Questions: 5a Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating, with reference to his Phaedrus and Republic

Donald Watt writes in his ‘Introduction to Charmides’: ‘Part of Plato’s purpose in this dialogue is to exculpate Socrates from any responsibility for the crimes of his former companions … By showing Critias as both quite lacking in sôphrosunê and quite ignorant of its meaning beyond a superficial acquaintance with its conventional use within his aristocratic circle; by representing Charmides as equally unaware of its true purport, despite his possession of the natural sôphrosunê of youth, which he will lose when he reaches adulthood; and by portraying Socrates as trying his best to discover with them the true meaning of sôphrosunê, and as failing to elicit answer from them, though possessing the virtue himself – by all these means Plato is endeavouring to show that Socrates tried to educate Critias and Charmides in sôphrosunê, but failed. But by trying, he saved himself from any possible accusation of responsibility for their later crimes.’ (Plato, Early Socratic Dialogues, Penguin Books, 1987, p. 167.)

Let us examine the validity of Watt’s characterization of the dialogue by focussing on Charmides, Critias, and Socrates in their interactions; the translation will be D. Watt’s, but I shall use sôphrosunê for his ‘self-control’.

Charmides presented to Socrates his third and last attempt at defining sôphrosunê as follows: ‘But give me your considered opinion of this statement about sôphrosunê (tode de skepsai ti soi dokei einai peri sôphrosunês), which I have just remembered (arti gar anemnêsthên) I heard from someone once (ho êdê tou êkousa legontos): the sôphrosunê might be doing one’s own job (hoti sôphrosunê an eiê to ta heautou prattein). Give me your considered opinion (skopei oun touto). Was the man who said that right (ei orthôs soi dokei legein ho legôn)?’ – Socrates: ‘You wicked boy (Ô miare), you heard that from Critias here (Kritiou toude akêkoas auto) or from another of our clever fellows (ê allou tou tôn sophôn).’ (161b4-c1)

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Watt’s ‘or from another of our clever fellows’ for Socrates’ ê allou tou tôn sophôn is hardly appropriate, for it simply means ‘or from another of the wise men’. In the Phaedrus, which on my dating preceded the Charmides, Plato’s Socrates gives the principle of ‘doing one’s own work’ a divine status: ‘Now within the heavens are many spectacles of bliss upon the highways (pollai men oun kai makariai theai te kai diexodoi entos ouranou) whereon blessed gods (has theôn genos eudaimonôn) pass to and fro (epistrephetai), each doing his own work (prattôn hekastos autôn to hautou, 247a4-6, tr. R. Hackforth).’

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Critias: ‘It must have been from someone else (Eoiken allou ‘It seems from someone else’). It certainly was not from me (ou gar dê emou ge, ‘for surely not from me’).’ – Charmides: ‘But what difference does it make (Alla ti diapherei), Socrates (ô Sôkrates), who I heard it from (hotou êkousa;)?’ – Socrates: ‘None at all (Ouden). In any case, the question we’ve got to consider is not who said it (pantôs gar ou touto skepteon, hostis auto eipen), but whether or not the statement is true (alla poteron alêthes legetai ê ou).’ – Charmides: ‘You’re quite right (Nun orthôs legeis).’ (161c2-7)

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Watt’s ‘You’re quite right’ for Charmides’ Nun orthôs legeis misses Charmides’ criticism of Socrates’ ‘you heard that from Critias here’ (Kritiou toude akêkoas auto), which is implied in his Nun: ‘Now you’re right.’

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Socrates: ‘Of course (Nê Dia), all the same, I should be surprised if we actually will discover what exactly its status is (all’ ei kai heurêsomen auto hopê̢ ge echei, thaumazoim’ an). It appears to have a sort of cryptic meaning (ainigmati gar tini eoiken).’ – Charmides: ‘How is that (Hoti dê ti ge;)?’ – Socrates: ‘Because presumably he did not really mean quite what his words conveyed (Hoti ou dêpou hê̢ ta rêmata ephthenxato tautê̢ kai enoei) when he said (legôn) that sôphrosunê was doing one’s own job (sôphrosunên einai to ta hautou prattein). Or do you believe that the writing-master does not do something (ê su ouden hêgê̢ prattein ton grammatistên) when he reads or writes (hotan graphê̢ ê anagignôskê̢)?’ – Charmides: ‘No, I do believe he does something (Egôge, hêgoumai men oun).’ – Socrates: ‘Then do you think (Dokei oun soi) it’s only his own name that the writing master reads and writes (to hautou onoma monon graphein ho grammatistês kai anagignôskein), or teaches boys to (ê humas tous paidas didaskein;)? Or did you write your enemies’ names just as much as your own and your friends’ (ê ouden hêtton ta tôn echthrôn egraphete ê ta humetera kai ta tôn philôn onomata;)’?’ – Charmides: ‘Just as much (Ouden hêtton).’ – Socrates: ‘Well then, were you meddling (Ê oun epolupragmoneite) – that is, were you without sôphrosunê (kai ouk esôphroneite) in doing that (touto drôntes;)?’ – Ch. ‘Not at all (Oudamôs).’ (161c8-e2)

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Socrates’ ‘were you meddling (Ê oun epolupragmoneite) – that is, were you without sôphrosunê (kai ouk esôphroneite)’ implies that Socrates himself in fact understands sôphrosunê as to ta hautou prattein, for he views it as the opposite of polupragmonein ‘to be busy about many things’, mostly in bad sense as ‘interfering’, ’being meddlesome’ (Liddle&Scott).

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Socrates: ‘And yet you were not doing your own job (Kai mên ou ta humetera ge autôn eprattete) if reading and writing are “doing something” (eiper to graphein prattein ti estin kai to anagignôskein).’ – Charmides: ‘They most certainly are (Alla mên estin).’ – S. ‘And, my friend, healing (Kai to iasthai, ô hetaire), building houses (kai to oikodomein), weaving (kai to huphainein) and producing any piece of skilled work whatsoever, by any skill whatsoever (kai to hê̢tinioun technê̢ hotioun tôn technês ergôn apergazesthai), are all presumably “doing something” (prattein dêpou ti estin).’ – Ch. ‘Of course (Panu ge).’ – S. ‘Well then (Ti oun), do you think (dokei an soi) a state would be well run (polis eu oikeisthai) by a law like this (hupo toutou tou nomou), which commands (tou keleuontos) each person to weave his own coat (to heautou himation hekaston huphainein) and wash it (kai plunein), and make his own sandals (kai hupodêmata skutotomein) and oil-flask (kai lêkuthon) and scraper (kai stlengida) [Watt notes: ‘After exercise, it was customary to cover the body with oil, which was then scraped off, taking the dirt and sweat with it.’] and everything else (kai t’alla panta) on the same principle (kata ton auton logon) of each person’s keeping his hands off what is not his own (tôn allotriôn mê haptesthai), and working at and doing his own job (ta de heautou hekaston ergazesthai te kai prattein;)?’ – Ch. ‘No, I don’t (Ouk emoige dokei).’ – S. ‘Nevertheless (Alla mentoi), a state run on the principle of sôphrosunê (sôphronôs ge oikousa) would be run well (eu an oikoito).’ – Ch. ‘Certainly (Pôs d’ ouk;).’ – S. ‘Then, sôphrosunê would not be doing one’s own job when it’s of that sort and done in that way (Ouk ara to ta toiauta te kai houtô ta hautou prattein sôphrosunê an eiê).’ – Ch. ‘Apparently not (Ou phainetai).’ – S. ‘Then it looks as if, as I was saying just now, the man who said that doing one’s own job was sôphrosunê was speaking cryptically (Êinitteto ara, hôs eoiken, hôsper arti egô elegon, ho legôn ta hautou prattein sôphrosunên einai), since I don’t suppose he was so simple-minded as that (ou gar pou houtô ge ên euêthês). Or was it some fool that you heard saying this (ê tinos êlithiou êkousas touti legontos), Charmides (ô Charmidê;)? – Ch. ‘Far from it (Hêkista ge). He seems to be a pretty clever fellow, you know (epei toi kai panu edokei sophos einai).’ (161e3-162b3)

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Again, Watt’s ‘He seems to be a pretty clever fellow, you know’ does not properly render Charmides’ epei toi kai panu edokei sophos einai, which means ‘for he appeared to be very wise indeed’. Socrates’ response indicates that he did not take Charmides’ words as if spoken in irony.

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Socrates: ‘Well, as far as I can see, he propounded this as a deliberate puzzle for us (Pantos toinun mallon, hôs emoi dokei, ainigma auto proubalen), for no other reason than that he thought it would be difficult for us to find out what on earth doing one’s job is (hôs on chalepon to ta hautou prattein gnônai hoti pote estin).’ – Charmides: ‘Possibly (Isôs).’ (162b4-7)

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Again, Watt misinterprets. Jowett’s ‘Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as a riddle’, for Socrates’ Pantos toinun mallon, hôs emoi dokei, ainigma auto proubalen, is much better, as is Jowett’s ‘thinking that no one would know the meaning of the words “doing his own business Socrates”’ for Socrates’ hôs on chalepon to ta hautou prattein gnônai hoti pote estin. Within the framework of the dialogue to ta hautou prattein remains an unsolved ainigma (‘riddle’).

Socrates’ ‘do you think (dokei an soi) a state would be well run (polis eu oikeisthai) by a law like this (hupo toutou tou nomou, 161e10-11)’ … ‘Nevertheless (Alla mentoi), a state run on the principle of sôphrosunê (sôphronôs ge oikousa) would be run well (eu an oikoito, 162a4-5)’ suggests that Plato was fully aware of the political implications and significance of the principle ta hautou prattein; when he in the end gave up on politics in Athens, he built the ideal state in the Republic on this principle understood as the principle of justice.

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Socrates: ‘So what on earth would doing one’s job be (Ti oun an eiê pote to ta hautou prattein; echeis eipein;)?’ – Charmides: ‘Heavens, I don’t know (Ouk oida, ma Dia, egôge). I dare say there is no reason why even the man who said it should have the slightest idea of what he meant (all’ isôs ouden kôluei mêde ton legonta mêden eidenai hoti enoei).’ And as he said that (Kai hama tauta legôn), he gave a little smile (hupegela te) and looked at Critias (kai eis ton Kritian apeblepen). (162b8-11)

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Again, Watt’s ‘I dare say’ is not an appropriate rendering of Charmides’ all’ isôs, which means ‘but perhaps’, ‘probably’, ‘but possibly’, ‘but most likely’.

I’ll end this post by discussing the introductory paragraph of Watt’s prefatory note to this section:

“‘Doing one’s own job’ or, more literally, ‘doing one’s own things’ is the definition of justice given at Republic 433a. There it means ‘each man performing the one function in the state for which his nature most suits him’. Here, however, Socrates takes it to mean the opposite, by interpreting the frase as ‘each man doing (or making) everything for himself’: each man should weave his own clothes, wash his own clothes, make his own shoes, etc. (This is the form of social organization rejected at Republic 369e ff.)” (Plato, Early Socratic Dialogues, Penguin Books, 1987, p. 186.)

Watt’s note is misleading, for Socrates does not ‘take’ to ta hautou prattein ‘to mean the opposite’ of what it means at Republic 433a. He takes it ‘as the words were said’ (hê̢ ta rêmata ephthenxato, 161d1), i.e. ‘to do one’s own things’. Throughout the whole passage, from161b5 to 162b11, the definite article ta functions as a demonstrative pronoun. The words to ta hautou prattein taken ‘as they were said’ do signify (not ‘are taken to signify’) the opposite of what they will mean in the Republic.

When Plato wrote the Charmides, getting ready for the role he was expected to play in the new aristocratic administration, he did view to ta hautou prattein along the lines he later developed in the Republic. For the principle is implied in Socrates’ final attempt to define sôphrosunê:

‘If indeed (ei men gar), as we were supposing at first (ho ex archês hupetithemetha), the sôphrôn would know (ê̢dei ho sôphrôn) what he knew and what he did not know (ha te ê̢dei kai ha mê ê̢dei), that he knows the former (ta men hoti oiden) and that he does not know the latter (ta d’ hoti ouk oiden), and would be able to recognize another man in the same state (kai allon t’auton touto peponthota episkepsasthai hoios t’ ên), it would be of a great advantage to us to be sôphrones [nom. pl. of sôphrôn ‘to be wise’] (megalôsti an hêmin ôphelimon ên sôphrosin einai); for we would live our life without making mistakes (anamartêtoi gar an ton bion diezômen), both we, who would be having the sôphrosunê (autoi te hoi tên sôphrosunên echontes), and all those who would be governed by us (kai hoi alloi pantes hosoi huph’ hêmôn êrchonto). For neither should we (oute gar an autoi) attempt to do what we did not know (epecheiroumen prattein ha mê êpistametha), but finding those who know (all’ exeuriskontes tous epistamenous) we would give it over to them (ekeinois an paredidometha), nor should we allow others (oute tois allois epetrepomen), whom we governed (hôn êrchomen), to do anything else than that which they would do well (allo ti prattein ê hoti prattontes orthôs emellon prattein), and this would be (touto d’ ên an) of which they had knowledge (hou epistêmên eichon); and thus a house under the rule of sôphrosunê (kai houtô dê hupo sôphrosunês oikia te oikoumenê) would be beautifully ordered (emellen kalôs oikeisthai), and a state administered (polis te politeuomenê), and everything else that sôphrosunê governed (kai allo pan hou sôphrosunê archoi); for with error eliminated (hamartias gar exê̢rêmenês), and rightness in charge (orthotêtos de hêgoumenês), men, who are in this state, must do nobly and well in all their doings (en pasê̢ praxei kalôs kai eu prattein anankaion tous houtô diakeimenous), and those who do well (tous de eu prattontas) must have happiness (tous de eu prattontas eudaimonas einai). (171d2-172a3)

Questions

Saturday, June 24, 2017

5a Plato’s Charmides in the light of its dating, with reference to his Phaedrus and Republic

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