Meno 8 ended with the Boy’s discovery of the side of the double size square (Meno 85b4-7). Having thus ended with the Boy, Socrates turned to Meno.
Socrates: What
do you think, Meno (Ti/ soi dokei=, w} Me/nwn;)? Was there any opinion that he did not give as an
answer of his own thought (e1stin h3ntina do/can ou0x au9tou= ou[toj a0pekri/nato;)?
Meno: No,
they were all his own (Ou1k, a0ll’ e9autou=).
Socrates: But
you see, he did not know, as we were saying a while since (Kai\ mh\n ou0k h1|dei
ge, w(j e1famen o0li/gon pro/teron).
Meno: That
is true (A0lhqh= le/geij).
Socrates:
Yet he had in him these opinions (E)nh=san de/ ge au0tw~| au[tai ai9 do/cai), had he not (h2 ou1;)?
Meno: Yes (Nai/).
Socrates: So
that he who does not know about any matters, whatever they be (Tw~| ou0k
ei0do/ti a1ra peri\ w{n a2n mh\ ei0dh=|), may have true opinions on such matters (e1neisin a0lhqei=j
do/cai peri\ tou/twn),
about which he knows nothing (w{n ou0k oi]den;)?
Meno: Apparently
(Fai/netai).
Socrates:
And at this moment those opinions have just been stirred in him, like a dream (Kai\ nu=n me/n ge
au0tw~| w#sper o1nar a1rti a0nakeki/nhntai ai9 do/cai au[tai); but if he were repeatedly asked
these same questions in a variety of forms (ei0 de\ au0to/n tij a0nerh/setai au0ta\
tau=ta kai\ pollaxh=|),
you know he will have in the end as exact an understanding of them as anyone (oi]sq’ o3ti teleutw~n
ou0deno\j h[tton a0kribw~j e0pisth/setai peri\ tou/twn).
Meno: So it seems
(E!oiken).
Socrates: Without
anyone having taught him, and only through questions put to him, he will
understand, recovering the knowledge out of himself (Ou0kou=n
ou0deno\j dida/cantoj a0ll’ e0rwth=santoj e0pisth/setai, a0nalabw_n
au0to\j e0c au9tou= th\n e0pisth/mhn;)?
Meno: Yes (Nai/).
Socrates:
And is not this recovery of knowledge, in himself and by himself, recollection (To\ de\ a0nalamba/nein
au0to\n e0n au9tw~| e0pisth/mhn ou0k a0namimnh/skesqai/ e0stin;)?
Meno: Certainly
(Pa/nu
ge).
Socrates:
And must he not have either once acquired or always had the knowledge he now
has (A}r’ ou]n ou0 th\n
e0pisth/mhn, h4n nu=n ou3toj e1xei, h1toi e1labe/ pote h2 a0ei\ ei]xen;)?
Meno: Yes (Nai/).
Socrates: Now
if he always had it (Ou0kou=n ei0 me\n a0ei\ ei]xen), he was always in a state of
knowing (a0ei\ kai\ h[n e0pisth/mwn); and if he acquired it at some time (ei0 de\ e0labe/
pote), he could not have
acquired it in this life (ou0k a2n e1n ge tw~| nu=n bi/w| ei0lhfw_j ei1h). Or has someone taught him geometry
(h2
dedi/daxe/ tij tou=ton gewmetrei=n;)? You see, he can do the same as this with all geometry and
every branch of knowledge (ou[toj ga\r poih/sei peri\ pa/shj gewmetri/aj tau0ta\
tau=ta, kai\ tw~n a1llwn maqhma/twn a9pa/ntwn). Now, can anyone have taught him all this (e1stin ou]n
o3stij au0to\n pa/nta dedi/daxe;),? You ought surely to know (di/kaioj ga/r pou ei] ei0de/nai), especially (a1llwj te ) as he was born and bred in your
home (e0peidh\
e0n th=| sh=| oi0ki/a| ge/gone kai\ te/qraptai).
Meno: Well,
I know that no one has ever taught him (A0ll’ oi]da e1gwge
o3ti ou0dei\j pw&pote e0di/dacen).
Socrates:
And has he these opinions (E!xei de\ tau/taj ta\j do/caj), or has he not (h2 ou0xi/)?
Meno: He
must have them, Socrates, evidently (A0na/gkh, w} Sw&kratej, fai/netai).
Socrates: And
if he did not acquire them in this present life (Ei0 de\ mh\ e0n tw~| nu=m bi/w|
labw&n), is it not
obvious at once (ou0k h1dh tou=to dh=lon) that he had them and learnt them during some other time (o3ti e0n a1llw|
tini\ xro/nw| ei]xe kai\ e0memaqh/kei;)?
Meno:
Apparently (Fai/netai).
Socrates:
And this must have been the time when he was not a human being (Ou0kou=n ou[to/j ge/
e0stin o9 xro/noj, o3t’ ou0k h]n a1nqrwpoj).
Meno: Yes (Nai/).
Socrates: So
if in both of these periods – when he was and when he was not a human being (Ei0 ou]n o3n t’ a2n h]| xro/non
kai\ o3n t’ a2n mh\ h]| a1nqrwpoj) – he has had true opinions in him (e0ne/sontai
au0tw~| a0lhqei=j do/cai)
which have only to have been awakened by questioning to become knowledge (a4 e0rwth/sei e0pegerqei=sai
e0pisth=mai gi/gnontai),
his soul must have had this cognisance throughout all time (a]r’ ou]n to\n a0ei\ xro/non memaqhkui=a e1stai h9
yuxh\ au0tou=;)? For
clearly he has always either been or not been a human being (dh=lon ga\r o3ti to\n
pa/nta xro/non e1stin h2 ou0k e1stin a1nqrwpoj).
Meno: Evidently
(Fai/netai).
Socrates:
And if the truth of all things that are is always in the soul (Ou=kou=n ei0 a0ei\
h9 a0lh/qeia h9mi=n tw~n o1ntwn e0sti\n e0n th=| yuxh=|), then the soul must be immortal (a0qa/natoj a2n h9
yuxh\ ei1h); so that you
should take heart and (w#ste qarrou=nta xrh/), whatever you do not happen to know at present (o9 mh\ tugxa/neij
e0pista/menoj nu=n) –
that is what you do not remember (tou=to d’ e0sti\n o4 mh\
memnhme/noj) – you must endeavour
to search out and recollect (e0pixeirei=n zhtei=n kai\ a0namimnh/skesqai;)?
Meno: What
you say commends itself to me, Socrates (Eu] moi dokei=j le/gein, w} Sw&kratej), I know not how (ou0k oi]d’
o3pwj).
Socrates:
And so it does to me, Meno (Kai\ ga\r e0gw_ e0moi/, w} Me/nwn). Most of the points I have made in
support of my argument are not such as I can confidently assert (kai\ ta\ me/n ge
a1lla ou0k a2n pa/nu u9pe\r tou= lo/gou diisxurisai/mhn); but that the belief in the duty of
inquiring (o3ti d’ oi0o/menoi dei=n zhtei=n) after what we do not know (a4 mh/ tij oi]de) will make us better and braver and
less helpless (belti/ouj a2n ei]men kai\ a0ndrikw&teroi kai\ h3tton
a0rgoi/) than the notion
that there is not even a possibility of discovering what we do not know (h2 ei0 oi0oi/meqa,
a3 mh\ e0pista/meqa, mhde\ dunato\n ei]nai eu9rei=n), nor any duty of inquiring after it
(mhde\
dei=n zhtei=n) – this is
a point for which I am determined to do battle, so far as I am able, both in
word and deed (peri\ tou/tou pa/nu a2n diamaxoi/mhn, ei0 o9io/j t’ ei1hn, kai\
lo/gw| kai\ e1rgw).
Meno: There
also I consider that you speak aright, Socrates (Kai\ tou=to me/n ge dokei=j moi
eu] le/gein, w} Sw&kratej).
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