Cratylus 2

Socrates: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view (Pw~j ou]n tou=to ti/qesai; a]r’ w{de; tou\j me\n pa/nu xrhstou\j pa/nu froni/mouj, tou\j de\ pa/nu ponhrou\j pa/nu a1fronaj;)?

Hermogenes: It would (E!moige dokei= ou3twj).

Soc. But if Protagoras is right and the truth is that the things are as they appear to anyone, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish (Oi[o/n te ou]n, ei0 Prwtago/raj a0lhqh= e1legen kai\ e1stin au9th= h9 a0lh/qeia, to\ oi[a a2n dokh=| e9ka/stw| toiau=ta kai\ ei]nai,tou\j me\n h9mw~n froni/mouj ei]nai, tou\j de\ a1fronaj;)?

Herm. Impossible (Ou0 dh=ta).

Soc. And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really distinguishable, you will allow, I think (Kai\ tau=ta/ ge, w(j e0gw}|mai soi\ pa/nu dokei=, fronh/seoj ou1shj kai\ a0frosu/nhj), that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct (mh\ pa/nu dunato\n ei]nai Prwtago/ran a0lhqh= le/gein). For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another (ou0de\n ga\r a1n pou th=|  a0lhqe/ia| o9 e3teroj tou= e9te/rou fronimw&teroj ei1h, ei1per a4 a2n e9ka/stw| dokh=| e9ka/stw| a0lhqh= e1stai).

Herm. He cannot (E!sti tau=ta).

Soc. Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus (A0lla\ mh\n ou0de\ kat’ Eu0qudh/mo/n ge oi]mai soi\ dokei=), that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always (pa=si pa/nta o9moi/wj ei]nai kai\ a0ei/); for neither on his view can there be some good (ou0de\ ga\r a2n ou3twj ei]en oi9 me\n xrhstoi/) and other bad (oi9 de\ ponhroi/), if virtue and vice are always equally to be distributed to all (ei0 o9moi/wj a3pasi kai\ a0ei\ a0reth/ te kai\ kaki/a ei1h).

Herm. There cannot (A0lhqh= le/geij).

Soc. But if neither is right, and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always (Ou0kou=n ei0 mh/te pa=si pa/nta e0sti\n o9moi/wj a3ma kai\ a0ei/, mh/te e9ka/stw| i0di/a| e3kaston), they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence (dh=lon dh\ o3ti au0ta\ au9tw~n ou0si/an e1xonta/ tina be/baio/n e0sti ta\ pra/gmata): they are not in relation to us (ou0 pro\j h9ma=j), or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy (ou0de\ u9f’ h9mw~n e9lko/mena a1nw kai\ ka/tw tw~| h9mete/rw| fanta/smati), but they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature (a0lla\ kaq’ au9ta\ pro\j th\n au9tw~n ou0si/an e1xonta h[|per pe/fuken).

Herm. I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth (Dokei=  moi, w} Sw&kratej, ou3tw).

Soc. Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves (Po/teron ou]n au0ta\ me\n a2n ei1h ou3twj pefuko/ta), or equally to the actions which proceed from them (ai9 de\ pra/ceij au0tw~n ou0 kata\ to\n au0to\n tro/pon;)? Are not actions also a class of being (h2 ou0 kai\ au[tai e3n ti ei]doj tw~n o1ntwn ei0si/n, ai9 pra/ceij;)?

Herm. Yes, the actions are real as well as the things (Pa/nu ge kai\ au[tai).

Soc. Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature (Ka/ta th\n au9tw~n a1ra fu/sin kai\ ai9 pra/ceij pra/ttontai), and not according to our opinion of them (ou0 kata\ th\n h9mete/ran do/can)? In cutting, for example (oi[on e0a/n ti e0pixeirh/swmen h9mei=j tw~n o1ntwn te/mnein), we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument (po/teron h9mi=n tmhte/on e0sti\n e3kaston w(j a2n h9mei=j boulw&meqa kai\ w{| a2n boulhqw~men); but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting (h2 e0a\n me\n kata\ th\n fu/sin boulhqw~men e3kaston te/mnein tou= te/mnein te kai\ te/mnesqai kai\ w{| pe/fuke); and the natural process is right and will succeed (temou=me/n te kai\ ple/on ti h9mi=n e1stai kai\ o0rqw~j pra/comen tou=to), but any other will fail and be of no use at all (e0a\n de\ para\ fu/sin, e0camarthso/meqa/ te kai\ ou0de\n pra/comen;).

Herm. I should say that the natural way is the right way (E!moige dokei= ou3tw).

Soc. Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument (Ou0kou=n kai\ e0a\n ka/ein ti e0pixeirh/swmen, ou0 kata\ pa=san do/can dei= ka/ein, a0la\ kata\ th\n o0rqh/n; au3th d’ e0sti\n h[| e0pefu/kei e3kaston ka/esqai/ te kai\ ka/ein ka\ w~| e0pefu/kei;).

Herm. True (E!sti tau=ta).

Soc. And this holds good of all actions (Ou0kou=n kai\ ta]lla ou3tw;)?

Herm. Yes (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. And speech is a kind of action (A]r’ ou]n ou0 kai\ to\ le/gein mi/a tij tw~n pra/cew&n e0stin;)?

Herm. True (Nai/).

Soc. And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure (Po/teron ou]n h[| a1n tw| dokh=| lekte/on ei]nai, tau/th| le/gwn o0rqw~j le/cei, h2 e0a\n me\n h[| pe/fuke ta\ pra/gmata le/gein te kai\ le/gesqai kai\ w{|, tau/th| kai\ tou/tw| le/gh|, ple/on te/ ti poih/sei kai\ e0rei=, a2n de\ mh\, e0camarth/setai/ te kai\ ou0de\n poih/sei;).

Herm. I quite agree with you (Ou3tw moi dokei= w(j le/geij).

Soc. And is not naming a part of speaking (Ou0kou=n tou= le/gein mo/rion to\ o0noma/zein;)? for in giving names men speak (o0noma/zontej ga/r pou le/gousi tou\j lo/gouj).

Herm. That is true (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action? (Ou0kou=n kai\ to\ o0noma/zein pra=cij ti/j e0stin, ei1per kai\ to\ le/gein pra=ci/j tij h]n peri\ ta\ pra/gmata;)?

Herm. True (Nai/).

Soc. And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves (Ai9 de\ pra/ceij e0fa/nhsan h9mi=n ou0 pro\j h9ma=j ou]sai), but had a special nature of their own (a0ll’ au9tw~n tina i0di/an fu/sin e1xousai;)?

Herm. Precisely (E!sti tau=ta).

Soc. Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and in no other way shall we name with success (Ou0kou=n kai\ o0nomaste/on h[| pe/fuke ta\ pra/gmata o0noma/zein te kai\ o0noma/zesqai kai\ w{|, a0ll’ ou0x h[| a2n h9mei=j boulhqw~men, ei1per ti toi=j e1mprosqen me/llei o9mologou/menon ei]nai; kai\ ou3tw me\n a2n ple/on ti poioi=men kai\ o0noma/zoimen, a1llwj de\ ou1;).

Herm. I agree (Fai/netai/ moi).

Soc. But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something (Fe/re dh/, o4 e1dei te/mnein, e1dei tw~|, fame/n, te/mnein;)?

Herm. Yes (Nai/).

Soc. And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something (Kai\ o4 e1dei kerki/zein, e1dei tw~| kerki/zein; kai\ o4 e1dei trupa=n, e1dei tw~| trupa=n;)?

Herm. Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. And that which has to be named has to be named with something (Kai\ o4 e1dei dh\ o0noma/zein, e1dei tw~| o0noma/zein;)?

Herm. True (E@sti tau=ta).

Soc. What is that (Ti/ dh\ h]n e0kei=no) with which we pierce (w{| e1dei trupa=n;)?

Herm. An awl (Tru/panon).

Soc. And with which we weave (Ti/ de\ w{| kerki/zein;)?

Herm. A shuttle (Kerki/j).

Soc. And with which we name (Ti/ de\ w{| o0noma/zomen;)?

Herm. A name (O@noma).

Soc. Very good: then a name is an instrument (Eu] le/geij, o1rganon a1ra ti/ e0sti kai\ to\ o1noma).

Herm. Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. Suppose that I ask (Ei0 ou]n e0gw_ e0roi/mhn), “What sort of instrument is a shuttle?” And you answer, “A weaving instrument (“Ti/ h]n o1rganon h9 kerki/j;” ou0x w{| kerki/zomen;).”

Herm. Well (Nai/).

Soc. And I ask again, “What do we do when we weave (Kerki/zontej de\ ti/ drw~men;)?” – The answer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof (ou0 th\n kro/khn kai\ tou\j sth/monaj sugkexume/nouj diakri/nomen;).

Herm. Very true (Nai/).

Soc. And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general (Ou0kou=n kai\ peri\ trupa/nou e3ceij ou3twj ei0pei=n kai\ peri\ tw~n a1llwn;)?

Her. To be sure (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you answer me (E1xeij dh\ kai\ peri\ o0no/matoj ou3twj ei0pei=n;)? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name (o0rga/nw| o1nti tw~| o0no/mati o0noma/zontej ti/ poiou=men;)?

Her. I cannot say (Ou0k e1xw le/gein).

Soc. Do we not give information to one another (A]r’ ou0 dida/skome/n ti a0llh/louj), and distinguish things according to their nature (kai\ ta\ pra/gmata diakri/nomen h[| e1xei;)?

Her. Certainly we do (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web (O!noma a1ra didaskaliko/n ti/ e0stin o1rganon kai\ diakri/tikon th=j ou0si/aj w#sper krokh\ u9fa/smatoj).

Her. Yes (Nai/).

Soc. And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver (U(fantiko\n de/ ge h9 kerki/j;).

Her. Assuredly (Pw~j d’ ou1;).

Soc. Then the weaver will use the shuttle well (U(fantiko\j me\n a1ra kerki/di kalw~j xrh/setai) – and well means like a weaver (kalw~j e0stin u9fantikw~j)? and the teacher will use the name well (didaskaliko\j de\ o0no/mati) – and well means like a teacher (kalw~j d’ e0sti didaskalikw~j).

Her. Yes (Nai/).

Soc. And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work he will be using well (Tw~| ti/noj ou]n e1rgw| o9 u9fa/nthj kalw~j xrh/setai o3tan th=| kerki/di xrh=tai;)?

Her. That of the carpenter  (Tw~| tou= te/ktonoj).

Soc. And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only (Pa=j de\ te/ktwn h2 o9 th\n te/xnhn e1xwn;)?

Her. Only the skilled (O( th\n te/xnhn).

Soc. And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well (Tw~| ti/noj de\ e1rgw o9 truphth\j kalw~j xrh/setai o3tan tw~| trupa/nw| xrh=tai;)?

Her. That of the smith (Tw~| tou= xalke/oj).

Soc. And is every man a smith, or only the skilled (A[r’ ou]n pa=j xalkeu\j h2 o9 th\n te/xnhn e1xwn;)?

Her. The skilled only (O9 th\n te/xnhn).

Soc. And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using (Ei]en, tw~| de\ ti/noj e1rgw| o9 didaskaliko\j xrh/setai o3tan tw~| o0no/mati xrh=tai;)?

Herm. There again I am puzzled (Ou0de\ tou=t’ e1xw).

Soc. Cannot you at least say who gives us the names we use (Ou0de\ tou=to/ g’ e1xeij ei0pei=n, ti/j paradi/dwsin h9mi=n ta\ o0no/mata oi[j xrw~meqa;)?

Her. Indeed I cannot (Ou0 dh=ta).

Soc. Does not the law seem to you to give us them (A0r’ ou0xi\ o9 no/moj dokei= ei]nai o9 paradidou\j au0ta/;)?

Her. Yes, I suppose so (E!oiken).

Soc. Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator (Nomoqe/tou a1ra e1rgw| xrh/setai o9 didaskaliko\j o3tan o0no/mati xrh=tai;)?

Her. I agree (Dokei= moi).

Soc. And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only (Nomoqe/thj de/ soi dokei= pa=j ei]nai a0nh\r h2 o9 th\n te/xnhn e1xwn;)?

Her. The skilled only (O( th\n te/xnhn).

Soc. Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name (Ou0k a1ra panto\j a0ndro/j, w} E(rmo/genej, o1noma qe/sqai), but only a maker of names (a0lla/ tinoj o0nomatourgou=); and this is the legislator (ou3toj d’ e0sti/n, w(j e1oike, o9 nomoqe/thj), who of all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest (o4j dh\ tw~n dhmiourgw~n spaniw&tatoj e0n a0nqrw&poij gi/gnetai).

Her. True (E!oiken).

Soc. And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look (I!qi dh/, e0pi/skeyai poi= ble/pwn o9 nomoqe/thj ta\ o0no/mata ti/qetai;)? Consider this in the light of the previous instances (e0k tw~n e1mprosqen de\ a0na/skeyai): to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle (poi= ble/pwn o9 te/ktwn th\n kerki/da poiei=;)? Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle (a]r’ ou0 pro\j toiou=to/n ti o9 e0pefu/kei kerki/zein;)

Her. Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he made the other (Ti/ de/; a2n katagh=| au0tw| h9 kerki\j poiou=nti, po/teron pa/lin poih/sei a1llhn pro\j th\n kateagui=an ble/pwn, h2 pro\j e0kei=no to\ ei]doj pro\j o3per kai\ h4\n kate/acen e0poi=ei)?

Her. To the latter, I should imagine (Pro\j e0kei=no, e1moige dokei=).

Soc. Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle (Ou0kou=n e0kei=no dikaio/tat’ a2n au0to\ o4 e1stin kerki\j kale/saimen;)?

Her. I think so (E!moige dokei=).

Soc. And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material (Ou0kou=n e0peida\n de/h| leptw~| i9mati/w| h2 paxei= h2  linw~| h2 e0rew~| h2 o9poiw|ou=n tini kerki/da poiei=n), ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle (pa/saj me\n dei= to\ th=j kerki/doj e1xein ei]doj); and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work (oi3a d’ e9ka/stw| kalli/sth e0pefu/kei), that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case (tau/thn a0podido/nai th\n fu/sin ei0j to\ e1rgon e9ka/ston).

Her. Yes (Nai/).

Soc. And the same holds for other instruments (Kai\ peri\ tw~n a1llwn dh\ o0rga/nwn o9 au0to\j tro/poj): when a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work (to\ fu/sei e9ka/stw| pefuko\j o1rganon e0ceuro/nta), he must express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may be, which he employs (dei= a0podou=nai ei0j e0kei=no e0c ou4 a2n poih=| to\ e1rgon, ou0x oi[on a2n au0to\j boulhqh=|, a0ll’ oi[on e0pefu/kei); for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses (to\ fu/sei ga\r e9ka/stw|, w(j e1oike, tru/panon pefuko\j ei0j to\n si/dhron dei= e0pi/stasqai tiqe/nai).

Her. Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses (Kai\ th\n fu/sei kerki/da e9ka/stw| pefukui=an ei0j cu/lon;)?

Her. True (E!sti tau=ta).

Soc. For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general (Fu/sei ga\r h]n e9ka/stw| ei1dei u9fa/smatoj, w(j e1oiken, e9ka/sth kerki/j, kai\ ta]lla ou3twj).

Her. Yes (Nai/).