Sunday, October 13, 2019

4 C. J. Rowe’s arguments for a late dating of the Phaedrus – the Phaedrus and the Republic, with reference to the Laws


In ‘The argument and structure of Plato’s Phaedrus’ (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 1986, pp. 106-125) Rowe says: ‘Finally, some brief remarks about dating. There is at present no clear consensus on the question: some regard the Phaedrus as belonging with the middle dialogues; others group it with the late dialogues like the Theaetetus or the Politicus [i.e. Statesman]. I make the following observations. 1. Those who hold the first view usually at least implicitly rely on the close resemblance between some of the main ideas contained in Socrates’ speech and those of the Republic, the Symposium, and the Phaedo: including, most notably, the idea of separated Forms and that of learning as recollection. What has not been sufficiently recognised is that these ideas appear in the Phaedrus exclusively in the framework of a muthos. If no muthos is to be taken as literally true (see p. 116 above), the result will be to throw immediate doubt on their status. In general, the Phaedrus seems to expound middle-period ideas only to recommend them for scrutiny. If so, it has more in common with the critical musings of the Parmenides than with the optimistic constructions of the middle dialogues themselves.’

To begin with, let me note that there is no ‘learning as recollection’ in the Republic and in the Symposium.

In this post I shall discuss Rowe’s claim that Plato in the Phaedrus presents ‘the idea of separated Forms’ exclusively in the framework of a muthos, thus ‘throwing immediate doubt on its status’. His related claim that ‘the Phaedrus seems to expound middle-period ideas only to recommend them for scrutiny’ I shall discuss in so far as it concerns the Phaedrus and the Republic.

In support of these claims, on p. 116 of his article, Rowe quotes the words with which Socrates reflects on his Palinode: ‘… by expressing the experience of love through some kind of simile (ouk oid’ hopȇi to erȏtikon pathos apeikazontes), which allowed us perhaps to grasp some truth (isȏs men alȇthous tinos ephaptomenoi), though may be it also took us in a wrong direction (tacha d’ an allose parapheromenoi), and mixing together a not wholly implausible speech (kerasantes ou pantapasin apithanon logon), we sang a playful hymn in the form of a story (muthikon tina humnon prosepaisamen) … to my master, and yours (ton emon te kai ton son despotȇn), Phaedrus (ȏ Phaidre) – Love (Erȏta), watcher over beautiful boys (kalȏn paidȏn ephoron, 265b6-c3)’.

Socrates says that in his mythical hymn he ‘perhaps grasped some truth’. To me it sounds as an understatement with which Socrates refers to the way in which he introduced ‘the Forms’ in his Palinode: ‘The region above the heavens (Ton de huperouranion topon) has never yet been celebrated as it deserves by an earthly poet (oute tis humnȇse pȏ tȏn tȇide poiȇtȇs), nor will it ever be (oute pote humnȇsei kat’ axian). But it is like this (echei de hȏde) – for one must be bold enough to say what is true (tolmȇteon gar oun to ge alȇthes eipein), especially when speaking about truth (allȏs te kai peri alȇtheias legonta). This region is occupied by being which really is, which is without colour or shape, intangible, observable by the steersman of the sole alone, by intellect, and to which the class of true knowledge relates (hȇ gar achrȏmatos te kai aschȇmatistos kai anaphȇs ousia ontȏs ousa, psuchȇs kubernȇtȇi monȏi theatȇ nȏi, peri hȇs to tȇs alȇthous epistȇmȇs genos, touton echei ton topon).’ (247c3d1)

The ancient tradition according to which the Phaedrus is Plato’s first dialogue allows us to fully appreciate the enthusiasm with which Plato presents to the reader his great discovery. Furthermore, it allows us to appreciate Plato’s reference to it in the Laws: ‘Truth (alȇtheia dȇ) is the guiding principle of everything good for gods (pantȏn men agathȏn theois hȇgeitai) and of everything good for men (pantȏn de anthrȏpois); a man who is to be blessed and happy would partake of it straight at the beginning (hȇs ho genȇsesthai mellȏn makarios te kai eudaimȏn ex archȇs metochos eiȇ), so that he might live as a man of truth as long time as possible (hina hȏs pleiston chronon alȇthȇs diabioi); for he can be trusted (pistos gar). (730c1-4)

But let me return to Rowe’s claims. Is he right when he says that since Plato in the Phaedrus presents ‘the idea of separated Forms’ exclusively in the framework of a muthos, he is thus ‘throwing immediate doubt on its status’? In an effort to get an objective answer to this question, let me point to the Republic, in which Plato too introduces the Forms within the framework of a muthos, namely the muthos by which he creates the republic (hȇ politeia hȇn muthologoumen logȏi, 501e4).

The occasion for introducing the Forms in the Republic is as follows. Socrates says that ‘until philosophers are kings in their cities (Ean mȇ ȇ hoi philosophoi basileusȏsin en tais polesin), or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy (ȇ hoi basilȇs te nun legomenoi kai dunastai philosophȇsȏsi gnȇsiȏs kai hikanȏs) … cities will never have rest from their evils … my dear Glaucon (ouk esti kakȏn paula, ȏ phile Glaukȏn, tais polesi)’. At hearing this, Glaucon says: ‘Socrates (Ō Sȏkrates), consider that the word which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons (toiouton embeblȇkas rȇma te kai logon hon eipȏn hȇgou epi se panu pollous te), and very respectable persons too (kai ou phaulous nun houtȏs), in a figure pulling off their cloaks all in a moment and seizing any weapon that comes to hand (hoion ripsantas ta himatia, gumnous labontas hoti hekastȏi paretuchen hoplon), will run at you might and main before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what (thein diatetamenous hȏs thaumasia ergasomenous); and if you don’t prepare an answer (hous ei mȇ amunȇi tȏi logȏi) and make good your escape (kai ekpheuxȇi), you will be “pared by their fine wits”, and no mistake (tȏi onti tȏthazomenos dȏseis dikȇn).’ (473c11-474a4, translations from the Republic are in this post B. Jowett’s)

To escape, Socrates embarks on explaining the nature of philosophers who are to rule in the state. He begins by defining them as ‘the lovers of the vision of truth’ (tous tȇs alȇtheias philotheamonas, 475e4) and goes on to explain the truth (tȇn alȇtheian) as the Forms (ta eidȇ, 476a5, idea, 479a1).

The connection of the introduction of the Forms in the Republic with the introduction of ‘the Forms’ in the Phaedrus appears to be unmistakable – I put the Phaedran ‘Forms‘ in quotation marks, for in the Phaedrus Plato does not use the terms eidos and idea with reference to the Forms; instead, he uses the terms truth (alȇtheia) and being which really is (ousia ontȏs ousa). On Rowe’s interpretation, presumably, it is this introduction of the Forms in the Republic that Plato ‘throws in doubt’ with his vision of Truth in the Phaedrus. On my interpretation, introducing the Forms in the Republic, Plato looks back on his vision of Truth in the Phaedrus, bringing in the terms eidos and idea – translated as Forms or Ideas – as terms that best express the act of intellectual vision, with which we comprehend true being, to on ontȏs, ousian ontȏs ousan.
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When Glaucon asked what Socrates meant by ‘the lovers of the vision of truth’, Socrates said: ‘To another I might have a difficulty in explaining (Oudamȏs raidiȏs pros ge allon) [Glaucon is Plato’s younger brother]; but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make (su de oimai homologȇsein moi to toionde).’ – Glaucon: ‘What is the proposition (To poion;)?’ – S.: ‘That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness (Epeidȇ estin enantion kalon aischrȏi), they are two (duo autȏ einai;)?’ – G.: ‘Certainly (Pȏs d’ ou;).’ – S.: ‘And inasmuch as they are two (Oukoun epeidȇ duo), each of them is one (kai hen hekateron;)?’ – G.: ’True again (Kai touto).’ – S.: ‘And of just (Kai peri dikaiou) and unjust (kai adikou), good (kai agathou) and evil (kai kakou), and of every other Form (kai pantȏn tȏn eidȏn peri), the same remark holds (ho autos logos); taken singly, each of them is one (auto men hen hekaston einai); but from various combinations of them with actions and bodies and with one another (tȇi de tȏn praxeȏn kai sȏmatȏn kai allȇlȏn koinȏniai), they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many (pantachou phantazomena polla phainesthai hekaston)?’ – G.: ‘Very true (Orthȏs legeis).’

Adam notes in his commentary: ‘This is the first appearance of the Theory of “Ideas” properly so called in the Republic.’

Socrates continues: ‘And this is the distinction which I draw (Tautȇi toinun diairȏ) between the sight-loving, art-loving, practical class which you have mentioned (chȏris men hous nundȇ eleges philotheamonas te kai philotechnas kai praktikous), and those of whom I am speaking (kai chȏris au peri hȏn ho logos), and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers (hous monous an tis orthȏs proseipoi philosophous).’ – G.: ‘How do you distinguish them (Pȏs legeis;)?’ – S.: ‘The lovers of sounds and sights (Hoi men pou philȇkooi kai philotheamones) … their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty (autou de tou kalou adunatos autȏn hȇ dianoia tȇn phusin idein te kai aspasasthai [‘to see and to love’, Jowett’s “or” is wrong]).’

The editors of Jowett’s translation say in the footnote: ‘Both “absolute beauty” and ‘Idea of beauty” are attempts to render the Greek phrase “the beautiful itself” (auto to kalon). The noun idea does not occur here.’

Glaucon.: ‘The fact is plain (Echei gar oun dȇ houtȏs).’ – S.: ‘Few are they who are able to attain to this ideal beauty and contemplate it (Hoi de dȇ ep’ auto to kalon dunatoi ienai te kai horan kath’ hauto ara ou spanioi an eien;).’ – G. ‘Very true (Kai mala).’ – S.: 'And he who, having a sense of beautiful things (Ho oun kala men pragmata nomizȏn), has no sense of absolute beauty (auto de to kallos mȇte nomizȏn), or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty, is unable to follow (mȇte, an tis hȇgȇtai epi tȇn gnȏsin autou, dunamenos hepesthai) – of such a one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only (onar ȇ hupar dokei soi zȇn;)? Reflect (skopei de): is not the dreamer (to oneirȏttein ara ou tode estin), sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in place of the real object (eante en hupnȏi tis eant’ egrȇgorȏs to homoion tȏi mȇ homoion all’ auto hȇgȇtai hȏi eoiken;)?’ – G.: ‘I should certainly say (Egȏ g’oun an phaiȇn) that such a one is dreaming (oneirȏttein ton toiouton).’ – S.: ‘But (Ti de;) he who, on the contrary, recognizes the existence of absolute beauty (ho t’anantia toutȏn hȇgoumenos te ti auto to kalon) and is able to contemplate both the Idea (kai dunamenos kathoran kai auto) and the objects which participate in it (kai ta ekeinou metechonta), neither putting the objects in the place of the Idea nor the Idea in the place of the objects (kai oute ta metechonta auto oute auto ta metechonta hȇgoumenos) – is he a dreamer, or is he awake (hupar ȇ onar au kai houtos dokei soi zȇn;)? – G.: ‘He is wide awake (Kai mala hupar).’ – S. ‘And since he knows, it would be right to describe his state of mind as knowledge (Oukoun toutou men tȇn dianoian hȏs gignȏskontos gnȏmȇn an orthȏs phaimen einai)?’ – G.: ‘Certainly (Panu men oun).’ (475e6-476d7) … Socrates: ‘And have we not a right to say in his defence (Ar’ oun dȇ ou metriȏs apologȇsometha) that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being – that is his nature (hoti pros to on pephukȏs eiȇ hamillasthai ho ge ontȏs philomathȇs); he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only (kai ouk epimenoi epi tois doxazomenois einai pollois hekastois), but will go on (all’ ioi) – the keen edge will not be blunted (kai ouk amblunoito) nor the force of his desire abate (oud apolȇgoi tou erȏtos) until he has attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence (prin autou ho estin hekastou tȇs phuseȏs hapsasthai) by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul (hȏi prosȇkei ephaptesthai tou toioutou, prosȇkei de sungenei), and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being (hȏi plȇsiasas kai migeis tȏi onti ontȏs), having begotten mind and truth (gennȇsas noun kai alȇtheian), he will have knowledge (gnoiȇ te) and will truly live (kai alȇthȏs zȏiȇ) and grow (kai trephoito); and then and not till then will he cease from his travail (kai houtȏ lȇgoi ȏdinos, prin d’ou, 490a8-b7). – Jowett’s ‘travail’ for Plato’s ȏdinȇ obscures the connection to ȏdinai ‘philosopher-lover’s pains’ (Rowe: ‘birth-pains’, Hackforth: ‘sufferings’) at Phaedrus 251e5.

After some more explanation, Socrates ends his defence against those ‘numerous persons and very respectable persons too’ who were ready to attack him ‘pulling off their cloaks and seizing any weapon that comes to hand running at him might and main’ (cf. Glaucon’s warning at 473e6-474a4): ‘Then will they still be angry (Eti oun agrianousi) at our saying (legontȏn hȇmȏn) that until philosophers bear rule (hoti prin an poleȏs to philosophon genos enkrates genȇtai), States and individuals have no rest from evil (oute polei oute politais kakȏn paula estai), nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized (oude hȇ politeia hȇn muthologoumen logȏi ergȏi telos lȇpsetai)?’ – Adeimantos [Plato’s older brother] replied: ‘I think they will be less angry (Isȏs hȇtton).’ (501e2-6)

There appears to be no connection between Rowe’s ‘we sang a playful hymn in the form of a story’ in the Phaedrus and Jowett’s ‘this our imaginary State’ in the Republic. The connection becomes nevertheless obvious if we realise that Rowe’s ‘we sang a playful hymn in the form of a story’ stands for muthikon tina humnon prosepaisamen and Jowett’s ‘this our imaginary State’ stands for hȇ politeia hȇn muthologoumen logȏi. In the Phaedrus Socrates views the Palinode, in which he introduced ‘the Forms’, as a myth (265b6-8)’, in the Republic Socrates introduced the Forms in the myth with which he was creating the ideal State. Socrates’ depiction of a true philosopher in Republic 473c 11-501e5 has much in common with the depiction of the true philosopher-lover in the Phaedran Palinode. In both cases the true philosopher is the one who can see the truth (tȇn alȇtheian, Phdr. 247c, Rep. 475e4), and in both cases the truth is identified with being that truly is (ousia ontȏs ousa, Phdr. 247c7, to on ontȏs, Rep. 490b5). In the Phaedran Palinode the attention is focussed on true beauty, on ‘beauty itself’ (auto to kallos. 250e2); correspondingly, the Form on which Plato focusses attention in the Republic is ‘the beautiful itself’ (auto to kalon, 476a10, auto kallos, 476c2).

Finally, note the correspondence between ‘touching on some truth’ (alȇthous tinos ephaptomenoi) in the passage in which the Palinode is characterized as a muthos, in the Phaedrus, and the passage in the Republic in which Socrates says that the true philosopher’s ‘desire won’t abate (oud apolȇgoi tou erȏtos) until he has touched on the true nature of every essence (prin autou ho estin hekastou tȇs phuseȏs hapsasthai) by that part of him that is fit to touch on it (hȏi prosȇkei ephaptesthai tou toioutou, 490b2-4)’. In the Phaedran Palinode Socrates maintains that ‘the mind of the philosopher (hȇ tou philosophou dianoia) is always as close as possible, through memory, to those things (pros ekeinois aei estin mnȇmȇi kata dunamin), to which his closeness gives god his divinity (pros hoisper theos ȏn theios estin, 249c4-6). By ‘those things’ Socrates refers to ‘being that truly is’ (to on ontȏs, 249c4), which the soul saw in its pre-incarnation state, when it still had its wings.

Plato in the Republic goes further than in the Phaedrus, where the philosopher’s mind can be with the ’being that truly is’ only through memory; the philosopher who is to rule the State must have a direct knowledge of the Forms, that is of ‘that which truly is’.

Saturday, October 5, 2019

3b C. J. Rowe’s arguments for a late dating of the Phaedrus – ‘Joining the Beginning to the End’


The international symposium ‘The Significance of the Republic and the Laws in Plato’s Thought’ was held in Prague on April 4-5th, 1997, on the occasion of the founding of the ‘Czech Plato Society’. On that occasion I gave a paper on ‘Joining the Beginning to the End’, which was then published in the ‘Proceedings of the First Symposium Platonicum Pragense’. I republished it on my website with permission of the publishing house OIKOYMENH.  I bring here an extract from it, which is directly relevant to Rowe’s argument ‘4. Other clear connections with Laws 10, as has long been noticed, are to be found in the arguments for immortality (245c-246a)’. I lived still in Oxford, and so I had access to relevant secondary literature.

Let me start with the beginning and the end of the paper:
‘A Stranger from Athens, Cleinias from Crete, and Megillus from Sparta walk along the road from Cretan City of Cnossus to the cave and temple of Zeus. The Athenian asks about the divine provenance of the laws in Crete and in Sparta, and his fellow travellers are happy to answer his queries. The journey promises to be agreeable, for along the road there will be convenient shady places under the lofty trees where they can relax; this is important, for they are old, all three of them, and the heat of the day is upon them (pnigous ontos ta nun, 625b3).

This is the opening scene of the Laws. It reminds the reader of the Phaedrus; there too the discussion takes place in the countryside, Socrates feels himself a stranger (230c), he and Phaedrus enjoy the shade of a lofty tree (230b), and the heat of the day is upon them (en tȏi pnigei, 258e7). Thesleff noticed the similarity and inferred from it that Plato began to write the Laws shortly after the Phaedrus. (H.Thesleff, Studies in Platonic Chronology, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, Helsinki, 1982, p. 187) The ancient tradition according to which the Phaedrus was Plato’s first dialogue invites a different explanation: when Plato in his old age embarked on writing the Laws he returned in his thought to his first work.’

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‘The Phaedrus ends with Phaedrus’ wish to partake of Socrates’ philosophy: “For friends share all things in common” (koina gar ta tȏn philȏn, 279c2-3). When the Athenian Stranger decides to join the foundation of the proposed city, he declares it to be “a common task for friends” (ȏ philoi, en koinȏi kai mesȏi eoiken hȇmin keisthai, 968e7-8).’

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‘The similarities concerning the notion of the soul in the Phaedrus and in the Laws have led a number of scholars to believe that the two share the same proof of the immortality of the soul, from which they derived a strong argument for the late dating of the former dialogue. But this is wrong, for although the soul is defined in both as the principle of motion, there is a fundamental difference between the two. In the Phaedrus the soul is proved to be immortal because it is declared to be the ungenerated first principle (archȇ de agenȇton, 245d1); in the Laws it is emphasized that the soul is the generated principle of motion (archȇn ara kinȇseȏs … genomenȇn, 895b4, cf. 892a-c). What is proved in the Laws is not the immortality of the soul, but only its priority to all bodily matter, to which the soul imparts motion (dedeiktai psuchȇ tȏn pantȏn presbutatȇ, genomenȇ ge archȇ kinȇseȏs, 896b2-3). In other words, Plato is arguing that the soul was generated before the body (psuchȇn proteran gegonenai sȏmatos, 896c1-2). What stands between the Phaedrus and the Laws is the creation of the soul by the demiurge, which Plato described in the Timaeus. In order to introduce the Phaedran notion of soul in the Laws, Plato had to revise it.’

In the note accompanying the opening sentence of this paragraph I wrote: ‘See e.g. H. Thesleff, Studies in Platonic Chronology, op. cit. p. 177 (n. 56): “… the proof of immortality in Phdr. 245c-246a is much more sophisticated than R X 617dff., and is adopted again in Leg.X 894b ff, cf. de Vries 1969. 9.” G.J. de Vries, A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato, Amsterdam 1969, p. 9: “A stronger argument [for the post-Republic dating of the Phaedrus] may be found in the proof of the soul’s immortality, offered in the Phaedrus; it is hardly conceivable that Plato would have published the rather clumsy argumentation of Rep. X if the better argument of Phdr. (used in Laws too), based on the soul’s motion, had been at his disposal.” See further L. Robin, La Théorie Platonicienne de l’amour, Paris 1908 (repr. 1964), pp. 70 and 97.'

Tuesday, October 1, 2019

3a C. J. Rowe’s arguments for a late dating of the Phaedrus – Laws X and the Phaedrus


There is one more link between Laws X and the Phaedrus. In Laws X, after proving a) that gods exist, b) that they care for every human being, and c) that they can’t be influenced by sacrifices and supplications, the Athenian stranger determines punishments imposed on these offences. The most severe punishment is reserved jointly on these three classes if those involved are not only impious, but try to lead the souls psuchagȏgȏsi – of many others astray. In the Phaedrus Plato defines rhetoric as psuchagȏgia, ‘a leading of the soul,’ as C.J. Rowe rightly translates this term (at 261a8 and 271c10). If I am not mistaken, this connection between Laws X and the Phaedrus has not been noticed by Platonic scholars; in translation, no connection between the two can be found. Saunders translates the Laws X passage as follows:

‘There are others, however, who in addition to not recognizing the existence of gods, or believing they are unconcerned about the world or can be bought off, become sub-human (hosoi d’an thȇriȏdeis genȏntai pros tȏi theous mȇ nomizein ȇ ameleis ȇ paraitȇtous einai). They take everybody for fools (kataphronountes de tȏn anthrȏpȏn), and many a man they delude during his life (psuchagȏgȏsi men pollous tȏn zȏntȏn); and then by saying after his death that they can conjure up his spirit (tous de tethneȏtas phaskontes psuchagȏgein), and promising to influence the gods (kai theous hupischnoumenoi peithein) through the alleged magic powers of sacrifices and prayers and charms (hȏs thusiais te kai euchais kai epȏidais goȇteuontes), they try to wrack completely whole homes and states for filthy lucre (idiȏtas te kai holas oikias kai poleis chrȇmatȏn charin epicheirȏsin kat’ akras exairein). (909a8-b6)

This can’t be right, for on this translation those who don’t recognize the existence of gods … promise to influence the gods. The text is difficult, but perhaps we get some clarity into it, if we translate the text as close to the original as possible, instead of reconstructing it: ‘All those who become like beasts of pray (hosoi d’an thȇriȏdeis genȏntai), and on top thinking that there are no gods (pros tȏi theous mȇ nomizein), or that they don’t care (ȇ ameleis), or that they are placable (ȇ paraitȇtous einai), despising mankind (kataphronountes de tȏn anthrȏpȏn), they lead the souls of many living men (psuchagȏgȏsi men pollous tȏn zȏntȏn); claiming to call the souls of the dead (tous de tethneȏtas phaskontes psuchagȏgein), and promising to influence the gods (kai theous hupischnoumenoi peithein) through the alleged magic powers of sacrifices and prayers and charms (hȏs thusiais te kai euchais kai epȏidais goȇteuontes), they try to wrack completely whole homes and states for filthy lucre (idiȏtas te kai holas oikias kai poleis chrȇmatȏn charin epicheirȏsin kat’ akras exairein).’

E.B. England notes: ‘psuchagȏgȏsi is first used in its sense of “inveigle”, and in the following line in that of “calling spirits from the vast deep,” i.e. this particular class of manteis are nekromanteis.’ The second psuchagȏgȏsi was well known; it applied merely to those who maintained that they can ‘call spirits from the vast deep’; with this second psuchagȏgȏsi Plato turned his attention to the third form of impiety.

The first psuchagȏgȏsi applied to all three kinds of impiety, and as it stands, it seems to be hanging in the air, unexplained. On purpose, I believe, for the reader, reminded of the Phaedrus in the discussion on writing and in the discussion of the nature of the soul, could not help thinking of psychagȏgia in the Phaedrus. Viewed in the light of the Phaedran psychagȏgia, the first psuchagȏgȏsi is displayed and combatted in the introductory passages of Laws X.

To give a taste of it to his fellow travellers – Cleinias, a Cretan, and Megillus, a Spartan – the Athenian stranger (Athȇnaios xenos) transports them into the intellectual atmosphere of Athens: ‘You think it’s just because people can’t resist temptation and desire that they are attracted to the godless life (hȇgeisthe akrateiai monon hȇdonȏn te kai epithumiȏn epi ton asebȇ bion hormasthai tas psuchas autȏn).’ – Cleinias: ‘What other reason could there be, sir (To de ti pros toutois aition an, ȏ xene, eiȇ;)?’ – Athenian: ‘A reason which you two, living outside (Schedon ho pantapasin humeis exȏ zȏntes), would know nothing about (ouk an eideiȇte); it will have completely passed you by (alla humas an lanthanoi).’ – Cl.: ‘What are you talking about now (Ti dȇ touto frazeis ta nun;)?’ – Ath.: ‘A form of ignorance that causes no end of trouble (Amathia tis mala chalepȇ), but which passes for the highest wisdom (dokousa einai megistȇ phronȇsis).’ – Cl.: ‘How do you mean (Pȏs legeis;)?’ – Ath.: ‘In Athens a number of written works are current (Eisin hȇmin en grammasi logoi keimenoi) which are not found in your states (hoi par’ humin ouk eisin), which are, I understand, too well run to tolerate them (di’ aretȇn politeias, hȏs egȏ manthanȏ) (886a9-b11) … When you and I present our proofs for the existence of gods (emou gar kai sou, hotan tekmȇria legȏmen hȏs eisin theoi) and adduce what you adduced (tauta auta propherontes) – sun (hȇlion te), moon (kai selȇnȇn), stars (kai astra) and earth (kai gȇn) – that they are gods and divine beings (hȏs theous kai theia onta), persuaded by the wise men they will say (hupo tȏn sophȏn toutȏn anapepeismenoi an legoien) that these things are just earth and stones (hȏs gȇn te kai lithous onta tauta), and are incapable of caring for human affairs (kai ouden tȏn anthrȏpeiȏn pragmatȏn phrontizein dunamena, 886d4-e1).

In the Phaedrus Socrates introduces psychagȏgia by asking Phaedrus: ‘Will not the science of rhetoric as a whole be (Ar’ oun ou to men holon hȇ rȇtorikȇ an eiȇ technȇ) a kind of leading of the soul by means of things said (psuchagȏgia tis dia logȏn), not only in law-courts (ou monon en dikastȇriois) and all other kinds of public gatherings (kai hosoi alloi dȇmosioi sullogoi), but in private ones two (alla kai en idiois, 261a7-9)?’ Phaedrus replies: ‘No, I must say (Ou ma ton Di’), not absolutely that (ou pantapasi houtȏs): a science of speaking and writing is perhaps especially employed in lawsuits (alla malista men pȏs peri tas dikas legetai te kai graphetai technȇi), though also in public addresses (legetai de kai peri dȇmȇgorias); I have not heard of any extension of it beyond that (epi pleon de ouk akȇkoa, 261b3-5).’ – Socrates: ‘What is it that the opposing parties in the law-courts do (en dikastȇriois hoi antidikoi ti drȏsin;)? Isn’t it just speaking in opposition to each other (ouk antilegousi mentoi;)? – Ph.: ‘Just that (Tout’ auto)’ – S.: On the subject of what is just (Peri tou dikaiou te) and unjust (kai adikou;)?’ – Phaedrus: ‘Yes (Nai).’ – S.: ‘So the man who does this scientifically (Oukoun ho technȇi touto drȏn) will make the same thing appear (poiȇsei phanȇnai to auto) to the same people (tois autois) at one time just (tote men dikaion), but at any other time he wishes (hotan de boulȇtai), unjust (adikon;)?’ – Ph. ‘Certainly (Ti mȇn;).’ – S.: ‘And in public addresses (Kai en dȇmȇgoriai dȇ) he will make the same things appear at one time good (tȇi polei dokein ta auta tote men agatha), at another the opposite (tote d’ au t’anantia;)?’ – Ph.: ‘Just so (Houtȏs).’ S.: ‘So do we not recognise that the Eleatic Palamedes [presumably Zeno] speaks scientifically (Ton oun Eleatikon Palamȇdȇn legonta ouk ismen technȇi), so as to make the same things appear to his hearers (hȏste phainesthai tois akouousi ta auta) to be like (homoia) and unlike (kai anomoia), one (kai hen) and many (kai polla), at rest (menonta te au) and in motion (kai pheromena;)?’ – Ph.: ‘Yes indeed (Mala ge).’ – S.: ‘Then the science of antilogic is not only concerned with law-courts (Ouk ara monon peri dikastȇria te estin hȇ antilogikȇ) and public addresses (kai peri dȇmȇgorian), but (all’), so it seems (hȏs eoike), there will be this one science – if indeed there is one – in relation to everything that is said (peri panta ta legomena mia tis technȇ, eiper estin, hautȇ an eiȇ).’ (261c4-e2, tr. C.J. Rowe)

The introductory speech with which the impious address the Athenian and his two fellow travellers can be seen as an example of psuchagȏgia discussed in the Phaedrus: ‘Let’s listen to the ridicule and scorn with which I imagine they put their case (epakousȏmen autȏn prȏton ha tȏi kataphronein hȇmȏn prospaizontas autous legein manteuomai). They’ll probably go in for bantering, and address us like this (Tauta tach’ an ereschȇlountes eipoien): “Gentlemen of Athens, of Sparta and of Crete (Ō xene Athȇnaie kai Lakedaimonie kai Knȏsie), you are quite right (alȇthȇ legete). Some of us are indeed absolute atheists (hȇmȏn gar hoi men to parapan theous oudamȏs nomizomen), whereas others (hoi de) do believe in such gods as you describe (hoious humeis legete). So we demand of you (axioumen dȇ) what you yourselves demanded of the laws (kathaper humeis ȇxiȏkate peri nomȏn), that before you resort to threats and bullying (prin apeilein hȇmin sklȇrȏs), you should try to convince us by arguments and cogent proofs that gods do exist (humas proteron epicheirein peithein kai didaskein hȏs eisi theoi, tekmȇria legontes hikana), and that they are in fact above being seduced by gifts into turning a blind eye to injustice (kai hoti beltious ȇ para to dikaion hupo tinȏn dȏrȏn paratrepesthai kȇloumenoi). But you see, it’s precisely in these and similar terms that we hear them spoken of (nun men gar tauta akouontes te kai toiauth’ hetera) by the most highly thought-of poets (tȏn legomenȏn aristȏn einai poiȇtȏn te) and orators (kai rȇtorȏn) and prophets (kai manteȏn) and priests (kai hiereȏn) and thousands of other people too (kai allȏn muriakis muriȏn). That’s why most of us make little effort to avoid crime (ouk epi to mȇ dran ta adika trepometha hoi pleistoi), but commit it first and try to put things right afterwards (drasantes exakeisthai peirȏmetha). So from lawgivers (para de dȇ nomothetȏn) who profess to use the velvet glove rather than the iron fist (phaskontȏn einai mȇ agriȏn alla hȇmerȏn) we claim the right to be tackled by persuasion first (axioumen peithoi prȏton chrȇsthai pros hȇmas). Even if, when you state your case for the existence of gods, your elegance of expression is only marginally superior to our opponents’ (ei mȇ pollȏi beltiȏ tȏn allȏn legontas peri theȏn hȏs eisin), persuade us that your argument is a better expression of the truth (all’ oun beltiȏ ge pros alȇtheian), and then perhaps we’ll believe you (kai tacha peithoimeth’ an isȏs humin). Isn’t that fair enough? Well then, try to reply to our challenge (all’ epicheireite, ei ti metrion legomen, eipein ha prokaloumetha).”’ (885c2-e6, tr. Trevor J. Saunders)

When Plato in the Phaedrus introduced the concept of psuchagȏgia as ‘one science in relation to everything that is said (peri panta ta legomena mia tis technȇ), he made a proviso eiper estin, ‘if it exists’, for as he was going to argue, what the rhetoricians called technȇ (‘science’ as Plato understood it) did not deserve that name: It must be based on dialectic, if it is to become technȇ. But when he towards the end of his discussion on rhetoric presented his project of psuchagȏgia as technȇ, he had no doubt about its power of persuasion: ‘Since the power of speech is in fact a leading of the soul (Epeidȇ logou dunamis tunchanei psuchagȏgia ousa), the man who is going to be an expert in rhetoric (ton mellonta rȇtorikon esesthai) must know how many forms soul has (anankȇ eidenai psuchȇ hosa eidȇ echei) … So people of one kind (hoi men oun toioide) are easily persuaded for this reason by one kind of speech to hold one kind of opinion (hupo tȏn toiȏnde logȏn dia tȇnde tȇn aitian es ta toiade eupeitheis), while people of another kind (hoi de toioide) are for these reasons (dia tade) difficult to persuade (duspeitheis); having then grasped these things satisfactorily (dei dȇ tauta hikanȏs noȇsanta), after that the student must observe them as they are in real life, and actually being put into practice (meta tauta theȏmenon auta en tais praxesin onta te kai prattomena), and be able to follow them with keen perception (oxeȏs tȇi aisthȇsei dunasthai epakolouthein) … But when he both has sufficient ability to say what sort of man is persuaded by what sorts of things (hotan de eipein te hikanȏs echȇi hoios huph’ hoiȏn peithetai), and is capable of telling himself when he sees him there that this is the man (paragignomenon te dunatos ȇi diaisthanomenos heautȏi endeiknusthasi hoti houtos esti) and this the nature (kai hautȇ hȇ phusis) which was discussed before (peri hȇs tote ȇsan hoi logoi), now actually present in front of him (nun ergȏi parousa hoi), to whom he must now apply these kinds of speech in this way (hȇi prosoisteon tousde hȏde tous logous) to persuade him of this kind of thing (epi tȇn tȏnde peithȏ) … recognising the right and wrong time for these (toutȏn tȇn eukairian te kai akairian diagnonti), then his grasp of the science will be well and completely finished (kalȏs te kai teleȏs estin hȇ technȇ apeirgasmenȇ).’ (271b10-272a8, tr. C.J. Rowe)

In Laws X Plato does not have the Phaedran trust in the power of speech. The Athenian does his best to refute the views of the impious, but in the end resorts to punishing those that stick to their impiety. The punishment for those who were leading the souls of others astray was the following: ‘If one of these people is found guilty (toutȏn de hos an ophlȏn einai doxȇi), the court must sentence him (timatȏ to dikastȇrion autȏi) to imprisonment as prescribed by law (kata nomon dedesthai men) in the prison in the centre of the country (en tȏi tȏn mesogeȏn desmȏtȇriȏi)’ – [which is ‘in a solitary spot where the terrain is at its wildest’ (hopȇiper an erȇmos te kai hȏs hoti malista agriȏtatos ȇi topos, 908a5-6)] – ‘no free man is to visit them at any time (prosienai de autois mȇdena eleutheron mȇdepote), and slaves must hand them their ration of food fixed by the Guardians of the Laws (taktȇn de hupo tȏn nomophulakȏn autous trophȇn para tȏn oiketȏn lambanein). And when such a man dies (apothanonta de) he must be cast out over the borders of the state (exȏ tȏn horiȏn ekballein) unburied (ataphon).’ (909b6-c4)

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The Phaedrus can help us understand the transition from ‘they lead the souls of many living men (psuchagȏgȏsi men pollous tȏn zȏntȏn)’ to ‘claiming that they can lead the souls of the dead (tous de tethneȏtas phaskontes psuchagȏgein) at 909b2-3 in Laws X. In the Phaedrus, after sketching an outline of the scientific psuchagȏgia founded on dialectic, Socrates realizes how demanding the project is, and says that one must try to see whether an easier way to scientific rhetoric could be found. So he evokes the teaching of the long dead Tisias, the teacher of Gorgias, who claimed ‘that the man who is going to be competent at rhetoric need have nothing to do with the truth about just or good things, or indeed about people who are such by nature or upbringing (hoti ouden alȇtheias metechein deoi dikaiȏn ȇ agathȏn peri pragmatȏn, ȇ kai anthrȏpȏn ge toioutȏn phusei ontȏn ȇ trophȇi, ton mellonta hikanȏs rȇtorikon esesthai). For in the law-courts no one cares in the slightest for the truth about these things (to parapan gar ouden en tois dikastȇriois toutȏn alȇtheias melein oudeni), but only for what is convincing (alla tou pithanou); and this is what is probable (touto d’ einai to eikos), which is what the man who is going to speak scientifically must pay attention to (hȏi dei prosechein ton mellonta technȇi erein, 272d4-e2).’ Then he asks Phaedrus: ‘Should we or should we not say to him – ‘ – Phaedrus: ‘What?’ – Socrates: ‘This: “Tisias, we have for some time been saying, before you came along, that this ‘probability’ comes about in the minds of the ordinary people …’ Follows a discourse in which Socrates ‘leads the soul of the dead Tisias’ (psuchagȏgei ton tethnȇkota Tisian) – if I may paraphrase Laws X – maintaining that unless a man follows the outline of psuchagȏgia, given in 271c10-b2, ‘he will never be an expert in the science of speaking (ou pot’ estai technikos logȏn peri) to the degree possible for mankind (kath’ hoson dunaton anthrȏpȏi). This ability he will never acquire without a great deal of diligent study (tauta de ou mȇ pote ktȇsȇtai aneu pollȇs pragmateias), which the sensible man ought to work through not for the purpose of speaking and acting in relation to men (hȇn ouch heneka tou legein kai prattein pros anthrȏpous dei diaponeisthai ton sȏphrona), but in order to be able both to say what is gratifying to the gods (alla tou theois kecharismena men legein dunasthai), and to act in everything, so far as he can, in a way which is gratifying to them (kecharismenȏs de prattein to pan eis dunamin). For you see (ou gar dȇ ara), Tisias (ȏ Teisia) … if the way round is a long one (hȏst’ ei makra hȇ periodos), don’t be surprised (mȇ thaumasȇis); for it is for the sake of great things that the journey is to be made (megalȏn gar heneka periiteon), not for those you have in mind (ouch hȏs su dokeis). Yet these too (estai mȇn), as our argument asserts (hȏs ho logos phȇsi), if that is what one wants (ean tis ethelȇi), will best come as a result of the others (kai tauta kallista ex ekeinȏn gignomena).’ (273d2-274a5, tr. C.J. Rowe)

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With Cleinias’ insistence that the Athenian should do his best to persuade the impious of the existence of the gods for his words ‘once written down (en grammasi tethenta), remain fixed and permanent, ready to stand up to scrutiny for ever (hȏs dȏsonta eis panta chronon elenchon, pantȏs ȇremei, 891a1-2)’ corrects the negative view on writing expressed in the closing section of the Phaedrus. Socrates in the Phaedrus maintains that ‘the written words speak as if they were thinking something (hȏs ti phronountas autous legein), but if you ask them something about anything they say (ean de ti erȇi tȏn legomenȏn), wanting to learn (boulomenos mathein), they always point to just one and the same thing (hen ti sȇmainei monon t’auton aei, 275d7-9)’. Cleinias in Laws X insists that the Athenian should not be alarmed if his arguments ‘at first they make difficult listening (ei chalepa kat’ archas akouein estin), because your slow learner will be able to go back again and again and examine them (ha g’ estai kai tȏi dusmathei pollakis epanionti skopein). Nor does their length (oute ei makra), provided they’re useful (ȏphelima de), justify any man in committing what seems to me (dia tauta logon oudamȇi echei), at least, an impiety (oude hosion emoige einai phainetai): I mean refusing to facilitate these explanations as best he can (to mȇ ou boȇthein toutois tois logois panta andra kata dunamin).’ (891a3-7) What Socrates saw as the weakness of writings in the Phaedrus – the written word is unable to defend itself 'when it is ill-treated and unjustly abused' (plȇmmeloumenos de kai ouk en dikȇi loidorȇtheis, 275e3-4) – Plato views in Laws X as the strength of the written word: writings ‘stand up to scrutiny for ever’.

In his discussion of the nature of the soul in Laws X Plato reaffirmed a revised view on this subject presented in the Phaedran Palinode.

Transporting his interlocuters into the intellectual atmosphere in Athens in the opening paragraphs of Laws X, where he can display the rhetorical acumen of the impious, and then, towards the end of Laws X, reserving the severest punishment for the impious who lead the souls of others astray (psuchagȏgȏsi), Plato reminds the reader of the second part of the Phaedrus, which is devoted to rhetoric defined as psuchagȏgia, and he says his no to it.