Meno 4

Towards the end of Meno 3 I quoted Meno’s attack on the very basis of Socrates’ preoccupation with questioning, his looking for virtue, his relentless asking what virtue is:

Meno: Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all (Kai\ ti/na tro/pon zhth/seij, w} Sw&kratej, tou=to, o4 mh\ oi]sqa to\ para/pan o3 ti e1sti;)? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not will you treat us to as the object of your search (poi=on ga\r w{n ou0k oi]sqa proqe/menoj zhth/seij;)? Or supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it (h2 ei0 kai\ o3ti ma/lista e0ntu/xoij au0tw~|), how will you know it is the thing you did not know (pw~j ei1sh| o3ti tou=to/ e0stin, o9 su\ ou0k h|1dhsqa;)? (The Meno 80d5-8, translation W.R.M. Lamb)

Socrates introduced his response to this attack of Meno by liberating it from its personal aspect; Meno’s attack was directed specifically at Socrates; Socrates turned it into attack at any research.  Only then he challenged it, relying on the immortality of the human soul, professed by priests and priestesses ‘who have studied so as to be able to give a reasoned account of their ministry’.

Socrates: I understand the point you would make, Meno (Manqa/nw oi[on bou/lei le/gein, w} Me/nwn). Do you see what a captious argument you are introducing (o9ra|=j tou=ton w(j e0ristiko\n lo/gon kata/geij) – that, forsooth, a man cannot inquire either about what he knows or about what he does not know (w(j ou0k a1ra e1sti zhtei=n a0nqrw&pw| ou1te o4 oi]den ou1te o4 mh\ oi]den)? For he cannot inquire about what he knows (ou1te ga\r a2n o4 te oi]de zhtoi=), because he knows it (oi]de ga/r), and in that case is in no need of inquiry (kai\ ou0de\n dei= tw~| toiou=tw| zhth/sewj); nor again can he inquire about what he does not know (ou1te o4 mh\ oi]den), since he does not know about what he is to inquire (ou0de\ ga\r oi]den o3 ti zhth/sei).

Meno: Now does it seem to you to be a good argument (Ou0kou=n kalw~j soi dokei= le/gesqai o9 lo/goj ou3toj, w} Sw&kratej;)?

Socrates: It does not (Ou0k e1moige).

Meno: Can you explain why not (E!xeij le/gein o3ph|)?

Socrates: I can; for I have heard from wise men and women who told of things divine that (E!gwge ׄ a0kh/koa ga\r a0ndrw~n sofw~n te kai\ gunaikw~n sofw~n peri\ ta\ qei/a pra/gmata) –

Meno: What was it they said (Ti/na lo/gon lego/ntwn)?

Socrates: Something true, as I thought, and admirable (A0leqh=, e1moige dokei=n, kai\ kalo/n).

Meno: What was it (Ti/na tou=ton;)? And who were the speakers (Kai\ ti/nej oi9 le/gontej;)?

Socrates: They were certain priests and priestesses who have studied so as to be able to give a reasoned account of their ministry (Oi9 me\n le/gonte/j ei0si tw~n i9ere/wn te kai\ i9erei/wn o3soij meme/lhke peri\ w{n metaxeiri/zontai lo/gon oi3oij t’ ei]nai dido/nai); and Pindar also and many another poet of heavenly gifts (le/gei de\ kai\ Pi/ndaroj, kai\ a1lloi polloi= tw~n poihtw~n, o3soi qei=oi/ ei0sin). As to their words (a4 de\ le/gousi), they are these (tauti/ e0stin): mark now (a0lla\ sko/pei), if you judge them being true (ei1 soi dokou=sin a0lhqh= le/gein). They say that the soul of man is immortal (fasi\ ga\r th\n yuxh\n tou= a0nqrw&pou ei]nai a0qa/naton), and at one time comes to an end (kai\ tote\ me\n teleuta=|n), which is called dying (o4 dh\ a0poqnh|/skein kalou=si), and at another is born again (tote\ de\ pa/lin gi/gnesqai), but never perishes (a0po/llusqai d’ ou0de/pote). Consequently one ought to live all one’s life in the utmost holiness (dei=n dh\ dia\ tau=ta w(j o9siw&tata diabiw&nai to\n bi/on). For from whomsoever (oi[si ga\r a2n) –

Persephone shall accept requital for ancient wrong, the souls of these she restores in the ninth year to the upper sun again; from these arise glorious kings and men of splendid might and surpassing wisdom, and for all remaining time they are called holy heroes amongst mankind.

Fersefo/na poina\n palaiou\ pe/nqeoj

de/cetai, ei0j to\n u3perqen a3lion kei/nwn e0na/tw| e1tei+

a0ndidoi= yuxa\j pa/lin,

e0k ta=n basilh/ej a0gau/oi

kai\ sqe/nei kraipnoi\ sofi/a| te me/gistoi

a1ndrej au1contai. e0j de\ to\n loipo\n xro/non h3rwej

a9gnoi\ pro\j a9nqrw&pwn kaleu=ntai.

Seeing then that the soul is immortal and has been born many times (A3te ou]n h9 yuxh\ a0qa/nato/j te ou]sa kai\ polla/kij gegonui=a), and has beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms (kai\ e9wrakui=a kai\ ta\ e0nqa/de kai\ ta\ e0n A3idou kai\ pa/nta xrh/mata), she has acquired knowledge of all and everything (ou1k e1stin o3 ti ou0 mema/qhken); so that it is no wonder that she should be able to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and other things (w#ste ou0de\n qaumasto\n kai\ peri\ a0reth=j kai\ peri\ a1llwn oi[o/n t’ ei]nai au0th\n a0namnhsqh=nai). For as all nature is akin (a3te ga\r th=j fu/sewj a9pa/shj suggenou=j ou]shj), and the soul has learned all things (kai\ memaqhkui=aj th=j yuxh=j a3panta), there is no reason why we should not, by remembering but one single thing (ou0de\n kwlu/ei e4n mo/non a0namnhsqe/nta) – an act which men call learning (o4 dh\ ma/qhsin kalou=sin a1nqrwpoi) – discover everything else (ta}lla pa/nta au0to\n a0neurei=n), if we have courage and faint not in this search (e0a/n tij a0ndrei=oj h]| kai\ mh\ a0poka/mnh| zhtw~n); since, it would seem, research and learning are wholly recollection (to\ ga\r zhtei=n a1ra kai\ to\ manqa/nein a0na/mnhsij o3lon e0sti/n). So we must not hearken to that captious argument (ou1koun dei= pei/qesqai tou/tw| tw|~\ e0ristikw~| lo/gw| ): it would make us idle (ou[toj me\n ga\r a2n h9ma=j a0rgou\j poih/seie), and is pleasing only to the indolent ear (kai\ e1sti toi=j malakoi=j tw~n a0nqrw&pwn h9du\j a0kou=sai), whereas the other makes us energetic and inquiring (o3de de\ e0rgatikou/j te kai\ zhthtikou\j poiei=). Putting my trust in its truth (w{| e0gw_ pisteu/wn a0lhqei= ei]nai), I am ready to inquire with you into the nature of virtue (e0qe/lw meta\ sou= zhtei=n a0reth\ o3 ti e1stin).