4 The dating of Plato’s Phaedrus with a reference to his Republic

Socrates’ discussion with Polemarchus in Republic I leads to his refutation of Polemarchus’ definition of justice. Concerning the widely accepted post-Republic dating of the Phaedrus – see Hackforth’s ‘Introduction’ to Plato’s Phaedrus, Cambridge University Press, 1952, repr. 1972, pp. 3-5 – the question is, whether this discussion can be seen as a basis for Plato’s pointing to him in the Phaedrus as a man turned to philosophy.

Let us begin by following Socrates’ refutation of Polemarchus’ definition of justice step by step. Socrates: ‘But ought the just to injure anyone at all (Estin ara dikaiou andros blaptein kai hontinoun anthrȏpȏn;)?’ – Pol. ‘Undoubtedly (Kai panu ge) he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies (tous ge ponȇrous te kai echthrous dei blaptein).’ – Soc. ‘When horses are injured (Blaptomenoi d’ hippoi), are they improved or deteriorated (beltious ȇ cheirous gignontai;)?’ – Pol. ‘The latter (Cheirous).’ – Soc. ‘Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs (Ara eis tȇn tȏn kunȏn aretȇn, ȇ tȇn tȏn hippȏn; 335b8)’ – Pol. ‘Yes, horses (Eis tȇn tȏn hippȏn).’ – Soc. ‘And dogs are deteriorated (Ar’ oun kai kunes blaptomenoi cheirous gignontai) in the good qualities of dogs, and not horses (eis tȇn tȏn kunȏn all’ ouk eis tȇn tȏn hippȏn aretȇn; 335b11)?’ – Pol. ‘Of course (Anankȇ, ‘Of necessity).’

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Socrates’ Ar’ oun kai kunes blaptomenoi cheirous gignontai eis tȇn tȏn kunȏn all’ ouk eis tȇn tȏn hippȏn aretȇn; (335b11) means ‘Don’t the damaged dogs as well become deteriorated in the virtue of dogs, but not that of horses?’ Apart from leaving untranslated Ar’ oun kai kunes blaptomenoi (‘Don’t the damaged dogs’), Jowett translated Socrates’ aretȇ at 335b8 and 335b11 as ‘good qualities’, instead of ‘virtue’, as in 335c2, which follows, thus impairing Socrates’ argument.

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Socrates: ‘And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man (Anthrȏpous de, ȏ hetaire, mȇ houtȏ phȏmen, blaptomenous eis tȇn athrȏpeian aretȇn cheirous gignesthai; ‘And humans, my friend, won’t we say thus: when they are damaged, they become deteriorated in the human virtue? 335c2)?’ – Pol. ‘Certainly (Panu men oun).’ – Soc. ‘And that human virtue is justice (All’ hȇ dikaiosunȇ ouk anthrȏpeia aretȇ;)?’ – Pol. ‘To be sure (Kai tout’ anankȇ, ‘This too is necessary’).’ – Soc. ‘Then, my friend, men who are injured are of necessity made more unjust (Kai tous blaptomenous ara, ȏ phile, tȏn anthrȏpȏn anankȇ adikȏterous gignesthai)?’ – Pol. ‘That is the result (Eoiken).’

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Jowett’s ‘That is the result’ is too definitive rendering of Polemarchus’ Eoiken, ‘It seems so’.

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Socrates: ‘But can the musician by his art (Ar’ oun tȇi mousikȇi hoi mousikoi) make men unmusical (amousous dunantai poiein)?’ – Pol. ‘Certainly not (Adunaton ‘It is impossible’).’ – Soc. ‘Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen (Alla tȇi hippikȇi hoi hippikoi aphippous;)?’ – Pol. ‘Impossible (Ouk estin).’ – Soc. ‘And can the just by justice make men unjust (Alla tȇi dikaiosunȇi dȇ hoi dikaioi adikous;), or speaking generally (ȇ kai sullȇbdȇn), can the good by virtue make them bad (aretȇi hoi agathoi kakous;)?’ – Pol. ‘Impossible (Alla adunaton).’ – Soc. ‘Any more than heat can produce cold, or drought moisture; these are the effects of opposite causes?’ – Pol. ‘Exactly.’ (Ou gar thermotȇtos oimai ergon psuchein alla tou enantiou. – Pol. Nai. – Soc. Oude xȇrotȇtos hugrainein alla tou enantiou. – Pol. Panu ge.) – Soc. ‘Nor is it the effect of the good, but of its opposite, to cause harm (Oude dȇ tou agathou blaptein alla tou enantiou)?’ – Pol. ‘Evidently (Phainetai, ‘It appears so’).’ – Soc. ‘And the just man (Ho de ge dikaios) is good (agathos)?’ – Pol. ‘Certainly (Panu ge).’ – ‘Then to injure a friend or anyone else is not the act of a just man (Ouk ara tou dikaiou blaptein ergon, ȏ Polemarche, oute philon out’ allon oudena), but of the opposite (alla tou enantiou), who is the unjust (tou adikou)?’ – Pol. ‘I think that what you say is quite true (Pantapasi moi dokeis alȇthȇ legein), Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates).’

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In Republic I Polemarchus accepts Socrates’ view that a just man cannot injure anybody. Does this make him worthy of being presented as an exemplary philosopher in the Phaedrus? For the answer to this question we must go to the Phaedrus.