In the Phaedrus Socrates refers to Polemarchus
in his prayer to Eros that crowns his Palinode (Recantation): ‘This, dear god
of love, is offered and paid to you as the finest and best palinode of which I
am capable (Hautȇ soi, ȏ
phile Erȏs, eis hȇmeteran dunamin hoti kallistȇ kai aristȇ dedotai te kai
ekteteistai palinȏidia … If in our earlier speech Phaedrus
and I said anything harsh against you (en
tȏi
prosthen ei ti logȏi soi apȇches eipomen Phaidros te kai egȏ), blame Lysias as the instigator of
the speech (Lusian ton tou logou patera
aitiȏmenos), and
make him cease from speeches of that kind (paue
tȏn
toioutȏn logȏn), turning him instead, as his brother Polemarchus has
been turned, to philosophy (epi
philosophian de, hȏsper h’adelphos autou
Polemarchos tetraptai, trepson), so that his lover here (hina kai ho erastȇs hode autou) may no longer waver as he does now
between two choices (mȇketi epamphoterizȇi kathaper nun), but may single-mindedly direct his
life towards love accompanied by talk of a philosophic kind (all’ haplȏs pros Erȏta meta
philosophȏn logȏn ton bion poiȇtai, 257a3-b6, tr. C. J. Rowe).’
Does this
reference to Polemarchus mean that when Plato wrote the dialogue, he viewed him
as a philosopher? If so, what did he mean by someone’s being a philosopher? For
an answer to this question we must go to the closing section of the Phaedrus: ‘Then we may regard our
literary pastime as having reached a satisfactory conclusion (Oukoun ȇdȇ pepaisthȏ metriȏs hȇmin ta peri
logȏn). Do you now go and tell Lysias (kai su te elthȏn phraze Lusiai) that we two went down to the stream
where is the holy place of the Nymphs (hoti
nȏ
katabante es to Numphȏn nama te kai mouseion), and there listened to the words (ȇkousamen
logȏn) which charged us to deliver a message, first to Lysias and all other
composers of discourses (hoi epestellon
legein Lusiai te kai ei tis allos suntithȇsi logous) … that if any of them has done his
work with a knowledge of the truth (ei men eidȏs hȇi to alȇthes echei sunethȇke tauta), can defend his statements (kai echȏn boȇthein) when challenged (eis elenchon
iȏn) … to call
him wise, Phaedrus, (to men sophon, ȏ Phaidre, kalein) would, I think, be going too far (emoige
mega einai dokei): the epithet is proper only to a god (kai theȏi monȏi prepein); a name that would fit him better,
and have more seemliness, would be “lover
(philo) of wisdom (sophos)” (to de philosophon
mallon te an autȏi kai harmottoi kai
emmelesterȏs echoi).’ (278b7-d6, tr. R. Hackforth)
In the Phaedrus, only a man who speaks with a
knowledge of truth and can defend his statements when challenged deserves the
name of a philosopher. In Republic I,
on both these accounts, Polemarchus is far from being a philosopher, and it is
hard to imagine how he could become one. Does this then mean that on account of
his performance in Republic I, and
his presentation in the Phaedrus, the
latter can’t be seen as following the former? What if, when Plato speaks of him
in the Phaedrus as a man turned to
philosophy, he means a man who just wants to become a philosopher? In other
words, what if the ‘philosophic credentials’ ascribed to him in the Palinode
are considerably lower than those ascribed to a fully-fledged philosopher at
the end of the dialogue?
We can get
clarity into Polemarchus’ philosophic status in the Phaedrus if we find out what are the ‘two choices’ between which
Phaedrus ‘wavers’, and what means ‘a single-minded direction of one’s life
towards love accompanied by talk of a philosophic kind’ – of which Socrates
speaks in his prayer to Eros.
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