Meno 10

 

Socrates: Then since we are of one mind as to the duty of inquiring into what one does not know, do you agree to our attempting a joint inquiry into the nature of virtue (Bou/lei ou]n, e0peidh\ o9monoou=men, o3ti zhthte/on peri\ ou[ mh/ tij oi]den, e0pixeirh/swmen koinh=| zhtei=n ti/ pot’ e1stin a0reth/;)?

Meno: By all means (Pa/nu me\n ou]n). But still, Socrates (ou0 me/ntoi, w} Sw&kratej), for my part I would like best of all to examine the question I asked first, and hear your view (a0ll’ e1gwge e0kei=no a2n h3dista, o3per h0ro/mhn to\ prw~ton, kai\ skeyai/mhn kai\ a0kou/saimi) as to whether in pursuing it we are to regard it as a thing to be taught (po/teron w(j dida/ktw| o1nti au0tw| dei= e0pixeirei=n), or as a gift of nature to mankind, or as arriving to them in some other way which I should be glad to know (h2 w(j fu/sei h2 w(j ti/ni pote\ tro/pw| paragignome/nhj toi=j a0nqrw&poij th=j a0reth=j).

Socrates: Had I control over you, Meno, as over myself (All’ ei0 me\n e0gw_ h]rxon, w} Me/nwn, mh\ mo/non e0mautou= a0lla\ kai\ sou=), we should not have begun considering whether virtue can or cannot be taught (ou0k a2n e0skeya/meqa po/teron ei1te didakto\n ei1te ou0 didakto\n h9 a0reth/) until we had first inquired into the main question of what it is (pri\n o3 ti e1sti prw~ton e0zhth/samen au0to/). But as you do not as much as attempt to control yourself (e0peidh\ de\ su\ sautou= me\n ou0d’ e0pixeirei=j a1rxein) – you are so fond of your liberty (i3na dh\ e0leu/qeroj h]|j) – and both attempt and hold control over me (e0mou= de\ e0pixeirei=j te a1rxein kai\ a1rxeij), I will yield to your request (sugxwrh/somai/ soi) – what else I am to do (ti/ ga\r xrh= poiei=n;)? So it seems we are to consider (e1oiken ou]n skepte/on ei]nai) what sort of thing it is (poi=o/n ti/ e0stin) of which we do not know (o4 mh/pw i1smen) what it is (o3 ti e1stin)! Well, the least you can do is to relax just a little of your authority (ei0 mh/ ti ou]n a0lla\ smikro/n ge/ moi th=j a0rxh=j xa/lason), and allow the question – whether virtue comes by teaching or some other way – to be examined by means of hypothesis (kai\ sugxw&rhson e0c u9poqe/sewj au0to\ skopei=sqai, ei1te didakto/n e0stin ei1te o9pwsou=n). I mean by hypothesis (le/gw de\ to\ e0c u9poqe/sewj w{de) what the geometricians often do (w#sper oi9 gewme/trai polla/kij skopou=ntai) in dealing with a question put to them (e0peida/n tij e1rhtai au0tou/j); for example, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangular space in a given circle (oi[on peri\ xwri/ou ei0 oi[o/n te e0j to/nde to\n ku/klon to/de to\ xwri/on tri/gwnon e0ntaqh=nai): they reply (ei1poi a1n tij) I cannot tell yet whether it has that capability (o3ti ou1pw oi[da ei0 e1sti tou=to toiou=ton); but I think, if I may put it so, that I have a certain helpful hypothesis for the problem, and it is as follows (a0ll’ w#sper me/n tina u9po/qesin prou1rgou oi]mai e1xein pro\j to\ pra=gma toia/nde): If this area is such (ei0 me/n e0sti tou/to to\ xwri/on toiou=ton) that when you apply it to a given line of the circle you find it falls short by a space (oi[on para\ th\n doqei=san au0tou= grammh\n paratei/nanta e0llei/pein toiou/tw| xwri/w|) similar to that which you just applied (oi[on a2n to\ paratetame/non h=|), then I take it you have one consequence (a1llo ti sumbai/nein moi dokei=), and if it is impossible for it to fall so, then some other (kai\ a1llo au], ei0 a0du/nato/n e0sti tau=ta paqei=n). Accordingly I wish to put a hypothesis, before I state our conclusion as regards inscribing this figure in the circle by saying whether it is impossible or not (u9poqe/menoj ou]n e0qe/lw ei0pei=n soi to\ sumbai=non peri\ th=j e0nta/sewj au0tou= ei0j to\n ku/klon, ei1te a0du/naton ei1te mh/).” In the same way with regard to our question about virtue (ou3tw dh\ kai\ peri\ a9reth=j h9mei=j), since we do not know either what it is or what kind of thing it may be (e0peidh\ ou0k i1smen ou1q’ o3 ti/ e0stin ou1q’ o9poi=o/n ti), we had best make use of a hypothesis in considering whether it can be taught or not, as thus: what kind of thing must virtue be in the class of mental properties, so as to be teachable or not (u9poqe/menoi au0to\ skopw~men ei1te didakto\n ei1te ou0 didakto/n e0stin, w{de le/gontej)? In the first place (prw~ton me/n), if it is something dissimilar or similar to knowledge (ei0 e1stin a0lloi=on h2 oi[on e0pisth/mh), is it taught or not (a]ra didakto\n h1 ou1) – or, as we were saying just now (h1 o9 nu=n dh\ e0le/gomen), remembered (a0namnhsto/n)? Let us have no dispute about the choice of the name (diafere/tw de\ mhde\n h9mi=n o9pote/rw| a2n tw~| o0no/mati xrw&meqa): is it taught (a0ll’ a]ra didakto/n;)? Or is not this fact plain to everyone (h2 touto/ ge panti\ dh=lon) – that the one and only thing taught to men is knowledge (o3ti ou0de\n a1llo dida/sketai a1nqrwpoj h2 e0pisth/mhn;)?

Meno: I agree to that (E!moige dokei=).

Socrates: Then if virtue is a kind of knowledge (Ei0 de/ g’ e0sti\n e0pisth/mh tij h9 a0reth/), clearly it must be taught (dh=lon o3ti didakto\n a2n ei1h)?

Meno: Certainly (Pw~j ga\r ou1;).

Socrates: So you see we have made short work of this question (Tou/tou me\n a1ra taxu\ a0phlla/gmeqa) – if virtue belongs to one class of things it is teachable (o3ti toiou=de me\n o1ntoj didakto/n), and if to another, it is not (toiou=de d’ ou1).

Meno: To be sure (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: The next question (To\ dh\ meta\ tou=to), it would seem (w(j e1oike), that we have to consider (dei= ske/yasqai) is whether virtue is knowledge (potero/n e0stin e0pisth/mh h9 a1reth/), or of another kind than knowledge (h1 a0lloi=on e0pisth/mhj).

Meno: I shoud say (E!moige dokei=) that is the next thing we have to consider (tou=to meta\ tou=to skepte/on ei]nai).

Socrates: Well now (Ti/ de\ dh/;), surely we call a virtue a good thing, do we not (a1llo ti h2 a0gaqo\n au0to/ famen ei]nai th\n a0reth/n), and our hypothesis stands (kai\ au3th h9 u9po/qesij me/nei h9mi=n), that it is good (a0gaqo\n au0to\ ei]nai;)?

Meno: Certainly we do (Pa/nu me\n ou]n).

Socrates: Then if there is some good apart and separable from knowledge (Ou0kou=n ei0 me/n ti/ e0stin a0gaqo\n kai\ a1llo xwrizo/menon e)pisth/mhj), it may be that virtue is not a kind of knowledge (ta/x’ a2n ei1h h9 a0reth\ ou0k e0pisth/mh tij); but if there is nothing good (ei0 de\ mhde/n e0stin a0gaqo/n) that is not embraced by knowledge (o4 ou0k e0pisth/mh perie/xei), our suspicion that virtue is a kind of knowledge would be well founded (e0pisth/mhn a1n tin’ au0to\ u9popteu/ontej ei]nai o0rqw~j u9popteu/oimen).

Meno: Quite so (E!sti tau=ta).

Socrates: Now it is by virtue that we are good (Kai\ mh\n a0reth=| g’ e0smen a0gaqoi/;)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: And if good (Ei0 de\ a0gaqoi/), profitable (w)fe/limoi); for all good things are profitable (pa/nta ga\r a0gaqa\ w)fe/lima), are they not (ׄou0xi/;)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: So virtue is profitable (Kai\ h9 a0reth\ dh\ w)fe/limo/n e0stin)?

Meno: That must follow from what has been admitted (A0na/gkh e0k tw~n w(mologhme/nwn).

Socrates: Then let us see (Skeyw&meqa dh/), in particular instances (kaq’ e3kaston a0nalamba/nontej), what sort of things they are that profit us (poi=a/ e0stin a4 h9ma=j w)felei=). Health (u9gi/eia), let us say (fame/n), and strength (kai\ i0sxu/j), and beauty (kai\ ka/lloj), and wealth (kai\ plou=toj dh/) – these and their like we call profitable (tau=ta le/gomen kai\ ta\ toiau=ta w)fe/lima), do we not (ou0xi/;)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: But these same things (Tau0ta\ de\ tau0ta/), we admit (famen), actually harm us at times (e0ni/ote kai\ bla/ptein); or do you dispute that statement (h2 su\ a1llwj fh\|j h2 ou3twj;)?

Meno: No (Ou0k), I agree (a0ll’ ou3twj).

Socrates: Consider now (Sko/pei dh/), what is the guiding condition in each case that makes them at one time profitable, and at another harmful (o3tan ti/ e9ka/stou tou/twn h9gh=tai, w)felei= h9ma=j, kai\ o3tan ti/, bla/ptei;). Are they not profitable when the use of them is right, and harmful when it is not (a]r’ ou0x o3tan me\n o0rqh\ xrh=sij, w)felei=, o3tan de\ mh/, bla/ptei;)?

Meno: To be sure (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates:  Then let us consider next the goods of the soul (E!ti toi/nun kai\ ta\ kata\ yuxh\n skeyw&meqa): by these you understand temperance, justice, courage, intelligence, memory, magnanimity, and so forth (swfrosu/nhn ti kalei=j kai\ dikaiosu/nhn kai\ a0ndrei/an kai\ mnh/mhn kai\ megalopre/peian).

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: Now tell me (Sko/pei dh/); such of these as you think are not knowledge (a3tta soi dokei= mh\ e0pisth/mh ei]nai), but different from knowledge (a0ll’ a1llo e0pisth/mhj) – do they not sometimes harm us (ei0 ou0xi\ tote\ me\n bla/ptei), and sometimes profit us (tote\ de\ w)felei=;)? For example, courage (oi[on a0ndrei/a), if it is courage apart from prudence (ei0 mh\ e1sti fro/nhsij h9 a0ndrei/a), and only a sort of boldness (a0ll’ oi[on qa/rroj ti): when a man is bold without sense (ou0x o3tan me\n a1neu nou= qarrh=| a1nqrwpoj), he is harmed (bla/ptetai); but when he has sense at the same time, he is profited, is he not (o3tan su\n nw~|, w)felei=tai;)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: And the same holds about temperance and intelligence (Ou0kou=n kai\ swfrosu/nh w(sau/twj kai\ eu0maqi/a): things learnt and co-ordinated with the aid of sense are profitable (meta\ me\n nou= kai\ manqano/mena kai\ katartuo/mena w0fe/lima), but without sense they are harmful (a1neu de\ nou= blabera/;)?

Meno: Most certainly (Pa/nu sfo/dra).

Socrates: And in brief (Ou0kou=n sullh/bdhn), all the undertakings and endurances of the soul (pa/nta ta\ th=j yuxh=j e0pixeirh/mata kai\ karterh/mata), when guided by wisdom (h9goume/nhj me\n fronh/sewj), end in happiness (ei0j eu0daimoni/an teleuta=|), but when folly guides in opposite (a0frosu/nhj de\ ei0j tou0nanti/on;)?

Meno: So it seems (E!oiken).

Socrates: Then if virtue is something that is in the soul (Ei0 a1ra a0reth\ tw~n e0n th=| yuxh=| ti/ e0sti), and must needs be profitable (kai\ a0nagkai=on au0tw~| w)feli/mw| ei]nai), it ought to be wisdom (fro/nhsin au0to\ dei= ei]nai), seeing that all the properties of the soul are in themselves neither profitable or harmful (e0peidh/per pa/nta ta\ kata\ th\n yuxh\n au0ta\ me\n kaq’ au9ta\ ou1te w)fe/lima ou1te blabera/ e0sti), but are made one or the other by the addition of wisdom or folly (prosgegenhme/nhj fronh/sewj h1 a0frosu/nhj blabera/ te kai\ w)fe/lima gi/gnetai); and hence by this argument (kata\ dh\ tou=ton to\n lo/gon), virtue being profitable (w)fe/limo/n ge ou]san th\n a0reth/n) must be a sort of wisdom (fro/nhsin dei= ei]nai).

Meno: I agree (E!moige dokei=).

Socrates: Then as to the other things (Kai\ me\n dh\ kai\ ta]lla), wealth and like, that we mentioned just now as being sometimes good and sometimes harmful (a4 nu=n dh\ e0le/gomen, plou=ton te kai\ ta\ toiau=ta, tote\ me\n a0gaqa\ tote\ de\ blabera\ ei]nai) – are not these also made profitable or harmful by the soul according as she guides them rightly or wrongly: just as, in the case of the soul generally, we found that the guidance of wisdom makes profitable the properties of the soul, while that of folly makes them harmful (a]r’ ou0x w#sper th=| a1llh| yuxh=| h9 fro/nhsij h9goume/nh w)fe/lima ta\ th=j yuxh=j e0poi/ei, h9 de\ a0frosu/nh blabera/, ou3twj au] kai\ tou/toij h9 yuxh\ o0rqw~j me\n xrwme/nh kai\ h9goume/nh w)fe/lima au0ta\ poiei=, mh\ o0rqw~j de\ blabera/;)?

Meno: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: And the wise soul guides rightly (O)rqw~j de/ ge h9 e1mfrwn h9gei=tai), and the foolish erroneously (h9marthme/nwj d’ h9 a1frwn;)?

Meno: That is so (E!sti tau=ta).

Socrates: Then may we assert this as a universal rule (Ou0kou=n ou3tw dh\ kata\ pa/ntwn ei0pei=n e1sti), that in man all other things depend upon the soul (tw~| a0nqrw&pw| ta\ me\n a1lla pa/nta ei0j th\n yuxh\n a0nhrth=sqai), while the things of the soul herself depend upon wisdom (ta\ de\ th=j yuxh=j au0th=j ei0j fro/nhsin), if they are to be good (ei0 me/llei a0gaqa\ ei]nai); and so by this account the profitable will be wisdom (kai\ tou/tw| tw~| lo/gw| fro/nhsij a2n ei1h to\ w)fe/limon), and virtue, we say, is profitable (fame\n de\ th\n a0reth\n w)fe/limon ei]nai;)?

Meno: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: Hence we conclude that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom (Fro/nhsin a1ra fame\n a0reth\n ei]nai, h1toi su/mpasan h2 me/roj ti;)?

Meno: It seems to me that your statement, Socrates, is excellent (Dokei= moi kalw~j le/gesqai, w} Sw&kratej, ta\ lego/mena).

Socrates: Then if this is so (Ou0kou=n ei0 tau=ta ou3twj e1xei), good men cannot be good by nature (ou0k a2n ei]en fu/sei oi9 a0gaqoi/).

Meno: I think not (Ou1 moi dokei=).

Socrates: No, for then, I presume, we should have had this result (Kai\ ga\r a1n pou kai\ to/d’ h]n): if good men were so by nature (ei0 fu/sei oi9 a0gaqoi\ e0gi/gnonto), we surely would have had men able to discern who of the young were good by nature (h]san a1n pou h9mi=n oi4 e0gi/gnwskon tw~n ne/wn tou\j a0gaqou\j ta\j fu/seij), and on their pointing them out (ou4j h9mei=j a2n paralabo/ntej e0kei/nwn a0pofhna/ntwn) we should have taken them over and kept them safe in the citadel (e0fula/ttomen e0n a0kropo/lei), having set our mark on them far rather than on our gold treasure (katashmhna/menoi polu\ ma=llon h2 to\ xrusi/on), in order that none might have tampered with them (i1na mhdei\j au0tou\j die/fqeiren), and when they came to be of age (a0ll’ e0peidh\ a0fi/konto ei0j th\n h9liki/an), they might be useful to their country (xrh/simoi gi/gnointo tai=j po/lesin).

Meno: Yes, most likely (Ei0ko/j ge/ toi), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: So since it is not by nature (A]r’ ou]n e0peidh\ ou0 fu/sei) that the good become good (oi9 a0gaqoi\ a0gaqoi\ gi/gnontai), is it by education (a]ra maqh/sei;)?

Meno: We must now conclude, I think, that it is (Dokei= moi h1dh a0nagkai=on ei]nai); and plainly (kai\ dh=lon), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), on our hypothesis (kata\ th\n u9po/qesin) that virtue is knowledge (ei1per e0pisth/mh e0sti\n a0reth/), it must be taught (o3ti didakto/n e0stin).

Socrates: Yes, I dare say (I!swj nh\ Di/a); but what if we were not right in agreeing to that (a0lla\ mh\ tou=to ou0 kalw~j w(mologh/samen;)?

Meno: Well, it seemed to be a correct statement a moment ago (Kai\ mh\n e0do/kei ge a1rti kalw~j le/gesqai).

Socrates: Yes, but not only a moment ago must it seem correct (A0lla\ mh\ ou0k e0n tw~| a1rti mo/non de/h| au0to\ dokei=n kalw~j le/gesqai), but now also (a0lla\ kai\ e0n tw~| nu=n) and hereafter (kai\ e0n tw~| e1peita), if it is to be at all sound (ei0 me/llei ti au0tou= u9gie\j ei]nai).

Meno: Why (Ti/ ou]n dh/;), what reason have you (pro\j ti/ ble/pwn) to make a difficulty about it (dusxerai/neij au0to/), and feel a doubt (kai\ a0pistei=j) as to virtue being knowledge (mh\ ou0k e0pisth/mh h=| h9 a0reth/;)?

Socrates: I will tell you Meno (E0gw/ soi e0rw~, w} Me/nwn). I do not withdraw as incorrect the statement that it is taught, if it is knowledge (to\ me\n ga\r didakto\n au0to\ ei]nai, ei1per e0pisth/mh e0sti/n, ou0k a0nati/qemai mh\ ou0 kalw~j le/gesqai); but as to its being knowledge, consider if I have grounds for misgiving (o3ti d’ ou0k e1stin e0pisth/mh, ske/yai e0a/n soi dokw~ ei0ko/twj a0pistei=n). For tell me now (to/de ga/r moi ei0pe/): if anything at all, not merely virtue, is teachable (ei0 e1sti didakto\n o9tiou=n pra/gma, mh\ mo/non a0reth/), must there not be teachers and learners of it (ou0k a0nagkai=on au0tou= kai\ didaska/louj kai\ maqhta\j ei]nai;)?

Meno: I think so (E!moige dokei=).

Socrates: Then also conversely (Ou0kou=n tou0nanti/on au]), if a thing had neither teachers or learners (ou[ mh/te dida/skaloi mh/te maqhtai\ ei]en), we should be right in surmising (kalw~j a2n au0to\ ei0ka/zontej ei0ka/zoimen) that it could not be taught (mh\ didakto\n ei]nai; )?

Meno: That is so (E!sti tau=ta): but do you think there are no teachers of virtue (a0ll’ a0reth=j dida/skaloi ou0 dokou=si/ soi ei]nai;)?

Socrates: I must say I have often inquired whether there were any, but for all my pains I cannot find one. And yet many have shared the search with me, and particularly those persons whom I regard as best qualified for the task. But look, Meno: here, at the very moment when he was wanted, we have Anytus sitting down beside us, to take his share in our quest.