Meno 2

Meno 1 ends with Socrates’ declaration that he has never yet come across anybody who did know what virtue is (71c3-4).  Meno exclaimed: What (Ti/ de/)? Gorgias (Gorgi/a|) you did not meet (ou0k e0ne/tuxej) when he was here (o3te e0nqa/de h]n)?

Obtaining Meno’s assertion that he shares Gorgias’ views, Socrates asks Meno to remind him what in Gorgias’ words virtue was, but then, since Gorgias is absent, he asks Meno himself to say what virtue is.

Socrates: I have not a very good memory (Ou0 pa/nu ei0mi\ mnh/mwn), Meno (w} Me/nwn), so (w#ste) I cannot tell (ou0k e1xw ei0pei=n) at the moment (e0n tw~| paro/nti) how he struck me then (pw~j moi to/te e1docen). But it may be (a0ll’ i1swj) he did know (e0kei=no/j te oi]de), and that you know (kai\ su/) what (a3) he (e0kei=noj) said (e1legen): remind (a0namnhso/n) therefore (ou]n) me (me) how (pw~j) he expressed it (e1legen); or if (ei0 de/) you like (bou/lei), you yourself (au0to/j) say (ei0pe/), for I expect you share his views (dokei= ga\r dh/pou soi\ a3per e0kei/nw|).

Meno: I do (E!moige).

Socrates: Then let us pass him over (E0kei=non me\n toi/nun e0w~men), since in fact he is not present (e0peidh\ kai\ a1pestin), and you yourself (su\ de\ au0to/j), in heaven’s name (w} pro\j qew~n), Meno (Me/nwn), what do you say (ti/ fh/|j) virtue (a0reth/n) to be (ei]nai)? Speak out (ei]pon) frankly (kai\ mh\ fqonh/sh|j and do not begrudge saying it), that I may find myself the victim of a most fortunate falsehood (i3na eu0tuxe/staton yeu/sma e0yeusme/noj w}), if you and Gorgias prove to have knowledge of it (a2n fanh|=j su\ me\n ei0dw_j kai\ Gorgi/aj), while I (e0gw_ de/) have said (ei0rhkw&j) that I never yet came across anyone who had (mhdeni\ pw&pote ei0do/ti e0ntetuxhke/nai).

After Socrates’ exhortation, Meno gives willingly his view on what virtue is.

Meno: Why (A0ll’), it is not difficult (ou0 xalepo/n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), to say (ei0pei=n). First of all (prw~ton me/n), if (ei0) you want (bou/lei) man’s (a0ndro/j) virtue (a0reth/n), it is easy (r9a|/dion), that (o3ti) this (au3th) is (e0sti/n) a man’s (a0ndro/j) virtue (a0reth/), to be competent (i9kano\n ei]nai) to manage the affairs of the city (ta\ th=j po/lewj pra/ttein), and manage them (kai\ pra/ttonta) so as to benefit his friends (tou\j me\n fi/louj eu] poiei=n) and harm his enemies (tou\j d’ e0xqrou\j kakw~j), and to take care to avoid suffering harm himself (kai\ au0to\n eu0labei=sqai mhde\n toiou=ton paqei=n). Or if you want (ei0 de\ bou/lei) a woman’s virtue (gunaiko\j a0reth/n), it is not difficult (ou0 xalepo/n) to describe it (dielqei=n) as her duty (o3ti dei= au0th/n) the house (th\n oi0ki/an) well (eu]) to order (oi0kei=n), looking after (sw&zousan te) the property indoors (ta\ e1ndon), and obeying (kai\ kath/koon ou]san) her husband (tou= a0ndro/j). And the child has another virtue (kai\ a1llh e0sti\ paido\j a0reth/) – one for the female (kai\ qhlei/aj), and one for the male (kai\ a1rrenoj); and for an elderly man (kai\ presbute/rou a0ndro/j) – if you like (ei0 me\n bou/lei ), for a freeman (e0leuqe/rou), or if you like (ei0 de\ bou/lei) for a slave (dou/lou). And there are very many other virtues besides (kai\ a1llai pa/mpollai a0retai/ ei0sin), so that (w#ste) one cannot be at a loss to explain what virtue is (ou0k a0pori/a ei0pei=n a0reth=j pe/ri o3 ti e1sti); for it is according to each activity (kaq’ e9ka/sthn ga\r tw~n pra/cewn) and age (kai\ tw~n h9likiw~n) that in whatever we do (pro\j e3kaston e1rgon), for every one of us (e9ka/stw| h9mw~n), there is a virtue (h9 a0reth/ e0stin); and the same (w(sau/twj de/), I think (oi]mai), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), will hold also of vice (kai\ h9 kaki/a).

With biting irony, Socrates welcomes Meno’s answer: I seem to be in a most lucky way (Pollh=| ge/ tini eu0tuxi/a| e1oika kexrh=sqai), Meno (w} Me/nwn); if seeking one virtue (ei0 mi/an zhtw~n a0reth/n) a swarm (smhno/j ti) I have discovered of virtues (a0nh/urhka a0retw~n), there in your keeping (para\ soi\ keime/nwn). Now (a9ta/r), Meno (w} Me/nwn), to follow this figure of swarms (kata\ tau/thn th\n ei0ko/na th\n peri\ ta\ smh/nh), suppose I should ask you what is the real nature of the bee (ei1 mou e0rome/nou meli/tthj peri\ ou0si/aj o3 ti/ pot’ e1sti), and you replied that there are many different kinds of bees (polla\j kai\ pantodapa\j e1legej au0ta\j ei]nai), what would you have answered me (ti/ a2n a0pekri/nw moi), had I asked (ei1 se e0rw&mhn): ‘Do you say (a]ra tou/tw| fh/|j) they are of many and varying kinds (polla\j kai\ pantodapa\j ei]nai) and differ from each other (kai\ diaferou/saj a0llh/lwn) by being bees (tw~| meli/ttaj ei=nai)? Or by this (h2 tou/tw~| me\n) they don’t differ at all (ou0de\n diafe/rousi), but by something else (a1llw| de\ tw~|) – for example (oi3on) by their beauty (h2 ka/llei) or size (h2 mege/qei) or some other quality (h2 a1llw| tw| tw~n toiou/twn)? Tell me (ei0pe/), what would you have answered (ti/ a2n a0pekri/nw) thus asked (ou#twj e0rwthqei/j)?

Meno: Why, this (Tou=t’ e1gwge) – that they do not differ at all (o3ti ou0de\n diafe/rousi), as bees (h[| me/littai ei0si/n), the one from the other (h9 e9te/ra th=j e9te/raj).

Socrates: And if I went on to say (Ei0 ou=n ei]pon) after that (meta\ tau=ta): This then (tou/to toi/nun), tell me this itself (moi au0to\ ei0pe/), Meno (w} Me/nwn): by which they do not differ (w{| ou0de\n diafe/rousin), but the same (a0lla\ tau0to/n) are they all (ei0sin a3pasai), what do you call this (ti/ tou=to fh\|j ei]nai)? You could find me an answer, I presume (ei]xej dh/pou a1n ti/ moi ei0pei=n)?

Meno: I could (E!gwge).

Socrates: And likewise (Ou3tw dh/) also about the virtues (kai\ peri\ tw~n a0retw~n), however many and various they may be (ka2n ei0 pollai\ kai\ pantodapai/ ei0sin), they all have one common character (e4n ge/ ti ei]doj tau0to\n a3pasai e1xousi) whereby (di’ o3) they are virtues (ei0si\n a0retai/), and on which one would of course be wise to keep an eye (ei0j o4 kalw~j pou e1xei a0poble/yanta) when one is answering (to\n a0pokrino/menon) to the questioner asking (tw~| e0rwth/santi) to clarify that (e0kei=no dhlw~sai) of what virtue really is  (o4 tugxa/nei ou]sa a0reth/). Or do you not understand (h2 ou0 manqa/neij), what I mean (o3 ti le/gw)?

Meno: My impression is that I do (Dokw~ ge/ moi manqa/nein); but still I do not yet grasp the meaning of the question as I could wish (ou0 me/ntoi w(j bou/lomai/ ge/ pw kate/xw to\ e0rwtw&menon).

As can be seen, Meno has made a major step on the road from Gorgias to Socrates; he fell into difficulty, and admitted it. But he was not happy with it, perceiving it as a failure. With his next questions Socrates aggravated Meno’s difficulties by expanding the field of the inquiry.

Socrates: Is it only in the case of virtue, do you think (Po/teron de\ peri\ a0reth=j mo/non soi ou3tw dokei=), Meno (w} Me/nwn), that there is one kind belonging to a man (a1llh me\n a0ndro\j ei]nai), another to a woman (a1llh de\ gunaiko/j), and so on with the rest (kai\ tw~n a1llwn), or in the case of health (h2 kai\ peri\ u9giei/aj), and in the case of size (h2 kai\ peri\ mege/qouj) and in the case of strength (h2 kai\ peri\ i0sxu/oj) it is just the same (w(sau/twj),? Do you consider that there is one health for a man (a1llh me\n a0ndro\j dokei= soi ei]nai u9giei/a), and another for a woman (a1llh de\ gunaiko/j)? Or is it of the same character universally (h2 tau0to\n pantaxou= ei]do/j e0stin), if it is health (e0a/nper u9gi/eia h]|), be it in a man or in anything else whatsoever (e0a/nte e0n a0ndri\ e0a/nte e0n a1llw| o9tw|ou=n h]|)?

Meno: I think that health is the same (H( au0th/ moi dokei= u9gi/eia/ ge ei]nai), both in man and in woman (kai\ a0ndro\j kai\ gunaiko/j).

Socrates: Then is it not so (Ou0kou=n) with size and strength also (kai\ me/geqoj kai\ i0sxu/j)? If a woman is strong (e0a/nper i0sxura\ gunh\ h]|), she will be strong by reason of the same form and the same strength (tw~| au0tw~| ei1dei kai\ th=| au0th=| i0sxu/i+ i0sxura\ e1stai)? By “the same” I mean (to\ ga\r th=| au0th=| tou=to le/gw) that strength does not differ as strength (ou0de\n diafe/rei pro\j to\ i0sxu\j ei]nai h9 i0sxu/j), whether it be in a man or in a woman (e0a/nte e0n a0ndri\ h]| e0a/nte e0n gunaiki/). Or do you think there is any difference (h2 dokei= ti/ soi diafe/rein)?

Meno: I do not (Ou0k e1moige).

Socrates: And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all (h9 de\ a0reth\ pro\j to\ a0reth\ ei]nai dioi/sei ti) whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a woman or in a man (e0a/nte e0n paidi\ h]| e0a/nte e0n presbu/th|, e0a/nte e0n gunaiki\ e0a/nte e0n a0ndri/)?

Meno: I feel somehow (E!moige/ pwj dokei=), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other cases (tou=to ou0ke/ti o3moion ei]nai toi=j a1lloij tou/toij).