Now we are
getting to the crowning point of the dialogue. When Cleinias proved to Socrates
that speech-making is not the art which would bring happiness, for ‘there are
some composers of speeches who do not know how to use the speeches which they
make’, Socrates asked: ‘I think that military command (Hȇ stratȇgikȇ moi dokei) is pre-eminently the art (technȇ pantos mallon einai) possession of which would bring
happiness (hȇn an tis ktȇsamenos eudaimȏn eiȇ).’ – Cleinias: ‘I don’t think so (Ouk emoige dokei).’ – Socrates: ‘Why (Pȏs;)?’ – Cleinias: ‘This art is a kind
of hunting men (Thȇreutikȇ tis hȇde ge estin technȇ anthrȏpȏn).’ –
Socrates: ‘What of it (Ti dȇ oun;)?’ –
Cleinias: ‘No branch of the hunting itself (Oudemia
tȇs thȇreutikȇs autȇs) extends beyond (epi pleon estin ȇ hoson) hunting
(thȇreusai) and capturing (kai cheirȏsasthai); and when the prey is taken (epeidan de cheirȏsȏntai touto ho an thȇreuȏntai) they
cannot use it (ou dunantai autȏi chrȇsthai), but huntsmen (all’ hoi men kunȇgetai) and fishermen (kai hoi haliȇs) hand it over to the cooks (tois opsopoiois paradidoasin), and the
geometricians (hoi d’au geȏmetrai) and
astronomers (kai hoi astronomoi) and mathematicians
(kai hoi logistikois) – for these belong
to the hunting class as well (thȇreutikoi eisi kai houtoi), for they do not make their diagrams (ou gar poiousi ta diagrammata hekastoi toutȏn), but find
out things that are (alla ta onta aneuriskousi) – since they
themselves do not know how to use them (hate
oun chrȇsthai autoi autois ouk epistamenoi), but only to catch their prey (alla thȇreusai monon), they hand over their discoveries
to the dialecticians to make use of them (paradidoasi
dȇpou tois dialektikois katachrȇsthai autȏn tois heurȇmasi), at least those of them do (hosoi ge autȏn) who are not deprived of their sense
(hosoi ge autȏn mȇ pantapasi anoȇtoi eisin). (290b1-c7)
***
Cleinias’ ta onta, ‘things that are’, which refer to the
things on which the geometricians and astronomers and mathematicians direct
their studies, recall ta onta in the Phaedrus (248a5) to which the
philosopher raises his eyes (254b) and which guide his actions, so that he and
his beloved live a blessed life here on earth (makarion enthade bion diagousin, 256a8-b1). Cleinias’ words make it
nevertheless clear that ta onta of the
geometricians and astronomers and mathematicians are not ta onta of the Phaedrus,
for they don’t know how to use them, and hand them over to dialecticians. What
kind of use is he hinting at? Within the given context it is clearly the
educational use; the dialectician uses these disciplines as stepping stones
towards the contemplation of the Forms.
The late
dating of the Phaedrus did not allow Platonic
scholars to see it like this, and so they mistranslate. Thus Jowett translates
Plato’s ‘they do not make their diagrams, but find out things that are’: ‘they do not make their diagrams, but find out that which was previously contained in them’.
Waterfield translates: ‘they merely show up what’s already there’ and says in
his note: ‘Platonic dialectic cannot be meant here, since Socrates continues to
search for the supreme science.’ (Plato, Early
Socratic Dialogues, Penguin Books 1987, p. 346, n. 2) Waterfield’s
observation that ‘Socrates continues to search for the supreme science’ is
certainly relevant – this is why it is Cleinias who speaks of ta onta of the geometricians and
astronomers and mathematicians, and of the dialecticians as the only ones who
can use them, not Socrates.
As has been
seen, Isocrates in Against the Sophists
in his rejection of the possibility that virtue could be taught styled himself
as a true follower of Socrates. It was therefore important to bring the
authentic Socrates back to life and make him display all his protreptic skills.
This has been achieved in Socrates’ first discussion with Cleinias. But in
order to properly defend philosophy against Isocrates’ attack Plato had at
least to indicate what his own educational program was. This could not be made
through the mouth of Socrates; he chose Cleinias to do it.
I believe
that Myles Burnyeat realized that Cleinias’ words ought to be taken as they
stand, without corrupting them in translation as Jowett and others did, but since
he could not contemplate the ancient dating of the Phaedrus – the Phaedrus
as Plato’s first dialogue sheds the required light on the Euthydemus – he came to believe that the Euthydemus was written after the Republic. It must have been in mid-eighties – or perhaps earlier,
1983 or 1984? – that he announced at the Philosophy Centre at Oxford a seminar,
which took place once a week for several weeks, in which he interpreted Euthydemus on this basis. The following
are some of the passages in the Republic
on the basis of which he presumably made his dating:
At 533c-d Plato
says that ‘dialectic alone (hȇ dialektikȇ methodos monȇ) lifts the eye of the soul upwards (to tȇs psuchȇs omma helkei kai anagei anȏ)
using as handmaids and helpers the sciences which we have been discussing (sunerithois kai sumperiagȏgois chrȏmenȇ hais
diȇlthomen technais)’. The sciences discussed were arithmetic, which ‘leads
the soul upward (anȏ poi agei tȇn psuchȇn)
and compels it to discuss numbers as they are in themselves (kai peri autȏn tȏn arithmȏn anankazei
dialegesthai, 525d)’. At 526e he considers geometry (geȏmetria) and
calculation (logismoi) in their role
of ‘tending to make more easy the vision of the Idea of good’ (teinei pros to poiein katidein raion tȇn tou agathou idean); and thither all things tend (teinei
de panta autose) which compel the soul
(hosa anankazei psuchȇn) to turn her
gaze towards that place (eis ekeinon ton
topon metastrephesthai) where is the full perfection of being (en hȏi esti to
eudaimonestaton tou ontos), which she thought, by all means, to behold (ho dei autȇn panti tropȏi idein).’ At 527d
he adds astronomy (astronomia) to
those disciplines, by which ‘the organ of the soul of each man is purified and
illuminated (hekastou organon ti psuchȇs ekkathairetai te kai anazȏpureitai), by which alone is truth seen (monȏi gar autȏi alȇtheia horatai)’.
I say ‘I
believe that Myles Burnyeat …’, for I attended only the first seminar. When
Myles opened it by announcing that on his view the Euthydemus was written after the Republic, I said I considered it impossible, for the idea on which
the Republic stands is the unity of
philosophy and politics, philosophers becoming kings or the kings becoming
philosophers (473c-e), but in the Euthydemus
philosophy and politics are held apart, each concerned with a different sphere
of reality. Then something Myles said made me think of a passage in the Phaedo. I didn’t have it with me, but I
saw that my neighbour had the whole of Plato in front of him. I asked for
permission, found the place I was looking for, read it aloud and then
translated it. When I finished, Burnyeat said: ‘Nobody in this seminar will
read a text aloud in Greek.’ And so, I left.
***
Sorates:
‘Good (Eien), fairest (ȏ kalliste) and
wisest Cleinias (kai sopȏtate Kleinia).
And is this true (touto houtȏs echei;)? –
Cleinias: ‘Certainly (Panu men oun), and
the generals are just like it (kai hoi ge
stratȇgoi houtȏ ton auton tropon); when they take a city (epeidan ȇ polin tina thȇreusȏntai) or a camp (ȇ stratopedon) they hand them over to the politicians
(paradidoasi tois politikois andrasi),
for they do not know how to use (autoi
gar ouk epistantai chrȇsthai toutois) the quarry (ha ethȇreusan), just as people who hunt quails (hȏsper oimai hoi ortugothȇrai) hand them
over to people who breed them (tois
ortugotrophois paradidoasin). If we are looking for the art (ei oun deometha ekeinȇs tȇs technȇs) which is
able to use that which it makes or takes (hȇtis hȏi an ktȇsȇtai ȇ poiȇsasa ȇ thȇreusamenȇ autȇ kai epistatai chrȇsthai), which as such (kai hȇ toiautȇ) will make us blessed (poiȇsei hȇmas makarious),
then we’d better look elsewhere (allȇn dȇ tina zȇtȇteon), and not
the military command (anti tȇs stratȇgikȇs).’
(290c7-d8)
When Crito
heard this, he interrupted the flow of Socrates’ narrative: ‘What are you saying
(Ti legeis su), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates;)? Did that youngster say such things
(ekeino to meirakion toiaut’ ephthenxato;)?’
– Socrates: ‘You don’t think so (Ouk oiei),
Crito (ȏ Kriȏn;)?’ – Crito: ‘By God (Ma Di’), I most certainly do not (ou mentoi); for I think that if he did
say these things (oimai gar auton egȏ, ei taut’ eipen), he doesn’t need educating by Euthydemus or anyone else (out’ Euthudȇmou oute allou oudenos
et’ anthrȏpou deisthai eis
paideian). (290e1-6)
With these
words Crito, just as Cleinias before him, steps out of his normal role within
the rest of the dialogue: they both transcend not only their own thoughts, expressing
Plato’s views on education, they transcend the historical Socrates.
Socrates: ‘Good
heavens! Then perhaps it was Ctesippus who said it (All’ ara, ȏ pros Dios, mȇ Ktȇsippos ȇn ho taut’ eipȏn), and I’ve forgotten (egȏ de ou memnȇmai;)?’ –
Crito: ‘Ctesippus! nonsense (Poios Ktȇsippos;).’ –
Socrates: ‘All I know is (Alla mȇn tode ge eu oida) that neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus (hoti oute Euthudȇmos oute Dionusodȏros) said
these words (ȇn ho eipȏn tauta). But
my dear Crito (all’, ȏ daimonie Kritȏn), couldn’t they have been spoken by some
superior being who was present (mȇ tis tȏn kreittonȏn parȏn auta ephthengxato;)? That I heard them (hoti gar ȇkousa ge tauta) I am certain (eu oida).’ – Crito: ‘Yes, I’d swear to it (Nai ma Dia), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates) – some
superior being, to be sure (tȏn kreittonȏn mentoi tis moi dokei); far superior in fact (kai polu ge).’ (290e7-291a7)
Waterfield
says in the accompanying note: ‘Crito means Socrates himself, of course, not
the god whom Socrates was suggesting.’ (Op.
cit. p. 347) In my view, Plato uses here Crito to point his finger through
Socrates and over Socrates’ head to himself. In the Euthydemus as in the Phaedrus,
Plato had to present both Socrates and himself. In the Phaedrus he had only Socrates to play with; let us see how he did
it in the passage which Crito’s and Socrates’ discussion recalls.
When
Phaedrus finished reading Lysias’ erotic piece, he said that nobody could say
anything better on the given theme. Socrates couldn’t agree, for wise men and
women who wrote on that theme would refute him. Phaedrus: ‘To whom do you refer
(Tines houtoi;)? Where (Kai pou) have you heard anything better
than this (su beltiȏ toutȏn akȇkoas;)?’ –
Socrates: ‘I can’t tell you off-hand (Nun
men houtȏ ouk echȏ eipein); but
I’m sure I have heard something better (dȇlon de hoti tinȏn akȇkoa) … I am of
course well aware it can’t be anything originating in my own mind (hoti men oun para ge emautou ouden autȏn ennenoȇka eu oida), for I know my own ignorance (suneidȏs emautȏi amathian)’
(235c1-8, tr. Hackforth). – To whom but the writer of the dialogue Socrates
points through his ‘not-knowing’ the source of ‘what he heard’?
Let me end
this post by pointing to another passage in the Phaedrus, which sheds light on Cleinias’ view on dialecticians in
the Euthydemus. Socrates in the former
closed the outline of dialectic with the words: ‘Believe me, Phaedrus, I am
myself a lover of these divisions and collections (Toutȏn dȇ egȏge autos te erastȇs, ȏ Phaidre, tȏn diaireseȏn kai sunagȏgȏn), that I may
gain the power to speak and to think (hina
hoios te ȏ legein te kai phronein); and whenever I deem another man
able to discern an objective unity and plurality (ean te tin’ allon hȇgȇsomai dunaton eis hen kai epi polla pephukoth’ horan), I follow in his footsteps where he
leads as a god (touton diȏkȏ “katopisthe met’ ichnion hȏste theoio”.’ (266b3-7, tr. Hackforth) – To whom
but Plato does Socrates refer?
No comments:
Post a Comment