Writing scientifically

Phaedrus: What way is this (Ti/na tou=ton;)?

Socrates: To give the actual words (Au0ta\ me\n ta\ r9h/mata ei0pei=n) would not be easy (ou0k eu0pete/j); but I’m willing to say how one should write, if it is to be as scientific as it is possible to be (w(j de\ dei= gra/fein, ei0 me/llei texnikw_j e1xein kaq’ o3son e0nde/xetai, le/gein e0qe/lw).

Phaedrus: Say then (Le/ge dh/).

Socrates: Since the power of speech (E)peidh\ lo/gou du/namij) is in fact a leading of the soul (tugxa/nei yuxagwgi/a ou]sa), the man who is going to be an expert in rhetoric (to\n me/llonta r9htoriko\n e1sesqai) must know how many forms soul has (a0na/gkh ei0de/nai yuxh\ o3sa ei1dh e1xei). Their number is so and so (e1stin ou]n to/sa kai\ to/sa), and they are of such and such kinds (kai\ toi=a kai\ toi=a), which is why some people are like this, and others like that (o3qen oi9 me\n toioi/de, oi9 de\ toioi/de gi/gnontai); and since these have been distinguished in this way (tou/twn de\ dh\ ou3tw dih|rhme/nwn), then again there are so many forms of speeches (lo/gwn au] to/sa kai\ to/sa e0stin ei1dh), each one of such and such a kind (toio/nde e3kaston). So people of one kind (oi9 me\n ou]n toioi/de) are easily persuaded for this reason by one kind of speech to hold one kind of opinion (u9po\ tw~n toiw&nde dia\ th/nde th\n ai0ti/an e0j ta\ toia/de eu0peiqei=j), while people of another kind (oi9 de\ toioi/de) are for these reasons (dia\ ta/de) difficult to persuade (duspeiqei=j); having then grasped these things satisfactorily, after that the student must observe them as they are in real life, and actually being put into practice, and be able to follow them with keen perception (dei= dh\ tau=ta i9kanw~j noh/santa, me/ta tau=ta qew&menon au0ta\ e0n tai=j pra/cesi o1nta te kai\ pratto/mena, o0ce/wj th=| ai0sqh/sei du/nasqai e0pakoloqei=n), or otherwise get no advantage, as yet, from the things he heard earlier when he was with me (h2 mhde\n ei]nai/ pw ple/on au0tw~| w{n to/te h1kouen lo/gwn sunw&n). But when he both has sufficient ability to say what sort of man is persuaded by what sort of things (o3tande\ ei0pei=n te i9kanw~j e1xh| oi[oj u9f’ oi3wn pei/qetai), and is capable of telling himself when he sees him there that this is the man and this is the nature which was discussed before (paragigno/meno/n te dunato\j h2|  diaisqano/menoj e9autw|~ e0ndei/knusqai o3ti ou[to/j e0sti kai\ au3th h9 fu/sij peri\ h[j to/te h]san oi9 lo/goi), now actually present in front of him (nu=n e1rgw| parou=sa/ oi9), to whom he must now apply these kinds of speeches in this way to persuade him of this kind of thing (h[| prosoiste/on tou/sde w{de tou\j lo/gouj e0pi\ th\n tw~nde peiqw&); when he now has all of this (tau=ta d’ h1dh pa/nta e1xonti), and has also grasped the occasions for speaking (proslabo/nti kairou\j tou= po/te lekte/on) and for holding back (kai\ e0pisxete/on), and for speaking concisely (braxulogi/aj te au]) and piteously (kai\ e0leinologi/aj) and in exaggerated fashion (kai\ deinw&sewj), and for all the forms of speeches he may learn (e9ka/stwn te o3sa a2n ei1dh ma/qh| lo/gwn), recognising the right and wrong time for these (tou/twn th\n eu0kairi/an te kai\ a0kairi/an diagno/nti), then his grasp of the science will be well and completely finished (kalw~j kai\ tele/wj e0sti\n h9 te/xnh a0peirgasme/nh), but not before that (pro/teron d’ ou1); but in whichever of these things someone is lacking (a1ll’ o3ti a2n au0tw~n tij e0llei/ph|) when he speaks (le/gwn) or teaches (h2 dida/skwn) or writes (h2 gra/fwn), and says he speaks scientifically (fh=| de\ te/xnh| le/gein), the person who disbelieves him is in the stronger position (o9 mh\ peiqo/menoj kratei=).