Meno 1

The Meno opens with Meno addressing Socrates: ‘Can you tell me (E1xeij moi ei0pei=n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), whether virtue can be taught (a]ra didakto\n h( a0reth/;), or is it not acquired by teaching (h2 ou0 didakto/n), but by practice (a0ll’ a0skhto/n;)? Or neither by practice (h2 ou1te a0skhto/n) nor by learning (ou1te maqhto/n), but it comes to mankind by nature (a0lla\ fu/sei paragi/gnetai toi=j a0nqrw&poij) or by some other way (h2 a1llw| tini\ tro/pw|)?’

Meno’s abrupt and self-assured address triggers Socrates’ ironical praise of Thessalians, Meno’s fellow countrymen: ‘Meno (W} Me/nwn), until now (pro\ tou= me/n) the Thessalians were famous (Qettaloi\ eu0do/kimoi h]san) among the Greeks (e0n toi=j E#llhsi) and admired (kai\ e0qauma/zonto) for their riding (e0f’ i9ppikh=| te) and their riches (kai\ plou/tw|); but now (nu=n de/), as I believe (w(j e0moi\ dokei=), for wisdom also (kai\ e0pi\ sofi/a|), and not in the least (kai\ ou0x h3kista) your friend Aristippus’s people (oi9 tou= sou= e9tai/rou A0risti/ppou poli=tai), the Larisaeans (Larisai=oi).’

What was the reason of this monumental advancement of Thessalians?

‘For this (tou/tou de/) you have to thank Gorgias (u9mi=n ai1tio/j e0sti Gorgi/aj); for when he came to that city [i.e. to Larisa] (a0fiko/menoj ga\r ei0j th\n po/lin) he found the leading men of the Aleuadae enamoured of wisdom (e0rasta\j e0pi\ sofi/a| ei1lhfen A0leuadw~n te tou\j prw&touj) – among them your lover Aristippus (w{n o( so\j e0rasth/j e0stin A0ri/stippoj) – and of the other Thessalians (kai\ tw~n a1llwn Qettalw~n). Nay more (kai\ dh\ kai/) he has given you the regular habit (tou=to to\ e1qoj u9ma\j ei1qiken) fearlessly (a0fo/bwj te) and magnificently (kai\ megaloprepw~j) to answer (a0pokri/nesqai) if anybody (e0a/n ti/j) asks anything (ti e1rhtai), as befits (w#sper ei0ko/j) those who know (tou\j ei0do/taj) just as he was offering himself (a1te kai\ au0to\j pare/xwn au9to/n) to be questioned (e0rwta=|n ) by any Greek who chooses (tw~n E(llhnw~n tw~| boulome/nw|), and on any point one likes (o3 ti a1n tij bou/lhtai, kai\ ou0deni\ o3tw| ou0k a0pokrino/menoj).

After praising the Thessalians for their love of wisdom, and Gorgias for introducing them to it, Socrates turns his eyes to Athens, where no man could be found, who would not laugh at questions concerning virtue; not knowing what wisdom is, how could one possibly answer a question whether it can be taught or no?

‘Now in this place (e0nqa/de de/), my dear Meno (w} fi/le Me/nwn), a contrary state of things (to\ e0na/ntion) prevails (perie/sthke): as if (w#sper) a drought (au0xmo/j tij) of wisdom (th=j sofi/aj) has come on (ge/gonen); and it seems as though wisdom had deserted our borders in favour of yours (kai\ kinduneu/ei e0k tw~nde tw~n to/pwn par’ u9ma=j oi1xesqai h9 sofi/a). If you only want to ask in this way one of those here (ei0 gou=n tina\ e0qe/leij ou3twj e0re/sqai tw~n e0nqa/de), there is nobody (ou0dei\j) who (o3stij) would not laugh (ou0 gela/setai) and say (kai\ e0rei=): Stranger (w} ce/ne), you must think me (kinduneu/w soi dokei=n) a specially favoured mortal (maka/rio/j tij ei]nai), to be able to tell whether virtue can be taught, or in what way it comes to one (a0reth\n gou=n ei1te didakto\n ei1q’ o3tw| tro/pw| paragi/gnetai ei0de/nai): so far am I from knowing whether it can be taught or not (e0gw­_ de\ tosou=ton de/w ei1te didakto\n ei1te mh\ didakto\n ei0de/nai), that I actually do not even know what the thing itself, virtue, is at all (w#st’ ou0de\ au0to/, o3 ti pot’ e0sti\ to\ para/pan a0reth/, tugxa/nw ei0dw&j).

Socrates says that concerning virtue he is as ignorant as his fellow Athenians.

‘And I myself (E)gw_ ou=n kai\ au0to/j), Meno (w} Me/nwn), am in the same case (o3twj e1xw); I share the poverty (sumpe/nomai) with my townsmen (toi=j poli/taij) in this matter (tou/tou tou= pra/gmatoj): I have to reproach myself (kai\ e0mauto\n katame/mfomai) with an utter ignorance about virtue (w#j ou0k ei0dw_j peri\ a0reth=j to\ para/pan); and if I do not know what a thing is (o4 de\ mh\ oi]da ti/ e0sti), how (pw~j a1n) what it’s like (o9poi=o/n ge/ ti) can I know (ei0dei/hn)? Or do you imagine (h2 dokei= soi) it possible (oi[o/n te ei]nai), if one has no cognisance at all of Meno (o3stij Me/nwna mh\ gignw&skei to\ para/pan o3stij e0sti/), that this one (tou=ton) could know (ei0de/nai) whether handsome (ei1te kalo/j) or rich (ei1te plou/sioj) or noble he is (ei1te kai\ gennai=o/j e0stin), or the reverse (ei1te kai\ ta0nanti/a) of these (tou/twn)? Do you suppose (dokei= soi) that one could (oi[o/n te ei]nai)?’

Meno agrees with Socrates’ arguments; but how can it be that Socrates is totally ignorant of what virtue is? Is Meno to report this about him in Thessaly?

Meno: ‘Not I (ou0k e1moige). But you (a0lla\ su/), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), in truth (a0lhqw~j) do not even know what virtue is (ou0d’ o3 ti a0reth/ e0stin oi]sqa)? But this (a0lla\ tau=ta) about you (peri\ sou=) also at home (kai\ oi1kade) are we to report (a0pagge/llwmen)?’

Socrates replies: ‘Not only this (mh\ mo/non ge), my friend (w} e9tai=re), but also (a0lla\ kai/) that (o3ti) I have never yet come across anybody (a1llw| tw~| e0ne/tuxon) who did know (ei0do/ti), in my opinion (w(j e0moi\ dokw~).’