Meno 17

Socrates: Then right opinion is just as useful as knowledge (Ou0de\n a1ra h[tton w)felimo/n e0stin o0rqh\ do/ca e0pisth/mhj).

Meno: With this difference (Tosou/tw| ge), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), that he who has knowledge (o3ti o9 me\n th\n e0pisth/mhn e1xwn) will always hit on the right way (a0ei\ ga\r e0pitugxa/noi), whereas he who has right opinion (o9 de\ th\n o0rqh\n do/can) will sometimes do so (tote\ me\n a2n tugxa/noi), sometimes not (tote\ d’ ou1).

Socrates: How do you mean (Pw~j le/geij;)? Will not he who always has right opinion be always right (o9 a0ei\ e1xwn o0rqh\n do/can ou0k a0ei\ tugxa/noi), so long as he opines rightly (e3wsper o0rqa\ doca/zoi;)?

Meno: It appears to me that he must (A0na/gkh moi fai/netai); and therefore I wonder (w#ste qauma/zw), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), this being the case (tou/tou ou3twj e1xontoj), that knowledge should ever be more prized than right opinion (o3ti dh/ pote polu\ timiwte/ra h9 e0pisth/mh th=j o0rqh=j do/chj), and why they should be two distinct and separate things (kai\ di’ o3 ti to\ me\n e3teron, to\ de\ e3tero/n e0stin au0tw~n;).

Socrates: Well, do you know (Oi]sqa ou]n) why it is that you wonder (di0 o3 ti qauma/zeij), or shall I tell you (h2 e0gw& soi ei2pw;)?

Meno: Please tell me (Pa/nu g’ ei0pe/).

Socrates: It is because you have not observed with attention the images of Daedalus (O#ti toi=j Daida/lou a0ga/lmasin ou0 prose/sxhkaj to\n nou=n). But perhaps there are none in your country (i1swj de\ ou0d’ e1sti par’ u9mi=n).

Meno: What is the point of your remark (Pro\j ti/ de\ dh\ tou=to le/geij;)?

Socrates: That if they are not fastened up they play truant and run away (O#ti kai\ tau=ta, e0a\n mh\ dedeme/na h]|, a0podidra/skei kai\\ drapeteu/ei); but, if fastened, they stay where they are (e0a\n de\ dedeme/na, parame/nei).

Meno: Well, what of that (Ti/ ou]n dh/;)?

Socrates: To possess one of his works which is let loose does not count for much value (Tw~n e0kei/nou poihma/twn lelume/non me\n e0kth=sqai ou0 pollh=j tino\j a1cio/n e0sti timh=j); it will not stay with you any more than a runaway slave (w#sper drape/thn a1nqrwpon, ou0 ga\r parame/nei); but when fastened up (dedeme/non de/) it is worth a great deal (pollou= a1cion), for his productions are very fine things (pa/nu ga\r kala\ ta\ e1rga e0sti/). And to what am I referring in all this (pro\j ti/ ou]n dh\ le/gw tau=ta;)? To true opinions (pro\j ta\j do/caj ta\j a0lhqei=j). For these, as long as they stay with us, are a fine possession (kai\ ga\r ai9 do/cai ai9 a0lhqei=j, o3son me\n a2n xro/non parame/nousin, kalo\n to\ xrh=ma), and effect all that is good (kai\ pa/nta ta0gaqa\ e0rga/zontai); but they do not care to stay very long (polu\n de\ xro/non ou0k e0qe/lousi parame/nein), and run away out of the human soul (a0lla\ drapteu/ousin e0k th=j yuxh=j tou= a0nqrw&pou), and thus are not of great value (w#ste ou0 pollou= a1ciai/ ei0sin) until one makes them fast with causal reasoning (e3wj a1n tij au0ta\j dh/sh| ai0ti/aj logismw~|). And this process, friend Meno, is recollection (tou=to d’ e0sti/n, Me/nwn e9tai=re, a0na/mnhsij), as in our previous talk we have agreed (w(j e0n toi=j pro/sqen h9mi=n w(molo/ghtai). But when once they are fastened (e0peida\n de\ deqw~si), in the first place they turn into knowledge (prw~ton me\n e0pisth/mai gi/gnontai), and in the second, are abiding (e1peita mo/nimoi). And this is why knowledge is more prized than right opinion (kai\ dia\ tau=ta dh\ timiw&teron e0pisth/mh o0rqh=j do/chj e0sti/): the one transcends the other by its trammels (kai\ diafe/rei desmw~| e0pisth/mh o0rqh=j do/chj).

Meno: Upon my word (Nh\ to\n Di/a), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), it seems to be very much as you say (e1oike toiou/tw| tini/).