2 Isocrates’ Against the Sophists and Plato’s Euthydemus

When Cleinias and Socrates agreed that ‘in every walk of life wisdom causes luck’ (hȇ sophia pantachou eutuchein poiei anthrȏpous, 280a6) and that wherever wisdom is present, good luck is redundant (sophias parousȇs, hȏi an parȇi, mȇden prosdeisthai eutuchias, 280b1-2), Socrates reviewed their previous agreement. ‘We agreed (Hȏmologȇsamen) that if we had plenty of good things (ei hȇmin agatha polla pareiȇ), we would be happy (eudaimonein) and would do well (kai eu prattein) … [three dots stand for Cleinias’ replies] Now, would we be happy (Ar’ oun eudaimonoimen an) if we derived no benefit from the presence of these good things (dia ta paronta agatha, ei mȇden hȇmas ȏpheloi)? Or do they have to benefit us (ȇ ei ȏpheloi;)? … And does mere possession without use benefit us (Ar’ oun an ti ȏpheloi, ei eiȇ monon hȇmin, chrȏimetha d’ autois mȇ)? (280b5-c1)

As in my preceding post, I am using Waterfield’s translation, but whenever the original compels me to change it, I do so. Take this last sentence. Waterfield correctly renders the gist of what Socrates is saying, but Socrates is talking to a lad, and uses language which the lad can fully understand: Ar’ oun an ti ȏpheloi (‘And would it benefit us’) ei eiȇ monon hȇmin (‘if we merely had the good things’) chrȏimetha d’ autois mȇ; (‘but didn’t use them?’)

When Cleinias agreed that ‘one must not only possess (dei ara mȇ monon kektȇsthai) these good things (ta toiauta agatha), but also use them (alla kai chrȇsthai autois), if one is to be happy (ton mellonta eudaimona einai, 280d4-6)’, Socrates asked: ‘So do the possession and use of good things constitute a sufficient condition of happiness?’ (Ar’ oun, ȏ Kleinia, ȇdȇ touto hikanon pros to eudaimona poiȇsai tina, to te kektȇsthai t’agatha ‘tohave the good things’ kai to chrȇsthai autois; ‘and use them? (280e1-2)

 Again, Waterfield takes recourse to a philosophical jargon. Isocrates in Against the sophists criticised philosophers for making promises they never can fulfil when they promise the young that if they study under them, they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy and prosperous. In the Euthydemus Plato shows that a philosopher – Socrates – can lead a young lad with simple questions to realise that he will be happy and prosperous (eudaimȏn) if his actions are guided by wisdom (sophia)/knowledge (epistȇmȇ).

Jowett took greater care in translating Socrates’ question (280e1-2): ‘Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?’ Still, Socrates’ questions are more attuned to the lad’s ear than that: ‘Is this then enough, Cleinias (Ar’ oun, ȏ Kleinia, ȇdȇ touto hikanon), for making someone happy (pros to eudaimona poiȇsai tina), to have the good things (to te kektȇsthai t’agatha) and to use them (kai to chrȇsthai autois;)?’ When Cleinias answered ‘I think so’ (Emoige dokei), Socrates asked: ‘For this to be so, do they need to be used correctly (Poteron ean orthȏs chrȇtai tis), or no (ȇ kai ean mȇ;)’?’ – Cleinias: ‘Correctly’ (Ean orthȏs). (280e3-4)

This is an important point, and Socrates elaborates on it to make Cleinias realize what it really means. Socrates: ‘Now (Ti oun;), in the working (en tȇi ergasiai te) and use (kai chrȇsei) of the wood (tȇi peri ta xula), is that which produces the right use something else (m’ȏn allo ti  esti to apergazomenon orthȏs chrȇsthai) than the knowledge of the carpenter (ȇ epistȇmȇ hȇ tektonikȇ;)?’ – Cleinias: ‘Certainly not’ (Ou dȇta) … Socrates ‘And as well (Ar’ oun kai) in the case of using (peri tȇn chreian) the good things mentioned at the outset (hȏn elegomen to prȏton tȏn agathȏn) – wealth (ploutou te), health (kai hugieias) and good looks (kai kallous) – is it knowledge which governs action and makes it correct (to orthȏs pasi tois toioutois chrȇsthai epistȇmȇ ȇn hȇgoumenȇ kai katorthousa tȇn praxin), or is it something else (ȇ allo ti;)?’ – Cleinias: ‘It is knowledge’ (Epistȇmȇ). (281a1-b2)

Socrates goes on to argue that all the aforementioned good things are neither good nor bad in themselves; they are good if their use is governed by wisdom, bad if by ignorance, so that ‘of the other things (tȏn men allȏn) nothing is good or bad (ouden on oute agathon oute kakon), and of these two (toutoin de duoin ontoin) wisdom is good (hȇ men sophia agathon), ignorance is bad’ (hȇ de amathia kakon, 281e4-5)’.

When Cleinias agrees, Socrates’ protreptic questioning has almost reached its aim: ‘Since (Epeidȇ) we all desire to be happy (eudaimones men einai prothumoumetha pantes), and we gain happiness, as has been shown (ephanȇmen ge toioutoi gignomenoi), by a use (ek tou chrȇsthai te) of the things of life (tois pragmasin), and the right use of them (kai orthȏs chrȇsthai), and that it is knowledge that gives the rightness and good fortune (tȇn de orthotȇta kai eutuchian epistȇmȇ ȇn hȇ parechousa), everybody ought, as it appears, by all means to try and make himself as wise as he can (dei dȇ, hȏs eoiken, ek pantos tropou hapanta andra touto paraskeuazesthai, hopȏs hȏs sophȏtatos estai). Isn’t it so (ȇ ou;)? – Cleinias: ‘Yes’ (Nai). (282a1-7; since 280e I’ve derived greater help from Jowett’s translation than Waterfield’s. Jowett’s ‘the things of life’ for pragmasin at 282a3 is inspired; and I find his ‘good fortune’ for eutuchia better than Waterfield’s ‘good luck’.)

Socrates goes on to argue that a man who thinks that this is so (touto oiomenon, 282a7) ought to do his best to obtain this, i.e. wisdom, from his father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor rather than money, and that it is not demeaning to perform any honourable service or ministration to any man, if the aim is to get wisdom (282a7-b6) ‘Don’t you think that it is so ?’ (ȇ ou dokei soi houtȏs;), he asks. – Cleinias: ‘Yes, I quite agree (Panu men oun), and think you are right (eu moi dokeis legein).’ – Socrates: ‘Yes, if only wisdom can be taught (Ei esti ge hȇ sophia didakton), and does not come to a man by chance (alla mȇ apo t’automatou paragignetai tois anthrȏpois); for this we have not yet considered (touto gar hȇmin eti askepton), and it is not yet agreed upon (kai oupȏ diȏmologȇmenon) by you and me (emoi te kai soi).’ – Cleinias: ‘But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught (All’ emoige, ȏ Sȏkrates, didakton einai dokei).’(282b6-c5)

Socrates is delighted: ‘Thank you (eu epoiȇsas) for saving me from a long investigation (apallaxas me skepseȏs pollȇs) as to (peri toutou autou) whether wisdom can be taught or not (poteron didakton ȇ ou didakton hȇ sophia). But now (nun oun), as you think that wisdom can be taught (epeidȇ soi kai didakton dokei), and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate (kai monon tȏn ontȏn eudaimona kai eutuchȇ poiein ton anthrȏpon), wouldn’t you say (allo ti ȇ phaiȇs an) that philosophy is essential (anankaion einai philosophein)? And do you yourself intend (kai autos en nȏi echeis) to take it up (auto poiein;)? – Cleinias: ‘Certainly (Panu men oun), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), I will do my best (hȏs hoion te malista).’ (282c6-d3)

Delighted with Cleinias’ answer, Socrates turned to the two representatives of eristic, who professed to be ‘the finest and quickest teachers of virtue alive’ (273d): ‘Well, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that is an example of exhortations I would have you give (To men emon paradeigma, ȏ Dionysodȏre te kai Euthudȇme, toiouton), amateurish perhaps (idiȏtikon isȏs), and clumsily longwinded (kai molis dia makrȏn legomenon). Now it’s up to one or the other of you (sphȏin de hopoteros bouletai) to present it to us in a professional manner (t’auton touto technȇi prattȏn epideixatȏ hȇmin). Or if you don’t want to do that (ei de mȇ touto boulesthon), then take up where I left off and proceed to show the youth (hothen egȏ parelipon, to hexȇs epideixaton tȏi meirakiȏi) whether he ought to acquire every branch of knowledge (poteron pasan epistȇmȇn dei auton ktasthai) or whether there is just one (ȇ esti tis mia), possession of which will make him happy and good (hȇn dei labonta eudaimonein kai agathon andra einai), and if so, which it is (kai tis hautȇ). You see, as I said at the beginning (hȏs gar elegon archomenos), we set considerable store (peri pollou hȇmin tunchanei on) by this youngster here (tonde ton neaniskon) becoming wise and good (sophon te kai agathon genesthai).

‘So anyway, Crito [the whole discussion in the dialogue is narrated by Socrates to his friend Crito], I said this (Egȏ men oun tauta eipon, ȏ Kritȏn), and I watched very closely for what would happen next (tȏi de meta touto esomenȏi panu sphodra proseichon ton noun), concentrating on how they would take up the theme (kai eskopoun tina pote tropon hapsointo tou logou) and what their starting point would be (kai hopothen arxointo) for encouraging the lad (parakeleuomenoi tȏi neaniskȏi) to devote himself to wisdom and virtue (sophian te kai aretȇn askein). Dionysodorus, the elder of the two (ho oun presbuteros autȏn, ho Dionusodȏros), spoke first (proteros ȇrcheto tou logou) … the argument he launched was pretty amazing, Crito (thaumaston gar tina, ȏ Kritȏn, h’anȇr katȇrchen logon), and you should hear it (hou soi axion akousai) as an example of an argument designed to motivate someone to virtue (hȏs parakeleustikos ho logos ȇn ep’ aretȇn).’ (282d4-283ab3).

Follows an eristic interlude, which begins as follows. Dionysodorus: ‘Tell me (Eipe moi), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates te), and all the rest of you (kai humeis hoi alloi) who say (hosoi phate) you want (epithumein) this young man (tonde ton neaniskon) to become wise (sophon genesthai), is this a joke (poteron paizete tauta legontes) or do you really mean it (ȇ hȏs alȇthȏs epithumeite kai spoudazete;)?’ – Socrates: ‘I said in no uncertain terms that we were incredibly serious (eti mallon eipon hoti thaumastȏs spoudazomen).’ – D.: ‘Reflect (Skopei mȇn), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), you may have to deny your words (hopȏs mȇ exarnos esȇi ha nun legeis).’ – S.: ‘I have reflected (Eskemmai), and I shall never deny my words (ou gar mȇ pot’ exarnos genȏmai).’ – D.: ‘You say (phate) that you wish Cleinias to become wise (boulesthai auton sophon genesthai;)? – S.: ‘Undoubtedly (Panu men oun).’ – D.: ‘Is Cleinias wise at the moment (Nun de Kleinias poteron sophos estin) or not (ȇ ou;)?’ – S.: ‘He does not say that he is as yet (Oukoun phȇsi ge pȏ), he is not a pretentious humbug (estin de ouk alazȏn).’ – D.: ‘But you (Humeis de) wish (boulesthe) him to become wise (genesthai auton sophon) and not ignorant (amathȇ de mȇ einai;)? … Since (epei) you wish him (boulesthe auton) no longer to be what he is (hos nun estin mȇketi einai), you wish him (boulesthe auton), as it appears (hȏs eoiken), to perish (apolȏlenai). Pretty lovers and friends they must be (kaitoi pollou an axioi hoi toioutoi eien philoi te kai erastai) who place supreme value on making their favourite perish (hoitines ta paidika peri pantos an poiȇsainto exolȏlenai).’ (283b4-d8)

At this point Ctesippus, a lover of Cleinias, stepped in: ‘What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others (hoti mathȏn mou kai tȏn allȏn katapseudȇi toiouton pragma), as that I wish Cleinias to perish (hȏs egȏ tonde boulomai exolȏlenai;)?’ He was answered by Euthydemus: ‘Oh, I see (Ti de), Ctesippus (ȏ Ktȇsippe), you think it’s possible to lie, do you (ȇ dokei soi hoion t’einai pseudesthai;)?

Euthydemus went on to prove that it is impossible to lie. The gist of his set of questions: who speaks says something, something existing, which is true since it is existing, so that Dionysodorus was telling the truth. (283e7-284c6) But Ktesippus insisted that Dionysodorus ‘in some way says things that are (ta onta men tropon tina legei), but not as they really are (ou mentoi hȏs ge echei, 284c7-8). So Dionysodorus stepped in: ‘What do you mean, Ctȇsippus, are there people who say things as they are?’ – Ctesippus: ‘Yes there are (Eisin mentoi), people who are decent and good (hoi kaloi te k’agathoi), and those who tell the truth (kai hoi t’alȇthȇ legontes).’ – Dionysodorus: ‘Aren’t good things in a good state (t’agatha ouk eu echei), bad things in a bad state (ta de kaka kakȏs;)? … So the good people say bad things badly (Kakȏs ara legousin hoi agathoi ta kaka), if they say them as they are (eiper hȏs echei legousin).’ – Ctesippus: ‘Yes, they certainly do (Nai ma Dia sphodra ge), in the case of bad people (tous g’oun kakous anthrȏpous); and if you take my advice, you’ll watch out in case you join their ranks (hȏn su, ean moi peithȇi, eulabȇsȇi einai) and have good people speak badly of you (hina mȇ se hoi agathoi kakȏs legȏsi).’ … Dionysodorus: ‘You are being offensive (Su men loidorȇi), Ctesippus (ȏ Ktȇsippe), very offensive (loidorȇi).’ – Ctesippus: ‘Oh no, not I (Ma Di’ ouk egȏge), Dionysodorus (ȏ Dionusodȏros), for I like you (epei philȏ se), but I’m giving you a friendly warning (alla nouthetȏ se hȏs hetairon) and trying to persuade you (kai peirȏmai peithein) never to behave so rudely in front of me as to say (mȇdepote enantion emou houtȏs agroikȏs legein) that I wish for the death of those (hoti toutous boulomai exolȏlenai) whom I value above all men (hous peri pleistou poioumai). (284c9-285a1)

When Socrates saw that they were ‘being rather brusque with each other’ (agriȏterȏs pros allȇlous echein) he told Ctesippus that they should ‘accept from the visitors what they say’ (para tȏn xenȏn dechesthai ha legousin) and not argue over words (kai mȇ onomasi diapheresthai), for if they know how to destroy men in such a way (ei gar epistantai houtȏs exollunai anthrȏpous) as to make good and sensible men out of bad and foolish ones (hȏst’ ek ponȇrȏn te kai aphronȏn chrȇstous te kai emphronas poiein) – and it is clear (dȇlon de) that they do know this (hoti epistasthon), at any rate they said (ephatȇn g’oun) that they’d recently discovered the art (tȇn technȇn sphȏn einai tȇn neȏsti hȇurȇmenȇn) of making good people out of bad (agathous poiein anthrȏpous ek ponȇrȏn), let us agree with them on that (sunchȏrȇsȏmen autoin auto); let them destroy the lad (apolesantȏn hȇmin to meirakion) and make him wise (kai phronimon poiȇsantȏn) and all the rest of us too (kai hapantas ge hȇmas tous allous).’ (28512-b7)

Socrates’ ‘it is clear that they do know this, they said that they’d recently discovered the art of making good people out of bad’, refers to their initial announcement that they ‘can impart virtue better and quicker than any man’ (Aretȇn hoiȏ t’ einai paradounai kallist’ anthrȏpȏn kai tachista, 273d8-9).

Socrates offers himself as a test-case: ‘I’m old (presbutȇs eimi), so I’m ready to take a chance (parakinduneuein hetoimos), and I put myself in Dionysodorus’ hands (kai paradidȏmi emauton Dionusodȏrȏi), let him destroy me (apollutȏ me), and if he wants (kai ei men bouletai), boil me (hepsetȏ), or whatever else he might choose (ei d’, hoti bouletai), let him do it (touto poieitȏ), if he will only make me good (monon chrȇston apophȇnatȏ).’ (285c2-6) Ctesippus joins Socrates: ‘I’m also ready to hand myself to our visitors (Egȏ men kai autos hetoimos eimi parechein emauton tois xenois), even if they choose (kai ean boulȏntai) to increase the flaying (derein eti mallon) they are already subjecting me to (ȇ nun derousin), as long as it ends in virtue (ei moi hȇ dora teleutȇsei eis aretȇn). And here is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him (kaitoi me oietai Dionusodȏros houtosi chalepainein autȏi); I am not angry (egȏ de ou chalepainȏ), but I do contradict him (all’ antilegȏ tauta) when I think that he is speaking improperly to me (ha moi dokei pros me mȇ kalȏs legein). You, my dear Dionysodorus, must not confuse contradiction with abuse (alla su to antilegein, ȏ gennaie Dionusodȏre, mȇ kalei loidoreisthai), which is quite different (heteron gar ti esti to loidoreisthai.’ – Dionysodorus: ‘Do you assume that contradiction exists (Hȏs ontos tou antilegein), Ctesippus (ȏ Ktȇsippe), when you make your arguments (poiȇi tous logous;)?’ – Ctesippus: ‘Absolutely (Pantȏs dȇpou), no doubt about it (kai sphodra ge). Do you think contradiction does not exist, Dionysodorus (ȇ su, ȏ Dionusodȏre, ouk oiei einai antilegein;)?’

Follows another episode of eristic arguments, which ends with Socrates’ presenting Dionysodorus and Euthydemus with an example of questions, which organically follow his previous protreptic discussion with Cleinias.

Socrates: ‘Cleinias (ȏ Kleinia), please remind me where we left off (anamnȇson me pothen tot’ apelipomen). Am I right in thinking that we ended up agreeing that philosophy is essential (hȏs men oun egȏimai, enthende pothen. philosophȇteon hȏmologȇsamen teleutȏntes˙ ȇ gar;)? – Cleinias: ‘Yes (Nai).’ – S.: ‘And philosophy (Hȇ de philosophia) is acquisition of knowledge (ktȇsis epistȇmȇs), isn’t it (ouch houtȏs;)? – C.: ‘Yes (Nai)’ – S.: ‘So what is the proper branch of knowledge to acquire (Tina pot’ oun an ktȇsamenoi epistȇmȇn orthȏs ktȇsaimetha;)? Isn’t it simply (ar’ oun touto men haploun) the one (hoti tautȇn) which benefits us (hȇtis hȇmas onȇsei;)?’ – C.: ‘Certainly (Panu ge).’ – S.: ‘Would it benefit us at all (Ar’ oun an ti hȇmas onȇseien) if we went about having a knowledge (ei epistaimetha gignȏskein periiontes) of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth (hopou tȇs gȇs chrusion pleiston katorȏruktai;)? – C.: ‘Perhaps (Isȏs).’ – S.: ‘But have we not already proved (Alla to proteron touto ge exȇlenxamen) that we should be none the better off (hoti ouden pleon), even if without trouble (oud’ ei aneu pragmatȏn) and digging (kai tou oruttein tȇn gȇn) all the gold which there is in the earth were ours (to pan hȇmin chrusion genoito)? And if we knew how to convert stones into gold (hȏste oud’ ei tas petras chrusas epistaimetha poiein), the knowledge would be of no value to us (oudenos an axia hȇ epistȇmȇ eiȇ). For unless we also know how to use the gold (ei gar mȇ kai chrȇsthai epistȇsometha tȏi chrusiȏi), it will be of no benefit to us, as we proved (ouden ophelos autou ephanȇ on)? Do you not remember (ȇ ou memnȇsai;)?’ – C.: ‘I quite remember (Panu ge memȇmai).’ – S.: ‘Nor (Oude ge), apparently (hȏs eoike), is there any benefit to be gained from any other knowledge (tȇs allȇs epistȇmȇs ophelos gignetai ouden), whether of money-making (oute chrȇmatistikȇs), or of medicine (oute iatrikȇs), or of any other (oute allȇs oudemias) which knows how to make a thing (hȇtis poiein ti epistatai), but not how to use (chrȇsthai de mȇ) that which it makes (hȏi an poiȇsȇi). (288d5-289a7)

In all that preceded, Plato illustrated eristic by presenting Dionysodorus and Euthydemus in action, and he sharply distinguished it from philosophy, which he represented by Socrates both in his exchanges with the two, but especially in his protreptic discussion with Cleinias. In doing so he showed how wrong Isocrates was when he criticized the contemporary philosophy as eristic. It was time to turn attention to speech-writing, on which Isocrates prided himself.

Socrates: ‘Therefore, my dear boy, a kind of knowledge is required (Toiautȇs tinos ara hȇmin epistȇmȇs dei, ȏ kale pai) which simultaneously combines both achievement of a result (en hȇi sumpeptȏken hama to te poiein, ‘in which is combined making’) and knowing how to use the result (kai to epistasthai chrȇsthai toutȏi ho an poiȇi, ‘and knowing how to use that which the knowledge makes’, 289b5-6) … Now, seriously (Alla pros theȏn), if we learned the art of composing speeches (ei tȇn logopoiikȇn technȇn mathoimen), is this the art (ara estin hautȇ) whose possession is bound (hȇn edei kektȇmenous) to make us happy (hȇmas eudaimonas einai;)?’ – Cleinias: ‘Not in my opinion Ouk oimai egȏ).’ – S.: ‘What’s your evidence (Tini tekmȇriȏi chrȇi;)?’ – C.: ‘I see that there are some composers of speeches (Horȏ tinas logopoious) who do not know how to use the speeches which they make (hoi tois idiois logois, hois autoi poiousin, ouk epistantai chrȇsthai) just as the makers of lyres do not know how to use the lyres (hȏsper hoi luropoioi tais lurais); and also some who are of themselves unable to compose speeches, but are able to use them (alla kai entautha alloi dunatoi chrȇsthai hois ekeinoi ȇrgasanto, hoi logopoiein autoi adunatoi); and this proves (dȇlon oun) that concerning the art of making speeches (hoti kai peri logous) the art of making is different from the art of using (chȏris hȇ tou poiein technȇ kai hȇ tou chrȇsthai).’ (289c6-d7)

Every contemporary reader would know that Cleinias was pointing his finger at Isocrates. How do we know this? George Norlin says in the ‘Introduction’ ‘that he lacked voice and the assurance which one had to possess in order to harangue the multitude and bandy words with the orators who haunt the rostrum.’ (The LOEB edition of Isocrates, vol. I., p. XIX). Isocrates himself wrote in his ninety-fourth year: ‘I have oftentimes before this found fault with my nature (pollakis ȇdȇ tȇn te phusin tȇn emautou katemempsamȇn) … I realized that it was not robust and vigorous enough for public affairs (tȇn phusin eidȏs pros men tas praxeis arrȏstoteran kai malakȏteran ousan tou deontos) and that it was not adequate nor altogether suited to public discourse (pros de tous logous oute teleian oute pantachȇi chrȇsimȇn), and that, furthermore (alla), although it was better able to form a correct judgement of the truth of any matter than are those who claim exact knowledge (doxasai men peri hekastou tȇn alȇtheian mallon dunamenȇn tȏn eidenai phaskontȏn), yet for expounding the truth before an assemblage of many people (eipein de peri tȏn autȏn toutȏn en sullogȏi pollȏn anthrȏpȏn) it was, if I may say so, the least competent in all the world (hapasȏn hȏs epos eipein apoleleimmenȇn). For I was born more lacking in the two things (houtȏ gar endeȇs amphoterȏn egenomȇn) which have the greatest power in Athens (tȏn megistȇn dunamin echontȏn par hȇmin) – a strong voice (phȏnȇs hikanȇs) and ready assurance (kai tolmȇs) – than, I dare say, any of my fellow citizens (hȏs ouk oid’ ei tis allos tȏn politȏn).’ (Panathenaicus 9-10, translation Norlin)

Isocrates’ criticism in Against the Sophists was brutal: ‘Indeed, who can fail to abhor (Tis gar ouk an misȇseien), yes to contemn (hama kai kataphronȇseie) those who devote themselves to disputations (tȏn peri tas eridas diatribontȏn) … since they pretend to search for truth (hoi prospoiountai men tȇn alȇtheian zȇtein), but straightway at the beginning of their professions (euthus d’en archȇi tȏn epangelmatȏn) attempt to deceive us with lies (pseudȇ legein epicheirousin, 1)?’

Plato responded with humour.

When Cleinias said that speech-making is not the art which would bring happiness, for ‘there are some composers of speeches who do not know how to use the speeches which they make’, Socrates said: ‘You give me a sufficient proof, I think (Hikanon moi dokeis tekmȇrion legein), that the art of making speeches is not one (hoti ouch hautȇ estin hȇ tȏn logopoiȏn technȇ) the possession of which (hȇn an ktȇsamenos tis) would bring happiness (eudaimȏn eiȇ). And yet I did think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be discovered in that direction (kaitoi egȏ ȏimȇn entautha pou phanȇsesthai tȇn epistȇmȇn hȇn dȇ palai zȇtoumen); for the composers of speeches (kai gar moi hoi te andres autoi hoi logopoioi), whenever I meet them (hotan sungenȏmai autois), always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias (hupersophoi, ȏ Kleinia dokousin einai), and their art (kai autȇ hȇ technȇ autȏn) as divinely sounding (thespesia tis) and lofty (kai hupsȇlȇ), and no wonder (kai mentoi ouden thaumaston). For their art is a part of the great art of enchantment (esti gar tȇs tȏn epȏidȏn technȇs morion), and only slightly inferior to it (mikrȏi de ekeinȇs epideestera); for the art of the enchanters (hȇ men gar tȏn epȏidȏn) is the charming of snakes and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests (echeȏn te kai phalangiȏn kai skorpiȏn kai tȏn allȏn thȇriȏn kai nosȏn kȇlȇsis estin), this art of theirs (hȇ de) is the charming and calming down of judges and members of the assembly and of mobs (dikastȏn te kai ekklȇsiastȏn kai tȏn allȏn ochlȏn kȇlȇsis te kai paramuthia tunchanei ousa). Or does it appear to you in some different way (ȇ soi allȏs pȏs dokei;)?’ – Cleinias: ‘No (Ouk), it appears to me (all’ houtȏ moi phainetai) as you say (hȏs su legeis).’ (289d8-290a6)