Pericles and Anaxagoras

 

Socrates: And what do we think, if the ‘honey-toned Adrastus’ (Ti/ de\ to\n meli/ghrun A1draston oi0o/meqa), or Pericles (h2 kai\ Perikle/a), heard of those really fine techniques we were going through just now (ei0 a0kou/seian w{n nundh\ h9mei=j dih|=men tw~n pagka/lwn texnhma/twn) – things like ‘speaking with brevity’ (braxulogiw~n te) and ‘speaking with images’ (kai\ ei0konologiw~n), and all the other things which we went through (kai\ o3sa a1lla dielqo/ntej) and said we should look at under the light (u9p’ au0ga\j e1famen ei]nai skepte/a) – do we think that they, like you and me, would coarsely utter some uneducated expression (po/teron xalepw~j a2n au0tou/j, w#sper e0gw& te kai\ su/, u9p’ a0groiki/aj r9h=ma/ ti ei0pei=n a0pai/deuton) at those who have written these things up (ei0j tou\j tau=ta gegrafo/taj te) and teach them (kai\ dida/skontaj) as a science of rhetoric (w(j r9htorikh\n te/xnhn), or because they are wiser than us (h2 a3te h9mw~n o1ntaj sofwte/rouj), do we think they would reproach us too (ka2n nw~|n e0piplh=cai), and say (ei0po/ntaj) ‘Phaedrus and Socrates (W] Faidre/ te kai\ Sw~kratej), one should not get angry (ou0 xrh\ xalepai/nein), but be forgiving (a0lla\ suggignw&skein), if some people (ei1 tinej) who are ignorant of dialectic (mh\ e0pista/menoi diale/gesqai) prove unable to give a definition (a0du/natoi e0ge/nonto o9ri/sasqai) of what rhetoric is (ti/ pot’ e1stin r9htorikh/), and as a result of being in this state (e0k de\ tou&tou tou= pa/qouj) think that they have discovered rhetoric when they have learned necessary preliminaries to the science (ta\ pro\ th=j te/xnhj a0nagkai=a maqh/mata e1xontej r9htorikh\n w)|h/qhsan hu9rhke/nai), and believe that when they teach these things to other people (kai\ tau=ta dh\ dida/skontej a1llouj) they have given them a complete course in rhetoric (h9gou=ntai/ sfisin tele/wj r9htorikh\n dedida/xqai), and that the matter of putting all these things persuasively and of arranging the whole (to\ de\ e3kasta tou/twn piqanw~j le/gein te kai\ to\ o3lon suni/stasqai), as something involving no difficulty (ou0de\n e1rgon o1n), their pupils must supply in their speeches from their own resources (au0tou\j dei=n par’ e9autw~n tou\j maqhta/j sfwn pori/zesqai e0n toi=j lo/goij)’?

Phaedrus: I rather think (A0lla\ mh/n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), that the substance of the science which these men teach and write up as rhetoric is something like that (kinduneu/ei ge toiou=to/n ti ei]nai to\ th=j te/xnhj h4n ou]toi oi9 a1ndrej w(j r9htorikh\n dida/skousin te kai\ gra/fousin), and to me, at any rate, you seem to be right (kai\ e1moige dokei=j a0lhqh= ei0rhke/nai); but how and from where can one acquire for oneself the science which belongs to the real expert in rhetoric and the really persuasive speaker (a0lla\ dh\ th\n tou= tw~| o1nti r9htorikou= te kai\ piqanou= te/xnhn pw~j kai\ po/qen a1n tij du/naito pori/sasqai;)?

Socrates: As for the ability to acquire it (To\ me\n du/nasqai), Phaedrus (w} Fai=dre), so as to become a complete performer (w#ste a0gwnisth\n te/leon gene/sqai), probably (ei0ko/j) – perhaps even necessarily (i1swj de\ kai\ a0nagkai=on) – the matter is as it is in all other cases (e1xein w#sper ta]lla): if it is naturally in you to become a good orator (ei0 me/n soi u9pa/rxei fu/sei r9htoikw|~ ei]nai), a notable orator you will be (e1sh| r9h/twr e0llo/gimoj), when you have got knowledge and practice besides (proslabw_n e0pisth/mhn te kai\ mele/thn), and whatever you lack of these (o3tou d’ a2n e0llei/ph|j tou/twn), you will be incomplete in this respect (tau/th| d’ a0telh\j e1sh|). But as for the part of it which is a science (o3son de\ au0tou= te/xnh), the way of proceeding seems not to be the one that Lysias and Thrasymachus choose (ou0x h[| Lusi/aj te kai\ Qrasu/maxoj poreu/etai dokei= moi fai/nesqai h9 me/qodoj).

Phaedrus: Well how, then (A0lla\ ph=| dh/;)?

Socrates: It is not surprising, I suppose, my good fellow, that Pericles turned out to be the most complete of all with respect to rhetoric (Kinduneu/ei, w} a1riste, ei0ko/twj o9 Periklh=j pa/ntwn telew&tatoj ei0j th\n r9htorikh\n gene/sqai).

Phaedrus: Why do you say that (Ti/ dh/;)?

Socrates: All sciences of importance (Pa=sai o3sai mega/lai tw~n texnw~n) require the addition (prosde/ontai) of babbling and lofty talk about nature (a0dolesxi/aj kai\ metewrologi/aj fu/sewj pe/ri); for the relevant high-mindedness and effectiveness in all directions seem to come to a man from some such source as that (to\ ga\r u9yhlo/noun tou=to kai\ pa/nth| telesiourgo\n e1oiken e0nteuqe/n poqen ei0sie/nai). This is something that Pericles acquired in addition to his natural ability (o4 kai\ Periklh=j pro\j tw~| eu0fuh\j ei]nai e0kth/sato); for I think because he fell with Anaxagoras, who was just such a person (prospesw_n ga\r oi]mai toiou/tw| o1nti A0naxago/ra|), and became filled with such lofty talk (metewrologi/aj e0mplhsqei\j), and arrived at the nature of mind and of absence of mind (kai\ e0pi\ fu/sin nou= te kai\ a0noi/aj a0fiko/menoj), which were the very subjects about which Anaxagoras used to talk so much (w{n dh\ pe/ri to\n polu\n lo/gon e0poiei=to A0nacago/raj), he was able to draw from there and apply to the science of speaking (e0nteu=qen ei3lkusen e0pi\ th\n tw~n lo/gwn te/xnhn) what was applicable to it (to\ pro/sforon au0th=|).

Phaedrus: What do you mean by that (Pw~j tou=to le/geij;)?