Speech of the man who knows

Having compared writing to painting – the offspring of painting stand there as if alive, but if you ask them something, they preserve quite a solemn silence. Similarly with written words – Socrates asks:

Well then (Ti/ d’;), do we see another way of speaking (a1llon o9rw~men lo/gon), a legitimate brother of this one (tou/tou a0delfo\n gnh/sion)? Do we see both how it comes into being (tw~| tro/pw| te gi/gnetai) and how much better (kai\ o3sw| a0mei/nwn) and more capable it is from its birth (kai\ dunatw&teroj tou/tou fu/etai;)?

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Rowe translates Plato’s lo/goj (lo/gon is accusative, lo/goj is nominative) as way of speaking, which can’t be right, for the English language has two different words for the Greek logos, which can be either written (gegramme/noj), or spoken. When spoken, then it is simply logos; the quality of ‘being spoken’, in contrast to ‘being written’, then can be emphasized by such epithets as ‘living’ (zw~n), and ‘having soul’ (e1myuxoj).

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Phaedrus: Which is this (Ti/na tou=ton), and how does it come into being, as you put it (kai\ pw~j le/geij gigno/menon;)?

Socrates: The one that is written together with knowledge in the soul of the learner (O#j met’ e0pisth/mhj gra/fetai e0n th|= tou= manqa/nontoj yuxh=|), capable of defending itself (dunato\j me\n a0mu/nai e9autw~|), and knowing how to speak (e0pisth/mwn de\ le/gein te) and keep silent (kai\ siga=n) in relation to the people it should (pro\j ou3j dei=).

Phaedrus: You mean the living and animate speech of the man who knows (To\n tou= ei0do/toj lo/gon le/geij zw~nta kai\ e1myuxon), of which written speech (ou[ o9 gegramme/noj) would rightly be called a kind of phantom (ei1dwlon a1n ti le/goito dikai/wj).

Socrates: Absolutely (Panta/pasi me\n ou]n).