Cratylus 3

Soc. Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural names of each thing into sounds and syllables (A]r’ ou]n, w} be/ltiste, kai\ to\ e9ka/stw| fu/sei pefuko\j o1noma to\n nomoqe/thn e0kei=non ei0j tou\j fqo/ggouj kai\ ta\j sullaba\j dei= e0pi/stasqai tiqe/nai), and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name (kai\ ble/ponta pro\j au0to\ e0kei=no o4 e1stin o1noma, pa/nta ta\ o0no/mata poiei=n te kai\ ti/qesqai), if he is to be a namer in any true sense (ei0 me/llei ku/rioj ei]nai o0noma/twn qe/thj;)? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables (ei0 de\ mh\ ei0j ta\j au0ta\j sullaba\j e3kastoj o9 nomoqe/thj ti/qhsin, ou0de\n dei= tou=to a0gnoei=n). For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron (ou0de\ ga\r ei0j to\n au0to\n si/dhron a3paj xalkeu\j ti/qhsin, tou= au0tou= e3neka poiw~n to\ au0to\ o1rganon). The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made (a0ll’ o3mwj, e3wj a2n th\n au0th\n i0de/an a0podidw|~, e0a/nte e0n a1llw| sidh/rw|, o3mwj o0rqw~j e1xei to\ o1rganon), whether in Hellas or in a foreign country; – there is no difference (e0a/nte e0nqa/de e0a/nte e0n barba/roij tij poih=|, h] ga/r;).

Her. Very true (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes no matter (Ou0kou=n ou3twj a0ciw&seij kai\ to\n nomoqe/thn to/n te e0nqa/de kai\ to\n e0n barba/roij, e3wj a2n to\ tou= o0no/matoj ei]doj a0podidw~| to\ prosh=kon e9ka/stw| e0n o9poiaijou=n sullabai=j, ou0de\n xei/rw nomoqe/thn ei]nai to\m e0nqa/de h2 to\n o9pouou=n a1lloqi;).

Her. Quite true (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used (Ti/j ou]n o9 gnwso/menoj ei0 to\ prosh=kon ei]doj kerki/doj e0n o9poiw|ou=n cu/lw| kei=tai;) ? the carpenter who makes (o9 poih/saj, o9 te/ktwn) or the weaver who uses (h2 o9 xrhso/menoj o9 u9fa/nthj;)?

Her. I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates (Ei0ko\j me\n ma=llon, w} Sw&kratej,to\n xrhso/menon).

Soc. And who uses the work of the lyre-maker (Ti/j ou]n o9 tw|~ tou= luropoiou= e1rgw| xrhso/menoj;)? Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done (a]r’ ou0x ou[toj o4j e0pi/staito a2n e0rgazome/nw| ka/llista e0pistatei=n), and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not (kai\ ei0rgasme/non gnoi/h ei1t’ eu] ei1rgastai ei1te mh/;)?

Her. Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. And who is he (Ti/j)?

Her. The player of the lyre (O( kiqaristh/j).

Soc. And who will direct the shipwright (Ti/j de\ o9 tw~| tou= nauphgou=;)?

Her. The pilot (Kubernh/thj).

Soc. And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? Will not the user be  the man (Ti/j de\ tw~| tou= nomoqe/tou e1rgw| e0pistath/seie/ t’ a2n ka/llista kai\ ei0rgasme/non kri/neie kai\ e0nqa/de kai\ e0n toi=j barba/roij; a1r’ ou0x o3sper xrh/setai;)?

Her. Yes (Nai/).

Soc. And this is he who knows how to ask questions (A1r’ ou0x o9 e0rwta=n e0pista/menoj ou3to/j e0stin;)?

Her. Yes (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. And how to answer them (O( de\ au0to\j kai\ a0pokri/nesqai;)?

Her. Yes (Nai/).

Soc. And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a dialectitian (To\n de\ e0rwta=n kai\ a0pokri/nesqai e0pista/menon a1llo ti su\ kalei=j h2 dialektiko/n;)?

Her. Yes; that would be his name (Ou1k, a1lla tou=to).

Soc. Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder (Te/ktonoj me\n a1ra e1rgon e0sti\n poih=sai phda/lion), and the pilot is to direct him (e0pistatou=ntoj kubernh/tou), if the rudder is to be well made (ei0 me/llei kalo\n ei]nai to\ phda/lion).

Her. True (Fai/netai).

Soc. And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectition must be his director if the names are to be rightly given (Nomoqe/tou de/ ge, w(j e1oike, o1noma, e0pista/thn e1xontoj dialektiko\n a1ndra, ei0 me/llei kalw~j o0no/mata qh/sesqai)?

Her. That is true (E!sti tau=ta).

Soc. Then, Hermogenes, I should say that the giving of names can be no such light matter as you fancy (Kinduneu/ei a11ra, w} E9rmo/genej, ei]nai ou0 fau=lon, w(j su\ oi1ei, h9 tou= o0no/matoj qe/sij), or the work of light or chance persons (ou0de\ fau/lwn a0ndrw~n ou0de\ tw~n e0pituxo/ntwn); and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature (kai\ Kra/tuloj a0lhqh= le/gei le/gwn fu/sei ta\ o0no/mata ei]nai toi=j pra/gmasi), and that not every man is an artificer of names (kai\ ou0 pa/nta dhmiourgo\n o0noma/twn ei]nai), but he only who looks to the name which each thing by nature has (a0lla\ mo/non e0kei=non to\n a0poble/ponta ei0j to\ th=| fu/sei o1noma o2n e9ka/stw|), and is able to express the true forms of things in letters and syllables (kai\ duna/menon au0tou= to\ ei]doj tiqe/nai ei1j te ta\ gra/mmata kai\ ta\j sullaba/j).

Her. I cannot answer you, Socrates (Ou0k e1xw, w} Sw&katej, o3pwj xrh\ pro\j o9 le/geij e0nantiou=sqai); but I find a difficulty in changing my opinion all in a moment (i1swj me/ntoi ou0 r9a=|dio/n e0stin ou3twj e0cai/fnhj peisqh=nai), and I think I should be more readily persuaded (a0lla\ dokw~ moi w{de a2n ma=llon piqe/sqai soi), if you would show me what this is which you term the natural fitness of names (ei1 moi dei/ceiaj h3ntina fh\|j ei]nai th\n fu/sei o0rqo/thta o0no/matoj).

Soc. My good Hermogenes, I have none to show (E)gw_ me/n, w} maka/rie E(rmo/genej, ou0demi/an le/gw,). Was I not telling you just now (but you have forgotten) (a0ll’ e0pela/qou ge w{n o0li/gon pro/teron e1legon), that I know nothing, and proposing to share enquiry with you (o3ti ou0k ei0dei/hn a0lla\ skeyoi/mhn meta\ sou=)? But now that you and I have talked over the matter (nu=n de\ skopoume/noij h9mi=n, e0moi/ te kai\ soi/), a step has been gained; for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name (tosou=ton me\n h1dh fai/netai para\ ta\ pro/tera, fu/sei te/ tina o0rqo/thta e1xon ei]nai to\ o1noma kai\ ou0 panto\j a0ndro\j e0pi/stasqai au0to\ pra/gmati o9tw|ou=n qe/sqai, h2 ou1;).

Her. Very good (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? That, if you care to know, is the next question (Ou0kou=n to\ meta\ tou=to xrh\ zhtei=n, ei1per e0piqumei=j ei0de/nai, h3tij pot’ au] e0stin au0tou= o0rqo/thj).

Her. Certainly, I care to know (A0lla\ mh\n e0piqumw~ ge ei0de/nai).

Soc. Then reflect (Sko/pei toi/nun).

Her. How shall I reflect (Pw}j ou]n xrh\ skopei=n;)?

Soc. The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and you must pay them well both in money and in thanks (O)rqota/th me\n th=j ske/yewj, w} e9tai=re, meta\ tw~n e0pistame/nwn, xrh/mata e0kei/noij telou=nta kai\ xa/ritaj katatiqe/menon); these are the Sophists (ei0si\ de\ ou3toi oi9 sofistai/), of whom your brother, Callias, has – rather dearly – bought the reputation of wisdom (oi[sper kai\ o9 a0delfo/j sou Kalli/aj polla\ tele/saj xrh/mata sofo\j dokei= ei]nai). But you have not yet come into your inheritance (e0peidh\ de\ ou0k e0gkrath\j ei] tw~n patrw&|wn), and you had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names (liparei=n xrh\ to\n a0delfo\n kai\ dei=sqai au0tou= dida/cai se th\n o0rqo/thta peri\ tw~n toiou/twn h4n e1maqen para\ Prwtago/rou).

Her. But how inconsistent should I be, if while repudiating Protagoras and his Truth, I were to attach any value to what he and his book affirm! (A1topoj menta2n ei1h mou, w} Sw&kratej, h9 de/hsij, ei0 th\n me\n A0lh/qeian th\n Prwtago/rou o3lwj ou0k a0pode/xomai, ta\ de\ th=| toiau/th| a0lhqei/a| r9hqe/nta a0gapw|&hn w#j tou= a1cia)

Soc. Then if you despise him (A0ll’ ei0 mh\ au] se tau=ta a0re/skei), you must learn of Homer (par’ O(mh/rou xrh\ manqa/nein) and other poets (kai\ para\ tw~n a1llwn poihtw~n).

Her. And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he say (Kai\ ti/ le/gei, w} Sw&kratej, O#mhroj peri\ o0noma/twn, kai\ pou=)?

Soc. He often speaks of them (Pollaxou=); notably and nobly in the places where he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same things (me/gista de\ kai\ ka/llista e0n oi[j diori/zei e0pi\ toi=j au0toi=j a3 te oi9 a1nqrwpoi o0no/mata kalou=si kai\ oi9 qeoi/). Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names (h2 ou0k oi1ei au0to\n me/ga ti kai\ qauma/sion le/gein e0n tou/toij peri\ o0noma/twn o0rqo/thtoj;)? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names (dh=lon ga\r dh\ o3ti oi3 ge qeoi\ au0ta\ kalou=si pro\j o0rqo/thta a3per e0sti fu/sei o0no/mata); do you not think so (h2 ou0k oi1ei;)?

Her. Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at all (Eu] oi]da me\n ou]n e1gwge, ei1per kalou=sin, o3ti o0rqw_j kalou=sin). But to what are you referring (a0lla\ poi=a tau=ta le/geij;)?

Soc. Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy (Ou0k oi]sqa o3ti peri\ tou= potamou= tou= e0n th=| Troi/a|) who had a single combat with Hefaestus (o4j e0monoma/xei H(fai/stw)?

Whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander. (“o4n Ca/nqon,” fhsi/, “kale/ousi qeoi/, a1ndrej de\ Skama/ndron;”)

Her. I remember (E!gwge).

Soc. Well (Ti/ ou]n dh/;), and about this river – to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander – is not that a solemn lesson (ou0k oi1ei tou=to semno/n ti ei]nai gnw~nai, o3ph| pote\ o0rqw~j e1xei e0kei=non to\n potamo\n Ca/nqon kalei=n ma=lon h2 Skama/ndron;)? Or about the bird which, as he says (ei0 de\ bou/lei peri\ th=j o1rniqoj h4n le/gei o3ti –

The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis; (xalki/da kiklh=|skousi qeoi/, a1ndrej de\ kumi/ndin).

To be taught how much more correct is the name Chalcis than the name Cymindis – do you deem it a light matter (fau=lon h9gh=| to\ ma/qhma o3sw| o0rqo/tero/n e0sti kalei=sqai xalki\j kumi/ndidoj tw~| au0tw~| o0rne/w|;)? Or about Batieia and Myrina (h2 th\n Bati/eia/n te kai\ Muri/nhn)? And there are many other observations of the same kind in Homer and other poets (kai\ a1lla polla\ kai\ tou/tou tou= poihtou= kai\ a1llwn;). Now, I think that this is beyond the understanding of you and me (a0lla\ tau=ta me\n i1swj mei/zw e0sti\n h2 kat’ e0me\ kai\ se\ e0ceurei=n); but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, which he affirms to be the names of Hector’s son, are more within the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance (o9 de\ Skama/ndrio/j te kai\ o9 A0stua/nac a0nqrwpinw&teron diaske/yasqai, w(j e0moi\ dokei=, kai\ r9a=|on, a3 fhsin o0no/mata ei]nai tw~| tou= E#ktoroj u9ei=, ti/na pote\ le/gei th\n o0rqo/thta au0tw~n): you will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer (oi]sqa ga\r dh/pou tau=ta ta\ e1ph e0n oi[j e1nestin a4 e0gw_ le/gw).

Her. I do (Pa/nu ge).

Soc. Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Hector’s son – Astyanax or Scamandrius (Po/teron ou]n oi1ei O#mhron o0rqo/teron h9gei=sqai tw~n o0noma/twn kei=sqai tw~| paidi/, to\n “A0stua/nakta” h2 to\n “Skama/ndrion”;)?

Her. I do not know (Ou0k e1xw le/gein).

Soc. How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give correct names (W#de dh\ sko/pei, ei1 tij e1roito/ se po/teron oi1ei o0rqo/teron kalei=n ta\ o0no/mata tou\j fronimwte/rouj h2 tou\j a1fronejte/rouj;)?

Her. I should say the wise, of course (Dh=lon dh\ o3ti tou\j fronimwte/rouj, fai/hn a1n).

Soc. And are the men or women of a city, taken as a class, wiser (Po/teron ou]n ai9 gunai=kej e0n tai=j po/lesin fronimw&terai/ soi dokou=sin ei]nai h2 oi9 a1ndrej, w(j to\ o3lon ei0pei=n ge/noj;)?

Her. I should say, the men (Oi9 a1ndrej).

Soc. And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him Astyanax [king of the city]; but if the men called him Astyanax, the other name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women (Ou0kou=n oi]sqa o3ti O#mhroj to\ pai/dion to\ tou= E#ktoroj u9po\ tw~n Trw&wn fhsi\n kalei=sqai A0stua/nakta, Skama/ndrion dh=lon o3ti u9po\ tw~n gunaikw~n, e0peidh\ oi3 ge a1ndrej au0to\n A0stua/nakta e0ka/loun).

Her. That may be inferred (E!oike/ ge).

Soc. And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their wives (Ou0kou=n kai\ O#mhroj tou\j Trw~aj sofwte/rouj h9gei=to h2 ta\j gunai=kaj au0tw~n;)?

Her. To be sure (Oi]mai e1gwge).

Soc. Then he must have thought Astyanax to be more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius (To\n “A0stua/nakta” a1ra o0rqo/teron w|!eto kei=sqai tw~| paidi\ h2 to\n “Skama/ndrion”;)?

Her. Clearly (Fai/netai).

Soc. And what is the reason of this? Let us consider: – does he not himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,

For he alone defended their city and long walls?

This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes (Skopw~men dia\ ti/ pote, h2 au0to\j h9mi=n ka/llista u9fhgei=tai to\ dio/ti; fhsi\n ga\r –

Oi]oj ga\r sfi e1ruto po/lin kai\ tei/xea makra/,

Dia\ tau=ta dh/, w(j e1oiken, o0rqw~j e1xei kalei=n to\n tou= swth/roj u9o\n A0stua/nakta tou/tou o4 e0sw~|zen o9 path\r au0tou=, w#j fhsin O#mhroj).

Her. I see (Fai/netai/ moi).

Soc. Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you (Ti/ dh/ pote; ou0 ga/r pw ou0d’ au0to\j e1gwge manqa/nw, w} E(rmo/genej, su\ de\ manqa/neij;)?

Her. No, indeed; not I (Ma\ Di/’ ou0k e1gwge).

Soc. But tell me (A0ll’ a]ra), friend (w)gaqe/), did not Homer himself also give Hector his name (kai\ tw~| E#ktori au0to\j e1qeto to\ o1noma O#mhroj;)?

Her. What of that (Ti/ dh/;)?

Soc. The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of Astyanax (O#ti moi dokei= kai\ tou=to paraplhsio/n ti ei]nai tw~| A0stua/nakti) – both are Hellenic (kai\ e1oiken E(llhnikoi=j tau=ta); and a king (a1nac) and a holder (e3ktwr) have nearly the same meaning (o9 ga\r “a1nac” kai\ o9 “e3ktwr” sxedo/n ti tau0to\n shmai/nei), and are both descriptive of a king (basilika\ a0mfo/tera ei]nai ta\ o0no/mata); for a man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king (ou[ ga\r a1n tij a1nac h]|, kai\ “e3ktwr” dh/pou e0sti\n tou/tou); he rules, and owns, and holds it (dh=lon ga\r o3ti kratei= te au0tou= kai\ ke/kthtai kai\ e1xei au0to/). But perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense (h2 ou0de/n soi dokw~ le/gein); and indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer (a0lla\ lanqa/nw kai\ e0mauto\n oi0o/meno/j tinoj w#sper i1xnouj e0fa/ptesqai th=j O(mh/rou do/chj) about the correctness of names (peri\ o0noma/twn o0rqo/thtoj;).

Her. I assure you that I think otherwise (Ma\ Di’ ou0 su/ ge, w(j e0moi\ dokei=j), and I believe you to be on the right track (a0lla\ i1swj tou= e0fa/pth|).

Soc. There is a reason (Di/kaion ge/ toi/ e0stin), I think (w(j e0moi\ fai/netai), in calling the lion’s whelp a lion (to\n le/ontoj e1kgonon le/onta kalei=n), and the foal of a horse a horse (kai\ to\n i3ppou e1kgonon i3ppon); I am speaking only of the ordinary course of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary births (ou1 ti le/gw e0a\n w#sper te/raj ge/nhtai e0c i3ppou a1llo ti h2 i3ppoj, a0ll’ ou[ a2n h]| tou= ge/nouj e1kgonon th\n fu/sin, tou=to le/gw); – if contrary to nature a horse have a calf (e0a\n boo/j e1kgonon fu/sei i3ppoj para\ fu/sin te/kh| mo/sxon), then I should not call it a foal but a calf (ou0 pw~lon klhte/on a0lla\ mo/sxon); nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a natural birth (ou0d’ a2n e0c a0nqrw&pou oi]mai mh\ to\ a0nqrw&pou e1kgonon ge/nhtai, to\ e1kgonon a1nqrwpoj klhte/oj). And the same may be held of trees (kai\ ta\ de/ndrea w(sau/twj) and other things (kai\ ta]lla a3panta). Do you agree with me (h2 ou0 sundokei=)?

Her. Yes, I agree (Sundokei=).