Meno 16

Socrates: I fear (Kinduneu/omen), Meno (w} Me/nwn), you and I (e0gw& te kai\ su/) are just poor creatures (fauloi/ tinej ei]nai a1ndrej), and Gorgias has been as faulty an educator of you (kai\ se/ te Gorgi/aj ou0x i9kanw~j pepaideuke/nai) as Prodicus of me (kai\ e0me\ Pro/dikoj). So our first duty is to look to ourselves (panto\j ma=llon ou]n prosekte/on to\n nou=n h9mi=n au0toi=j), and try to find somebody who will have some means or other of making us better (kai\ zhthte/on o3stij h9ma=j e9ni\ tw~| tro/pw| belti/ouj poih/sei). I say this with special reference to our recent inquiry (le/gw de\ tau=ta a0poble/yaj pro\j th\n a1rti zh/thsin), in which I see that we absurdly failed to note (w(j h9ma=j e1laqe katagela/stwj) that it is not only through the guidance of knowledge that human conduct is right and good (o3ti ou0 mo/non e0pisth/mhj h9goume/nhj o0rqw&j te kai\ eu] toi=j a0nqrw&poij pra/ttetai ta\ pra/gmata); and it is probably owing to this that we fail to perceive (h9| i1swj kai\ diafeu/gei h9ma=j to\ gnw~nai) by what means good men can be produced (ti/na pote tro/pon gi/gnontai oi9 a0gaqoi\ a1ndrej).

Meno: To what are you alluding, Socrates (Pw~j tou=to le/geij, w} Sw&kratej;)?

Socrates: I mean that good men must be useful: we were right, were we not, in admitting that this must needs be so (W{de, o3ti me\n tou\j a0gaqou\j a1ndraj dei= w)feli/mouj ei]nai, o0rqw_j w(mologh/kamen tou=to/ ge, o3ti ou0k a2n a1llwj e1xoi, h] ga/r)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: And in thinking that they will be useful if they give us right guidance in conduct: here also, I suppose, our admission was correct (Kai\ o3ti w)feli/moi e1sontai, a2n o0rqw~j h9mi=n h9gw~ntai tw~n pragma/twn, kai\ tou=to/ pou kalw~j w(mologou=men;)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: But our assertion that it is impossible to give right guidance unless one has knowledge looks very like a mistake (O#ti d’ ou0k e1stin o0rqw~j h9gei=sqai, e0a\n mh\ fro/nimoj h=|, tou=to o9moioi/ e0smen ou0k o0rqw~j w(mologhko/sin).

Meno: What do you mean by that (Pw~j dh\ le/geij;)?

Socrates: I will tell you (E0gw_ e0rw~). If a man knew the way to Larisa (ei1 tij ei0dw_j th\n o9do\n th\n ei0j La/risan), or any other place you please (h2 o3poi bou/lei a1llose), and walked there and led others (badi/zoi kai\ a1lloij h9goi=to), would he not give right and good guidance (a1llo ti o0rqw~j a2n kai\ eu] h9goi=to;)?

Meno: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: Well, and a person who had a right opinion as to which was the way, but had never been there and did not really know, might give right guidance, might he not (Ti/ d’ ei1 tij o0rqw~j me\n doca/zwn, h3tij e1stin h9 o9do/j, e0lhluqw_j de\ mh\ mh\d’ e0pista/menoj, ou0 kai\ ou[toj a2n o0rqw~j h9goi=to;)?

Meno: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: And so long, I presume, as he has right opinion about that which the other man really knows (Kai\ e3wj g’ a1n pou o0rqh\n do/can e1xh| peri\ w{n o9 e3teroj e0pisth/mhn), he will be just as good a guide (ou0de\n xei/rwn h9gemw_n e1stai) – if he thinks the truth (oio/menoj me\n a0lhqh=) instead of knowing it (fronw~n de\ mh/) – as the man who has the knowledge (tou= tou=to fronou=ntoj).

Meno: Just as good (Ou0de\n ga/r).

Socrates: Hence true opinion is as good a guide to rightness of action as knowledge (Do/ca a1ra a0lhqh\j pro\j o0rqo/thta pra/cewj ou0de\n xei/rwn h9gemw_n fronh/sewj); and this is a point we omitted just now in our consideration of the nature of virtue (kai\ tou=to/ e0stin o4 nundh\ parelei/pomen e0n th=| peri\ th=j a0reth=j ske/yei, o9poi=o/n ti ei1h), when we stated that knowledge is the only guide of right action (le/gontej o3ti fro/nhsij mo/non h9gei=tai tou= o0rqw~j pra/ttein); whereas we find there is also true opinion (to\ de\ a1ra kai\ do/ca h]n a0lhqh/j).

Meno: So it seems (E1oike/ ge).