Proceeding scientifically

 

Socrates: Well then (To\ toi/nun), on the subject of nature (peri\ fu/sewj), see (sko/pei) what Hippocrates and the true account say about it (ti/ pote le/gei I9ppokra/thj te kai\ o9 a0lhqh\j lo/goj). Shouldn’t one reflect about the nature of anything like this (a]r’ ou0x w{de dei= dianoei=sqai peri\ o9touou=n fu/sewj): first (prw~ton me/n), is the thing about which we will want to be experts ourselves and be capable of making others expert simple or complex (a9plou=n h2 polueide/j e0stin ou[ pe/ri boulhso/meqa ei]nai au0toi\ texnikoi\ kai\ a1llon dunatoi\ poiei=n)? Next (e1peita de/), if it is simple (a2n me\n a9plou=n h]|), we should consider, shouldn’t we, what natural capacity it has for acting and on what (skopei=n th\n du/namin au0tou=, ti/na pro\j ti/ pe/fuken ei0j to\ dra=n e1xon), or what capacity it has for being acted upon, and by what (h2 ti/na ei0j to\ paqei=n u9po\ tou=); and if it has more forms than one (e0a\n de\ plei/w ei1dh e1xh|), we should count these (tau=ta a0riqmhsa/menon), and see in the case of each, as in the case where it had only one (o3per e0f’ e9no/j, tou=t’ i0dei=n e0f’ e9ka/stou), with which of them it is its nature to do what (tw~| ti/ poiei=n au0to\ pe/fuken), or with which to have what done to it by what (h2 tw~| ti/ paqei=n u9po\ tou=;)?

Phaedrus: Probably (Kinduneu/ei), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: At any rate proceeding without doing these things (H( gou=n a1neu tou/twn me/qodoj) would be just like a blind man’s progress (e0oi/koi a2n w#sper tuflou= porei/a|). But on no account must we represent the man who pursues anything scientifically (a0ll’ ou0 mh\n a0peikaste/on to/n ge te/xnh| metio/nta o9tiou=n) as like someone blind or deaf (tuflw~| ou0de\ kwfw~|); rather it is clear (a0lla\ dh=lon w(j) that if anyone teaches anyone rhetoric in a scientific way (a1n tw&| tij te/xnh| lo/gouj didw~|), he will reveal precisely the essential nature of that thing (th\n ou0si/an dei/cei a0kribw~j th=j fu/sewj tou/tou) to which his pupil will apply his speeches (pro\j o4 tou\j lo/gouj prosoi/sei); and that, I think, is soul (e1stai de/ pou yuxh\ tou=to).

Phaedrus: Of course (Ti/ mh/n;).

Socrates: Then all his effort is concentrated on that (Ou0kou=n h9 a3milla au0tw~| te/tatai pro\j tou=to pa=sa); for it is in the soul that he tries to produce conviction (peiqw_ ga\r e0n tou/tw| poiei=n e0pixeirei=), True (h] ga/r;)?

Phaedrus: Yes (Nai/).