Questions: 5b Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating

Referring to his discussion with Charmides concerning his attempt at defining sôphrosunê as to ta heautou prattein – for which see the preceding post – Socrates narrates: ‘Now Critias had clearly long been champing at the bit in his eagerness to impress Charmides and the others present (Kai ho Kritias dêlos men ên kai palai agôniôn kai philotimôs pros te ton Charmidên kai pros tous parontas echôn). He had only with great difficulty managed to restrain himself up to then (mogis d’ heauton en tô̢ prosthen katechôn), and this was the last straw (tote ouch hoios te egeneto). (162c1-4)

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Watt’s ‘last straw’ marks Socrates’ reference to the end of his discussion with Charmides on the definition of sôphrosunê, which Charmides remembered to have heard from ‘some wise man’. Socrates asked Charmides: ‘So what on earth would doing one’s job be (Ti oun an eiê pote to ta hautou prattein; echeis eipein;)?’ – Charmides replied: ‘Heavens, I don’t know (Ouk oida, ma Dia, egôge). I dare say there is no reason why even the man who said it should have the slightest idea of what he meant (all’ isôs ouden kôluei mêde ton legonta mêden eidenai hoti enoei).’ – ‘And as he said that (Kai hama tauta legôn), he gave a little smile (hupegela te) and looked at Critias (kai eis ton Kritian apeblepen)’, Socrates observed. (162b8-11)

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Socrates continues: ‘I think it’s absolutely certain (dokei gar moi pantos mallon alêthes einai) – as I assumed at the time (ho egô hupelabon) – that it was from Critias (tou Kritiou) that Charmides had heard (akêkoenai ton Charmidên) this answer (tautên tên apokrisin) about sôphrosunê (peri tês sôphrosunês). So Charmides (ho men oun Charmidês), who did not want to explain the answer himself, but to have Critias do it (boulomenos mê autos hupechein logon all’ ekeinon tês apokriseôs), kept trying to provoke him (hupekinei auton ekeinon) and pointing out that he had been refuted (kai enedeiknuto hôs exelêlegmenos eiê). This was too much for Critias (ho d’ ouk ênescheto). It appeared to me as though he had got irritated with Charmides (alla moi edoxen orgisthênai autô̢), just as a poet might do (hôsper poiêtês) with an actor (hupokritê̢) who treated his poetry badly (kakôs diatithenti ta heautou poiêmata). So he gave him a look and said (hôst’ emblepsas autô̢ eipen), “Is that what you think (Houtôs oiei), Charmides (ô Charmidê)? That if you don’t know (ei su mê oistha) what on earth the man meant (ho ti pot’ enoei) who said that doing one‘s own job was sôphrosunê (hos ephê sôphrosunên einai to ta heautou prattein), he doesn’t know either (oude ekeinon eidenai;)?” (162c4-d6)

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Socrates’ insistence on attributing the provenance of the principle of ta hautou prattein to Critias is striking; consider the initial rebuke from Charmides concerning Socrates’ inquisitiveness. When Socrates said to Charmides: ‘You heard that from Critias here (Kritiou toude akêkoas auto), Charmides reposted: ‘But what difference does it make (Alla ti diapherei), Socrates (ô Sôkrates), who I heard it from (hotou êkousa;)?’ Socrates at that point conceded that it made no difference: ‘None at all (Ouden).’ (161b8-c5)

In view of the importance of to ta hautou prattein in Plato’s political thought – in the Phaedrus it figures as the principle which is observed by the gods in their administration of the world (247a4-6) – it seems that in this way, free from flattery, Plato expressed his indebtedness to Critias for it, and at the same time emphasized its importance in the days to come, in which, as he had hoped, the aristocrats ‘would administer the State by leading it out of an unjust way of life into a just way’ (ek tinos adikou biou epi dikaion tropon agontas dioikêsein tên polin, Seventh Letter 324d-5)

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Socrates: ‘Why (All’), Critias, my dear fellow (ô beltiste Kritia), it is not at all surprising that at his age Charmides doesn’t understand it (touton men ouden thaumaston agnoein têlikouton onta); but, of course, it’s natural for you to possess that knowledge (se de pou eikos eidenai) in view of your age (kai hêlikias heneka) and your devotion to study (kai epimeleias). So if you agree (ei oun sunchôreis) that sôphrosunê is (tout’ einai sôphrosunên) what Charmides says it is (hoper houtosi legei), and are willing to take the argument over (kai paradechê̢ ton logon), I’d much rather investigate with you (egôge polu an hêdion meta sou skopoimên) whether what we said is true or not (eit’ alêthes eite mê to lechthen).’ – Critias: ‘Well (Alla), I do agree (panu sunchôrô), and am willing to take it over (kai paradechomai).’ – Socrates: ‘That’s very good of you (Kalôs ge su toinun poiôn). Tell me (kai moi lege), do you also agree with what I was asking a minute ago (ê kai ha nundê êrôtôn egô sunchôreis), that all craftsmen (tous dêmiourgous pantas) make something (poiein ti;)?’ – Cr. ‘I do (Egôge).’ – S. ‘Well then (Ê oun), do you think (dokousi soi) they make only their own things (ta heautôn monon poiein) or other people’s things too (ê kai ta tôn allôn;)?’ – Cr. ‘Other people’s things too (Kai ta tôn allôn).’ – S. ‘Then are they self-controlled (Sôphronousin oun) in so far as they’re not making only their own things (ou ta heautôn monon poiountes)? (162d7-163a4)’

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Watt’s ‘Then are they self-controlled’ stands for sôphronousin oun, where sôphrosunê figures in a verb form, as an activity: ‘do they self-control?’

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Critias: ‘What objection is there (Ti gar kôluei;)?’ – Socrates: ‘None as far as I’m concerned (Ouden eme ge). But watch (All’ hora) that there is not one for the man (mê ekeinon kôluei) who assumes (hos hupothemenos) that doing one’s own job is sôphrosunê (sôphrosunên einai to ta heautou prattein), and then (epeita) says that there is no objection (ouden phêsi kôlueien) to those who do other people’s jobs being self-controlled too (kai tous ta tôn allôn prattontas sôphronein).’ – Cr. ‘I suppose I’ve agreed (Egô gar pou touth’ hômologêka) that those who do other people’s jobs are self-controlled (hôs hoi ta tôn allôn prattontes sôphronousin), by agreeing that those who make other people’s things are (ei tous ta tôn allôn poiountas hômologêsa).’ (163a5-12)

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Jowett tries to make sense of Critias’ last response by interpreting instead of translating it: ‘Nay, did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I said, those who make, not those who do.’ It was Socrates who introduced the term ‘make’ (poiein) at 162e8-9: ‘do you also agree with what I was asking a minute ago (ê kai ha nundê êrôtôn egô sunchôreis), that all craftsmen (tous dêmiourgous pantas) make something (poiein ti;)?’ To which Critias replied positively: ‘I do (Egôge).’ Then, in the last exchange, Socrates took the two terms – ‘doing’ (prattein) and ‘making’ (poiein) – as equivalent, and thus ‘saw an implicit difficulty’ concerning Critias’ definition of sôphrosunê; Critias insists on their difference, thus refusing to accept any inconsistency in his argument.

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Socrates: ‘Tell me (Eipe moi), don’t you call “making” and “doing” the same thing (ou t’auton kaleis to poiein kai to prattein;)?’ – Critias; ‘No, I don’t (Ou mentoi), nor for that matter (oude ge to) “working” (ergazesthai) and “making” (kai to poiein). I learned that (emathon gar) from Hesiod (par Hêsiodou), who said (hos ephê), “Work is no disgrace (ergon d’ ouden einai oneidos).” Now, do you suppose (oiei oun) that if he had been calling the sort of thing you were speaking of a minute ago “works” and “working” and “doing” (auton, ei ta toiauta erga ekalei kai ergazesthai kai prattein, hoia nundê su eleges), he would have said there was no disgrace in being a cobbler (oudeni an oneidos einai skutotomounti) or selling salt fish (ê tarichopôlounti) or being employed in a brothel (ê ep’ oikêmatos kathêmenô̢;)? (163b1-8)

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Jowett translates 163b5-8 similarly: ‘Now do you imagine that if Hesiod had meant by working and doing such things as you were describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace in them – for example, in the manufacture of shoes, or in selling dried fish, or sitting for hire in a house of ill fame?’

Does it then mean that Critias viewed as disgrace such activities as making of shoes, selling dried fish – named by him – and activities named by Socrates, to which he refers in the same breath, such as pupils learning to write and read, teachers teaching pupils to read and write, furthermore healing, building, weaving, and producing any piece of skilled work whatsoever (161d-e)? Although Critias was a sworn aristocrat, I find it difficult to accept, and the text militates against Jowett’s and Watt’s interpretation. They both fail to take into account Critias’ oudeni ‘for no one’. Since the principle of ta heautou prattein was an important principle in Plato’s political thinking, I presume that by putting the oudeni into Critias’ mouth he wants to say something important: for those, who are best fitted and best skilled to make shoes, making shoes is no disgrace; by making shoes they do their job – ta heautôn prattousi.

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Critias continues: ‘Don’t you believe it (Ouk oiesthai ge chrê ‘It’s not to be believed’), Socrates (ô Sôkrates). Hesiod too, in my opinion, considered making to be different from doing and working (alla kai ekeinos oimai poiêsin praxeôs kai ergasias allo enomizen). A thing which was made sometimes brought disgrace (kai poiêma men gignesthai oneidos eniote) when it lacked beauty (hotan mê meta tou kalou gignetai); ((163b8-c2)

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Watt’s ‘when it lacked beauty’ for Critias’ hotan mê meta tou kalou gignetai, literally ‘when it does not happen with the beauty,’ is hardly appropriate. Jowett translated: ‘when the employment was not honourable’; in doing so Jowett attempted to express the fact that Critias’ meta tou kalou does not refer only to the beauty of the object made, but to the circumstances in which it was made, the maker, his/her qualification, motives, application to the work at hand etc.

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Critias continues: ‘while a work could never be any disgrace at all (ergon de oudepote ouden oneidos). Things that are beautifully and beneficially made (ta gar kalôs te kai ôphelimôs poioumena) he called “works” (erga ekalei), and such “makings” he called “workings” and “doings” (kai ergasias te kai praxeis tas toiautas poiêseis). It must be stated (phanai de ge chrê) that he believed only things like that to be a man’s proper business (kai oikeia mona ta toiauta hêgeisthai auton), while everything that was harmful was other people’s business (ta de blabera panta allotria). So we must conclude that both Hesiod (hôste kai Hêsiodon chrê oiesthai) and any other knowledgeable person (kai allon hostis phronimos) call the man who does his own job sôphrona [Watt: ‘self-controlled’] (ton ta hautou prattonta phronimon).’ – Socrates: ‘Critias (Ô Kriria), the minute you begin to speak (kai euthus archomenou sou) I was pretty sure of your thesis (schedon emanthanon ton logon) – that you called what is proper to a man and what is his own job good things (hoti ta oikeia te kai ta hautou agatha kaloiês), and what you called the “makings” of good things (kai tas tôn agathôn poiêseis) “doings” (praxeis). I have heard Prodicus drawing his innumerable distinctions between names, you know (kai gar Prodikou muria tina akêkoa peri onomatôn diairountos). But I give you my permission to assign each name as you wish (all’ egô soi tithesthai men tôn onomatôn didômi hopê̢ an boulê̢ hekaston); only do make it plain (dêlou de monon) to what you are applying whichever name you use (eph’ hoti an pherê̢s t’ounoma hoti an legê̢s). Now then (nun oun), go back to the beginning again (palin ex archês) and give us a clear definition (saphesteron horisai). Are you saying that this doing or making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things is sôphrosunê (ara tên tôn agathôn praxin ê poiêsin ê hopôs su boulei onomazein, tautên legeis su sôphrosunên einai;)?’ – Critias: ‘I am (Egôge).’ – S. ‘So it’s not the man who does the bad things, but the man who does good things who sôphronei [a verb form: ‘who self-controls’, D. Watt: ‘is self-controlled’] (Ouk ara sôphronei ho ta kaka prattôn, all’ ho agatha;)?’ – Cr. ‘Don’t you think so, my good fellow (Soi de, ô beltiste, ouch houtô dokei;)?’ – S. ‘Never mind (Ea), let’s not consider what I think just yet (mê gar pô to emoi dokoun skopômen), but rather what you’re saying now (all’ ho su legeis nun).’ (163b2-e7)

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Socrates’ mê gar pô to emoi dokoun skopômen ‘let’s not investigate what I think just yet’ is intriguing. Does it mean that at some point in the forthcoming discussion Socrates and Critias are going to investigate Socrates’ own thinking: ‘what I think’ (to emoi dokoun, 163e6)?

Questions

Tuesday, June 27, 2017

5b Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating

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