Meno 3

Meno 2 ended as follows:

Meno: I think that health is the same, both in man and in woman.

Socrates: Then is it not so with size and strength also? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and the same strength? By “the same” I mean that strength does not differ as strength, whether it be in a man or in a woman … And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a woman or in a man?

Meno: I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other cases. (72e2-73a5)

Meno 3 begins with Socrates’ question:

Socrates: Why (Ti/ de/)? Were you not saying that a man’s virtue (ou0k a0ndro\j me\n a0reth\n e1legej) is to manage a state well, and a woman’s a house (po/lin eu] dioikei=n, gunaiko\j de\ oi0ki/an)?

Meno: I was (E!gwge).

Socrates: And is it possible to manage a state well (A]r’ ou]n oi[o/n te eu] dioikei=n h2 po/lin), or a house, or anything at all (h2 oi0ki/an h2 a1llo o9tiou=n), if you do not manage it temperately and justly (mh\ swfro/nwj kai\ dikai/wj dioikou=nta;)?

Meno: Surely not (Ou0 dh=ta).

Socrates: Then whoever manages temperately and justly (Ou0kou=n a1nper dikai/wj kai\ swfr/nwj dioikw~si) will manage with temperance and justice (dikaiosu/nh| kai\ swfrosu/nh| dioikh/sousin)?

Meno: That must be (A0na/gkh).

Socrates: Then both the woman and the man require the same qualities of justice and temperance, if they are to be good (Tw~n au0tw~n a1ra a0mfo/teroi de/ontai, ei1per me/llousin a0gaqoi\ ei]nai, kai\ h9 gu/nh kai\ o9 a0nh/r, dikaiosu/nhj kai\ swfrosu/nhj).

Meno: Evidently (Fai/nontai).

Socrates: And what of a child or an old man (Ti/ de\ pai=j kai\ presbu/thj;)? Can they ever hope to be good if they are intemperate and unjust (mw~n a0ko/lastoi o1ntej kai\ a1dikoi a0gaqoi\ a1n pote genoi=nto;)?

Meno: Surely not (Ou0 dh=ta).

Socrates: Only if they are temperate and just (A0lla\ sw&fronej kai\ di/kaioi)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: So all mankind are good in the same way (Pa/ntej a1r’ a1nqrwpoi tw~| au0tw~| tro/pw| a0gaqoi/ ei0si); for they become good when they acquire the same qualities (tw~n au0tw~n ga\r tuxo/ntej a0gaqoi\ gi/gnontai).

Meno: So it seems (E!oiken).

Socrates: And I presume (Ou0k a2n dh/pou), if they had not the same virtue (ei1 ge mh\ h9 au0th\ a0reth\ h]n au0tw~n), they would not be good in the same way (tw~| au0tw~| a2n tro/pw| a0gaqoi\ h]san).

Meno: No indeed (Ou0 dh=ta).

Socrates: Since it is the same virtue in all cases (E)peidh\ toi/nun h9 au0th\ a0reth\ pa/ntwn e0sti/), try to tell me and recollect (peirw~ ei0pei=n kai\ a0namnhsqh=nai), what Gorgias – and you in agreement with him – say it is (ti/ au0to/ fhsi Gorgi/aj ei=nai kai\ su\ met’ e0kei/nou).

***

As can be seen, Socrates reminds Meno again and again of his avowed adherence to Gorgias’ views; it is a powerful way of liberating Meno from Gorgias. Meno does produce his – and Gorgias’, as he claims – definition of virtue; he hardly could have made a greater faux pas.

***

Meno: Simply that it is the power of governing mankind (Ti/ a1llo g’ h2 a1rxein oi3o/n t’ ei]nai tw~n a0nqrw&pwn;) – if you want some single description to cover all cases (ei1per e3n ge/ ti zhtei=j kata\ pa/ntwn).

Socrates: That is just what I am after (Alla\ mh\n zhtw~ ge). But is virtue the same in a child (a0ll’ a]ra kai\ paido\j h9 au0th\ a0reth/;), Meno (w} Me/nwn), and in a slave  (kai\ dou/lou) – an ability to govern each his master (a1rxein oi3w|& te ei]nai tou= despo/tou)? And do you think that he who governed would still be a slave (kai\ dokei= soi e1ti a2n dou/loj ei]nai o9 a1rxwn;)?

Meno: I should say certainly not (Ou0 pa/nu moi dokei=), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: No, indeed, it would be unlikely (Ou0 ga\r ei0ko/j), my excellent friend (w} a1riste). And again, consider this further point (e1ti ga\r kai\ to/de sko/pei): you say it is “to be able to govern” (a1rxein fh\|j oi3o/n t’ ei]nai); shall we not add to that (ou0 prosqh/somen au0to/se ) – “justly (to\ dikai/wj), not unjustly (a0di/kwj de\ mh/;)”?

Meno: Yes, I think so (Oi]mai e1gwge); for justice (h9 ga\r dikaiosu/nh), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), is virtue (a0reth/ e0stin).

Socrates: Virtue (Po/teron a0reth/), Meno (w} Me/nwn), or a virtue (h2 a0reth/ tij;)?

Meno: What do you mean by that (Pw~j tou=to le/geij;)?

Socrates: What I would in any other case (W(j peri\ a1llou o9touou=n). To take roundness, for instance (oi3on, ei0 bou/lei, stroggulo/thtoj pe/ri); I should call it a figure (ei1poim’ a2n e1gwge, o3ti sxh=ma/ ti/ e0stin), and not figure pure and simple (ou0x ou3twj a9plw_j o3ti sxh=ma). And I should name it so (dia\ tau=ta de\ ou3twj a2n ei1poimi) because there are other figures as well (o3ti kai\ a1lla e1sti sxh/mata).

Meno: You would be quite right (O)rqw~j ge le/gwn su/) – just as I say (e0pei\ kai\ e0gw_ le/gw) there are other virtues besides justice (ou0 mo/non dikaiosu/nhn a0lla\ kai\ a1llaj ei]nai a0reta/j).

***

Apparently, Meno threw overboard his moments of uncertainty, patting Socrates on his shoulder from within his original definition of justice: ‘at last Socrates began to see the light, accepting the fundamental framework of Meno’s original definition of justice’. But Meno’s regaining self-assurance was to be short-lived.

***

Socrates: What are they (Ti/naj tau/taj)? Tell me (ei0pe/). In the same way as I can tell you of other figures (oi[on kai\ e0gw/ soi ei1poimi a2n kai\ a1lla sxh/mata), if you request me (ei1 me keleu/oij), so do you tell me of other virtues (kai\ su\ ou]n e0moi\ ei0pe\ a1llaj a0reta/j).’

Meno: Well then, courage, I consider, is a virtue (H( a0ndrei/a toi/nun e1moige dokei= a0reth\ ei]nai), and temperance (kai\ swfrosu/nh) and wisdom (kai\ sofi/a), and loftiness of mind (kai\ megalopre/peia); and there are a great many others (kai\ a1llai pa/mpollai).

Socrates: Once more (Pa/lin), Meno (w} Me/nwn), we are in the same plight (tau0to\n pepo/nqamen): again we have found a number of virtues (polla\j au] hu9rh/kamen a0reta\j) when we are looking for one (mi/an zhtou=ntej), though not in the same way as we did just now (a1llo\n tro/pon h2 nundh/); but the one (th\n de\ mi/an) that runs through them all (h4 dia\ pa/ntwn tou/twn e0sti/n), this we are not able to find (ou0 duna/meqa a0neurei=n).

Meno: No, for I am not able (Ou0 ga\r dunamai/ pw), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), to follow your line of search (w(j su\ zhtei=j), and find a single virtue common to all (mi/an a0reth\n labei=n kata\ pa/ntwn), as one can in other cases (w#sper e0n toi=j a1lloij).

***

Socrates responds to Meno’s admission of failure with an encouragement.

***

Socrates: And no wonder (Ei0ko/twj ge); but I will make an effort (a0ll’ e0gw_ proqumh/somai), so far as I can (e0a\n oi[o/j t’ w}), to help us onward (h9ma=j probiba/sai). You understand, of course (manqa/neij ga/r pou), that this principle applies to anything (o3ti ou9twsi\ e1xei peri\ panto/j): if someone asked you the question (ei1 ti/j se a0ne/roito tou=to) I put to you just now (o4 nundh\ e0gw_ e1legon): What is figure (ti/ e0sti sxh=ma), Meno (w} Me/nwn)? and you replied: Roundness (ei0 au0tw~| ei]pej o3ti stroggulo/thj); and then he said as I did (ei1 soi ei]pen a3per e0gw&): Is roundness figure or a figure (po/teron sxh=ma h9 stroggulo/thj e0sti\n h2 sxh=ma/ ti)? I suppose you would answer: A figure (ei]pej dh/pou a2n o3ti sxh=ma/ ti).

Meno: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: And for this reason (Ou0kou=n dia\ tau=ta) – that there are other figures as well (o3ti kai\ a1lla e1sti sxh/mata)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: And if he went on to ask you of what sort they were (Kai\ ei1 ge prosanhrw&ta se o9poi/a), you would tell him (e1legej a1n).

Meno: I would (E!gwge).

Socrates: And if he asked likewise what colour is (Kai\ au] ei0 peri\ xrw&matoj w(sau/twj a0nh/reto o3 ti e1sti), and on your answering “white” (kai\ ei0po/ntoj sou, o3ti to\ leuko/n) your questioner then rejoined (meta\ tau=ta u9pe/laben o9 e0rwtw~n): is “white” colour or a colour (po/teron to\ leuko\n xrw~ma/ e0stin h2 xrw~ma/ ti)? your reply would be (ei]pej a1n): A colour (o3ti xrw~ma/ ti); because there are other colours besides (dio/ti kai\ a1lla tugxa/nei o1nta).

Meno: It would (E!gwge).

Socrates: And if he bade you mention other colours (Kai\ ei1 ge/ se e0ke/leue le/gein a1lla xrw&mata), you would tell him of others (e1legej a2n a1lla) that are colours just as much as white (a4 ou0de\n h[tton tugxa/nei o1nta xrw&mata tou= leukou=;)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: Now suppose that, like me, he pursued the argument (Ei0 ou]n w#sper e0gw_ meth/|ei to\n lo/gon) and said: We are always arriving at a variety of things (kai\ e1legen o3ti a0ei\ ei0j polla\ a0fiknou/meqa), but let me have no more of that (a1lla\ mh/ moi ou3twj): since you call these many things by one single name (a0ll’ e0peidh\ ta\ polla\ tau=ta e9ni/ tini prosagoreu/eij o0no/mati), and say they are figures, every one of them (kai\ fh\|j ou0de\n au0tw~n o3 ti ou0 sxh=ma ei]nai), even when they are opposed to one another (kai\ tau=ta kai\ e0nanti/a o1nta a0llh/loij), tell me what is that which comprises round and straight alike, and which you call figure – including straight equally with round under that term (o3 ti e1sti tou=to, o4 ou0de\n h3tton kate/xei to\ stroggu/lon h2 to\ eu0qu/, o3 dh\ o0noma/zeij sxh=ma kai\ ou0de\n ma=llon fh\|j to\ stroggu/lon sxh=ma ei]nai h2 to eu0qu/;). For that is your statement, is it not (h2 ou0x ou3tw le/geij;)?

Meno: It is (E!gwge).

Socrates: And in making it (A]r’ ou]n, o3tan ou3tw le/gh|j), do you mean to say that round is no more round than straight (to/te ou0de\n ma=llon fh\|j to\ stroggu/lon ei]nai stroggu/lon h1 eu0qu/), or straight no more straight than round (ou0de\ to\ eu0qu\ eu0qu\ ma=llon h1 stroggu/lon;)?

Meno: No, to be sure, Socrates (Ou0 dh/pou, w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: What you mean is that the round shape is no more a figure than the straight (A0lla\ mh\n sxh=ma/ ge ou0de\n ma=llon fh\|j ei]nai to\ stroggu/lon tou= eu0qe/oj), or the straight no more than the round (ou0de\ to\ e3teron tou= e9te/rou).

Meno: Quite right (A0lhqh= le/geij).

Socrates: Then what can this be, which bears the name of figure (Ti/ pote ou]n tou=to, ou[ tou=to o1noma/ e0sti, to sxh=ma;)? Try and tell me (peirw~ le/gein). Suppose that, on being asked this question by someone, either about figure or about colour, you had replied (ei0 ou]n tw~| e0rwtw~nti ou3twj h2 peri\ sxh/matoj h2 xrw&matoj ei]pej o3ti). Why, I do not as much as understand what do you want, sir (a0ll’ ou0de\ manqa/nw e1gwge o3 ti bou/lei, w} a1nqrwpe), or even know what you are saying (ou0de\ oi]da o3 ti le/geij): he might well have shown surprise, and said (i1swj a2n e0qau/mase kai\ ei]pen): Do you not understand (ou0 manqa/neij) that I am looking for that which is the same common element in all these things (o3ti zhtw~ to\ e0pi\ pa=si tou/toij tau0to/n;)? Or would you still be unable to reply, Meno, if you were approached on these terms (h2 ou0de\ e0pi\ tou/toij, w} Me/nwn, e1xoij a2n ei0pei=n ), and were asked (ei1 tij e0rwtw&h): What is it that is common to the round and the straight and everything else that you call figures – the same in all (ti/ e0stin e0pi\ tw~| stroggu/lw| kai\ eu0qei= kai\ e0pi\ toi=j a1lloij, a3 dh\ sxh/mata kalei=j, tau0to\n e0pi\ pa=si;)? Try and tell me (peirw~ ei0pei=n); it will be good practice for your answer about virtue (i3na kai\ ge/nhtai/ soi mele/th pro\j th\n peri\ th=j a0reth=j a0po/krisin).

Meno: No (Mh/), it is you who must answer, Socrates (a0lla\ su/, w} Sw&kratej, ei0pe/).

Socrates: You wish me to do you the favour (Bou/lei soi xari/swmai;)?

Meno: By all means (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: And then you will agree to take your turn and answer me on virtue (E)qelh/seij ou]n kai\ su\ e0moi\ ei0pei=n peri\ th=j a0reth=j;)?

Meno: I will (E1gwge).

Socrates: Well then, I must make the effort (Proqumhte/on toi/nun), for it is worth our while (a1cion ga/r).

Meno: Certainly (Pa/nu me\n ou]n).

Socrates: Come now, let me try and tell you what figure is (Fe/re dh/, peirw&meqa/ soi ei0pei=n, ti/ e0sti sxh=ma). Just consider if you accept this description of it (sko/pei ou]n ei0 to/de a0pode/xh| au0to\ ei]nai): figure, let us say, is the only existing thing that is found always following colour (e1stw ga\r dh\ h(mi=n tou=to sxh=ma, o9 mo/non tw~n o1ntwn tugxa/nei xrw/mati a0ei\ e9po/menon). Are you satisfied (i9kanw&j soi), or are you looking for something different (h2 a1llwj pwj zhtei=j;)? I am sure I should be content with a similar account of virtue from you (e0gw_ ga\r ka2n ou3twj a0gapw&|hn ei1 moi a0reth\n ei1poij).

Meno: But it is such a silly one, Socrates (A0lla\ tou=to/ ge eu1hqej, w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: How do you mean (Pw~j le/geij;)?

Meno: Well, figure, as I understand by your account, is what always follows colour (O#ti sxh=ma/ pou/ e0sti kata\ to\n so\n lo/gon, o4 a0ei\ xro/a| e3petai). Very good (ei]en); but if someone said he did not know colour (ei0 de\ dh\ th\n xro/an tij mh\ fai/h ei0de/nai), and was in the same difficulty about it as about figure (a0lla\ w(sau/twj a0poroi= w#sper peri\ tou= sxh/matoj), what answer do you suppose would have come from you (ti/ a2n oi1ei soi a0pokekri/sqai;)?

Socrates: The truth, from me (Ta0lhqh= e1gwge); and if my questioner were a professor of the eristic and contentious sort (kai\ ei0 me/n ge tw~n sofw~n tij ei1h kai\ e0ristikw~n te kai\ a0gwnistikw~n o9 e0ro/menoj), I should say to him (ei1poim’ a2n au0tw~| o3ti): I have made my statement (e0moi\ me\n ei1rhtai); if it is wrong your business is to examine and refute it (ei0 de\ mh\ o0rqw~j le/gw, so\n e1rgon lamba/nein lo/gon kai\ e0le/gxein). But if, like you and me on this occasion, we were friends and chose to have a discussion together (ei0 de\ w#sper e0gw& te kai\ su\ nuni\ filoi\ o1ntej bou/lointo a1llh/loij diale/gesqai), I should have to reply in some milder tone more suited to dialectic (dei= dh\ pra|o/tero/n pwj kai\ dialektikw&teron a0pokri/nesqai). The more dialectical way, I suppose, is not merely to answer what is true (e1sti de\ i1swj to\ dialektikw&teron mh\ mo/non ta0lhqh= a0pokri/nesqai), but also to make use of those points which the questioned person acknowledges he knows (a0lla\ kai\ di’ e0kei/nwn w{n a2n prosomologh=| ei0de/nai o9 e0rwtw&menoj). And this is the way in which I shall now try to argue with you (peira/somai dh\ kai\ e0gw& soi ou3twj ei0pei=n). Tell me (le/ge ga/r moi), is there something you call an end (teleuth\n kalei=j ti;)? Such a thing, I mean, as a limit or extremity (toio/nde le/gw oi[on pe/raj kai\ e1sxaton) – I use all these terms in the same sense (pa/nta tau=ta tau0to\n ti le/gw), though I may say Prodicus might quarrel with us (i1swj d’ a1n h9mi=n Pro/dikoj diafe/roito). But you, I am sure (a0lla\ su/ ge/ pou), refer to a thing as terminated or ended (kalei=j pepera/nqai ti kai\ teteleuthke/nai): something of that sort is what I mean (to\ toiou=ton bou/lomai le/gein) – nothing complicated (ou0de\n poiki/lon).

Meno: Yes, I do (A0lla\ kalw~), and I think I grasp your meaning (kai\ oi]mai manqa/nein  o3 le/geij).

Socrates: Well then (Ti/ d’), you speak of a surface (e0pi/pedon kalei=j ti), and also of a solid (kai\ e3teron au] stereo/n) – the terms employed in geometrical problems (oi[on tau=ta ta\ e0n gewmetri/aij;)?

Meno: I do (E!gwge kalw~).

Socrates: So now you are able to comprehend from all this what I man by figure (H!dh toi/nun a2n ma/qoij mou e0k tou/twn, sxh=ma o4 le/gw). In every instance of figure I call that figure in which the solid ends (kata\ ga\r panto\j sxh/matoj tou=to le/gw, ei0j o4 to\ stereo\n perai/nei, tou=t’ ei]nai sxh=ma); and I may put it more succinctly by saying that figure is “limit of solid” (o3per a2n sullabw_n ei1poimi stereou= pe/raj sxh=ma ei]nai).

Meno: And what do you say of colour, Socrates (To\ de\ xrw~ma ti/ le/geij, w} Sw&kratej;)?

Socrates: How overbearing of you, Meno (U(bristh/j g’ ei], w} Me/nwn), to press an old man with demands for answers, when you will not trouble yourself to recollect and tell me what account Gorgias gives of virtue (a0ndri\ presbu/th| pra/gmata prosta/tteij a0pokri/nesqai, au0to\j de\ ou0k e0qe/leij a0namnhsqei\j ei0pei=n, o3 ti/ pote le/gei Gorgi/aj a0reth\n ei]nai)!

Meno: When you have answered my question, Socrates (A0ll’ e0peida/n moi su\ tou=t’ ei1ph|j, w} Sw&kratej), I will answer yours (e0rw~ soi).

Socrates: One might tell even blindfolded, Meno (Ka2n kekalumme/noj tij gnoi/h, w} Me/nwn), by the way you discuss (dialegome/nou sou), that you are handsome (o3ti kalo\j ei]) and still have lovers  (kai\ e0rastai/ soi e1ti ei0si/n).

Meno: Why so (Ti/ de/;)?

Socrates: Because you invariably speak in a peremptory tone (O(ti oude\n a0ll’ h2 e0pita/tteij e0n toi=j lo/goij), after the fashion of spoilt beauties (o3per poiou=sin oi( trufw~ntej), holding as they do a despotic power (a3te turanneu/ontej) so long as their bloom is on them (e3wj a2n e0n w#ra| w}si). You have also, I dare say, made a note of my weakness for handsome people (kai\ a3ma e0mou= i1swj kate/gnwkaj, o3ti ei0mi\ h3ttwn tw~n kalw~n). So I will indulge you and answer (xariou=mai ou]n soi kai\ a0pokrinou=mai).

Meno: You must certainly indulge me (Pa/nu me\n ou]n xa/risai).

Socrates: Then would you like me to answer you in the manner of Gorgias (Bou/lei ou]n soi kata\ Gorgi/an a)pokri/nwmai), which you would find easiest to follow (h[| a2n su\ ma/lista a0kolouqh/saij;)?

Meno: I should like that (Bou/lomai), of course (pw~j ga\r ou1).

Socrates: Do not both of you say there are certain effluences of existing things, as Empedocles held (Ou0kou=n le/gete a0porroa\j tina\j tw~n o1ntwn kata\ E)mpedokle/a;)?

Meno: Certainly (Sfo/dra ge).

Socrates: And passages (Kai\ po/rouj) into which and through which the effluences pass (ei0j ou4j kai\ di’ w{n ai9 a0porroai\ poreu/ontai;)?

Meno: To be sure (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: And some of the effluences fit into various passages (Kai\ tw~n a0porrow~n ta\j me\n a9rmo/ttein e0ni/oij tw~n porw~n), while some are too small or too large (ta\j de\ e0la/ttouj h2 mei/zouj ei]nai;)?

Meno: That is so (e1sti tau=ta).

Socrates: And further, there is what you call sight (Ou0kou=n kai\ o1yin kalei=j ti)?

Meno: Yes (E!gwge).

Socrates: So now “conceive my meaning,” (e0k tou/twn dh\ cu/nej o3 toi le/gw) as Pindar says (e1fh Pi/ndaroj): colour is an effluence of figures (e1sti ga\r xro/a a0porroh\ sxhma/twn), commensurate with sight and sensible (o1yei su/mmetroj kai\ ai0sqhto/j).

Meno: Your answer, Socrates, seems to me excellently put (A1rista/ moi dokei=j, w} Sw&kratej, tau/thn th\n a0po/krisin ei0rhke/nai).

Socrates: Yes, for I expect you find its terms familiar (I!swj ga/r soi kata\ sunh/qeian ei1rhtai); and at the same time (kai\ a3ma) I fancy (oi]mai) you observe (e0nnoei=j) that it enables you to tell what sound and smell are (o3ti e1xoij a2n e0c au0th=j ei0pei=n kai\ fwnh/n, o4 e1sti, kai\ o0smh/n), and numerous other things of the kind (kai\ a1lla polla\ tw~n toiou/twn).

Meno: Certainly (Pa/nu me\n ou]n).

Socrates: It is an answer in the high poetic style, Meno (Tragikh\ ga/r e0stin), and so more agreeable to you (w#ste a0re/skei soi ma=llon) than that about the figure (h2 h9 peri\ tou= sxh/matoj).

Meno: Yes, it is (E!moige).

Socrates: But yet, son of Alexidemus, I am inclined to think the other was the better of the two (A0ll’ ou0k e1stin, w} pai= Alecidh/mou, w(j e0gw_ e0mauto\n pei/qw, a0ll’ e0kei=nh belti/wn); and I believe you should prefer it (oi]mai de\ ou0d’ a1n soi do/cai), if you were not compelled, as you were saying yesterday, to go away before the mysteries (e0 mh/, w#sper xqe\j e1legej, a0nagkai=o/n soi a0pie/nai pro\ tw~n musthri/wn), and could stay awhile and be initiated (a0ll’ ei0 perimei/naij te kai\ muhqei/hj).

***

What mysteries? Certainly not those in Eleusis. The Phaedran Palinode may give us the answer:

‘Of that place beyond the heavens none of our earthly poets has yet sung, and none shall thing worthily … It is there that true Being dwells, without colour or shape, that cannot be touched; reason alone, the soul’s pilot, can behold it, and all true knowledge is knowledge thereof. Now even as the mind of god is nourished by reason and knowledge, so also it is with every soul that has a care to receive its proper food (Phaedrus 247c3-d3) … the philosopher alone … is ever near in memory to those things a god’s nearness thereunto makes him truly god. (249c3-6, translation R. Hackforth.)

***

Meno: But I should stay, Socrates (A0lla\ perime/noim’ a1n, w} Sw&kratej), if you would give me many such answers (ei1 moi polla\ toiau=ta le/goij).

Socrates: Well then (A0lla\ mh/n), I will spare no endeavour (proqumi/aj ge ou0de\n a0polei/yw), both for your sake (kai\ sou= e3neka) and for my own (kai\ e0mautou=), to continue in that style (le/gwn toiau=ta); but I fear I may not succeed in keeping for long on that level (a0ll’ o3pwj mh\ ou0x’ oi[o/j t’ e1somai polla\ toiau=ta le/gein).

***

It is important to note that Meno is willing to stay if Socrates is going to make it worth his while, and Socrates is willing to do his best to make Meno stay, and be initiated into philosophic mysteries.

***

But come now (a0ll’ i1qi dh/), you in your turn must try and fulfil your promise (peirw~ kai\ su\ e0moi\ th\n u9po/sxesin a0podou=nai) by telling me what virtue is in a general way (kata\ o3lou ei0pw_n a0reth=j pe/ri, o3 ti e1sti); and you must stop producing a plural from a singular (kai\ pau=sai polla\ poiw~n e0k tou= e9no/j), as the wags say whenever one breaks something (o3per fasi\ tou=j sunti/bonta/j ti e9ka/stote oi9 skw/ptontej), but leave virtue whole and sound (a0ll’ e0a/saj o3lhn kai\ u9gih=), and tell me what it is (ei0pe\ ti/ e0stin a0reth/), The pattern you have now got from me (ta\ de/ ge parade/igmata par’ e0mou= ei1lhfaj).

Meno: Well, in my view, Socrates, virtue is (Dokei= ou]n moi, w} Sw&kratej, a0reth\ ei]nai), in the poet’s words (kaqa/per o9 poihth\j le/gei) “to rejoice in things honourable, and be able for them” (xai/rein te kaloi=si kai\ du/nasqai); and that, I say, is virtue (kai\ e9gw_ tou=to le/gw a0reth/n) – to desire what is honourable (e0piqumou=nta tw~n kalw~n) and be able to procure it (dunato\n ei]nai pori/zesqai).

Socrates: Do you say that he who desires the honourable (A0ra le/geij to\n tw~n kalw~n e0piqumou=nta) is desirous of good (a0gaqw~n e0piqumhth\n ei]nai;)?

Meno: Certainly (Ma/lista/ ge).

Socrates: Implying that there are some who desire the evil (A]ra w(j o1ntwn tinw~n oi4 tw~n kakw~n e0piqumou=sin), and others the good (e9te/rwn de\ oi4 tw~n a0gaqw~n)? Do not all men (ou0 pa/ntej), in your opinion, my dear sir, desire the good (w!riste, dokou=si/ soi tw~n a0gaqw~n e0piqumei=n;)?

Meno: I think not (Ou0k e1moige).

Socrates: There are some who desire the evil (A0lla/ tinej tw~n kakw~n;)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: Thinking the evil to be good, do you mean, or actually recognising it to be evil, and desiring it nevertheless (Oi0o/menoi ta\ kaka\ a0gaqa\ ei]nai, le/geij, h2 kai\ gignw&skontej, o3ti kaka/ e0stin, o3mwj e0piqumou=si au0tw~n;)?

Meno: Both, I believe (A0mfo/tera, e1moige dokei=).

Socrates: Do you really believe, Meno, that a man knows the evil to be evil (H} ga\r dokei= ti/j soi w} Me/nwn, gignw&skwn ta\ kaka\ o3ti kaka/ e0stin), and still desires it (o3mwj e0piqumei=n au0tw~n;)?

Meno: Certainly (Ma/lista).

Socrates: What do you mean by “desires” (Ti/ e0piqumei=n le/geij)? Desires the possession of it (h] gene/sqai au0tw~|)?

Meno: Yes (Gene/sqai); what else could it be (ti/ ga\r a1llo;)?

Socrates: And does he think the evil benefits him who gets it (Po/teron h9gou/menoj ta1 kaka\ w)felei=n e0kei=non w{| a2n ge/nhtai), or does he know that it harms him who has it (h2 gignw&skwn ta\ kaka\ o3ti bla/ptei w{| a2n parh=|;)?

Meno: There are some who think the evil is a benefit (Ei0si/ me\n oi4 h9gou/menoi ta\ kaka\ w)felei=n), and others who know that it does harm (ei0si\ de\ kai\ oi9 gignw&skontej o3ti bla/ptei).

Socrates: And, in your opinion, do those who think the evil a benefit know that it is evil (H} kai\ dokou/si/ soi gignw&skein ta\ kaka/, o3ti kaka/ e0stin, oi9 h9gou/menoi kaka\ w)felei=n;)?

Meno: I do not think that at all (Ou0 pa/nu moi dokei= tou=to/ ge).

Socrates: Obviously those who are ignorant of the evil do not desire it, but only what they supposed to be good, though it is really evil (Ou0kou=n dh=lon o3ti ou[toi me\n ou0 tw~n kakw~n e0piqumou=sin, oi9 a0gnoou=ntej au0ta/, a0lla\ e0kei/nwn, a4 w|!onto a1gaqa\ ei]nai, e1sti de\ tau=ta/ ge kaka/); so that those who are ignorant of it (w#ste oi9 a0gnoou=ntej au0ta/) and think it good (kai\ oi0o/menoi a0gaqa\ ei]nai) are really desiring the good (dh=lon o3ti tw~n a0gaqw~n e0piqumou=sin). Is not that so (h2 ou1;)?

Meno: It would seem to be so in their case (Kinduneu/ousin ou[toi/ ge).

Socrates: Well now (Ti/ de/;), I presume those who, as you say, desire the evil (oi0 tw~n kakw~n me\n e0piqumou/ntej, w(j fh\|j su/), and consider that the evil harms him who gets it (h9gou/menoi de\ ta\ kaka\ bla/ptein e0kei=non, w{| a2n gi/gnhtai ), know that they will be harmed by it (gignw&skousi dh/pou o3ti blabh/sotai u9p’ au0tw~n;)?

Meno: They needs must (A0na/gkh).

Socrates: But do they not hold that those who are harmed are miserable (A9lla\ tou\j blaptome/nouj ou[toi ou0k oi1ontai a0qli/ouj ei]nai) in proportion to the harm they suffer (kaq’ o3son bla/ptontai;)?

Meno: That too must be (Kai\ tou=to a0na/gkh).

Socrates: And are not the miserable ill-starred (Tou\j de\ a0qli/ouj ou0 kakodai/monaj)?

Meno: I think so (Oi]mai e1gwge).

Socrates: Then is there anyone wo wishes to be miserable and ill-starred (E!stin ou]n o3stij bou/letai a1qlioj kai\ kakodai/mwn ei]nai;)?

Meno: I do not suppose there is, Socrates (Ou1 moi dokei=, w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: No one, then, Meno, desires evil, if no one desires to be such a one (Ou0k a1ra bou/letai, w} Me/nwn, ta\ kaka\ ou0dei/j, ei1per mh\ bou/letai toiou/toj ei]nai): for what is being miserable (ti/ ga\r a1llo e0sti\n a1qlion ei]nai) but desiring evil and obtaining it (h2 e0piqumei=n te tw~n kakw~n kai\ kta=sqai)?

Meno: It seems that what you say is true, Socrates (Kinduneu/eij a0lhqh= le/gein, w} Sw&kratej), and that nobody desires evil (kai\ ou0dei\j bou/letai ta\ kaka/).

Socrates: Well now, you were saying a moment ago that virtue is a desire and ability for good (Ou0kou=n nu=n dh\ e1legej, o3ti e1stin h9 a0reth\ bou/lesqai/ te ta0gaqa\ kai\ du/nasqai;)?

Meno: Yes, I was (Ei]pon ga/r).

Socrates: One part of the statement – the desire – belongs to our common nature (Ou0kou=n tou= lexqe/ntoj to\ me\n bou/lesqai pa=sin u9pa/rxei), and in this respect one man is no better than another (kai\ tau/th| ge ou0de\n o9 e3teroj tou= e9te/rou belti/wn )?

Meno: Apparently (Fai/netai).

Socrates: But it is plain that if one man is not better than another in this (A0lla\ dh=lon o3ti, ei1per e0sti\ belti/wn a1lloj a1llou), he must be superior in the ability (kata\ to\ du/nasqai a2n ei1h a0mei/nwn).

Meno: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: Then virtue, it seems by your account, is ability to produce goods (Tou=t’ e1stin a1ra, w(j e1oike, kata\ to\n so\n lo/gon a0reth/, du/namij tou= pori/zesqai a0gaqa/).

Meno: I entirely agree, Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter (Panta/pasi/ moi dokei=, w} Sw&kratej, ou3twj e1xein, w(j su\ nu=n u9polamba/neij).

Socrates: Then let us see whether your statement is true in another respect (I!dwmen dh\ kai\ tou=to ei0 a0lhqe\j le/geij); for very likely you may be right (i1swj ga\r a2n eu] le/goij). You say virtue is the ability to procure goods (ta0gaqa\ fh|\j oi[o/n t’ ei]nai pori/zesqai a0reth\n ei]nai)?

Meno: I do (E!gwge).

Socrates: And do you not mean by goods such things as health and wealth (A0gaqa\ de\ kalei=j ou0xi\ oi[on h9gi/eia/n te kai\ plou=ton;)?

Meno: Yes, and I include the acquisition of gold and silver, and of state honours and offices (Kai\ xrusi/on le/gw kai\ a0rgu/rion kta=sqai kai\ tima\j e0n po/lei kai\ a0rxa/j).

Socrates: Are there any things besides this sort, that you class as goods (Mh\ a1ll’ a1tta le/geij ta0gaqa\ h1 ta\ toiau=ta)?

Meno: No, I refer only to everything of that sort (Ou1k, a0lla\ pa/nta le/gw ta\ toiau=ta).

Socrates: Very well: procuring gold and silver is virtue, according to Meno, the ancestral friend of the Great King (Ei]en ׄ xrusi/on de\ dh\ kai\ a1rgu/rion pori/zesqai a0reth/ e0stin, w#j fhsi Me/nwn o9 tou= mega/lou basile/wj patriko\j ce/noj). Tell me, do you add to such procurement, Meno (po/teron prostiqei=j tou/tw| tw|~ po/rw|, w} Me/nwn), that it is to be done justly and piously (to\ dikai/wj kai o9si/wj), or is this indifferent to you (h2 ou0de/n soi diafe/rei), but even though a man procures these things unjustly (a0lla\ ka2n a0di/kwj tij au0ta\ pori/zhtai), do you call them virtue all the same (o9moi/wj su\ au0ta\ a0reth\n kalei=j;)?

Meno: Surely not, Socrates (Ou0 dh/pou, w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: Rather, vice (A0lla\ kaki/an;).

Meno: Yes, of course (Pa/ntwj dh/pou).

Socrates: Then it seems (Dei= a1ra, w)j e1oike) that justice or temperance or holiness or some other part of virtue must accompany the procuring of these things (tou/tw| tw~| po/rw| dikaiosu/nhn h2 swfrosu/nhn h2 o9sio/thta prosei/nai, h2 a1llo ti mo/rion a0reth=j): otherwise (ei0 de\ mh/) it will not be virtue (ou0k e1stai a0reth/), though it provides one with goods (kai/per e0kpori/zousa ta0gaqa/).
Meno: Yes, for how without these could it be virtue (Pw~j ga\r a1neu tou/twn a0reth\ ge/noit’ a2n;)?

Socrates: And not to procure gold and silver (To\ de\ mh\ e0kpori/zein xrusi/on kai\ a0rgu/rion), when it would be unjust (o3tan mh\ di/kaion h}|), either for oneself or for another (mh/te au9tw~| mh/te a1llw|) – what we call the want of such things – is virtue, is it not (ou0k a0reth\ kai\ au3th e0sti\n h9 a0pori/a;)?

Meno: Apparently (Fai/netai).

Socrates: So the procuring of this sort of goods will be no more virtue than the want of them (Ou0d\en a1ra ma=llon o9 po/roj tw~n toiou/twn a0gaqw~n h2 h9 a0pori/a a0reth\ a2n ei1h); but it seems that whatever comes accompanied by justice will be virtue (a0lla\, w(j e1oiken, o4 me\n a2n meta\  dikaiosu/nhj gi/gnhtai, a0reth\ e1stai), but whatever comes without any such quality, vice (o4 d’ a2n a1neu pa/ntwn tw~n toiou/twn, kaki/a).

Meno: I agree that it must be as you say (Dokei= moi a0nagkai=on ei]nai w(j le/geij).

Socrates: And were we saying a little while ago that each of these things was a part of virtue (Ou0kou=n tou/twn e3kaston o0li/gon pro/teron mo/rion a0reth=j e1famen ei]nai) – justice and temperance and the rest of them (th\n dikaiosu/nhn kai\ swfrosu/nhn kai\ pa/nta ta\ toiau=ta;)?

Meno: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: And here you are, Meno, making fun of me (Ei]ta, w} Me/nwn, pai/zeij pro/j me;)?

Meno: How so, Socrates (Ti/ dh/, w} Sw&kratej;)?

Socrates: Because after my begging you (O#ti a1rti e0mou= dehqe/ntoj sou) not to brake up virtue into small change (mh\ katagnu/nai mhde\ kermati/zein th\n a0reth/n), and giving you a pattern on which you should answer (kai\ do/ntoj parade/igmata kaq’ a4 de/oi a0pokri/nesqai), you have ignored all this (tou/tou me\n h0me/lhsaj), and now tell me (le/geij de/ moi) that virtue is the ability to procure things with justice (o3ti a0reth/ e0stin oi[o/n t’ ei]nai ta0gaqa\ pori/zesqai meta\ dikaiosu/nhj); and this, you tell me, is a part of virtue (tou=to de\ fh\|j mo/rion a0reth=j ei]nai;)?

Meno: I do (E!gwge).

Socrates: Then it follows (Ou0kou=n sumbai/nei) from your own admission (e0c w{n su\ o9mologei=j) that doing whatever one does with a part of virtue is itself virtue (to\ meta\ mori/ou a0reth=j pra/ttein, o3 ti a2n pra/tth|, tou=to a0reth\n ei]nai); for you say that justice is a part of virtue (th\n ga\r dikaiosu/nhn mo/rion fh\|j a0reth=j ei]nai), and so is each of such qualities (kai\ e3kasta tou/twn). You ask the meaning of my remark (ti/ ou]n dh\ tou=to le/gw;). It is that after my requesting you to speak of virtue as a whole (o3ti e0mou= dehqe/ntoj o3lon ei0pei=n th\n a0reth/n), you say not a word as to what it is in itself (au0th\n me\n pollou= dei=j ei0pei=n o3 ti e1sti), but tell me that every action is virtue provided that it is done with part of a virtue (pa=san de\ fh\|j pra=cin a0reth\n ei]nai, e0a\n meta\ mori/ou a0reth=j pra/tthtai); as though you had told me (w#sper ei0rhkw_j) what virtue is in the whole (o3 ti a0reth/ e0sti to o3lon), and I must understand it forthwith (kai\ h1dh gnwsome/nou e0mou=) – when you are really splitting it into fragments (kai\ e0a\n su\ katakermati/zh|j au0th\n kata\ mo/ria)! I think therefore that you must face the same question all over again, my dear Meno – What is virtue? (dei=tai ou]n soi pa/lin e0c a0rxh=j, w(j e0moi\ dokei=, th=j au0th=j e0rwth/sewj, w} fi/le Me/nwn, ti/ e0stin a0reth/) – if we are to be told that every action accompanied by a part of virtue is virtue (ei0 meta\ mori/ou a0reth=j pa=sa pra=cij a0reth\ a2n ei1h;); for that is the meaning of the statement that every action accompanied by justice is virtue (tou=to ga/r e0sti le/gein, o3tan le/gh| tij, o3ti pa=sa h9 meta\ dikaiosu/nhj pra=cij a0reth/ e0stin). Or do you not agree that you have to meet the same question afresh (h2 ou0 dokei= soi pa/lin dei=sqai th=j au=th=j e0rwth/sewj, a0ll’ oi1ei tina ei0de/nai mo/rion a0reth=j o1ti e1stin, au=th\n mh\ eido/ta;)?

Meno: No, I do not (Ou0k e1moige dokei=).

Socrates: And I daresay you remember (ei0 ga\r kai\ me/mnhsai), when I answered you a while ago about figure (o3t’ e0gw& soi a1rti a0pekrina/mhn peri\ tou= sxh/matoj), how we rejected the sort of answer that attempts to proceed in terms which are still under inquiry and has not yet been admitted (a0peba/llome/n pou th\n toiau/thn a0po/krisin th\n dia\ tw~n e1ti zhtoume/nwn kai\ mh/pw w(mologhme/nwn e0pixeirou=san a0pokri/nesqai).

Meno: Yes, and we were right in rejecting it, Socrates (Kai\ o0rqw~j ge a0peba/llomen, w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: Well then, my good sir, you must in your turn suppose that while the nature of virtue as a whole is still under inquiry you will explain it to anyone by replying in terms of its parts (Mh\ toi/nun, w} a1riste, mhde\ su\ e1ti zhtoume/nhj a0reth=j o3lhj o3 ti e1stin oi1ou dia\ tw~n tau/thj mori/wn a0pokrino/menoj dhlw&sein au0th\n o9tw|ou=n), or by any other statement on the same line (h2 a1llo o9tiou=n tou/tw| tw~| au0tw~| tro/pw| le/gwn): you will only have to face the same question all over again (a0lla\ pa/lin th=j au0th=j deh/sesqai e0rwth/sewj) – What is this virtue, of which you are speaking all the time (ti/noj o1ntoj a0reth=j le/geij a4 le/geij)? Or do you see no force in what I say (h2 ou0de/n soi dokw~ le/gein;)?

Meno: I think what you say is right (E!moige dokei=j o0rqw~j le/gein).

Socrates: Then answer me again from the beginning (A0po/krinai toi/nun pa/lin e0c a0rxh=j): what do both you and your associate say that virtue is (ti/ fh\|j a0reth\n ei]nai kai\ su\ kai\ o9 e9tairo/j sou)?

***

Led by Socrates, Meno answered Socrates‘ questions, but he was not happy about it, and he made it show:

***

Meno: Socrates, I used to be told, before I began to meet you (W} Sw&kratej, h1kouon me\n e1gwge pri\n kai\ suggene/sqai soi), that yours was just the case of being in doubt yourself and making others doubt also (o3ti su\ ou0de\n a1llo h2 au0to/j te a0porei=j kai\ tou\j a1llouj poiei=j a0porei=n); and so now I find you are merely bewitching me with your spells and incantations (kai\ nu=n, w(j ge/ moi dokei=j, gohteu/eij me kai\ farma/tteij kai\ a0texnw~j katepa/|deij), which have reduced me to utter perplexity (w#ste mesto\n a0pori/aj gegone/nai). And if I am indeed to have my jest, I consider that both in your appearance and in other respects you are extremely like the flat torpedo sea-fish (kai\ dokei=j moi pantelw~j, ei0 dei= ti kai\ skw~yai, o9moio/tatoj ei]nai to/ te ei]doj ka\ ta]lla tau/th| th=| platei/a| na/rkh| th=| qalatti/a|); for it benumbs anyone who approaches and touches it (kai\ ga\r au3th to\n a0ei\ plhsia/zonta kai\ a9pto/menon narka=n poiei=), and something of the sort is what I find you have done to me now (kai\ su\ dokei=j moi nu=n e0me\ toiouto/n ti pepoihke/nai). For in truth I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed (a0lhqw~j ga\r e1gwge kai\ th\n yuxh\n kai\ to\ sto/ma narkw~), and I am at a loss what answer to give you (kai\ ou0k e1xw o3 ti a0pokri/nwmai/ soi). And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue to various people (kai/toi muria/kij ge peri\ a0reth=j pampo/llouj lo/gouj ei1rhka kai\ pro\j pollou/j) – and very good speeches they were (kai\ pa/nu eu]), so I thought (w#j ge e0mautw~| e0do/koun) – but now I cannot say one word as to what it is (nu=n de\ ou0d’ o3 ti e1sti to\ para/pan e1xw ei0pei=n). You are well advised, I consider (kai/ moi dokei=j eu] bouleu/esqai), in not voyaging or taking a trip away from home (ou0k e0kple/wn e0nqe/nde ou0d’ a0podhmw~n); for if you went on like this as a stranger in any other city (ei0 ga\r ce/noj e0n a1llh| po/lei toiau=ta poioi=j) you would very likely be taken up for a wizard (ta/x’ a2n w(j go/hj a0paxqei/hj).

Socrates: You are a rogue Meno (Panou=rgoj ei], w} Me/nwn), and had almost deceived me (kai\ o=li/gou e0chpa/thsa/j me).

Meno: How is that, Socrates (Ti/ ma/lista, w} Sw&kratej;)?

Socrates: I perceive your aim in thus comparing me (Gignw&skw ou[ e3neka/ me ei1kasaj).

Meno: What was it (Ti/noj dh\ oi1ei)?

Socrates: That I might compare you in turn (I3na se\ a0nteika/sw). One thing I know about all handsome people is this (e0gw\ de\ tou=to oi]da peri\ pa/ntwn tw~n kalw~n) – they delight in being compared to something (o3ti xai/rousin ei0kazo/menoi). They do well over it (lusitelei= ga\r au0toi=j), since fine features, I suppose, must have fine similes (kalai\ ga/r, oi]mai, tw~n kalw~n kai\ ai9 ei0ko/nej).

***

With an erotic badinage, Socrates blunted the sting in Meno’s comparing him to the flat torpedo sea-fish; moreover, he accepted the simile under the condition that it applied to him in the first place. I said ‘he accepted the simile …’, but did he? He accepted the simile ‘if the torpedo is torpid itself by causing others to be torpid. The torpedo is anything but torpid itself when it causes others to be torpid. Discussing Meno’s simile, Socrates derived from it the information concerning himself, which Plato wanted us to accept, or at least to consider.

***

But I am not for playing your game (a0ll’ ou0k a0nteika/somai/ se). As for me (e0gw_ de\), if the torpedo is torpid itself by causing others to be torpid (ei0 me\n h9 na/rkh au0th\ narkw~sa ou3tw kai\ tou\j a1llouj poiei= narka=|n), I am like it (e1oika au0th=|), but not otherwise (ei0 de\ mh\, ou1). For it is not from any sureness in myself that I cause others to doubt (ou0 ga\r eu0porw~n au0to\j tou\j a1llouj poiw~ a0porei=n): it is from being in more doubt than anyone else that I cause doubt in others (a0ll\ panto\j ma=llon au0to\j a0porw~n ou3twj kai\ tou\j a1lloujpoiw~ a0porei=n).

***

Socrates did not allow the discussion on the torpedo simile to distract him from questioning Meno on virtue.

***

So now, for my part, I have no idea what virtue is (kai\ nu=n peri\ a0reth=j, o4 e1stin, e0gw_ me\n ou0k oi]da), whilst you, though perhaps you may have known before you came to touch with me (su\ me/ntoi i1swj pro/teron me\n h=|dhsqa pri\n e0mou= a3yasqai), are now as good as ignorant of it also (nu=n me/ntoi o3moioj ei] ou0k ei0do/ti). But none the less I am willing to join you in examining it and inquiring into its nature (o3mwj de\ e0qe/lw meta\ sou\ ske/yasqai kai\ suzhth=sai  o3 ti/ pote/ e0stin).

***

But Meno has had enough of it, determined as he was to end Socrates’ questioning once for all.

***

Meno: Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all (Kai\ ti/na tro/pon zhth/seij, w} Sw&kratej, tou=to, o4 mh\ oi]sqa to\ para/pan o3 ti e1sti;)? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not will you treat us to as the object of your search (poi=on ga\r w{n ou0k oi]sqa proqe/menoj zhth/seij;)? Or supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it (h2 ei0 kai\ o3ti ma/lista e0ntu/xoij au0tw~|), how will you know it is the thing you did not know (pw~j ei1sh| o3ti tou=to/ e0stin, o9 su\ ou0k h|1dhsqa;)?

***

Let me end this entry by comparing Meno’s end of his affair with Socrates with its beginning: Meno opened the dialogue with the words: ‘Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught, or is acquired by practice, not teaching? Or if neither by practice nor by learning, whether it comes to mankind by nature or in some other way?’

There are a few lines in Meno’s recent comparing Socrates to the flat torpedo sea-fish that help us to link the beginning of Meno’s affair with Socrates to its end: ‘On countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue to various people – and very good speeches they were, so I thought – but now I cannot say one word as to what it is .’

Meno approached Socrates, determined to excel. In the discussion that ensued, Socrates appeared to have the upper hand. Yet in the end, Meno proved to be victorious. For what greater victory could Meno have achieved, than that of exposing as self-contradictory Socrates’ searching for knowledge on the basis and within the framework of his not-knowing?