Cratylus 1

Hermogenes: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument (Bou/lei ou]n kai\ Swkra/tei tw~|de a0nakoinwsw&meqa to\n lo/gon;)?

Cratylus: If you please (Ei1 soi dokei=).

Herm. I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not conventional (Kra/tuloj fhsi\n o3de, w} Sw&kratej, o0no/matoj o0rqo/thta ei]nai e9ka/stw| tw~n o1ntwn fu/sei pefukui=an); not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use (kai\ ou0 tou=to ei]nai o1noma o4 a1n tinej sunqe/menoi kalei=n kalw~si, th=j au9tw~n fwnh=j mo/rion e0pifqeggo/menoi); but that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians (a0lla\ o0rqo/thta/ tina tw~n o0noma/twn pefuke/nai kai\ E#llhsi kai\ barba/roij th\n au0th\n a3pasin). Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers “Yes (e0rwtw~ ou]n au0to\n e0gw\ ei0 au0tw~| Kratu/loj th=| a0lhqei/a| o1noma, o9 de\ o9mologei=).” And Socrates? “Yes.” (“Ti/ de\ Swkra/tei;” e1fhn, “Swkra/thj,” h] d’ o3j) Then every man’s name, as I tell him, is that what he is called (“Ou0kou=n kai\ toi=j a1lloij a0nqrw&poij pa=sin, o3per kalou=men o1noma e3kaston, tou=to/ e0stin e9ka/stw| o1noma;”). To this he replies (o9 de/) – “If all the world ought to call you Hermogenes, it would not be your name (“Ou0kou=n soi/ ge,” h] d’ o3j, “o1noma E(rmoge/nhj, ou0de\ a2n pa/ntej kalw~sin a1nqrwpoi,”).” And when I am anxious to have a further explanation (kai\ e0mou= e0rwtw~ntoj kai\ proqumoume/nou ei0de/nai o3ti pote\ le/gei) he is ironical and mysterious (ou1te a0posafei= ou0de\n ei0rwneu/etai/ te pro/j me), and seems to imply that he has a notion of his own about the matter (prospoiou/meno/j ti au0to\j e0n e9autw|~ dianoei=sqai w(j ei0dw_j peri\ au0tou=), if he would only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible (o4 ei0 bou/loito safw~j ei0pei=n, poh/seien a2n kai\ e0me\ o9mologei=n kai\ le/gein a3per au0to\j le/gei). Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means (Ei0 ou]n ph=| e1xeij sumbalei=n th\n Kratu/lou mantei/an, h9de/wj a2n a0kou/saimi); or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far sooner hear (ma=llon de\ au0tw~| soi o3ph| do/kei peri\ o0noma/twn o0rqo/thtoj e1ti a2n h3dion puqoi/mhn, ei1 soi boulome/nw|).

Socrates: Son of Hipponicus (W} pai= I(pponi/kou E(rmo/genej), there is an ancient saying (palaia\ paroimi/a), that “hard is the knowledge of the good (o3ti xalepa\ ta\ kala/ e0stin o3ph| e1xei maqei=n).” And the knowledge of names is great part of knowledge (kai\ dh\ kai\ to\ peri\ tw~n o0noma/twn ou0 smikro\n tugxa/nei o2n ma/qhma). If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus (Ei0 me\n ou]n e0gw_ h1dh a0khko/h para\ Prodi/kou th\n penthkonta/draxmon e0pi/deicin), which is a complete education in grammar and language (h4n a0kou/santi u9pa/rxei peri\ tou/to pepaideu=sqai) – these are his own words (w#j fhsin e0kei=noj) – and then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names (ou0de\n a2n e0kw&lue/n se au0ti/ka ma/la ei0de/nai th\n a0lh/qeian peri\ o0noma/twn o0rqo/thtoj). But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course (nu=n de\ ou0k a0kh/koa, a0lla\ th\n draxmiai/an), and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters (ou1koun oi]da ph=| pote to\ a0lhqe\j e1xei peri\ tw~n toiou/twn); I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of them (suzhtei=n me/ntoi e9toimo/j ei0mi kai\ soi\ kai\ Kratu/lw| koinh=|). When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes (o3ti de\ ou0 fhsi/ soi E(rmoge/nh o1noma ei]nai th|= a0lhqei/a|), I suspect that he is only making fun of you (w#sper u9popteu/w au0to\n skw&ptein) – he means to say that you are not the true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after fortune and never in luck (oi1etai ga\r i1swj se xrhma/twn e0fie/menon kth/sewj a0potugxa/nein e9ka/stote). But, as I was saying (a0ll’ o4 nundh\ e1legon), there is a great deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge (ei0de/nai me\n ta\ toiau=ta xalepo/n), and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides (ei0j to\ koino\n kataqe/ntaj xrh\ skopei=n ei1te w(j su\ le/geij e1xei ei1te w(j Kratu/loj).

Hermogenes: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others (Kai\ mh\n e1gwge, w} Sw&kratej, polla/kij dh\ kai\ tou/tw| dialexqei\j kai\ a1lloij polloi=j), and cannot convince myself (ou0 du/namai peisqh=nai) that there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement (w(j a1llh tij o0rqo/thj o0no/matoj h2 sunqh/kh te kai\ o9mologi/a); any name which you give, in my opinion, is the right one (e0moi\ ga\r dokei= o3ti a1n ti/j tw| qh=tai o1noma, tou=to ei]nai to\ o0rqo/n), and if you change that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old (kai\ a2n au]qi/j ge e3teron metaqh=tai, e0kei=no de\ mhke/ti kalh|=, ou0de\n h[tton to\ u3steron o0rqw~j e1xein tou= prote/rou) – we frequently change the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old (w#sper toi=j oi0ke/taij h9mei=j metatiqe/meqa): for there is no name given to anything by nature (ou0 ga\r fu/sei e9ka/stw| pefuke/nai ou0de\n ou0deni/); all is convention and habit of the users (a0lla\ no/mw| kai\ e1qei tw~n e0qisa/ntwn te kai\ kalou/ntwn); – such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of anyone else (ei0 de/ ph| a1llh| e1xei, e3toimoj e1gwge kai\ manqa/nein kai\ a0kou/ein ou0 mo/non para\ Kratu/lou, a0lla\ kai\ par’ a1llou o9touou=n).

Socrates: I dare say that you are right, Hermogenes (I!swj me/ntoi ti\ le/geij, w} E(rmo/genej): let us see (skeyw&meqa de/); – Your meaning is, that name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to call it (o4 a2n fh\|j kalh|= tij e3kaston, tou=q’ e9ka/stw| o1noma).

Hermogenes: That is my notion (E!moige dokei=).

Socrates: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city (Kai\ e0a\n i0diw&thj kalh=| kai\ e0a\n po/lij;)?

Hermogenes: Yes (Fhmi/).

Socrates: Well, now (Ti/ ou]n;), let me take an instance (e0a\n e0gw_ kalw~ o9tiou=n tw~n o1ntwn); – suppose I call a man horse (oi3on o9 nu=n kalou=men a1nqrwpon, e0a\n e0gw_ tou=to i3ppon prosagoreu/w) or a horse a man (o9 de\ nu=n i3ppon, a1nqrwpon), you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world (e1stai dhmosi/a| me\n o1noma a0nqrw&poj tw~| au0tw~|, i0di/a| de\ i3ppoj;); and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the rest of the world (kai\ i0di/a| me\n au] a1nqrwpoj, dhmosi/a| de\ i3ppoj;): – that is your meaning (ou3tw le/geij;)?

Hermogenes: He would, according to my view (E!moige dokei=).

Socrates: But how about truth, then? You would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false (Fe/re dh/ moi to/de ei0pe/, kalei=j ti a0lhqh= le/gein kai\ yeudh=;)?

Hermogenes: Certainly (E!gwge).

Socrates: And there are true and false propositions (Ou0kou=n ei1h a2n lo/goj a0lhqh/j, o3 de\ yeudh=j;)?

Hermogenes: To be sure (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: And a true proposition says that which is (A]r’ ou]n ou3toj o4j a2n ta\ o1nta le/gh| w(j e1stin, a0lhqh/j), and a false proposition says that which is not (o4j d’ a2n w(j ou0k e1stin, yeudh/j;)?

Hermogenes: Yes, what other answer is possible (Nai/ [Jowett, whose translation I use, is very free with his rendering of the text])?

Socrates: Then in a proposition there is a true and false (E!stin a1ra tou=to, lo/gw| le/gein ta\ o1nta te kai\ mh/;)?

Hermogenes: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue (O( lo/goj d’ e0sti\n o9 a0lhqh\j po/teron me\n o3loj a0lhqh/j, ta\ mo/ria d’ au0tou= ou0k a0lhqh=;)?

Hermogenes: No; the parts are true as well as the whole (Ou1k, a0lla\ kai\ ta\ mo/ria).

Socrates: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part (Po/teron de\ ta\ me\n mega/la mo/ria a0lhqh=, ta\ de\ smikra\ ou1, h2 pa/nta;)?

Hermogenes: I should say that every part is true (Pa/nta, oi]mai e1gwge).

Socrates: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name (E!stin ou]n o3ti le/geij lo/gou smikro/teron mo/rion a1llo h2 o1noma;)?

Hermogenes: No, that is the smallest (Ou1k, a0lla\ tou=to smikro/taton).

Socrates: Then the name is a part of the true proposition (Kai\ tou=to o1noma a1ra to\ tou= a0lhqou=j lo/gou le/getai;)?

Hermogenes: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: Yes, and a true part, as you say (Alhqe/j ge, w(j fh\|j).

Hermogenes: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood (To\ de\ tou= yeu/douj mo/rion ou0 yeu/doj;)?

Hermogenes: Yes (Fhmi/).

Socrates: Then, if proposition may be true and false, names may be true and false (E!stin a1ra o1noma yeu=doj kai\ a0lhqe\j le/gein, ei1per kai\ lo/gon;)?

Hermogenes: So we must infer (Pw~j ga\r ou1;).

Socrates: And the name of anything is that which anyone affirms to be the name (O4 a2n a1ra e3kastoj fh=| tw| o1noma ei]nai, tou=to/ e0stin e9ka/stw| o1noma;)?

Hermogenes: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them (H} kai\ o9po/sa a2n fh=| tij e9ka/stw| o0no/mata ei]nai, tosau=ta e1stai kai\ to/te o9po/tan fh=|;)?

Hermogenes: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than this (Ou0 ga\r e1xw e1gwge, w} Sw&kratej, o0no/matoj a1llhn o0rqo/thta h2 tau/thn); you give one name and I another (e0moi\ me\n e3teron ei]nai kalei=n e9ka/stw| o1noma, o4 e0gw_ e0qe/mhn, soi\ de\ e3teron, o4 au] su/); and in different cities and countries there are different names for the same things (ou3tw de\ kai\ tai=j po/lesin o9rw~ i0di/a| e0ni/oij e0pi\ toi=j au0toi=j kei/mena o0no/mata); Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another (kai\ E3llhsi pa/ra tou\j a1llouj E#llhnaj, kai\ E#llhsi para\ barba/rouj).

Socrates: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names differ (Fe/re dh\ i1dwmen, w} E(rmo/genej, po/teron kai\ ta\ o1nta ou3twj soi\ e1xein fai/netai)? And are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us (i0di/a| au0tw~n h9 ou0si/a ei]nai e9ka/stw|, w#sper Prwtago/raj e1legen)? For he says that man is the measure of all things (le/gwn “pa/ntwn xrhma/twn me/tron” ei]nai a1nqrwpon), and that things are to me as they appear to me (w(j a1ra oi[a me\n a2n e0moi\ fai/nhtai ta\ pra/gmata, toiau=ta me\n e1stn e0moi/), and that they are to you as they appear to you (oi[a d’ a2n soi/, toiau=ta de\ soi/). Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own (h2 e1xein dokei= soi au0ta\ au9tw~n tina bebaio/thta th=j ou0si/aj;)?

Herm. There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras (H!dh pote\ e1gwge, w} Sw&kratej, a0porw~n kai\ e0ntau=qa e0chne/xqhn ei0j a3per Prwtago/raj le/gei); not that I agree with him at all (ou0 pa/nu ti me/ntoi moi dokei= ou3twj e1xein).

Socr. What! (Ti/ de/;) Have you ever been driven to admit (e0j to/de h1dh e0chne/xqhj) that there was no such thing as a bad man (w#ste mh\ pa/nu soi dokei=n ei]nai/ tina a1nqrwpon ponhro/n;)?

Herm. No, indeed (Ou0 ma\ to\n Di/a); but I have often had reason to think (a0lla\ polla/kij dh\ au0to\ pe/ponqa) that there are very bad men (w#ste moi dokei=n pa/nu ponhrou\j ei]nai/ tinaj a0nqrw&pouj), and a good many of them (kai\ ma/la suxnou/j).

Socr. Well, and have you ever found any very good ones (Ti/ de/; pa/nu xrhstoi\ ou1pw soi e1docan ei]nai;)?

Herm. Not many (Kai\ ma/la o0li/goi).

Socr. Still you have found them (E#docan d’ ou]n;)?

Herm. Yes (E!moige).