Science of rhetoric

 

Well, my good man (A]r’ ou]n, w} a0gaqe/): have we abused the science of speaking more coarsely than we should (a0groiko/teron tou= de/ontoj leloidorh/kamen th\n tw~n lo/gwn te/xnhn;)? She might perhaps say (h9 d’ i1swj a2n ei1poi) ‘Why is it (“Ti/ pot’), you excellent people (w} qauma/sioi), that you talk this nonsense (lhrei=te;)? I do not insist that anyone who learns how to speak should be ignorant of the truth (e0gw_ ga\r ou0de/n’ a0gnoou=nta ta0lhqe\j a0nagka/zw manqa/nein le/gein); on the contrary, if my advice is anything (a0ll’, ei1 ti e0mh\ sumboulh/), it is that he should get the truth first (kthsa/menon e0kei=no) and then seize hold of me (ou3twj e0me\ lamba/nein); but this at any rate is my boast (to/de d’ ou]n me/ga le/gw), that without me (w(j a1neu e0mou=) the man who knows what is true (tw~| ta\ o1nta ei0do/ti) will be quite unable to persuade scientifically (ou0de/n ti ma=llon e1stai pei/qein te/xnh|).

Phaedrus: So will she be right (Ou0kou=n di/kaia e0rei=) in saying this (legou/sa tau=ta;)?

Socrates: I say she will (Fhmi/); if, that is, the arguments advancing on her (e0a\n oi3 g’ e0pio/ntej au0th=| lo/goi) testify that she is a science (marturw~sin ei]nai te/xnh|). For I seem as it were to hear certain arguments approaching and solemnly protesting even before the case comes to court (w#sper ga\r a0kou/ein dokw~ tinwn prosio/ntwn kai\ diamarturwme/nwn lo/gwn) that she is lying (o3ti yeu/detai), and is not a science (kai\ ou0k e1sti te/xnh) but an unscientific knack (a1ll’ a1texnoj tribh/); of speaking (tou= de\ le/gein), saith the Spartan (fhsi\n o9 La/kwn), a genuine science (e1tumoj te/xnh), without a grasp of truth (a1neu tou= a0lhqei/aj h[fqai), neither exists (ou1t’ e1stin) nor will come into existence in the future (ou1te mh/ pote u3steron ge/nhtai).

Phaedrus: We need these arguments (Tou/twn dei= tw~n lo/gwn), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej); bring them here before us (a1lla\ deu=ro au0tou\j para/gwn) and examine what they say and how they say it (e0ce/taze ti/ kai\ pw~j le/gousin).

Socrates: Come here then (Pa/rite dh/), you noble beasts (qre/mmata gennai=a), and persuade Phaedrus of the beautiful offspring (kalli/paida/ te Fai=dron pei/qete) that unless he engages in philosophy sufficiently well (w(j e0a\n mh\ i9kanw~j filosofh/sh|) he will never be a sufficiently good speaker (ou0de\ i9kano/j pote le/gein e1stai) about anything (peri\ ou0deno/j). Let Phaedrus answer you (a0pokrine/sqw dh\ o9 Fai=droj).

Phaedrus: Ask your questions (E)rwta=te).

Socrates: Well then (A]r’ ou]n), will not the science of rhetoric  as a whole be (ou0 to\ me\n o3lon h9 r9htorikh\ a2n ei1h te/xnh) a kind of leading of the soul by means of things said (yuxagwgi/a tij dia\ lo/gwn), not only in law-courts (ou0 mo/non e0n dikasthri/oij) and all other kinds of public gatherings (kai\ o3soi a1lloi dhmo/sioi su/llogoi), but in private ones too (a0lla\ kai\ e0n i0di/oij) – the same science (h9 au0th/), whether it is concerned with small matters or large ones (smikrw&n te kai\ mega/lwn pe/ri), and something which possesses no more value (kai\ ou0de\n e0ntimo/teron), if properly understood (to/ ge o0rqo/n), when it comes into play with things of importance than when it does with things of no importance (peri\ spoudai=a h2 peri\ fau/la gigno/menon;)? Is this what you’ve heard about it (h2 pw~j su\ tau=t’ a0kh/koaj;)?

Phaedrus: No, I must say (Ou0 ma\ to\n Di/’), not absolutely that (ou0 panta/pasin ou3twj): a science of speaking and writing is perhaps especially employed in lawsuits (a0lla\ ma/lista me/n pwj peri\ ta\j di/kaj le/getai/ te kai\ gra/fetai te/xnh|), though also in public addresses (le/getai de\ kai\ peri\ dhmhgori/aj); I have not heard of any extension beyond that (e0pi\ ple/on de\ ou0k a0kh/koa).

Socrates: What? Have you only heard of the manuals on rhetoric by Nestor and Odysseus (A0ll’ h] ta\j Ne/storoj kai\ Odusse/wj te/xnaj mo/non peri\ lo/gwn a0kh/koaj), which they composed at Troy when they had nothing to do (a4j e0n I)li/w| sxola/zontej sunegraya/thn)? You have not heard of those of Palamedes (tw~n de\ Palamh/douj a0nh/kooj ge/gonaj)?

Phaedrus: No, and neither indeed have I heard of Nestor’s (Kai\ nai\ ma\ Di/’ e1gwge tw~n Ne/storoj), unless you are dressing up Gorgias as a Nestor (ei0 mh\ Gorgi/an Ne/stora/ tina kataskeua/zeij), or maybe Thrasymachus and Theodorus as Odysseus (h1 tina Qrasu/maxo/n te kai\ Qeo/dwron Odusse/a).

Socrates: Perhaps (I!swj). But anyway let them pass (a1lla\ ga\r tou/touj e0w~men), and you tell me (su\ d’ ei0pe/), what is it that the opposing parties in the law-courts do (e0n dikasthri/oij oi9 a0nti/dikoi ti/ drw~sin;)? Isn’t it just speaking in opposition to each other (ou0k a0ntile/gousin mentoi;)? Or what shall we say (h2 ti/ fh/somen;)?

Phaedrus: Just that (Tou=t’ au0to/).

Socrates: On the subject of what is just and unjust (Peri\ tou= dikai/ou te kai\ a0di/kou;)?

Phaedrus: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: So the man who does this scientifically (Ou0kou=n o9 te/xnh| tou=to drw~n) will make the same thing appear (poih/sei fanh=nai) to the same people at one time just (to\ au0to\ toi=j au0toi=j tote\ me\n di/kaion), but at any other time he wishes (o3tan de\ bou/lhtai), unjust (a1dikon;)?

Phaedrus: Certainly (Ti/ mh/n;).

Socrates: And in public addresses (Kai\ e0n dhmhgori/a| dh/) he will make the same things appear at one time good (th=| po/lei dokei=n ta\ au0ta\ tote\ me\n a0gaqa/), at another the opposite (tote\ d’ au] ta0nanti/a;)?

Phaedrus: Just so (Ou3twj).

Socrates: So do we not recognize that the Eleatic Palamedes speaks scientifically (To\n ou]n E0leatiko\n Palamh/dhn le/gonta ou0k i1smen te/xnh|), so as to make the same things appear to his hearers to be like and unlike (w#ste fai/nesqai toi=j a0kou/ousi ta\ au0ta\ o3moia kai\ a0no/moia), one and many (kai\ e4n kai\ polla/), at rest and in motion (me/nonta/ te au] kai\ fero/mena;)?

Phaedrus: Yes indeed (Ma/la ge).

Socrates: Then the science of antilogic is not only concerned with law-courts (Ou0k a1ra mo/non peri\ dikasth/ria/ te/ e0stin h9 a0ntilogikh/) and public addresses (kai\ peri\ dhmhgori/an), but (a0ll’), so it seems (w(j e1oike), there will be this one science – if indeed it is one – in relation to everything that is said (peri\ pa/nta ta\ lego/mena mi/a tij te/xnh, ei1per e1stin, au3th a2n ei1h), by which a man will be able to make everything which is capable of being made to resemble something else resemble everything which it is capable of being made to resemble (h4| tij oi[o/j t’ e1stai pa=n panti\ o9moiou=n tw~n dunatw~n kai\ oi[j dunato/n), and to bring it to light when someone else makes one thing resemble another and disguises it (kai\ a1llou o9moiou=ntoj kai\ a0pokruptome/nou ei0j fw~j a1gein).

Phaedrus: What sort of thing do you mean (Pw~j dh\ to\ toiou=ton le/geij;)?

Socrates: I think it will become clear to us if we direct our search in this way (Th=|de dokw~ zhtou=sin fanei=sqai): does deception come about more in the case of things which are widely different (a0pa/th po/teron e0n polu\ diafe/rousi gi/gnetai ma=llon) or in those which differ little (h2 o0li/gon;)?

Phaedrus: In those which differ little (E0n toi=j o0li/gon).

Socrates: Now when you are passing over from one thing to its opposite you will be more likely to escape detection if you take small steps (A0lla/ ge dh\ kata\ smikro\n metabai/nwn ma=llon lh/seij e0lqw_n e0pi\ to\ e0nanti/on) than if you take large ones (h2 kata\ me/ga).

Phaedrus: Certainly (Pw~j d’ ou1;).

Socrates: In that case the person who intends to deceive someone else (Dei= a1ra to\n me/llonta a0path/sein me\n a1llon), but be undeceived himself (au0to\n de\ mh\ a0path/sesqai), must have a precise knowledge of the resemblance and the dissimilarity between the things that are (th\n o9moio/thta tw~n o1ntwn kai\ a0nomoio/thta a0kribw~j dieide/nai).

Phaedrus: Necessarily (A0na/gkh me\n ou]n).

Socrates: So will he be able (H} ou]n oi[o/j te e1stai), if he is ignorant of the truth of each thing (a0lh/qeian a0gnow~n e9ka/stou), to identify the resemblance, whether small or great, which the other things have to the thing he does not know (th\n tou= a0gnooume/nou o9moio/thta smikra/n te kai\ mega/lhn e0n toi=j a1lloij diagignw&skein;)?

Phaedrus: Impossible (A0du/naton).

Socrates: Then clearly those who hold beliefs contrary to what is the case and are deceived (Ou0kou=n toi=j para\ ta\ o1nta doca/zousi kai\ a0patwme/noij dh=lon w(j) have this kind of thing creeping in on them through certain resemblances (to\ pa/qoj tou=to di’ o9moioth/twn tinw~n ei0serru/h).

Phaedrus: It does happen that way (Gi/gnetai gou=n ou3twj).

Socrates: So is there any way in which a man will be expert (E!stin ou]n o3pwj te/xnikoj e1stai) at making others cross over little by little from what is the case on each occasion, via the resemblances, leading them away towards the opposite (metabiba/zein kata\ smikro\n dia\ tw~n o9moio/thtwn a0po\ tou= o1ntoj e9ka/stote e0pi\ tou0nanti/on a0pa/gwn), or at escaping this himself (h2 au0to\j tou=to diafeu/gein), if he has not recognised what each thing that is actually is (o9 mh\ e0gnwrikw_j o4 e1stin e3kaston tw~n o1ntwn;)?

Phaedrus: No, never (Ou0 mh/ pote).

Socrates: In that case, my friend, anyone who does not know the truth, but has made it his business to hunt down appearances (Lo/gwn a1ra te/xnhn, w} e9tai=re, o9 th\n a0lh/qeian mh\ ei0dw&j, do/caj de\ teqhreukw&j), will give us a science of speech which is, so it seems, ridiculously unscientific (geloi/an tina/, w(j e1oike, kai\ a1texnon pare/cetai).

Phaedrus: You may be right (Kinduneu/ei).

***

 

There is a marked difference between Socrates’ last entry, in which he addresses Phaedrus very personally and intimately – ‘In that case, my friend’ – and the previous impersonal investigation of the method of using a series of small steps, of small resemblances, if one intends to persuade a person or persons of the contrary to what is the case; which is paralleled by a similar difference between Phaedrus’ ‘You may be right’, which expresses uncertainty, with which Phaedrus responds to Socrates’ personal appeal, which in the Greek kinduneuei expresses Phaedrus’ reluctant agreement with what Socrates says in his personal address to him (kindunos means ‘danger’, ‘peril’). But if we want to get the meaning of Phaedrus’ expression of uncertainty in his ‘You may be right’ and that of reluctant agreement expressed in kinduneuei, we must go back to my previous post, namely to Socrates’ question at 259e4-6: Well then, for things that are going to be said well and acceptably, at least, mustn’t there be knowledge in the mind of the speaker of the truth about whatever he intends to speak about?

Phaedrus replied: What I have heard about this, my dear Socrates, is that there is no necessity for the man who intends to be an orator to understand what is really just, but only what would appear so to the majority of those who will give judgement, and not what is really good or fine but whatever will appear so; because persuasion comes from that and not from the truth. (259e7-260a4)

Note the correspondence between Phaedrus’ ‘my dear Socrates’ at 259e7, and Socrates’ ‘my friend’ at 262c1.