Next,
Isocrates presents in Against the
Sophists his educational program: ‘It is my duty not only to rebuke others
(dei mȇ monon tȏn allȏn katȇgorein), but
also to set forth my own views (alla kai
tȇn emautou dȇlȏsein dianoian,
14)’. He devotes to this task paragraphs 14-18, and in all these paragraphs there
can be found striking similarities to the outline of reformed rhetoric
presented by Plato in the Phaedrus.
Phaedrus
asks: ‘By what means and from what source can one attain the art of the true
rhetorician, the real master of persuasion (tȇn tou tȏi onti rȇtorikou te kai pithanou technȇn pȏs kai pothen an tis dunaito porisasthai;)?’ Socrates answers: ‘If you mean
how can one become a finished performer (To
men dunasthai, ȏ Phaidre, hȏste agȏnistȇn teleon genesthai), then probably (eikos) –
indeed I might say undoubtedly (isȏs de kai anankaion) – it is the same as with everything else (echein hȏsper t’alla): if you have an innate capacity for
rhetoric (ei men soi huparchei phusei rȇtorikȏi einai), you will become a famous
rhetorician (esȇi rȇtȏr ellogimos),
provided you also acquire knowledge and practice (proslabȏn epistȇmȇn te kai meletȇn); but if you lack any of these three
(hotou d’an elleipȇis toutȏn) you will be correspondingly
unfinished (tautȇi d’ atelȇs esȇi).’
(269c9-d6, translation R. Hackforth)
Isocrates
says in paragraph 14, in which he introduces his own views on the subject: ‘Ability
(hai men dunameis), whether in speech
(kai tȏn logȏn) or any
other activity (kai tȏn allȏn ergȏn hapantȏn), is found in those who are well
endowed by nature (en tois euphuesin
engignontai) and have been schooled by practical experience (kai tois peri tas empeirias gegumnasmenois).’
In paragraph
15 he further develops this thought: ‘Formal training (hȇ de paideusis) makes such men more skilful and
more resourceful in discovering the possibilities of a subject (tous men toioutous technikȏterous kai pros to zȇtein euporȏterous epoiȇsen); for it teaches them to take from a
readier source the topics which they otherwise hit upon in haphazard fashion (hois gar nun entunchanousi planȏmenoi, tout’ ex hetoimoterou lambanein autous edidaxen). But it cannot fully fashion men
who are without natural aptitude into good debaters or writers (tous de katadeesteran tȇn phusin echontas agȏnistas men agathous ȇ logȏn poiȇtas ouk an apoteleseien), although it is capable of leading them on to
self-improvement and to a greater degree of intelligence on many subjects (autous d’an hautȏn proagagoi kai pros polla phronimȏterȏs diakeisthai poiȇseien).’
***
Hackforth
notes on Phaedrus 269d: ‘Both
substance and language here are very similar to Isocrates, contra Soph. par. 16-17 [in fact par. 14-15], and (in a rather less degree) to the later Antidosis par. 186-9. It is quite possible that Plato had
been reading the former work recently, but there is no suggestion of attack or
even disagreement on this point, in any case, it is a commonplace which gives
no ground for supposing borrowing on either side.’
To explain away the similarities
between Against the Sophists 14-15
and Phaedrus 269d by referring to
both these passages as ‘a common place’ is wrong. Isocrates presents the quoted lines (par. 14-15)
emphatically as his own views, in contrast to the philosophers criticised for ‘having
gone so far in their having no scruple (houtoi
toinun eis touto tolmȇs elȇluthasin) that
they attempt to persuade (hȏste peirȏntai peithein) our young men (tous neȏterous) that (hȏs) if they will only study under them
(ȇn autois plȇsiazȏsin) they will
know what to do in life (ha te prakteon
estin eisontai) and through this knowledge (kai dia tautȇs tȇs epistȇmȇs) will become
happy and prosperous (eudaimones genȇsontai). More
than that (kai), although they set
themselves as masters and dispensers of goods so precious (tȇlikoutȏn agathȏn hautous didaskalous
kai kurious katastȇsantes), they are not ashamed (ouk aischunontai) of asking for them a
price of three or four minae (treis ȇ tettaras mnas huper toutȏn aitountes)! Why (all’), if they were to sell any other commodity for so trifling a
fraction of its worth (ei men ti tȏn allȏn ktȇmatȏn pollostou merous tȇs axias epȏloun) they would not deny their folly (ouk an ȇmphȇsbȇtȇsan hȏs eu phronountes
tunchanousi);
nevertheless, although they set so insignificant a price on the whole stock of
virtue and happiness (sumpasan de tȇn aretȇn kai tȇn eudaimonian houtȏs oligou timȏntes), they
pretend to wisdom and assume the right to instruct the rest of the world (hȏs noun echontes
didaskaloi tȏn allȏn axiousi gignesthai).’ (3-4, translation Norlin)
Philosophers
thus criticised did not advertise their teaching of justice (dikaiosunȇn,
Against the Sophists 5), of virtue (aretȇn), and of self-control (kai sȏphrosunȇn, Against the Sophists 20) by promising to help their students acquiring
virtue, justice and self-control, and thus making them eudaimonas (‘happy and prosperous’) only if they were endowed by
nature with the ability to obtain these qualities.
Isocrates’ ‘imitation’ of Phaedrus 269d in Against the Sophists 14 is intentional; he claims the thought it
presents as his original insight.
***
Norlin notes on Against the Sophists 4: ‘Socrates (Plato, Apology 20 B) speaks with the same sarcasm of a sophist named
Evenus, who professed to teach all the virtues necessary to a good man and good
citizen for five minae.’
When Isocrates wrote Against the Sophists Socrates’ defence
speech must have been still a living memory in the minds of all those who were
at the trial, who heard and spoke about it, let alone in the mind of all those
who read Plato’s Apology. Philosophers
whom Isocrates exposes to his opprobrium were the followers of Socrates. How could it have happened
that they turned their back so radically on Socrates as he presented himself at
his trial? This question must be asked, for Isocrates’ testimony on this point
should be taken seriously.
***
In paragraph 16 of Against the Sophists Isocrates begins to
unfold his educational program: ‘I hold
(phȇmi gar egȏ) that to obtain
a knowledge of the elements out of
which we make and compose all discourses (tȏn
men ideȏn, ex hȏn tous logous
hapantas kai legomen kai suntithemen, labein epistȇmȇn) is not so very
difficult (ouk einai tȏn panu chalepȏn)
if anyone entrusts himself (ȇn tis hauton
paradȏi), not to those who make rash promises (mȇ tois raidiȏs hupischnoumenois), but to those who have some
knowledge of these things (alla tois
eidosi ti peri autȏn).’
Compare Plato’s opening of the program
of a reformed rhetoric outlined in the Phaedrus:
‘Since the power of speech is in fact a leading of the soul (Epeidȇ logou dunamis tunchanei psuchagȏgia
ousa), the man who is going to be an expert in rhetoric (ton mellonta rȇtorikon esesthai) must
know how many forms soul has (anankȇ eidenai psuchȇ hosa eidȇ echei). Their number is so and
so (estin oun tosa kai tosa), and
they are of such and such kinds (kai toia
kai toia), which is why some people are like this, and others like that (hothen hoi men toioide, hoi de toioide
gignontai); and since these have been distinguished in this way (toutȏn de dȇ houtȏ diȇirȇmenȏn), then
again there are so many forms of
speeches (logȏn au tosa kai tosa estin eidȇ), each one of such and such a
kind (toionde hekaston).’ (271c10-d5,
translation C. J. Rowe)
Norlin’s ‘elements’ for Isocrates’ ideȏn and Rowe’s ‘forms’ for Plato’s eidȇ does not help the reader to find
any resemblance between Isocrates’ and Plato’s outline of rhetoric. But leaving
this aside, there is a profound difference between the two. In Isocrates’
program all reference to the forms of souls is missing; in Plato’s outline the
knowledge of the forms of souls is of primary importance, knowledge of the
forms of speeches comes second. And yet, it is just this difference which
indicates that when Isocrates wrote the given passage, he had the Phaedran
passage clearly in his mind if not in front of his eyes. For when Socrates
finished the outline, Phaedrus said: ‘still, it seems no light business’ (kaitoi ou smikron ge phainetai ergon)
and Socrates responded: ‘It is just for this reason (toutou
toi heneka) that we must turn all our arguments upside down (chrȇ pantas tous logous anȏ kai katȏ
metastrephonta) and look to see (episkopein)
whether any easier and shorter route to it appears anywhere (ei tis pȇi raiȏn kai brachutera phainȇtai
ep’ autȇn hodos), so that someone doesn’t waist his time going off on a
long and rough road (hina mȇ matȇn pollȇn
apiȇi kai tracheian) when he could take a short and smooth one (exon oligȇn te kai leian).’ , 272b5-c2,
tr. Rowe). Isocrates responded to this when he said in par. 16: ‘to obtain a
knowledge of the elements (tȏn ideȏn
‘of the forms’) out of which we make and compose all discourses is not so very difficult if anyone entrusts
himself, not to those who make rash promises, but to those who have some
knowledge of these things’.
In fact, in the Phaedrus actual discussions between Isocrates and Plato on this
matter appear to be reflected, for prior to the complaint of Phaedrus that the
proposed outline ‘seems no light business’, Socrates brought in ‘the writer’ (ho sungrapheus) who objected: ‘What do
you mean (ti dȇ oun;)? Is this what
it looks like to you (dokei houtȏs;)?
Shouldn’t we accept some other account of the art of speech (mȇ allȏs pȏs apodekteon legomenȇs logȏn
technȇs;)?’ (272b2-4; this translation is mine, for I can accept neither
Hackforth’s nor Rowe’s translation of these words.) If this is so, then the
praise of Isocrates’ exceptional talent for rhetoric in the closing section of
the Phaedrus expresses Plato’s
appreciation of the discussions he had with Isocrates on the subject. It is presented
as Socrates’ praise of the young Isocrates in harmony with the dramatic date of
the dialogue (279a). (In 1939 B.D. Meritt reported the discovery of an
inscription that lists Phaedrus among those who were exiled in 415. The Phaedrus is dramatically staged during
the ‘Peace of Nicias’, which began in 421 B.C.; Isocrates, born in 436, was fifteen
years old.)
***
In the Phaedrus, in the passage that immediately follows the quoted
271c10-d5 one, Socrates explains how the prerequisite knowledge of how many
forms of souls and how many forms of speeches there are is to be further
developped and applied: ‘So people of one kind (hoi men oun toioide) are easily persuaded for this reason by one
kind of speech to hold one kind of opinion (hupo
tȏn toiȏnde logȏn dia tȇnde tȇn aitian es ta toiade eupeitheis), while
people of another kind (hoi de toioide)
are for these reasons (dia tade)
difficult to persuade (duspeitheis);
having then grasped these things satisfactorily (dei dȇ tauta hikanȏs noȇsanta), after that (meta tauta) the student must observe them as they are in real life
(theȏmenon auta en tais praxesin onta te),
and actually being put into practice (kai
prattomena), and be able to follow them with keen perception (oxeȏs tȇi aisthȇsei dunasthai epakolouthein),
or otherwise get no advantage, as yet (ȇ
mȇden einai pȏ pleon autȏi), from the things he heard earlier (hȏn tote ȇkouen logȏn) when he was with me
(sunȏn ‘when he was with his
teacher’; Rowe’s ‘when he was with me’ can only refer to Socrates, who is
speaking, but Socrates is merely expressing the proposed principles of teaching
the scientific rhetoric, he doesn’t present himself as a teacher of it). But
when he both has sufficient ability to say (hotan
de eipein te hikanȏs echȇi) what sort of man is persuaded by what sort of
things (hoios huph’ hoiȏn peithetai),
and is capable of telling himself when he sees him (paragignomenon ge dunatos ȇi diaisthanomenos heautȏi endeiknusthai)
that this is the man (hoti houtos esti)
and this the nature (kai hautȇ hȇ phusis)
which was discussed before (peri hȇs tote
ȇsan hoi logoi), now actually present in front of him (nun ergȏi parousa hoi), to whom he must now apply these kinds of
speech in this way (hȇi prosoisteon
tousde hȏde tous logous) to persuade him of this kind of thing (epi tȇn tȏnde peithȏ); when he now has
all of this (tauta d’ ȇdȇ panta echonti),
and has also grasped the occasions (proslabonti kairous) for speaking (tou pote lekteon) and for holding back (kai epischeteon), and for speaking
concisely (brachulogias te au) and
piteously (kai eleeinologias) and in
an exaggerated fashion (kai deinȏseȏs),
and for all the forms of speeches he may learn (hekastȏn te hosa an eidȇ mathȇi logȏn).’ (271d5-272a6, tr. Rowe)
***
From Isocrates’ point of view all this
is unrealistic and irrelevant to rhetoric, and there are reasons to believe
that Plato himself soon realised the folly. In the Charmides, which he wrote after the Phaedrus as his second dialogue (see ‘Plato’s first two dialogues, a
reflection of his political hopes’ on my website), everybody is full of praise
of Charmides’ beauty, but Socrates maintains the young man deserves real praise
‘provided that he happens to be endowed with a fine soul’ (ei tȇn psuchȇn tunchanei eu pephukȏs). When Critias insists that ‘he’s
very beautiful and noble in that respect too’ (panu kalos kai agathos estin kai tauta), Socrates suggests: ‘Then
why don’t we strip that part of him, and look at it’ (ti oun ouk apedusamen autou auto touto kai etheasamen), ‘he must be
now of an age to be willing to engage in discussion’ (pantȏs gar pou tȇlikoutos ȏn ȇdȇ ethelei dialegesthai). (154e1-7) Discussion is the way to learn about the soul, and the whole
of the Charmides may be viewed as
Socrates’ endeavour to get an insight into the soul of Charmides. He limits the
enquiry to the question whether Charmides has the virtue of sȏphrosunȇ (self-control, temperance, wisdom …), but
even so the dialogue ends with his avowed ignorance concerning it. In his major
closing entry, in which he reflects on his and Critias’ abortive investigation
of what this virtue is, Socrates says to Charmides: ‘See whether you do possess
it (all hora ei echeis te), because
if you do possess it (ei gar echeis),
I’d advise you (mallon an egȏge soi
sumbouleusaimi) to consider me a fool (eme
men lȇron hȇgeisthai einai), incapable of investigating anything in a
reasoned argument (kai adunaton logȏi hotioun
zȇtein), and yourself (seauton de)
the happier the more self-controlled you are (hosȏiper sȏphronesteros ei, toioutȏi einai kai eudaimonesteron).’
(176a1-5) This can be viewed as Socrates crowning move in ‘stripping the soul
of Charmides’, for Charmides replied: ‘But heavens (Alla ma Di’), Socrates (ȏ
Sȏkrates), I don’t know (ouk oida)
whether I possess it (out’ ei echȏ) or
whether I don’t (out’ ei mȇ echȏ).
How can I know it (pȏs gar an eideiȇn),
when, on your own admission, not even you and Critias are able to discover what
on earth it is (ho ge mȇd’ humeis hoioi
te este exeurein hoti pot’ estin, hȏs phȇis su;)? Still, I don’t really
believe you at all (egȏ mentoi ou panu
soi peithomai), Socrates, and I really do think I need the charm (kai emauton, ȏ Sȏkrates, panu oimai deisthai
tȇs epȏidȇs)’ – the charm that instils sȏphrosunȇ
in the soul (155e-158c) – and as far as I am concerned (kai to g’ emon), there’s no reason why I should not be charmed by
you every day (ouden kȏluei epaidesthai
hupo sou hosai hȇmerai), until you say (heȏs
an phȇis su) I’ve had enough (hikanȏs
echein).’ Critias, rightly, took Charmides’ decision to follow Socrates and
not disappoint him as ‘a proof that he is self-controlled (tekmȇrion hoti sȏphroneis). Still, the Charmides shows that after Plato wrote and published the Phaedrus, he realised what a task it is
to get an insight into another person’s soul.
***
According to Isocrates only the forms
of speeches can be properly known, and all the rest is a matter of a good teacher
on the one hand and of the daring mind that is capable of good judgment; his deliberations
on teaching rhetoric are therefore considerably simpler: ‘But to choose from
these elements those which should be employed for each subject (to de toutȏn eph’ hekastȏi tȏn pragmatȏn has
[ideas] dei dielesthai), to join them together (kai mixai pros allȇlas), to arrange them properly (kai taxai kata tropon), and also (eti de), not to miss what the occasion
demands (tȏn kairȏn mȇ hamartein) but appropriately to adorn the whole
speech with striking thoughts (alla kai
tois enthumȇmasi prepontȏs holon ton logon katapoikilai) and to clothe it
in flowing and melodious phrase (kai tois
onomasin euruthmȏs kai mousikȏs eipein) – these things, I hold (tauta de), require much study (pollȇs epimeleias deisthai) and are the
task of a vigorous and imaginative mind (kai
psuchȇs andrikȇs kai doxasitkȇs ergon einai): for this, the student must
not only have the requisite aptitude (kai
dein ton men mathȇtȇn pros tȏi tȇn phusin echein hoian chrȇ) but he must
learn the different kinds of discourse (ta
men eidȇ ta tȏn logȏn mathein) and practice himself in their use (peri de tas chrȇseis autȏn gumnasthȇnai);
and the teacher, for his part (ton de
didaskalon), must so expound the principles of the art with the utmost
possible exactness (ta men houtȏs akribȏs
hoiont’ einai dielthein) as to leave out nothing that can be taught (hȏste mȇden tȏn didaktȏn paralipein),
and, for the rest (peri de tȏn loipȏn),
he must in himself set such an example of oratory (toiouton hauton paradeigma paraschein) that the students who have
taken form under his instruction (hȏste
tous ektupȏthentas) and are able to pattern after him (kai mimȇsasthai dunamenous) will, from the outset, show in their
speaking a degree of grace and charm which is not found in others (euthus anthȇroteron kai chariesteron tȏn
allȏn phainesthai legontas).’ (16-18)
Socrates ends his exposition with the
words: ‘recognising the right and the wrong time for these (toutȏn te eukairian te kai akairian
diagnonti), then his grasp of the science will be well and completely
finished (kalȏs te kai teleȏs estin hȇ
technȇ apeirgasmenȇ), but not before that (proteron d’ ou); but in whichever of these things someone is
lacking (all’ hoti an autȏn tis elleipȇi) when he speaks (legȏn) or teaches (ȇ didaskȏn) or writes (ȇ
graphȏn), and says that he speaks scientifically (phȇi de technȇi legein), the person who disbelieves him is in the
stronger position (ho mȇ peithomenos
kratei).’ (272a6-b2, tr. Rowe)
Isocrates ends his exposition as
follows: ‘When all of these requisites are found together (kai toutȏn men hapantȏn sumpesontȏn), then the devotees of
philosophy will achieve complete success (teleiȏs
hexousin hoi philosophountes); but according as any one of these things
which I have mentioned is lacking (kath’ ho d’ an elleiphthȇi ti tȏn eirȇmenȏn),
to this extent their disciples of necessity fall below the mark (anankȇ tautȇi cheiron diakeisthai tous
plȇsiazontas, 18)
Isocrates ends his educational
program, viewed as philosophy, with a prediction concerning contemporary
philosophers (criticised in paragraphs 1-8): ‘Now as for the sophists who have
lately sprung up (Hoi men oun arti tȏn
sophistȏn anaphuomenoi) and have very recently embraced these pretensions (kai neȏsti prospeptȏkotes tais alazoneiais),
even though they flourish at the moment (ei
kai nun pleonazousin), they will all, I am sure, come round to this position
(eu oid’ hoti pantes epi tautȇn
katenechthȇsontai tȇn hupothesin, 19).’
Isocrates’ pretensions, his criticism
and misrepresentation of Plato and of the other Socratic philosophers had to be
answered; Plato responded to Isocrates’ Against
the Sophists in the Euthydemus.
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