Euthyphro in the Cratylus – continuation

Having presented the etymological explanation of the names of Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus, Socrates says that if he remembered the genealogy of Hesiod, he would have gone on and tried the same sort of enquiry on the remoter ancestors of the gods ‘to make a trial (e3wj a0pepeira/qhn) of this wisdom (th=j sofi/aj tauthsi/) – which now (h9 nu=n), all in an instant (e0cai/fnhj), has come to me (e0moi\ prospe/ptwken), just at present (a3rti), I know not whence  (ou0k oi]d’ o9po/qen) – what it would do (ti/ poih/sei)’ (396c6-d1),

Hermogenes: ‘You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly inspired, and to be uttering oracles (xrhsmw|dei=n).’

Socrates: ‘Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul. I think that this will be the right course – today (to\ me\n th/meron) I shall let his superhuman power work and finish my investigation of names (kai\ ta\ loipa\ peri\ tw~n o0noma/twn e0piske/yasqai); but tomorrow (au1rion de/), if you (as the discussion goes, the “you” appears to refer simply to Hermogenes) are so disposed (a2n kai\ u9mi=n sundokh=|, Socrates’ u9mi=n indicates that he considers Cratylus, as well as himself and Hermogenes, as the one possessed by Euthyphro’s enchanting wisdom; so far, Cratylus has been a silent bystander, and will remain so, until the last discussion, in which Socrates assumes the role of the purifying sophist), we will conjure him away (a0podiopomphso/meqa au0th/n, 396e3-4; the feminine pronoun au0th/n refers to th=j sofi/aj tauthsi/, “this wisdom”, 396c6, in the last sentence in Socrates’ preceding speech), and make a purgation of him (“of it” au0th/n), if we can only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purification of this sort.’

Hermogenes: ‘With all my heart; for I am very curious to hear the rest of the inquiry about names.’ (396d2-397a3, Jowett’s translation, amended)

Is it just the chutzpah of investigating the names of the gods that requires purgation, or is there yet another train of thought involved, which deserves purgation?

Socrates: ‘Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the gods (a0po\ tw~n qew~n a1rxesqai), and show for what reason they are rightly so named?’

Hermogenes: ‘Yes, that will be well.’

Socrates: ‘My notion would be something of this sort; – I suspect that the sun, moon, earth, stars and heaven, were the only gods known to the original Hellenes, which is still the case with many barbarians. Seeing that they were always moving and running (i0o/nta dro/mw| kai\ qeo/nta), from this nature (a0po\ tau/thj th=j fu/sewj) of running (th=j tou= qei=n) they were called gods (“qeou/j” au0tou\j e0ponoma/sai); and when men became acquainted with the other gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to them all. Do you think that likely?’

Hermogenes: ‘I think it very likely indeed.’ (397c4-d7; Jowett’s translation, amended)

***

In the closing section of the dialogue Socrates says to Cratylos:

‘Let us now examine this (e1ti toi/nun to/de skeyw&meqa), that we are not misled by the appearance of such a multitude of names (o3pwj mh\ h9ma=j ta\ polla\ tau=ta o0no/mata e0capata=|), all tending in the same direction (e0j tau0to\n tei/nonta); if indeed (ei0 tw~| o1nti me/n) the givers (oi9 qe/menoi) of those names (au0ta/) gave them thinking (dianohqe/ntej ge e1qento) that all things are always in motion (w(j i0o/ntwn a9pa/ntwn a0ei/) and in flux (kai\ r9eo/ntwn). For they seem even to me (fai/nontai ga\r e1moige kai\ au0tw~|) that they were thinking that way (ou3tw dianohqh/nai); but that (to\ d’), perhaps (ei0 e1tuxen), is not happening that way (ou0x ou3twj e1xei), and they themselves (a0ll’ ou3toi au0toi/ te) are carried round (kukw~ntai), and drag us in after them (kai\ h9ma=j e0felko/menoi prosemba/llousin). For examine (ske/yai ga/r), master (w} qauma/sie) Cratylus (Kratu/le), that about which I often dream (o4 e1gwge polla/kij o0neirw&ttw), whether we are to maintain (po/teron fwme/n) that there is something (ti ei]nai) which is beautiful itself (au0to\ kalo/n) and good (kai\ a0gaqo/n), and each of the things that are (kai\ e4n e3kaston tw~n o1ntwn) in the same way (ou3tw), or not (h2 mh/)?’

Cratylus: ‘Certainly, Socrates, I think so (e1moige dokei=, w} Sw&kratej).’ (439b10-d2, Jowett’s translation, amended)