Meno 19

Socrates: Well now (Ou0kou=n), since virtue is not taught, we no longer take it to be knowledge (e0peidh\ ou0 didakto/n e0stin, ou0d’ e0pisth/mh dh\ e1ti gi/gnetai h9 a0reth/;)?

Meno: Apparently not (Ou0 fai/netai).

Socrates: So of two good and useful things (Duoi=n a1ra o1ntoin a0gaqoi=n kai\ w)feli/moin) one has been rejected (to\ me\n e3teron a0pole/lutai): knowledge cannot be our guide in political conduct (kai\ ou0k a2n ei1h e0n politikh=| pra/cei e0pisth/mh h9gemw&n).

Meno: I think not (Ou1 moi dokei=).

Socrates: Therefore it was not by any wisdom (Ou0k a1ra sofi/a| tini/), nor because they were wise (ou0de\ sofoi/ o1ntej), that the sort of men we spoke of controlled their states – Themistocles and the rest of them (oi9 toiou=toi a1ndrej h9gou=nto tai=j po/lesin, oi9 a1mfi Qe/mistokle/a te kai\ ou4j A1nutoj o3de e1lege), to whom our friend Anytus was referring a moment ago. For this reason it was that they were unable to make others like unto themselves (dio\ kai\ ou0x oi[oi/ te a1llouj poiei=n toiou/touj oi[oi/ au0toi/ ei0sin) – because their qualities were not an effect of knowledge (a3te ou0 di’ e0pisth/mhn o1ntej toiou=toi).

Meno: The case is probably as you say, Socrates (E1oiken ou3twj e1xein, w} Sw&kratej, w(j le/geij).

Socrates: And if not by knowledge (Ou0kou=n ei0 mh\ e0pisth/mh|), as the only alternative it must have been by good opinion (eu0doci/a| dh\ to\ loipo\n gi/gnetai). This is the means which statesmen employ for their direction of states (h[| oi9 politikoi\ a1ndrej xrw&menoi ta\j po/leij o0rqou=sin), and they have nothing more to do with wisdom than soothsayers and diviners (ou0de\n diafero/ntwj e1xontej pro\j to\ fronei=n h2 oi9 xrhsmw|doi/ te kai\ oi9 qeoma/nteij); for these people utter many a true thing when inspired (kai\ ga\r ou[toi le/gousi me\n a0lhqh= kai\ polla/), but have no knowledge of anything they say (i1sasi de\ ou0de\n w{n le/gousin).

Meno: I daresay that is so (Kinduneu/ei ou3twj e1xein).

Socrates: And may we, Meno (Ou0kou=n, w} Me/nwn), rightly call those men divine (a1cion tou/touj qei/ouj kalei=n tou\j a1ndraj) who, having no understanding (oi3tinej nou=n mh\ e1xontej), yet succeed in many a great deed and word (polla\ kai\ mega/la katorqou=sin w{n pra/ttousi kai\ le/gousin;)?

Meno: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: Then we shall be right in calling those divine (O)rqw_j a1r’ a2n kaloi=men qei/ouj te) of whom we spoke just now as soothsayers and prophets (ou4j nundh\ e0le/gomen xrhsmw|dou\j kai\ ma/nteij) and all of the poetic turn (kai\ tou\j pohtikou\j a3pantaj); and especially we can say of the statesmen that they are divine (kai\ tou\j politikou\j ou0x h3kista tou/twn fai=men a2n qei/ouj te ei]nai) and enraptured (kai\ e0nqousia/zein), as being inspired (e0pi/pnouj o1ntaj) and possessed of God (kai\ katexome/nouj e0k tou= qeou=) when they succeed in speaking many great things (o3tan katorqw~si le/gontej polla\ kai\ mega/la pra/gmata), while knowing nought of what they say (mhde\n ei0do/tej w{n le/gousin).

Meno: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: And the women too (Kai\ ai3 ge gunai=kej), I presume (dh/pou), Meno (w} Me/nwn), call good men divine (tou\j a0gaqou\j a1ndraj qei/ouj kalou=si); and the Spartans, when they eulogize a good man (kai\ oi9 La/kwnej o3tan tina\ e0gkwmia/zousin a0gaqo\n a1ndra), say – “He is a divine person (qei=oj a0nh/r, fasi/n, ou[toj).”

Meno: And to all appearance, Socrates, they are right; though perhaps our friend Anytus may be annoyed at your statement (Kai\ fainontai/ ge, w} Sw&kratej, o0rqw~j le/gein, kai/toi i1swj A1nutoj o3de soi\ a1xqetai le/gonti).

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There is nothing in the Greek text that corresponds to Lamb’s (the translator’s) ‘our friend Anytus’. In Greek we have A1nutoj o3de “Anytus here”, with which Meno emphasizes Anytus’ disagreement with his and Socrates’ views on the matter.

In fact, it is Socrates who introduces the pronoun o3de to emphasize Anytus’ presence; he does so in discussion on virtue, in which he wants to involve Anytus.

Meno asks Socrates: Do you think there are no teachers of virtue?

Socrates replies: I must say I have often inquired whether there were any, but for all my pains I cannot find one … But look, Meno: here, at the very moment when he was wanted, we have Anytus [A1nutoj o3de “Anytus here”] sitting down beside us, to take his share in our quest. And we may well ask his assistance; for our friend Anytus (A1nutoj ga\r o3de) …

And it is again Socrates who emphasises Anytus’ silent presence with the pronoun o3de, in the accusative to/nde, in Socrates’ last sentence, with which the dialogue ends: ‘It is now time for me to go my way (nu=n d’e0moi\ me\n w#ra poi i0e/nai), but do you persuade our friend Anytus of that whereof you are now yourself persuaded (su\ de\ tau=ta a3per au0to\j pe/peisai pei=qe kai\ to\n ce/non to/nde A1nuton), so as to put him in a gentler mood (i3na pra|o/teroj h]|); for if you can persuade him (w(j e0a\n pei/sh|j tou=ton), you will do a good turn to the people of Athens also (e1stin o3 ti kai\ A0qhnai/ouj o0nh/seij).’

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Socrates’ “‘It is now time for me to go my way (nu=n d’e0moi\ me\n w#ra poi i0e/nai)” is reminiscent of Euthyphro’s “Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go” (nu=n ga\r speu/dw poi, kai/ moi w#ra a0pie/nai), with which Euthyphro leaves the scene in the Euthyphro. The coincidence is hardly accidental; the question is, why Plato wanted Anytus to be reminded of the Euthyphro. To get some clarity into this question, I intend to subject the Euthyphro to the same treatment on my blog, to which I have subjected the Meno. But first I must end the Meno.