Examples of scientific and unscientific speaking and writing

 

Socrates: So do you want to take the speech of Lysias (Bou/lei ou]n e0n tw~| Lusi/ou lo/gw|) which you are carrying with you (o4n fe/reij), and the ones I made (kai\ e0n oi[j h9mei=j ei1pomen), and see in them something of the features which we say are scientific and unscientific (i0dei=n ti w{n famen a0te/xnwn te kai\ e0nte/xnwn ei]nai;)?

Phaedrus: More than anything (Pa/ntwn ge/ pou ma/lista); as things are (w(j nu=n ge), our discussion is somewhat bare (yilw~j pwj le/gomen), because we do not have sufficient examples (ou0k e1xontej i9kana\ paradei/gmata).

Socrates: What is more (Kai\ mh/n), by some chance (kata\ tu/xhn ge/ tina) – so it seems (w(j e1oiken) – the two speeches which were given do have in them an example (e0rrhqh/thn tw_ lo/gw e1xonte/ ti para/deigma) of how someone who knows the truth (w(j a2n o9 ei0dw~j to\ a0lhqe/j) can mislead his audience by making play in what he says (prospai/zwn e0n lo/goij para/goi tou\j a0kou/ontaj). I myself (kai\ e1gwge), Phaedrus (w} Fai=dre), blame the gods of the place (ai0tiw~mai tou\j e0ntopi/ouj qeou/j); and perhaps too the interpreters of the Muses who sing over our heads may have breathed this gift upon us (i1swj de\ kai\ oi9 tw~n Mousw~n profh=tai oi9 u9pe\r kefalh=j w)|doi\ e0pipepneuko/tej a2n h9mi=n ei]en tou=to to\ ge/raj) – for I don’t think I share in any science of speaking (ou0 ga/r pou e1gwge te/xnhj tino\j tou= le/gein me/toxoj).

Phaedrus: So be it (E!stw w(j le/geij); only make clear what you are saying (mo/non dh/lwson o4 fh/|j).

Socrates: Well then (I!qi dh/), read me (moi a0na/gnwqi) the beginning of Lysias’ speech (th\n tou= Lusi/ou lo/gou a0rxh/n).

Phaedrus: ‘You know how the matters are with me (Peri\ me\n tw~n e0mw~n pragma/twn e0pi/stasai), and you have heard me say how I think it is to our advantage that this should happen (kai\ w(j nomi/zw sumfe/rein h9mi=n tou/twn genome/nwn, a0kh/koaj); and I claim that I should not fail to achieve what I ask (a0ciw~ de\ mh\ dia\ tou=to a0tuxh=sai w{n de/omai) because I happen not to be in love with you (o3ti ou0k e0rasth\j w@n sou= tugxa/nw). Those who are in love repent of the services they do when (w(j e0kei/noij me\n to/te metame/lei) –‘

Socrates: Stop (Pau=sai). We must say, then, where Lysias goes wrong and what he does unscientifically (ti/ dh\ ou]n ou[toj a9marta/nei kai\ a1texnon poiei= lekte/on). Am I right (h] ga/r;)?

Phaedrus: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: Isn’t this sort of thing, at least, clear to everyone (A]r’ ou]n ou0 panti\ dh=lon to/ ge toio/nde) – that we are in agreement about some things like this (w(j peri\ me\n e1nia tw~n toiou/twn o9monohtikw~j e1xomen), and at odds about others (peri\ d’ e1nia stasiwtikw~j;)?

Phaedrus: I think I understand what you mean (Dokw~ me\n o4 le/geij manqa/nein), but tell me still more clearly (e1ti d’ ei0pe\ safe/steron).

Socrates: When someone utters the word (O(tan tij o1noma ei1ph|) ‘iron’ (sidh/rou), or ‘silver’ (h2 a0rgu/rou), don’t we all have the same thing in mind (a]r’ ou0 to\ au0to\ pa/ntej dienoh/qhmen;)?

Phaedrus: Absolutely (Kai\ ma/la).

Socrates: What about the words ‘just’ or ‘good’ (Ti/ d’ o3tan dikai/ou h2 a0gaqou=;)? Don’t we diverge (ou0k a1lloj a1llh| fe/retai), and disagree both with each other and with ourselves (kai\ a0mfisbhtou=men a0llh/loij te kai\ h9mi=n au0toi=j;)?

Phaedrus: Certainly (Pa/nu me\n ou]n).

Socrates: Then we are in accord in some cases (E)n me\n a1ra toi=j sumfounou=men), not in others (e0n de\ toi=j ou1).

Phaedrus: Just so (Ou3tw).

Socrates: So in which of the two are we easier to deceive (Pote/rwqi ou]n eu0apathto/teroi/ e0smen), and in which does rhetoric have the greater power (kai\ h9 r9htorikh\ e0n pote/roij mei=zon du/natai;)?

Phaedrus: Clearly in those cases where we go in different directions (Dh=lon o3ti e0n oi[j planw&meqa).

Socrates: So the man who intends to pursue a science of rhetoric (Ou0kou=n to\n me/llonta te/xnhn r9htorikh\n metie/nai) must first have divided these up methodically (prw~ton me\n dei= tau=ta o9dw~| dih|rh=sqai), and grasped some mark which distinguishes each of the two kinds (kai\ ei0lhfe/nai tina\ xarakth/ra e9kate/rou tou= ei1douj), those in which most people are bound to tread uncertainly (e0n w{| te a0na/gkh to\ plh=qoj plana=sqai), and those in which they are not (kai\ e0n w{| mh/).

Phaedrus: A fine kind of thing he will have identified, Socrates (Kalo\n gou=n a2n, w} Sw&kratej, ei]doj ei1h katanenohkw&j), if he grasps this latter kind (o9 tou=to labw&n).

Socrates: Then (E1peita ge), I think (oi]mai), as he comes across each thing (pro\j e9ka/stw| gigno/menon), he must not be caught unawares (mh\ lanqa/nein) but look sharply to see (a0ll’ o0ce/wj ai0sqa/nesqai) which of the two types the thing he is going to speak about belongs to (peri\ ou4 a2n me/llh| e0rei=n pote/rou o2n tugxa/nei tou= ge/nouj).

Phaedrus: Right (Ti/ mh/n;).

Socrates: Well then (Ti/ ou]n;), are we to say that love belongs  with the disputed cases (to\n e1rwta po/teron fw~men ei]nai tw~n a0mfisbhthsi/mwn) or the undisputed ones (h2 tw~n mh/;)?

Phaedrus: With the disputed (Tw~n a]mfisbhthsi/mwn), surely (dh/pou); otherwise, do you think it would have been possible for you to say what you said about it just now (h2 oi1ei a1n soi e0gxwrh=sai ei0pei=n a4 nundh\ ei]pej peri\ au0tou=), both that it is harmful to beloved and lover (w(j bla/bh te/ e0sti tw~| e0rwme/nw| kai\ e0rw~nti), and then (kai\ au]qij), on the other hand that it is really the greatest of goods (w(j me/giston o2n tw~n a0gaqw~n tugxa/nei;)?

Socrates: Admirably said (A1rista le/geij); but tell me this too (a0ll’ ei0pe\ kai\ to/de) – for of course because of my inspired condition then, I don’t quite remember (e0gw_ ga/r toi dia\ to\ e0nqousiastiko\n ou0 pa/nu me/mnhmai) – whether I defined love (ei0 w(risa/mhn e1rwta) when beginning my speech (a0rxome/noj tou= lo/gou).

Phaedrus: Yes indeed you did (Nh\ Di/a), most emphatically (a0mhxa/nwj ge w(j sfo/dra).

Socrates: Hey now (Feu=)! How much more scientific you’re saying the Nymphs (o3sw| le/geij texnikwte/raj Nu/mfaj), daughters of Achelous (ta\j A0xelw&|ou), and Pan (kai\ Pa=na), son of Hermes (to\n E(rmou=), are than Lysias (Lusi/ou) son of Cephalus (tou= Kefa/lou) in the business of speaking (pro\j lo/gouj ei]nai). Or am I wrong (h2 ou0de\n le/gw)? Did Lysias too (a0lla\ kai\ o9 Lusi/aj) compel us when beginning his speech on love to take love as some one definite thing (a0rxo/menoj tou= e0rwtikou= h0na/gkasen h9ma=j u9polabei=n to\n E1rwta e3n ti tw~n o1ntwn), which he himself had in mind (o4 au0to\j e0boulh/qh), and did he then bring the whole speech which followed to its conclusion by ordering it in relation to that (kai\ pro\j tou/to h1dh suntaca/menoj pa/nta to\n u3steron lo/gon diepera/nato;)? Shall we read the beginning again (bou/lei pa/lin a0nagnw~men th\n a0rxh\n au0tou=;)?

Phaedrus: If you think we should (Ei0 soi/ ge dokei=); but what you’re looking for (o4 me/ntoi zhtei=j) isn’t there (ou0k e1st’ au0to/qi).

Socrates: Quote it (Le/ge), so that I can hear (i3na a0kou/sw) the man himself (au0tou= e0kei/nou).

Phaedrus: ‘You know how the matters are with me (Peri\ me\n tw~n e0mw~n pragma/twn e0pi/stasai), and you have heard me say how I think it is to our advantage that this should happen (kai\ w(j nomi/zw sumfe/rein h9mi=n tou/twn genome/nwn, a0kh/koaj); and I claim that I should not fail to achieve what I ask (a0ciw~ de\ mh\ dia\ tou=to a0tuxh=sai w{n de/omai) because I happen not to be in love with you (o3ti ou0k e0rasth\j w@n sou= tugxa/nw). Those in love repent of the services they do (w(j e0kei/noij me\n to/te metame/lei w{n a2n eu] poih/swsin) when their desire ceases (e0peida\n th=j e0piqumi/aj pau/swntai) –‘

Socrates: Indeed he seems to be a long way from doing what we’re looking for (H} pollou= dei=n e1oike poiei=n o3de ge o4 zhtou=men), since he doesn’t even begin at the beginning, but from the end, trying to swim through his speech in reverse, on his back (o4j ou0de\ a0p’ a0rxh=j a0ll’ a0po\ teleuth=j e0c u9pti/aj a0na/palin dianei=n e0pixeirei= to\n lo/gon), and begins from the things which the lover would say to his beloved when he had already finished (kai\ a1rxetai a0f’ w{n pepaume/noj a2n h1dh o9 e0rasth\j le/goi pro\j ta\ paidika/). Or am I wrong (h2 ou0de\n ei]pon), Phaedrus (Fai=dre), my dear (fi/lh kefalh/;)?

Phaedrus: What he makes his speech about, Socrates, is certainly an ending (E1stin ge/ toi dh/, w} Sw&kratej, teleuth/, peri\ ou[ to\n lo/gon poiei=tai).

Socrates: What about the rest (Ti/ de\ ta]lla;)? Don’t the elements of the speech seem to have been thrown in in a random heap (ou0 xu/dhn dokei= beblh=sqai ta\ tou= lo/gou)? Or do you think the second thing he said (h2 fai/netai to\ deu/teron ei0rhme/non) had to be placed second for some necessary reason (e1k tinoj a0na/gkhj deu/teron dei=n teqh=nai), or any of the others where they were (h1 ti a1llo tw~n r9hqe/ntwn;)? It seemed to me (e0moi\ me\n ga\r e1docen), as one who knows nothing about it (w(j mhde\n ei0do/ti), that the writer had said just what happened to occur to him, in a not ignoble way (ou0k a0gennw_j to\ e0pio\n e0rh=sqai tw~| grafo/nti); but do you know of any constraint deriving from the science of speech-writing (su\ d’ e1xeij tina\ a0na/gkhn logografikh/n) which made him place these thoughts one beside another in this order (h[| tau=ta e0kei=noj ou3twj e0fech=j par’ a1llh/la e1qhken;)?

Phaedrus: You’re kind (Xrhsto\j ei]) to think me competent (o3ti me h9gh=| i9kano\n ei]nai) to understand so precisely what he has done (ta\ e0kei/nou ou3twj a0kribw~j diidei=n).

Socrates: This much I think you would say (A0lla\ to/de ge oi]mai/ se fa/nai a1n): that every speech should be put together like a living creature (dei=n pa/nta lo/gon w#sper zw~|on sunesta/nai), as it were with a body of its own (sw~ma/ ti e1xonta au0to\n au9tou=), so as not to lack either a head (w#ste mh/te a0ke/falon o1nta) or feet (mh/te a1poun), but to have both middle parts (a0lla\ me/sa te e1xein) and extremities (kai\ a1kra), so written as to fit both each other and the whole (pre/ponta a0llh/loij kai\ tw~| o3lw| gegramme/na).

Phaedrus: Yes indeed (Pw~j ga\r ou1;).

Socrates: Well then, ask if your friend’s speech (Ske/yai toi/nun to\n tou= e9tai/rou sou lo/gon) is like this or not (ei1te ou3twj ei1te a1llwj e1xei); and you’ll find it exactly like the epigram (kai\ eu9rh/seij tou= e0pigra/mmatoj ou0de\n diafe/ronta) which some say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian (o4 Mi/da| tw~| Frugi/ fasi/n tinej e0pigegra/fqai).

Phaedrus: What is this epigram you mean (Poi=on tou=to), and what feature of it are you referring to (kai\ ti/ peponqo/j;)?

Socrates: It’s this (E!sti me\n tou=to to/de):

‘A bronze-clad maid (Xalkh= parqe/noj ei0mi/), I stand on Midas’ tomb (Mi/da d’ e0pi\ sh/mati kei=mai),

 As long as rivers run (o1fr’ a2n u3dwr te na/h|) and  trees grow tall (kai\ de/ndrea makra\ teqh/lh|),

   A guardian of this much-lamented grave (au0tou= th=|de me/nousa poluklau/tou e0pi\ tu/mbou),

   I’ll tell the traveller (a0ggele/w pariou=si): Midas rests within (Mi/daj o3ti th|=de te/qaptai).

I think you see that it makes no difference whether any part of it is put first or last (o3ti d’ ou0de\n diafe/rei au0tou= prw~ton h2 u3stato/n ti lege/sqai, e0nnoei=j pou, w(j e0gw|}mai).

Phaedrus: You’re making fun (Skw&pteij) of our speech (to\n lo/gon h9mw~n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej).

***

Presenting Lysias’ speech in terms of the paradigm offered to him by the poem on the tomb of Midas, Plato misrepresented it: ‘I think you see that it makes no difference whether any part of it is put first or last’. To demonstrate the misrepresentation, let me quote just one paragraph:

‘Moreover, many of those in love desire a person’s body before they know his ways and gain experience of the other aspects of his personality, so that it is unclear to them  whether they will still want friendship to continue when their desire ceases, whereas for those not in love, since they were friends with each other even before they did what they did, the things from which they benefit are not likely to make their friendship less, but rather to remain as memorials of things still to come. Moreover, you should become a better person by listening to me than to a lover. For they praise words and actions even if it means disregarding what is best, in part because they are afraid to incur dislike, in part because their own judgement is weakened as a result of their desire. For such are the ways that love displays itself: if they are unsuccessful, it makes them regard as distressing the sorts of things which cause pain to no one else; if they are successful, under its compulsion even things which ought not to give pleasure receive praise from them, so that it is much more fitting for their loved ones to pity than to want to emulate them. But if you listen to me, in the first place I shall associate with you with an eye not to present pleasure, but also to the benefit which is to come, because I am not overcome by love, but master of myself, not starting violent hostilities because of small things, but feeling slight anger slowly because of large things, forgiving the unintentional and trying to prevent the intentional; for these are signs of a friendship which will last for a long time.’ (Translation C.J. Rowe)

Here every sentence in its sequence gives us greater insight into Lysias’ view of a non-lover, which he proposes to the boy, in contrast to his concept of a lover, which he rejects.

***

Socrates: Well, to avoid your becoming upset, let us leave this speech to one side (Tou=ton me\n toi/nun, i3na mh\ su\ a1xqh|, e0a/swmen) – though it does seem to me to contain plenty of examples (kai/toi suxna/ ge e1xein moi dokei= paradei/gmata) which someone could glance at with profit (pro\j a3 tij ble/pwn o0ni/nait’ a1n), if not exactly by trying to imitate them (mimei=sqai au0ta\ e0pixeirw~n mh\ pa/nu ti) – and pass on to the others (ei0j de\ tou\j e9te/rouj lo/gouj i1wmen). For in my view there was something in them (h0n ga/r ti e0n au0toi=j, w(j dokw~) which should be noticed (prosh=kon i0dei=n) by those who wish to enquire into speeches (toi=j boulome/noij peri\ lo/gwn skopei=n).

Phaedrus: What sort of thing do you mean (To\ poi=on dh\ le/geij;)?

Socrates: They were, I think, opposites (E0nanti/w pou h1sthn): the one said that favours should be granted to the lover, the other to the non-lover (o9 me\n w(j tw~| e0rw~nti, o9 d’ w(j tw~| mh\ dei= xari/zesqai, e0lege/thn).

Phaedrus: And very manfully too (Kai\ ma/l’ a0ndrikw~j).

Socrates: I thought you were going to speak the truth (W|!mhn se ta0lhqe\j e0rei=n), and say ‘madly’ (o3ti manikw&j); and that, in fact, was the very thing I was looking for (o4 me/ntoi e0zh/toun e0sti\n au0to\ tou=to). We said, didn’t we, that love was a kind of madness (mani/an ga/r tina e0fh/samen ei]nai to\n e1rwta: h] ga/r;)?

Phaedrus: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: And that there were two kinds of madness (Mani/aj de/ ge ei1dh du/o), the one caused by sicknesses of human sort (th\n me\n u9po\ noshma/twn a0nqrwpi/nwn), the other coming about from a divinely caused reversal of our customary ways of behaving (th\n de\ u9po\ qei/aj e0callagh=j tw~n ei0wqo/twn nomi/mwn gignome/nhn).

Phaedrus: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: And of the divine kind we distinguished four parts, belonging to four gods (Th=j de\ qei/aj tetta/rwn qew~n te/ttara me/rh dielo/menoi), taking the madness of the seer as Apollo’s inspiration (mantikh=j me\n e0pi/pnoian A0po/llwnoj qe/ntej), that of mystic rites as Dionysius’ (Dionu/sou de\ telestikh/n), poetic madness for its part, as the Muses’ (Mousw~n d’ au] poihtikh/n), and the fourth as belonging to Aphrodite (teta/rthn de\ A0frodi/thj) and Love (kai\ E!rwtoj); the madness of love we said was best (e0rwtikh\n mani/an e0fh/same/n te a0ri/sthn ei]nai), and by expressing the experience of love through some kind of simile (kai\ ou0k oi]d’ o3ph| to\ e0rwtiko\n pa/qoj a0peika/zontej), which allowed us perhaps to grasp some truth (i1swj me\n a0lhqou=j tinoj e0fapto/menoi), though maybe also it took us in the wrong direction (ta/xa d’ a2n kai\ a1llose parafero/menoi), and mixing together a not wholly implausible speech (kera/santej ou0 panta/pasin a0pi/qanon lo/gon), we sang a playful hymn in the form of a story (muqiko/n tina u3mnon prosepai/samen), in a fittingly quiet way (metri/wj te kai\ eu0fh/mwj), to my master and yours (to\n e0mo/n te kai\ so\n despo/thn), Phaedrus, Love (E1rwta, w} Fai=dre), watcher over beautiful boys (kalw~n pai/dwn e1foron).

Phaedrus: And it gave me great pleasure (Kai\ ma/la e1moige ou0k a0hdw~j) to hear it (a0kou/sai).

Socrates: Well then, let us take up this point from it (To/de toi/nun au0to/qen la/bwmen): how the speech was able to pass over from censure to praise (w)j a0po\ tou= ye/gein pro\j to\ e0painei=n e1sxen o9 lo/goj metabh=nai).

Phaedrus: What aspect of that are you referring to, precisely (Pw~j dh\ ou]n au0to\ le/geij;)?

***

Socrates does not answer Phaedrus’ question; instead, he presents an outline of the method of collections and divisions, which I shall leave for the next post.