1 The ancient dating of the Phaedrus as reflected in Isocrates’ Against the Sophists

Diogenes Laertius says in his Life of Plato: ‘And there is a story (logos de) that the first dialogue he wrote was the Phaedrus’ (prȏton auton grapsai ton Phaidron), and that indeed there is something juvenile about it’ (kai gar echein meirakiȏdes ti to problȇma, III. 38). This ancient tradition was dismissed by modern Platonists; wrongly, as I have argued in ‘Plato’s first two dialogues, a reflection of his political hopes’, which I have published on my website. In this post I shall argue that Isocrates’ Against the Sophists reflects the ancient dating of the Phaedrus.

Isocrates informs us in his autobiographical Antidosis that he wrote Against the Sophists: ‘when I entered upon my profession as a teacher’ (hot’ ȇrchomȇn peri tautȇn einai tȇn pragmateian, 193). He wrote the discourse to inform the public of what he was going to teach, and he opened it by distancing himself from other teachers: ‘If all  who are engaged in the profession of education were willing (Ei pantes ȇthelon hoi paideuein epicheirountes) to state the facts (alȇthȇ legein ‘to tell the truth’) instead of making greater promises (kai mȇ meizous poieisthai tas huposcheseis) than they can possibly fulfil (hȏn emellon epitelein), they would not be in such a bad repute (ouk an kakȏs ȇkouon) with the lay-public (hupo tȏn idiȏtȏn). As it is, however (nun d’), the teachers who do not scruple to vaunt their powers with utter disregard of the truth (hoi tolmȏntes lian aperiskeptȏs alazoneuesthai) have created the impression (pepoiȇkasin) that those who choose a life of careless indolence are better advised (hȏste dokein ameinon bouleuesthai tous raithumein hairoumenous) than those who devote themselves to serious study (tȏn peri philosophian diatribontȏn ‘than those who devote themselves to philosophy’.’ (1; in this post I am using G. Norlin’s translation.)

Norlin misrepresents Isocrates’ discourse by translating philosophia as ‘serious study’. In this opening paragraph Isocrates distances himself from contemporary philosophers, maintaining that they have damaged philosophy in the way they are presenting it.

‘Indeed, who can fail to abhor (Tis gar ouk an misȇseien), yes to contemn those teachers (hama kai kataphronȇseie), in the first place (prȏton men), who devote themselves to disputations (tȏn peri tas eridas diatribontȏn) … (1)

Norlin notes on ‘those teachers … who devote themselves to disputations’: ‘Captious argumentation in the field of ethics. He is not thinking of Socrates, who did not teach for pay, nor of Plato’s dialectic, which was not yet famous, but of the minor Socratics, especially Antisthenes and Euclides, who taught for money while effecting contempt for it. In general he is thinking of such quibblers as are later shown up in Plato’s Euthydemus’.

As can be seen, Norlin is anxious to remove Plato from those against whom Isocrates raises his criticism, but his dating of Against the Sophists makes it implausible. For he dates the discourse ‘About 390 B.C.’ (Note ‘b’ to his ‘Introduction’, Isocrates, vol. II, The Loeb Classical Library edition, p. 160.) Plato informs us in his Seventh Letter that when he was forty, i.e. in 389, he went to Sicily (324a); he went on his journey having come to the conclusion that ‘the classes of mankind will have no cessation of evils (kakȏn oun ou lȇxein ta anthrȏpina genȇ) until either the class of those who are right and true philosophers attains political supremacy (prin an ȇ to tȏn philosphountȏn orthȏs ge kai alȇthȏs genos eis archas elthȇi tas politikas), or else the class of those who hold power in the State (ȇ to tȏn dunasteuontȏn en tais polesin) becomes, by some dispensation of Heaven, really philosophic (ek tinos moiras theias ontȏs philosophȇsȇi, 326b7-b4, Bury’s translation).’ As Bury notes, this echoes the famous passage in Republic V. 473 D. (Note 2 on page 482, vol. IX of LOEB edition of Plato). Plato had his ideal state, in which philosophers become rulers or the rulers become true philosophers, clearly worked out in his mind when he went to Sicily, for it was this thought that he implanted in the mind of the young Syracusan aristocrat Dion; to make it work, he was invited to Syracuse by Dion when Dionysius the elder died.

This means that prior to Norlin’s dating of Isocrates’ Against the Sophists Plato wrote all dialogues in which his conception of the ideal State is missing, such as the Phaedrus, the Lysis, the Meno, the Laches, the Protagoras, the Gorgias, and especially the Euthydemus where he explicitly separates philosophy and political activity as two good disciplines (hȇ philosophia agathon estin kai hȇ politikȇ praxis), each related to different spheres (pros allo de hekatera, 306b2-3). As could be seen, Norlin in his note dates the Euthydemus after Isocrates’ Against the Sophists; rightly so, for he is aware that Plato in it refers to Isocrates’ discourse.

Clearly, Norlin’s contention that Isocrates in his discourse does not aim his criticism at Plato ‘for Plato’s dialectic was not yet famous’ is wrong. Isocrates’ criticism of contemporary philosophers is all-embracing, he aims it at all contemporary philosophers; to make sense of it, we must find out what in Plato justifies Isocrates’ criticism. In this task we may be helped by Hermeias who in his Commentary on the Phaedrus reproduces the ancient criticism raised against the Phaedrus: ‘In the first place they say (Phasi gar prȏton men) that he inappropriately (ou deontȏs) made the discourse against eros and for eros (kat’ erȏtos kai huper erȏtos pepoiȇsthai auton ton logon), like a youngling ambitiously contending on each side (hȏsper meirakion philotimoumenon eis hekateron), and then (epeita) his writing against the discourse of Lysias (to antigraphein tȏi Lusiou logȏi) and competing with him (kai hamillasthai) appears to be the work of a malign and contentious youngster (baskanou tinos kai philoneikou neou eoiken einai), lampooning the rhetorician (kȏmȏiduntos ton rhȇtora), and accusing him of lack of art (kai eis atechnian auton diaballontos).’ (Hermeias, In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, ed. Couvreur, Paris 1901, p. 9.)

Isocrates continues: ‘[who can fail to abhor, yes to contemn those teachers], since they pretend to search for truth (hoi prospoiountai men tȇn alȇtheian zȇtein), but straightway at the beginning of their professions (euthus d’en archȇi tȏn epangelmatȏn) attempt to deceive us with lies (pseudȇ legein epicheirousin ‘they are engaged in telling lies’)?’

If Plato is to fit this criticism, then we must find ‘straightway at the beginning’ of his writings a clearly identifiable ‘lie’. It is at this point that the ancient dating of the Phaedrus as his first dialogue is invaluable; for in it the Palinode on love culminates with the proclamation that ‘if (ean men dȇ oun) the victory be won by the higher elements of mind guiding them [the lover and his beloved] into the ordered rule of the philosophic life (eis tetagmenȇn te diaitan kai philosophian nikȇsȇi ta beltiȏ tȇs dianoias agagonta), their days on earth will be blessed with happiness and concord (makarion men kai homonoȇtikon ton enthade bion diagousin); for the power of evil in their soul has been subjected, and the power of goodness liberated: they have won self-mastery and inward peace (enkrateis hautȏn kai kosmioi ontes, doulȏsamenoi men hȏi kakia psuchȇs enegigneto, eleutherȏsantes de hȏi aretȇ. 256a7-b3, tr. R. Hackforth.)’ The Palinode then ends with a prayer in which Socrates asks Eros to ‘turn Lysias to philosophy even as his brother Polemarchus has been turned’ (epi philosophian de, hȏsper h’adelphos autou Polemarchos tetraprai, trepson), for then Phaedrus will be able to live with him ‘for Love in singleness of purpose with the aid of philosophical discourse’ (haplȏs pros Erȏta meta philosophȏn logȏn ton bion poiȇtai, 257b3-6, tr. Hackforth)’.

When Plato wrote these lines – in 405, in democracy – these assertions of his appeared to be entirely appropriate. It all went wrong when the in 404 democracy was overturned and the Thirty tyrants put Polemarchus to death. It was a sordid affair, which Lysias depicts in Against Eratosthenes (17-20), the man directly responsible for Polemarchus’ imprisonment. It was a case well known to all Athenians, which cast a grave shadow over the Phaedrus. That’s why Isocrates can allude to it as he does, using it as a whip with which he can chastise all Socratics who proclaimed that justice (dikaiosunȇ) and self-control (sȏphrosunȇ) led to eudaimonia, ‘happiness and prosperity’, and as such professed teaching it:

‘For I think it is manifest to all (oimai gar hapasin einai phaneron) that foreknowledge of future events (hoti ta mellonta progignȏskein) is not vouchsafed to our human nature (ou tȇs hȇmeteras phuseȏs estin), but that we are so far removed from this prescience (alla tosouton apechomen tautȇs tȇs phronȇseȏs) that Homer (hȏsth’ Homȇros), who has been conceded the highest reputation for wisdom (ho megistȇs epi sophiai doxan eilȇphȏs), has pictured even the gods (kai tous theous pepoiȇken) as at times debating among themselves about the future (estin hote bouleuomenous huper autȏn) – not that he knew their minds (ou tȇn ekeinȏn gnȏmȇn eidȏs) but that he desired to show us (all’ hȇmin endeixasthai boulomenos) that for mankind (hoti tois anthrȏpois) this power lies in the realm of the impossible (hen touto tȏn adunatȏn estin). But these professors (Houtoi toinun ‘But these’) have gone so far in their lack of scruple (eis touto tolmȇs elȇluthasin ‘have gone to such a point in their rashness’) that they attempt to persuade (hȏste peirȏntai peithein) our young men (tous neȏterous) that (hȏs) if they will only study under them (ȇn autois plȇsiazȏsin) they will know what to do in life (ha te prakteon estin eisontai) and through this knowledge (kai dia tautȇs tȇs epistȇmȇs) will become happy and prosperous (eudaimones genȇsontai).’ (1-3).