Euthyphro in the Cratylus

After the intermezzo with Ludvík Vaculík, let me return to Plato. In ‘1 Plato’s Euthyphro and Cratylus’ I argued that Plato came to the Porch of the King Archon intending to present to the King Archon his written indictment (graya/menon, Diog. Laert. II. 29) of his father, in which he indicted him for murder (fo/nou, Euth.4a10). He justified his intention to do so with reference to Zeus who ‘bound his father’, Cronos, ‘because he wickedly devoured his sons’, and to Cronos, who too punished (by castration, e0ktemei=n) his father, Uranus, ‘for similar reasons’ (di’ e3tera toiau=ta) (Euth. 6a1-3).

Euthyphro opens the dialogue by asking Socrates ‘What has happened (Ti/ new&teron ge/gonen) that you have abandoned your activities in Lyceum (ta\j e0n Lukei/w| katalipw_n diatriba\j), and spend now your time here (e0nqa/de nu=n diatri/beij), at the porch of the King Archon. Diatri/bw means ‘rub hard’, ‘wear away’; metaphorically of time: ‘spend time’, ‘waste time’, and so, Euthyphro must have watched Socrates for some time. This means that Euthyphro was approaching the porch of the King Archon, to put his case to the “King”, not coming out of it, and that the whole dialogue took place before Euthyphro indicted his father, not after he indicted him. Diogenes Laertius says in the Life of Socrates that ‘Socrates, after some conversation with Euthyphro upon piety, diverted him from his purpose’, i.e. diverted Euthyphro from indicting his father (II. 29).

This was no small thing, for as Euthyphro says, his father, and all his other relatives and friends tried to divert him from indicting his father. How did Socrates achieve it? The only thing we can learn in the Euthyphro is that Euthyphro could not refute Socrates’ objections against the view of piety with which he justified his intended indictment of his father. For when Socrates shows to him that he is contradicting himself, and wants to start their investigation of piety all over again, Euthyphro remembers that he is due to go somewhere in a hurry (speu/dw poi), and hurries away, promising Socrates ‘another time’ (ei0j au]qij, 15e3-4). Presumably, Euthyphro hurries away still convinced that he is right. Is it likely that Socrates with his few objections against Euthyphro’s views on piety could shake his conviction of being a great expert on all matters concerning religiosity? (4d9-5a2) Doesn’t this mean that Diogenes’ story about Socrates diverting Euthyphro from indicting his father must be rejected as spurious? On the other hand, it must have been well known whether Euthyphro did indict his father of murder or refrained from doing so.

The Cratylus offers us a solution to this conundrum. Thrown into uncertainty concerning his original understanding of his religious duty, Euthyphro appears to have turned to what he believed to be the original significance of the names of Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus. This turn of Euthyphro’s mind affected Socrates deeply – ‘Euthyphro talked and I listened, and he has filled not only my ears with his wisdom, but has taken possession of my soul’ (396d6-8).

Socrates’ etymological speculations about the names of Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus in the Cratylus must have reminded Plato’s readers of the etymological speculations with which Plato opens his hymn on love in the Phaedrus, the Palinode. To make this clear, let us turn to the texts.

In the Cratylus, Socrates ends his etymological speculations concerning the names of Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus by reflecting on ‘this wisdom’ (sofi/a au3th), which has come to him ‘all in an instant’ (e0cai/fnhj), ‘I know not whence’ (ou0k oi]d’ o9po/qen, 396c6-d1). In the Phaedrus, when Phaedrus finished reading Lysias’ erotic speech, Socrates feels (ai0sqa/nomai) his breast (sth/qoj) becoming full (plh=rej) with a different speech ‘which is no worse’ (mh\ xei/rw): ‘I know well that it can’t have come from my own mind, for I know of my own ignorance; I must have been filled up (peplhrw&sqai) from a different source (235c6-d1).’

In the Cratylus Socrates says that we are right in calling Zeus Zena (Zh=na) and Dia (Di/a), through (di/a) whom (o3n) we all have our life (to\ zh=n). The name of Cronos he derives from ‘the pure (to\ kaqaro/n) and undefiled (a0kh/raton) mind (tou= nou=)’, and Uranus from ‘looking upwards to heavenly bodies’ (o9ra=n ta\ a1nw), which is the way to have a pure mind’ (to\n kaqaro\n nou=n paragi/gnesqai) (396a-c).

In the Phaedrus love is viewed as madness (mani/a), negatively in Lysias’ and Socrates’ first speech, but as the highest good in Socrates’ second speech, the Palinode. In the opening passage of the Palinode Socrates ‘appeals to the testimony (a1cion e0pimartu/rasqai) of the men of old (tw~n palaiw~n) who gave things their names (oi9 ta\ o0no/mata tiqe/menoi, 244b6-7) … otherwise they would not have given to that greatest of arts (th=| kalli/sth| te/xnh|), whereby the future is discerned (h9| to\ me/llon kri/netai), this very name (au0to\ tou=to tou1noma), madness (maniken, manikh/n) … though the men of to-day (oi9 nu=n), with no sense of values (a0peirokalw~j), put in the letter “t” (to\ tau= e0pemba/llontej) and call it mantic (mantikh\n e0ka/lesan, 244b6-c2).

The introductory passage in the Phaedran Palinode can be read as an introduction to the Cratylus.