In his
second cluster of doctrinal objections to the dating of the Phaedrus as Plato’s first dialogue, Temptation
and inner conflict, Richard Sorabji emphasizes the simplicity of the Protagoras and the Gorgias in comparison to the more sophisticated Republic 435-441 and Phaedrus: ‘The latter are helped to take
a more sophisticated view partly by their recognizing three parts in the soul.’
***
In Republic 435-441 Plato presents the
proof of the tripartite division of the soul. He arrived at this point as
follows. Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato’s two brothers, charged Socrates in Book
II with the task ‘in the first place, to inquire thoroughly into the nature of
justice and injustice (diereunȇsasthai ti te estin hekateron), and secondly, to discover the truth about their relative
advantages’ (kai peri tȇs ȏphelias
autoin t’alȇthes poterȏs echei, 368c5-7, tr. is Jowett’s, as will
be all the forthcoming translations from the Republic in this post).
Socrates expects
the search to be difficult, and since ‘justice is sometimes spoken of as the
virtue of an individual (dikaiosunȇ esti men andros henos), and sometimes as the virtue of a State (esti de pou kai holȇs poleȏs), a State is larger than an
individual (meizon polis henos andros),
justice is likely to be more abundant and more easily discernible in the
larger, (isȏs toinun pleiȏn an dikaiosunȇ en tȏi
meizoni eneiȇ kai raiȏn katamathein)’, he suggests: ‘I propose therefore
that we inquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear
in the State (ei oun boulesthe, prȏton en tais
polesi zȇtȇsȏmen poion ti estin), and secondly in the individual (epeita houtȏs episkepsȏmetha kai en heni hekastȏi), proceeding
from the greater to the lesser and comparing them (tȇn tou meizonos homoiotȇta en tȇi tou elattonos ideai episkopountes).’ (368e2-369a3)
To
accomplish this task, Socrates decided ‘to construct as good a State as we
could (kai houtȏ ȏikizomen
hȏs edunametha aristȇn [tȇn polin]), knowing
well that in the good one justice would be found (eu eidotes hoti en ge tȇi agathȇi an eiȇ [hȇ
dikaiosunȇ], 434e1-2)’.
The best State consists of three classes, traders (chrȇmatistikou), auxiliaries (epikourikou), and guardians (philakikou
genous), and the justice is defined as ‘each of these classes doing their
own business in the State’ (hekastou toutȏn to hautou prattontos en polei, 434c7-9). The question Socrates investigates next is,
‘whether the soul has these three principles or not (peri psuchȇs, eite echei ta tria eidȇ tauta en autȇi
eite mȇ, 435c5-6)’,
and so he asks ‘whether we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with
another (manthanomen men heterȏi, thumoumetha de allȏi tȏn en hȇmin), and with a third part desire the
satisfaction of our natural appetites (epithumoumen
d’ au tritȏi tini tȏn peri tȇn trophȇn te kai gennȇsin
hȇdonȏn kai hosa toutȏn adelpha); or whether the whole soul comes
into play in each sort of action (ȇ holȇi tȇi psuchȇi kath’ hekaston autȏn prattomen, hotan hormȇsȏmen, 436a8-b2).’
To solve
this problem, Socrates formulates the following principle: ‘Clearly the same
thing cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same
thing at the same time, in contrary ways (Dȇlon hoti
t’auton t’anantia poiein ȇ paschein kata t’auton ge kai pros t’auton ouk ethelȇsei hama); and
therefore (hȏste) whenever
this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same (an pou heuriskȏmen en autois tauta
gignomena), we know
(eisometha) that they are really not
the same (hoti ou t’auton ȇn), but
different (alla pleiȏ, 436b8-c1).’
James Adam
notes ad loc. that this ‘is the
earliest explicit statement in Greek literature of the maxim of Contradiction’.
(Op. cit. [in my previous posts],
vol. I, p. 246)
Socrates: ‘The
soul of the thirsty one (Tou dipsȏntos hȇ
psuchȇ), in so far
as he is thirsty (kath’ hoson dipsȇi), desires
only drink (ouk allo ti bouletai ȇ piein); for
this she yearns (kai toutou oregetai),
and for this she strives (kai epi touto
hormai) … And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from
drink (Oukoun ei pote ti autȇn anthelkei
dipsȏsan), that must be different (heteron an ti en autȇi eiȇi)
from the thirsty principle which draws him
like a beast to drink (autou tou dipsȏntos kai agontos
hȏsper thȇrion epi to piein – there is nothing in Socrates’
Greek that entitles Jowett to view ‘the thirsting’ as a principle); for, as we
were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of
itself act in contrary ways about the same (ou
gar dȇ,
phamen, to ge auto tȏi autȏi heautou peri to auto ham’ an
t’anantia prattoi) …
Now are there times when men are thirsty (Poteron
dȇ
phȏmen tinas estin hote dipsȏntas), and yet unwilling to drink (ouk ethelein piein;)? … And in such a
case what is one to say (Ti oun phaiȇ tis an
toutȏn peri)? Would you not say that there was something in the soul
bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him (ouk eneinai men en tȇi psuchȇi autȏn to keleuon, eneinai
de to kȏluon piein),
which is other and stronger than the
principle which bids him (allo on kai
kratoun tou keleuontos – again,
there is no ground for translating to
keleuon, ‘that which is bidding’ as a principle)?
… And the prohibition in such cases is derived from reasoning (Ar’ oun ou to men kȏluon ta toiauta engignetai, hotan engenȇtai, ek logismou), whereas the motives which lead (ta de agonta) and attract (kai helkonta ‘and dragging’) proceed
from passions and diseases (dia pathȇmatȏn te
kai nosȇmatȏn paragignetai)? … Then we may fairly assume that
they are two (Ou dȇ alogȏs
axiȏsomen auta ditta te), and that they differ from one
another
(kai
hetera allȇlȏn einai); the one with which a man reasons (to men hȏi logizetai), we may call thee rational principle of the soul (logistikon prosagoreuontes tȇs psuchȇs), the other,
with which he loves (to de hȏi erai te) and
hungers (kai peinȇi) and thirsts
(kai dipsȇi) and feels the flutterings of any
other desire (kai peri tas allas
epithumias eptoȇtai), may be termed the irrational or
appetitive (alogiston te kai epithumȇtikon), the
ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions (plȇrȏseȏn
tinȏn kai hȇdonȏn hetairon) … So much (Tauta men), then (toinun),
for the definition of two of the principles
existing in the soul (duo hȇmin
hȏristhȏ eidȇ en psuchȇi enonta ‘let
there be defined these two kinds existing
in the soul’). And what now of passion, or spirit (to de dȇ tou thumou kai hȏi thumoumetha)?
Is it a third (poteron triton) or
akin to one of the preceding (ȇ toutȏn poterȏi an eiȇ homophues)?’ (439a9-e4)
That thumos (the spirited part of the soul)
and to epithumȇtikon (the
appetitive part of the soul) are separate entities Socrates proves as follows:
‘Well (Alla), there is a story which
I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith (pote akousas ti pisteuȏ toutȏi). The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion (hȏs ara Leontios ho Aglaїȏnos), coming
up one day from the Piraeus (aniȏn ek
Peiraiȏs), under the north wall on the outside (hupo to boreion teichos ektos), observed some dead bodies (aisthomenos nekrous) lying on the ground
at the place of execution (para tȏi dȇmiȏi keimenous).
He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them (hama men idein epithumoi, hama de au
duscherainoi kai apotrepoi heauton); for a time he struggled (kai teȏs men machoito te) and covered his eyes (kai parakaluptoito), but at length the
desire got the better of him (kratoumenos
d’oun hupo tȇs epithumias); and forcing them open (dielkusas tous ophthalmous), he ran up
to the dead bodies (prosdramȏn pros tous nekrous), saying, Look, ye wretches (“Idou
humin”, ephȇ, “ȏ kakodaimones), take your full of the fair sight (emplȇsthȇte tou kalou theamatos”) … The moral of the tale is (Houtos mentoi ho logos sȇmainei) that
anger at times goes to war with desire (tȇn orgȇn polemein eniote tais epithumiais), as though they were two distinct things (hȏs allo on allȏi) … And are
there not many other cases in which we observe (Oukoun kai allothi pollachou aisthanometha) that when a man’s
desires violently prevail over his reason (hotan
biazȏntai tina para ton logismon epithumiai), he reviles himself (loidorounta te hauton), and is angry at the violence within him (kai thumoumenon tȏi
biazomenȏi en hautȏi), and that in this struggle, which is like the
struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason (kai hȏsper duoin stasiazontoin summachon
tȏi logȏi gignomenon ton thumon tou toioutou;); – but for the passionate or spirited
element to take part with the desires (tais
d’ epithumiais auton koinȏnȇsanta) when reason decides that she should
not be opposed (hairountos logou mȇ dein antiprattein),
is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in
yourself (oimai se ouk an phanai
genomenou pote en sautȏi tou toioutou
aisthesthai), nor,
as I should imagine, in anyone else (oimai
oud’ en allȏi)? … When a man thinks that he is the
sufferer of the wrong (Ti de hotan
adikeisthai tis hȇgȇtai;), then the spirit within him boils
and chafes (ouk en toutȏi zei te kai chalepainei), and is on the side of what it believes to be justice (kai summachei tȏi dokounti
dikaiȏi); and though it suffers hunger or cold or other pain (kai, dia to peinȇn kai dia to rigoun kai panta ta toiauta paschein), it is only the more determined to
persevere and conquer (hupomenȏn kai nikai
kai ou lȇgei tȏn gennaiȏn). Such a noble spirit will not be quelled until it
has achieved its object (prin an ȇ diapraxȇtai) or been
slain (ȇ
teleutȇsȇi), or until it has been recalled by the reason within,
like a dog by the shepherd (ȇ hȏsper kuȏn hupo nomeȏs hupo tou logou tou
par’ hautȏi anaklȇtheis praünthȇi;)?’ – Glaucon:
‘The illustration is perfect (Panu men
oun eoike toutȏi hȏi legeis); and in our State, as we were
saying (kaitoi g’ en tȇi hȇmeterai polei), the auxiliaries were to be dogs (tous epikourous hȏsper kunas ethemetha), and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds (hupȇkoous tȏn archontȏn hȏsper poimenȏn
poleȏs).’ (439e6-440d6)
Having
observed that ‘in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the
rational principle (auto [to
thumoeides] en tȇi tȇs psuchȇs stasei tithesthai ta hopla pros to logistikon)’, Socrates asks ‘whether passion is
different from reason also (ar’ oun
heteron on [to thumoeides] kai toutou [tou logistikou]), or only a kind of
reason (ȇ logistikou ti eidos, 440e8)’. Glaucon says that ‘it must be the third’ (Anankȇ triton, 441a4), and ‘that is easily proved
(ou chalepon phanȇnai): – We may
observe even in young children (kai gar
en tois paidiois an tis idoi) that they are full of spirit almost as soon
as they are born (hoti thumou men euthus
genomena mesta esti), whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use
of reason (logismou d’ enioi men emoige
dokousin oudepote metalambanein), and most of them late enough (hoi de polloi opse pote).‘ – Socrates: ‘Excellent
(Nai ma Dia, kalȏs ge eipes)
and you can see passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of
the truth of what you are saying (eti de
en tois thȇriois an tis idoi ho legeis, hoti houtȏs echei). And
we may once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted
by us (pros de toutois, kai ho anȏ pou
eipomen, to tou Homȇrou marturȇsei, to) “He smote his breast, and thus
rebuked his heart” (stȇthos de
plȇxas kradiȇn ȇnipape muthȏi); for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the
power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the
unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it (entautha
gar dȇ
saphȏs hȏs heteron heterȏi epiplȇtton pepoiȇken Homȇros to analogisamenon tȏi
alogistȏs thumoumenȏi) … And so, after much tossing, we have
reached land (Tauta men ara mogis
dianeneukamen), and are fairly agreed (kai
hȇmin
epieikȏs hȏmologȇtai) that the same principles
which exist in the State exist also in the individual (ta auta men en polei, ta auta d’ en henos hekastou tȇi posuchȇi genȇ eneinai), and that they are three in number (kai isa ton
arithmon).’ (441a7-c7)
Jowett
misrepresents Plato’s text when he speaks of epithumȇtikon (the appetitive part) and of thumos (the spirited part) as
principles. In the light of Republic
X these two lower parts appear to be accretions that do not belong to the
immortal soul (611b1-612a6). (See ‘1 Dating of the Phaedrus – doctrinal arguments (the soul in Republic X)’)
In Book IV
Socrates prefaced his proof of the tripartite soul with a cautionary
observation: ‘And I must impress upon you, Glaucon (kai eu g’ isthi, ȏ Glaukȏn), that in my opinion (hȏs hȇ emȇ doxa) our present methods of argument are not at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question
(akribȏs men touto ek toioutȏn methodȏn, hoiais nun en
tois logois chrȏmetha, ou mȇ pote labȏmen); the true method is another and a longer one (allȇ gar makrotera kai pleiȏn hodos hȇ epi touto agousa, 435c9-d3).’
***
Adam notes ad loc.: ‘touto in akribȏs men touto
and in hȇ epi touto agousa ought, so
far as grammar goes, to mean the question whether the soul has tria eidȇ (‘three kinds’) or not. But
the makrotera periodos (‘the longer
method’) in VI 504 B ff., where Plato expressly refers back to this passage,
eschews the psychological problem altogether. The makrotera periodos of Books VI-VII is in harmony with the present
enquiry in so far as it seeks to determine the nature of Justice and the other
virtues (VI 504 D, 506 A), but it is nowhere in the Republic expressly used either to confirm or to overthrow the
triple division of soul which is here propounded … The only way out of these
difficulties is to suppose that touto
here was not intended by Plato to refer to the psychological, but to the
ethical question, to which the psychological enquiry is introductory. Touto must then be taken as dikaiosunȇs te peri kai sȏphrosunȇs kai
andreias kai sophias ho hekaston esti [‘concerning justice and temperance
and courage and wisdom, what each is’ (VI 504 A)’ (Op. cit. p. 244)
Pace
Adam, there is no need to replace the clear reference of touto in Book IV 435d1 and d3 to the question ‘whether the soul has
tria eidȇ (‘three kinds’) or not’ by
construing a new reference for it from Book VI 504 A. The difficulties to which
Adam points can be solved if we pay closer attention to Plato’s makrotera periodos (‘the longer method’)
in Books VI and VII.
In Book VI, at 504a4-b3 Socrates says
to Adeimantus: ’You may remember (Mnȇmoneueis
men pou) that we divided the soul into three parts (hoti tritta eidȇ psuchȇs diastȇsamenoi); and, by relating them to
each other, distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage,
and wisdom (sunebibazomen dikaiosunȇs te
peri kai sȏphrosunȇs kai andreias kai sophias ho hekaston eiȇ)? …And do you
remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them (Ê kai to prorrȇthen autȏn;) … We were
saying, if I am not mistaken (Elegomen
pou), that he who wanted to see them
in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way (hoti hȏs men dunaton ȇn kallista auta katidein allȇ makrotera eiȇ periodos), at the
end of which they would appear (hȇn perielthonti kataphanȇ gignoito).’
Jowett’s ‘to see them in their perfect
beauty’ for kallista auta katidein is
misleading. Plato does not propose to see the three parts of the soul and the
four virtues ‘in their perfect beauty’ – no such thing is offered in the
‘longer and more circuitous way’. He proposes to see them in the best way possible:
hȏs men dunaton ȇn kallista auta katidein.
Similarly, he does not say ‘at the end of which they would appear’, he says ‘at the end of which it would appear.’ Concerning these,
what would appear by virtue of the ‘longer and more circuitous way’, we learn
in Book VII, when Socrates speaks of its culmination, of seeing the Good.
‘Our argument (Ho de ge nun logos) shows (sȇmainei)
that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already (tautȇn tȇn enousan hekastou dunamin en tȇi
psuchȇi kai to organon hȏi katamanthanei hekastos); and that just as if it
were not possible to turn the eye from darkness to light without the whole body
(hoion ei omma mȇ dunaton ȇn allȏs ȇ sun
holȏi tȏi sȏmati strephein pros to phanon ek tou skotȏdous), so too the
instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming to that of
being (houtȏ sun holȇi tȇi psuchȇi ek tou gignomenou periakteon einai), and
learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of
being (heȏs an eis to on kai tou ontos to
phanotaton dunatȇ genȇtai anaschesthai theȏmenȇ), or in other words, of the
good (touto d’ einai phamen t’agathon,
518c4-d1).
The immortal soul, which we can see by
virtue of the ‘longer road’, is unitary. Socrates does not speak here explicitly
about the two lower ‘parts of the soul’, their bodily nature is nevertheless
indicated implicitly when he contrast the intellectual virtue with virtues he
discussed in Book IV: ‘And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul (Hai men toinun allai aretai kaloumenai
psuchȇs) seem to be akin to bodily qualities (kinduneuousin engus ti einai tȏn tou sȏmatos, 518d9-10).’
No comments:
Post a Comment