In my last
post I wrote: ‘Polemarchus, then, is your heir? I said (Oukoun, ephȇ, egȏ, ho Polemarchos, tȏn ge sȏn klȇronomos;
[331d8] – Jowett’s I said, i.e. his
ascription of these words to Socrates, is wrong. It is Polemarchus who turns to
his father with the words: ‘Am I not the heir of the things that are yours?’.
James Adam,
without referring to Jowett by name, notes on 331d8: ‘There is not sufficient
reason for changing the best supported reading ephȇ, egȏ to ephȇn egȏ [i.e. for changing Oukoun, ephȇ, egȏ (‘Am I not’, said) ho Polemarchos (Polemarchus),
tȏn ge sȏn klȇronomos (‘the
heir of the things that are yours?’);
into Oukoun, ephȇn egȏ, ho Polemarchos, tȏn ge sȏn klȇronomos; – ‘Polemarchus,
then, is your heir? I said.’]. Polemarchus is throughout the introduction
represented as a vivacious person: e.g. horais
oun hȇmas – hosoi esmen [‘but do you see us – how
many we are’] (327c), and in the
lively emphasis with which he breaks in just above Panu men oun [‘Yes it is’ {the definition of justice}] – eiper ge ti chrȇ Simȏnidȇi peithesthai
[‘if Simonides is to be believed’]. True to his name [Polem – archos, polemos = ‘war’, archos = ‘leader’], he is first to mingle in the fray … Cephalus
leaves the argument to be carried on by the assembled company (for humin [‘to you’] does not mean
Polemarchus and Socrates alone): whereupon Polemarchus, seizing hold on the
word paradidȏmi in its sense of ‘transmit’, ‘bequeath,’
playfully claims the right to inherit his logos
as Cephalus’ eldest son and heir.’ (The Republic of
Plato, Cambridge Universityy Press, 1902, digitally printed 2009, vol. I,
p. 12)
Let me add
that Polemarchus’ claim to all things that are his fathers is to be understood in
unity with Cephalus’ self-portrait as a moderate money-maker and as a man who uses
his wealth to act in accordance with justice, never to lie and never to deceive
anyone, – and as such to be viewed in connection with Against Eratosthenes (19) in which Lysias intimates that when the
Thirty confiscated Polemarchus’ property, the wealth they got was ‘beyond what
they had ever expected to get’.
If we want
to see how Plato himself saw Polemarchus’ character, which he depicted in Republic I, we must go to Republic VIII and take into account his
description of the transformation of oligarchy into tyranny and of democracy
into tyranny: ‘And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner,
so to speak, as democracy from oligarchy (Ar’
oun tropon tina ton auton ek te oligarchias dȇmokratia gignetai kai ek dȇmokratias
turannis;)? … The
good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the object for which it was
established (Ho prouthento agathon, kai
di’ hou hȇ oligarchia kathistato) was wealth (touto ȇn ploutos) – am I not right (ȇ gar;)? … Thus,
the insatiable desire for wealth (hȇ ploutou
toinun aplȇstia) and the neglect of all other things
(kai hȇ tȏn allȏn ameleia) for
the sake of money getting (dia chrȇmatismon) was
also the ruin of oligarchy (autȇn apȏllu;)? … And democracy also is brought to
dissolution by an insatiable desire for that which she designates as good (Ar’ oun kai ho dȇmokratia
horizetai agathon, hȇ toutou aplȇstia kai tautȇn kataluei;)?’ – ‘What do you suppose that to be
(Legeis d’ autȇn ti horizesthai;)?’ – ‘Freedom (Tȇn eleutherian),
which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of the State (touto gar pou en dȇmokratoumenȇi
polei akousais an hȏs echei te kalliston) – and that therefore (kai dia tauta) in a democracy alone (en monȇ tautȇi) will the freeman of nature deign to
dwell (axion oikein hostis phusei
eleutheros) … When a democracy which has begun to thirst for freedom (Hotan oimai dȇmokratoumenȇ polis eleutherias dipsȇsasa) has evil
cup-bearers presiding over the feast (kakȏn oinochoȏn
prostatountȏn tuchȇi), and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of
freedom (kai porrȏterȏ tou
deontos akratou autȇs methusthȇi), then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give
a plentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that
they are accursed oligarchs (tous
archontas dȇ, an mȇ panu praioi ȏsi kai pollȇn parechȏsi
tȇn eleutherian, kolazei aitiȏmenȇ hȏs miarous te kai
oligarchikous) … By
degrees the anarchy must find a way into private houses (Kai kataduesthai ge eis te tas idias oikias) … the father grows
accustomed to descend to the level of his sons (patera men ethizesthai paidi homoion gignesthai), and to fear them
(kai phobeisthai tous hueis), and the
son is on a level with his father (huon
de patri) … And the metic is equal
with the citizen and the citizen with the metic (metoikon de astȏi kai aston
metoikȏi exizousthai), and the stranger is quite as good as either (kai xenon hȏsautȏs).’ (562a10-563a1, tr. Jowett)
In Republic I, doesn’t Polemarchus, a metic,
speak and behave as an equal of Socrates, Adeimantus, and Glaucon?
In Republic VIII there is only one thing
that Plato views as a greater evil: ‘The last extreme of popular liberty is (To de ge eschaton tȇs
eleutherias tou plȇthous, hoson gignetai en tȇi toiatȇi polei) when
the slave bought with money, whether male or female (hotan dȇ hoi eȏnȇmenoi kai hai eȏnȇmenai), is
just as free as his or her purchaser (mȇden hȇtton
eleutheroi ȏsi tȏn priamenȏn, 563b4-7, tr. Jowett).’
In the Republic Plato accomplishes a dual task;
he indicates how it happened to him that in the Phaedrus he pointed to Polemarchus as a man turned to philosophy,
and he makes it abundantly clear that Polemarchus is anything but a man turned
to philosophy.
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