n tau=ta
e0kei/noij au] a0ntidwrei=sqai;)? For it would not be scientific giving to give anyone what he does not
need (ou0
ga/r pou texniko/n g’ a2n ei1h dwroforei=n dido/nta tw~|
tau=ta w{n ou0de\n dei=tai).
Euthyphro:
You are right, Socrates (A0lhqh=
le/geij, w} Sw&kratej).
Socrates:
Then holiness would be a kind of barter between gods and men (E0mporikh\ a1ra tij a2n ei1h, w}
Euqu/fron, te/xnh h9 o9sio/thj qeoi=j kai\ a0nqrw&poij par’ a0llh/lwn.)?
Euthyphro:
Yes, of barter, if you like to call it so (E)mporikh/, ei0 ou3twj h3dio/n soi o0noma/zein).
Socrates: I don’t like to call it so (A0ll’ ou0de\n h9di/on e1moige), if it is not true (ei0 mh\ tugxa/nei a0lhqe\j o1n). But tell me (fra/son de/ moi),
what advantage accrues to the gods from the gifts they get from us (ti/j h9 w)fe/leia toi=j qeoi=j
tugxa/nei ou]sa a0po\ tw~n dw&rwn w{n par’ h9mw~n lamba/nousin;)? For everybody knows what they give (a4 me\n ga\r dido/asi, panti\ dh=lon), since we have nothing good which they do
not give (ou0de\n
ga\r h9mi=n e0stin a0gaqo/n, o3 ti a2n mh\ e0kei=noi dw~sin). But what advantage do they derive from what
they get from us (a4
de\ par’ h9mw~n lamba/nousin, ti/
w)felou=ntai;)? Or have we so much the better of
them in our bartering (h2
tosou=ton au0tw~n pleonektou=men kata\ th\n e0mpori/an) that we get all good things from them (w#ste pa/nta ta0gaqa\ par’ au0tw~n lamba/nomen) and they nothing from us (e0kei=noi de\ par’ h9mw~n ou0de/n;)?
Euthyphro: Why you don’t suppose,
Socrates, that the gods gain any advantage from what they get from us, do you (A0ll’ oi1ei, w} Sw&kratej, tou\j qeou\j
w)felei=sqai a0po\ tou/twn, a4 par’ h9mw~n lamba/nousin;)?
Socrates: Well then, what would those
gifts of ours to the gods be (A0lla\
ti/ dh/pot’
a2n ei1h tau=ta, w} Eu0qu/fron, ta\ par’ h9mw~n dw~ra toi=j qeoi=j;)?
Euthyphro: What else than (Ti’ d’ oi1ei a1llo h2) honour (timh/ te) and praise (kai\ ge/ra), and, as I said before, (kai\, o3per e0gw_ a1rti e1legon) gratitude (xa/rij;)?
Socrates: Then, Euthyphro, holiness is
grateful to the gods, but not advantageous or precious to the gods (Kexarisme/non a1ra e0stin, w}
Euqu/fron, to\ o3sion, a0ll’ ou0xi\ w)fe/limon ou0de\ fi/lon toi=j qeoi=j;)?
Euthyphro: I think it is precious above
all things (Oi]mai
e1gwge pa/ntwn ge ma/lista fi/lon).
Socrates: Then again, it seems,
holiness is that which is precious to the gods (Tou=to a1r’ e0stin au], w(j e1oike, to\ o3sion,
to1 toi=j qeoi=j fi/lon)?
Eurhyphro: Certainly (M/a/lista/ ge).
Socrates: Then will you be surprised (Qauma/sei ou]n), since you say this (tau=ta le/gwn), if your words do not remain fixed (e0a/n soi oi9 lo/goi fai/nwntai mh\
me/nontej) but walk about (a0lla\ badi/zontej), and will you accuse me of being the
Daedalus (kai\
e0me\ ai0tia/sei to\n Dai/dalon) who makes
them walk (badi/zontaj
au0tou\j poiei=n), when you are
yourself much more skilful than Daedalus (au0to\j de\ w@n polu\ texnikw&teroj tou= Daida/lou) and make them go around in a circle (kai\ ku/klw| periio/nta poiw~n;)? Or do you not see (h2 ou0k ai0sqa/nei) that our definition has come round to the
point from which it started (o3ti
o9 lo/goj perielqw_n pa/lin ei0j tau0to\n h3kei;)?
For you remember, I suppose (me/mnhsai
ga/r pou), that a while ago we found that
holiness and what is dear to the gods are not the same (o3ti e0n tw~| e1mprosqen to/ te o3sion
kai\ to\ qeofile\j ou0 tau=to\n h9mi=n e0fa/nh),
but different from each other (a0ll’ e3tera a0llh/lwn); or do you not remember (h2 ou0 me/mnhsai;)?
Euthyphro: Yes, I remember (E!gwge).
Socrates: Then either our argument a while ago was wrong (Ou0kou=n h2 a1rti ou0 kalw~j w(mologou=men), or if that was right (h2 ei0 to/te kalw~j), we are wrong now (nu=n ou0k o0rqw~j tiqe/meqa).
Euthyphro: So it seems (E!oiken).
Socrates: Then we must begin again at
the beginning and ask (E)c
a0rxh=j a1ra h9mi=n pa/lin skepte/on)
what holiness is (ti/
e0sti to\ o3sion). Since I shall
not willingly give up until I learn (w(j e0gw&, pri\n a2n ma/qw, e9kw_n ei]nai ou0k a0podeilia/sw). And do not scorn me (kai\ mh/ me a0tima/sh|j), but by all means apply your mind now to the
utmost (a0lla\ panti\
tro/pw| prose/xwn to\n nou=n o3 ti ma/lista nu=n)
and tell me the truth (ei0pe\
th\n a0lh/qeian); for you know (oi]sqa ga/r), if any one does (ei1per tij a1lloj a0nqrw&pwn), and like Proteus, you must be held (kai\ ou0k a0fete/oj ei], w#sper o9
Prwteu/j) until you speak (pri\n a2n ei1ph|j). For if you had not clear knowledge (ei0 ga\r mh\ h1|dhsqa safw~j) of holiness and unholiness (to/ te o3sion kai\ to\ a0no/sion), you would have surely not undertaken to
prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant (ou0k e1stin o3pwj a1n pote
e0pexei/rhsaj u9pe\r a0ndro\j qhto\j a1ndra presbu/thn pate/ra diwka/qein fo/nou). You would have been afraid to risk the
anger of the gods (a0lla\
kai\ tou\j qeou\j a2n e1deisaj parakinduneu/ein),
in case your conduct should be wrong (mh\ o0rqw~j au0to\ poih/soij),
and would have been ashamed in the sight of men (kai\ tou\j a0nqrw&pouj h0|sxu/nqhj). But now I am sure (nu=n de\ eu] oi]da) you think you know (o3ti safw~j oi1ei ei0de/nai) what is holy and what is not (to/ te o3sion kai\ mh/). So tell me (ei0pe\ ou]n),
most excellent Euthyphro (w}
be/ltiste Eu0qu/fron), and do not
conceal your thought (kai\
mh\ a0pokru/yh| o3 ti au0to\ h9gei=)
Euthyphro: Some other time, Socrates (Ei0j au]qij toi/nun, w} Sw&kratej). Now I am in a hurry to go somewhere (nu=n ga\r speu/dw poi) and it is time for me to go (kai/ moi w#ra a0pie/nai).
Socrates: Oh my friend, what are you
doing (Oi[a poiei=j, w}
e9tai=re!)? You go away and leave me cast down
from the high hope (a0p’
e0lpi/doj me
katabalw_n mega/lhj a0pe/rxei) I had (h4n ei]xon) that I shou learn from you what is holy (w(j para\ sou= maqw_n ta/ te o3sia) and what is not (kai\ mh/),
and should get rid of Meletus’ indictment (kai\ th=j pro\j Me/lhton grafh=j a0pala/comai) by showing him (e0ndeica/menoj e0kei/nw|) that I have been made wise by Euthyphro
about divine matters (o3ti
sofo\j h1dh par’ Eu0qu/fronoj ta\ qei/a ge/gona)
and am no longer through ignorance acting carelessly (kai\ o3ti ou0ke1ti u9p’ a0gnoi/aj au0tosxedia/zw) and making innovations (ou0de\ kainotomw~) in respect of them (peri\ au0ta/) and that I shall live a better life henceforth
(kai\ dh\ kai\
to\n a1llon bi/on a1meinon biwsoi/mhn).
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