The Charmides: self-control as self-knowledge

 

Inspired by the Delphic inscription (to\ Delfiko\n gra/mma) ‘Know thyself’ (Gnw~qi sauto/n), which he understands as a divine command swfro/nei (‘Be temperate, and wise, and self-controllled’), Critias defines swfrosu/nh as ‘knowing oneself’ (to\ gignw~skein au0to\j e9auto/n, 165b4). Wanting to get this statement clarified, Socrates asked: ‘If indeed self-control is knowing something (ei0 ga\r dh\ gignw&skein ge/ ti/ e0stin h9 swfrosu/nh), it will obviously be a knowledge (dh=lon o3ti e0pisth/mh tij a3n ei1h) and a knowledge of something (kai\ tino/j), won’t it (h2 ou1;)?’ Critias replied: ‘Yes (E!stin), of oneself (e9autou= ge).’ But Socrates wanted to know more about it, comparing it to other knowledges. Critias rejected Socrates’ comparisons: ‘You’re trying to find some similarity between self-control and the other knowledges (su\ de\ o9moio/thta/ tina zhtei=j au0th=j [th=j swfrosu/nhj] tai=j a1llaij [e0pisth/maij]). There isn’t any (to\ d’ ou0k e1stin ou3twj). All the other knowledges are knowledges of something else (a0ll’ ai9 me\n a1llai pa=sai a1llou ei0si\n e0pisth=mai), not of themselves (e9autw~n d’ ou1). Self-control alone is the knowledge both of the other knowledges (h9 de\ [swfrosu/nh] mo/nh tw~n te a1llwn e0pisthmw~n e0pisth/mh e0sti/) and of its own self (kai\ au0th= e9auth=j). Socrates asks: ‘Would it be a knowledge of ignorance too (Ou0kou=n kai\ a0nepisthmosu/nhj e0sth/mh a2n ei1h), if it is a knowledge of knowledge (ei1per kai\ e0pisth/mhj;)?’ Critias replied: ‘Yes, certainly (Pa/nu ge).’ (166e7-9)

Summarizing the main points, Socrates asks: ‘So the self-controlled man alone (O( a1ra sw&frwn mo/noj) will know himself (au0to/j te e9auto\n gnw~setai) and be able to examine (kai\ oi[o/j te e1stai e0ceta/sai) what he in fact knows (ti/ te tugxa/nei ei0dw&j) and what he doesn’t (kai\ ti/ mh/), and he will be capable of looking at other people in the same way (kai\ tou\j a1llouj w(sau/twj dunato\j e1stai e0piskopei=n) to see what any of them knows and thinks he knows (ti/ tij oi]den kai\ oi1etai), if he does know (ei1per oi]den); and what (kai\ ti/), on the other hand (au]), he thinks he knows (oi1etai me\n ei0de/nai), but does not (oi]den d’ou1). No one else will be able to do that (tw~n de’ a1llqn ou0dei/j). In fact, that is being self-controlled (kai\ e1stin dh\ tou=to to\ swfronei=n te) and self-control (kai\ swfrosu/nh) and knowing oneself (kai\ to\ e9auto\n au0to\n gignw&skein) – knowing what one knows and what one doesn’t (to\ ei0de/nai a3 te oi]den kai\ a4 mh\ oi]den). Is that what you’re saying (a]ra tau=ta/ e0stin a4 le/geij;)?’

‘Yes (E!gwg’),’ he replied (e1fh).

Having thus ascertained that this is Critias’ view on swfrosu/nh, Socrates suggested subjecting it to scrutiny; ‘Well then (Pa/lin toi/nun),’ I said (h]n d’ e0gw&), ‘third time lucky (to\ tri/ton tw~| swth=ri).’ (167a1-9)

***

Donals Watt in his translation of the Charmides explains: ‘Literally, ‘the third (libation) to (Zeus) the Saviour’. The third cup of wine of a libation was dedicated to Zeus the Saviour. To drink that third cup was to pray for good luck.

***

‘Let’s go back to the beginning again, as it were (w#sper e0c a0rxh=j e0piskeyw&meqa), and consider – whether or not it is possible for that to be the case (prw~ton me\n ei0 dunato/n e0stin) – to know that one knows and that one does not know what one knows and what one does not know (to\ a4 oi]den kai\ a4 mh\ oi]den ei0de/nai o1ti oi]de kai\ o3ti ou0k oi]den); and secondly (e1peita), if it is perfectly possible (ei0 o3ti ma/lista dunato/n), what benefit our knowing that would bring us (ti/j a2n ei1h h9mi=n w)feli/a ei0do/sin au0to/).’

‘Indeed we ought to look at that,’ Critias said (A)lla\ xrh/, e1fh, skopei=n).

‘Come on then, Critias,’ I said (I!qi dh/, e1fhn e0gw&, w} Ktiti/a), ‘look at it (ske/yai), and see whether you can be shown to be closer to a solution in these matters than I (e0a/n ti peri\ au0tw~n eu0porw~teroj fanh=|j e0mou=), because I am at a loss (e0gw_ me\n ga\r a0porw~). Shall I tell you where I find myself in difficulties (h|[ de\ a0porw~, fra/sw soi;)?’

‘Yes, certainly (Pa/nu g’)’, Critias said (e1fh).

‘Well then,’ I said, ‘if what you were saying a moment ago really is the case (A!llo ti ou]n, h]n d’ e0gw&, pa/nta tau=t’ a2n ei1h), won’t it all amount to this, that there is some one knowledge which is the knowledge of nothing but itself and the other knowledges (ei0 e1stin o3per su\ nundh= e1legej, mi/a tij e0pisth/mh, h9 ou0k a1llou tino/j e0stin h2 e9auth=j te kai\ tw~n a1llwn e0pisthmw~n e0pisth/mh), this same knowledge being the knowledge of ignorance too (kai\ dh\ kai\ a0nepisthmosu/nhj h9 au0th\ au4th;)?’

‘Yes, certainly (Pa/nu ge).’

‘See what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend (I)de\ dh\ w#j a1topon e0pixeirou=men, w] e9tai=re, le/gein). If you look at the same proposition in other cases (e0n a1lloij ga/r pou to\ au0to\ tou=to e0a\n skoph/|j), it’ll seem to you (do/cei soi), I think (w#j e0gw}|mai), that it is impossible (a0du/naton ei]nai).’

‘How ­(Pw~j dh/)? In what cases (kai\ pou=;)?’

‘In these (E)n toi=sde). Consider (e0nno/ei ga/r) whether you think there is a vision (ei1 soi dokei= o1yij tij ei]nai) which is not the vision of what the other visons are visions of (h4 w#n me\n ai9 a1llai o1yeij ei0si/n, ou0k e1stin tou/twn o1yij), but is the vision of itself and the other visions (e9auth=j te kai\ tw~n a1llwn o1yewn o1yij e1stin), and non-vision in the same way (kai\ mh\ o1yewn w(sau/twj): and though it is a vision, it sees no colour (kai\ xrw~ma me\n o9ra|= ou0de\n o1yij ou]sa), only itself (e9auth\n de/) and the other visions (kai\ ta\j a1llaj o1yeij). Do you think there is such a vision (dokei= ti/j soi ei]nai toiau/th;)?’

‘Havens (Ma\ Di/’), no, I don’t (ou0k e1moige).’

‘What about a hearing (Ti/ de\ a0koh/n;) which hears no sound (h9 fwnh=j me\n o0demia=j a0kou/ei), but hears itself (au9th=j de/) and the other hearings (kai\ tw~n a1llwn a0kow~n a0kou/ei) and non-hearings (kai\ tw~n mh\ a0kow~n;)?’

‘No, not that either (Ou0de\ tou=to).’

‘Take all the senses together (Sullh/bdhn dh\ sko/pei peri\ pasw~n tw~n ai0sqh/sewn). Do you think there is (ei2 ti/j soi dokei= ei]nai) some sense of the senses (ai0sqh/sewn me\n ei]nai ai1sqhsij) and of itself (kai\ e9auth=j) which, however, senses nothing of what the other senses sense (w#n de\ dh\ ai9 a1llai ai0sqh/seij ai0sqa/nontai, mhdeno\j ai0sqanome/nh;)?’

‘No, I don’t (Ou0k e1moige).’ (167a9-d10)

***

Having discarded the possibility that any of the senses might be self-reflective, Socrates raises the same question concerning other faculties:

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‘Do you think that there is some desire (A)ll’ e0piqumi/a dokei= ti/j soi ei]nai), which is the desire for no pleasure (h3tij h9donh=j me\n ou0demia/j e0stin e0piqumi/a), but for itself (a9uth=j de/) and the other desires (kai\ tw~n a1llwn e0piqumiw~n;)? … and no wish (ou0de\ mh\n bou/lhsij), I think (w(j e0gw}|mai), which does not wish any good (h4 a0gaqo\n me\n ou0de\n bou/letai), but which wishes for itself (au9th\n de/) and for the other wishes (kai\ ta\j a1llaj boulh/seij) wishes (bou/letai)? … some love (e1rwta), which is (o3j tugxa/nei w!n) love of no beautiful thing (e1rwj kalou= me\n ou0deno\j), but of itself (e9autou= de/) and the other loves (kai\ tw~n a1llwn e0rw~twn;)?  … a fear (fo/bon de/) which fears itself and the other fears (o4j e9auto\n me\n kai\ tou\j a1llouj fo/bouj fobei=tai), but fears none of the thing which are frightening (tw~n deinw~n d’ oude\ e4n fobei/tai;)? … or any opinion which is an opinion of opinions (do/can de\ docw~n do/can) and of itself (kai\ au9th=j), but which holds no opinion about what the other opinions hold opinions about (w{n de\ ai3 a1llai doca/zousin mhde\n doca/zousan;)?’ (167e1-168a4)

Critias says his ‘no’ to all these questions.’

With the question of self-reflectivity concerning opinion (do/ca) Socrates comes the nearest to the question of self-reflectivity concerning knowledge (e0pisth/mh), which is considered, or rather re-considered, next.

‘But it would appear we’re saying that there is some such knowledge (A)ll’ e0pisth/mhn, w(j e1oiken, fame/n tina ei]nai toiau/thn), which is the knowledge of no branch of learning (h3tij maqh/matoj me\n ou0deno/j e0stin e0pisth/mh), but is the knowledge of itself and the other knowledges (au9th=j de\ kai\ tw~n a1llwn e0pisth/mwn e0pisth/mh;)?’

‘This we say, certainly (Fame\n ga/r).’

‘Isn’t it strange, then (Ou0kou=n a1topon), if it really does exist (ei0 a1ra kai\ e1stin;)? Let’s not state categorically just yet that it does not exist (mhe\n ga/r pw diisxurizw&meqa w(j ou0k e1stin), but let’s keep investigating whether it does exist (a0ll’ ei0 e1stin e1ti skopw~men).’

‘You’re right (O)rqw~j le/geij).’

‘Come on, then (Fe/re dh/). This knowledge is the knowledge of something (e1sti me\n au9th= h9 e0pisth/mh tino\j e0pisth/mh), and it has some such faculty (kai\ e1xei tina\ tiau/thn du/namin), so as to be of something (w#ste tino\j ei]nai), hasn’t it (h] ga/r;)?’

‘Yes, certainly (Pa/nu ge).’ (168a6-b4)

***

Coming to the question whether knowledge of itself and of other knowledges does exist, Socrates points to instances of putative self-reflectivity, which in fact cannot exist.

***

‘For example, we say that that which is greater, has some such faculty (Kai\ ga\r to\ mei=zo/n famen toiau/thn tina\ e1xein du/namin), so as to be greater than something (w3ste tino\j ei]nai mei/zon;)?’

‘Yes, it does’ (E!xei ga/r).

‘Of something smaller (Ou0kou=n e0la/ttono/j tinoj), if it is to be bigger (ei1per e1stai mei=zon).

‘It must be (A)na/gkh)’.

‘If it were the greater of itself (Ei1per e9autou= mei/zon ei1h), it would also be the smaller of itself (kai\ e1latton e9autou= ei]nai), wouldn’t it (h2 ou0;)?’

‘Very much so, necessarily (Pollh\ a0na/gkh),’ Critias said (e1fh), ‘Socrates (w} Sw~kratej).’

Socrates heaps up similar instances:

‘And if something is the double both of the other doubles and of itself (Ou0kou=n kai\ ei1 ti dipla/sio/n e0stin tw~n te a1llwn diplasi/wn kai\ e9autou=), it would itself constitute a half of itself (h3mi/seoj d=h/pou o1ntoj e9autou= te), and of the others (kai\ tw~n a1llwn), would be the double (dipla/sion a2n ei1h), since there is not, I’m sure, a double of anything but half (ou0 ga/r e0sti/n pou a1llou dipla/sion h2 h9mi/seoj) … and what is heavier of itself (baru/teron de\ e9autou=) will be lighter of itself too (kai\ koufo/teron e1stai), and what is older younger, and so on (kai\ presbu/teron o2n new~teron, kai\ t’a1lla w(sau/twj) . Whatever relates its own faculty to itself (o3tiper a2n th\n e9autou= du/namin pro\j e9auto\ e1xh|) won’t it also have that essential nature (ou0 kai\ e0kei/nhn e3cei th\n ou0si/an) to which its faculty was related (pro\j h4n h9 du/namij au0tou= h]n;)?’

‘Yes (Nai/)’

Do you see, then (O(ra|j ou]n, w} Kriti/a, o3ti o3sa dielhlu/qamen), Critias (ȏ Kritia), that of all the examples we’ve gone through, for some it seems to us absolutely impossible, while in the case of the others it is very difficult to believe, that they could ever relate their own faculty to themselves (ta\ me\n au0tw~n a0du/nata panta/pasi fai/netai h9mi=n, ta\ d’ a0pistei=tai sfo/dra, mh/ pot’ a2n th\n e9autw~n du/namin pro\j e9auta\ sxei=n;)? For instance, it is absolutely impossible for magnitudes and numbers and the like (mege/qh me\n ga\r kai\ plh/qh kai\ ta\ toiau=ta panta/pasin a0du/naton), isn’t it (h2 ou0xi/)?’

‘Yes, certainly (Pa/nu ge).’

‘Whereas hearing and vision and also motion moving itself (A)koh= d’ au2 kai\ o1yij kai\ e1ti ge kai\ ki/nhsij au0th\ e9auth\n kinei=n), and heat burning itself (kai\ qermo/thj ka/ein), and everything like that (kai\ pa/nta au] ta\ toiau=ta), would excite disbelief in some people (toi=j me\n a0pisti/an a2n para/sxoi), though perhaps not in others (i1swj de/ tisin ou0). What we need, my friend, is some great man (mega/lou dh/ tinoj, w} fi/le, a0ndro\j dei=) to determine satisfactorily for all instances (o3stij tou=to kata\ pa/ntwn i9kanw~j diairh/setai) whether none of the things which exist (po/teron ou0de\n tw~n o1ntwn) relates its own faculty to itself (th\n au9tou= du/namin au0to\ pro\j au9to\ pe/fuken e1xein), but to something else instead (a0lla\ pro\j a1llo), or whether some do (h2 ta\ me/n), but others don’t (ta\ d’ ou!); and if there are things which relate it to themselves (kai\ ei0 e1stin au2 a3tina au0ta\ pro\j au9ta\ e1xei), whether the knowledge which we say is self-control is one of them (a]r’ e0n tou/toij e0sti\n e0pisth/mh, h3n dh\ h9mei=j swfrosu/nhn fame\n ei]nai). I don’t believe I’m competent to settle these questions (e0gw& me\n ou0 pisteu/w e0mautw~| i9kano\j ei]nai tau=ta diele/sqai), which is why I cannot state categorically whether it is possible for there to be a knowledge of knowledge (dio\ kai\ ou1t’ ei0 dunato\n e0sti\ tou=to gene/sqai, e0pisth/mhj e0pisth/mhn ei]nai, e1xw diisxuri/sasqai), and why I do not accept that, if it definitely does exist, it is self-control (ou1t’ ei0 o3ti ma/lista e1sti, swfrosu/nhn a0pode/xomai au0to\ ei]nai), until I have considered a thing like that would benefit us or not (pri\n a2n e0piske/ywmai ei1te ti a2n h9ma=j w)feloi= toiou=ton o1n ei1te mh/), since I do have a feeling that self-control is something beneficial and good (th\n ga\r ou]n dh\ swfrosu/nhn w)fe/limo/n ti kai\ a0gaqo\n manteu/omai ei]nai).’ (168b5-169a5)

***

By including ‘motion that moves itself’ (ki/nhsij au0th\ e9auth\n kinei=n) among the putative instances of self-reflection, Socrates includes the very foundation of the Phaedran Palinode within the framework of his self-deprecation: ‘I don’t believe I’m competent to settle these questions (e0gw& me\n ou0 pisteu/w e0mautw~| i9kano\j ei]nai tau=ta diele/sqai, 169a7-8).

In the Palinode, Socrates opens the proof of the soul’s immortality with the words: ‘All soul is immortal (yuxh\ pa=sa a0qa/natoj). For that which is always in movement is immortal (to\ ga\r a0eiki/nhton a0qa/naton); that which moves something else (to\ d’ a1llo kinou=n) and is moved by something else (kai\ u9p’ a1llou kinou/menon), in ceasing from movement (pau=lan e1xon kinh/sewj), ceases from living (pau=lan e1xei zwh=j). Only that which moves itself (mo/non dh\ to\ au9to\ kinou=n), because it does not abandon itself (a3te ou0k a0polei=pon e9auto/), never stops moving (ou1pote lh/gei kinou/menon). It is also source and first principle of movement for the other things which move (a0lla\ kai\ toi=j a1lloij o3sa kinei=tai tou=to phgh\ kai\ a0rxh\ kinh/sewj).’ (Pl. Phdr. 245c5-9, translation C.J. Rowe)

In the Charmides, dramatically preceding the Phaedrus by some thirty years, Socrates points to Plato as a great man that is needed (mega/lou dh/ tinoj a0ndro\j dei=) to solve the problems outlined in the dialogue.

***

Socrates, rising from his self-deprecation, turned to Critias: ‘Right, then, son of Callaeschrus (su\ ou]n, w} pai= Kallai/sxrou), since you maintain that self-control is the knowledge of knowledge (ti/qesai ga\r swfrosu/nhn tou=t’ ei]nai, e0pisth/mhn e0pisth/mhj) and indeed of ignorance too (kai\ dh\ kai\ a0nepisthmosu/nhj), show first (prw~ton me\n tou=to e1ndeicai), as I said a minute ago, that it is possible (o3ti dunato\n o4 nundh\ e1legon), and then in addition to being possible it is beneficial as well (e1peita pro\j tw~| dunatw~| o3ti kai\ w)fe/limon); and you may perhaps satisfy me that you’re right in what you say self-control is (ka0me\ ta/x’ a2n a0poplhrw~saij w(j o0rqw~j le/geij peri\ swfrosu/nhj o$ e1stin).

When Critias heard this (Kai\ o9 Kriti/aj a0kou/saj tau=ta), and saw that I was in difficulties (kai\ i0dw&n me a0porou=nta), just as (w#sper) people who see others yawning in their faces (oi3 tou\j xasmwme/nouj katantikru\ o9rw~ntej) are affected similarly (tau0to\n tou=to sumpa/sxousin), he too seemed to me by my being in difficulties (ka0kei=noj e1doce/ moi u9p’ e0mou= a0porou=ntoj) to be forced (a0nagkasqh=nai) to fall into difficulties himself (kai\ au0to\j a9lw~nai u9po\ a0pori/aj). Well, conscious that he had a reputation to keep up (a3te ou]n eu0dokimw~n e9ka/stote), he felt ashamed in front of the others (h0|||sxu/neto tou\j paro/ntaj), and was unwilling to admit to me that he was unable to determine the points on which I was challenging him (kai\ ou1te sugxwrh=sai/ moi h1qelen a0du/natoj ei]nai diele/sqai a4 proukalou/mhn au0to\n). He said nothing clear (e1lege/n te ou0de\n safe/j), in an attempt to conceal his difficulties (e0pikalu/ptwn th\n a0pori/an). (169b5-d1)

***

In these lines culminates Socrates’ harsh criticism of Critias in the Charmides; let us now cast our eye on the discussion concerning Socrates, between Critias and Charmides, at the close of the dialogue, and compare it with Socrates’ criticism of Critias.

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Socrates ends his discussion with Critias bewailing his inability to investigate anything worthwhile concerning temperance (o3ti ou0de\n xrhsto\n peri\ swfrosu/nhj skopw~, 175a 10-11}, and that, worst of all, after doing their best to obtain a definition of temperance, temperance thus defined appeared to them to be useless (tou=to h9mi=n a0nwfele\j o2n a0pe/faine, 175d4-5).

Socrates says: ‘As far as I am concerned (to\ me\n ou]n e0mo/n), I lament it less (kai\ h3tton a0ganaktw~), but concerning you (u9pe\r de\ sou/), Charmides (w] Xarmi/dh), I lament it very much (pa/nu a0ganaktw~), if you (ei0 su/), having such beauty (toiou=toj w@n th\n i0de/an) and furthermore (kai\ pro\j tou/tw|), being most temperate of soul (th\n yuxh\n swfrone/statoj), should have no profit or good in life from this temperance (mhde\n o0nh/sh| a0po\ tau/thjth=j swfrosu/nhj). And still more I lament (e1ti de\ ma=llon a0ganaktw~) about the charm (u9pe\r th=j e0pw|dhj) which I learned from the Thracian (h4n para\ tou= Qra|ko\j e1maqon), if for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth (ei0 mhdeno\j a0ci/ou pra/gmatoj ou]san) I was learning it with much effort (au0th\n meta\ pollh=j spoudh=j e0ma/nqanon). This then (tau=t’ ou]n) I really do not think (pa/nu me\n ou0k oi1omai) to be like this (ou3twj e1xein), but I think that I am a bad enquierer (a0ll’ e0me\ fau=lon ei]nai zhthth\n); for temperance is a great good (e0pei= th/n ge swfrosu/nhn me/ga ti a0gaqon ei]nai), and if you have it (kai\ ei1per ge e1xeij au0to/), you are a blessed man (maka/rion ei]nai/ se). But see (a1ll’ o3ra) if you have it (ei0 e1xeij te) and have no need of the charm (kai\ mhde\n de/h| th=j e0pw|dh\j); for if you do (ei0 ga\r e1xeij), I would rather advise you (ma=llon a2n e1gwge/ soi sumbouleu/saimi) to regard me simply as a fool (e0me\ me\n lh=ron h9gei=sqai ei]nai) who is never able to reason out anything (kai\ a0du/naton lo/gw| o9tiou]n zhtei=n); but that you yourself (seauto\n de/), the more wise and temperate you are (o9sw~|per swfrone/steroj ei]), the happier you are (tosou/tw| ei]nai kai\ eu0daimone/steron).’ (175d5-176a5)

Charmides replied (kai\ o9 Xarmi/dhj): ‘But, dear God (Alla\ ma\ Di/’)’, said he (h] d’ o3j), I myself (e1gwge), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), do not know (ou0k oi]da) whether I have or do not have it (ou1t’ ei0 e1xw ou1t’ ei0 mh\ e1xw); for how could I know (pw~j ga\r a2n ei0dei/hn), that which even you and Critias are (o3 ge mhd’ u9mei=j) unable to discover (oi9oi/ te/ e0ste e0ceurei=n) what it is (o3ti pot’ e1stin), as you say (w(j fh|\j su/)? But I do not really believe you (e0gw_ me/ntoi ou0 pa/nu soi pei/qomai), and I think that I (kai\ e0mauto/n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), am very much in need of the charm (pa/nu oi]mai dei=sqai th=j e0pw|dh=j), and as far as I am concerned (kai\ to/ g’ e0mo/n), nothing stands in the way (ou0de\n kwlu/ei) of my being charmed daily by you (e0pa|/desqai u9po\ sou= o3sai h9me/rai), until you say that I have had enough (e3wj a2n fh=|j su\ i9kanw~j e1xein).’ (176a6-b4)

‘Very good (Ei]en)’ said Critias (e1fh o9 Kriti/aj), ‘Charmides (w} Xarmi/dh), if you do this (h2n dra=|j tou=to) to me this will be a proof (e1moig’ e1stai tou=to tekmh/rion) that you are self-controlled (o3ti swfronei=j), that is if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates (h]n e0pa/|dein pare/xh|j Swkra/tei), and never desert him (kai\ mh\ a0polei/ph| to=tou) at all (mh/te me/ga mh/te smikro/n).’

‘You may depend on my following and not deserting him (w#j a0kolouqh/sontoj kai\ mh\ a0poleipome/nou),’ said Charmides (e1fh) ‘for I should be very wrong (deina\ ga\r a2n poioi/hn) not to obey you (ei0 mh\ peiqoi/mhn soi/) who are my guardian (tw~| e]pitro/pw|), and if I didn’t do (kai\ mh\ poioi/hn) what you command me to do (a$ keleu/eij).’

‘And I do command you,’ he said (A)lla\ mh/n, e1fh, keleu/w e1gwge).

‘Then I will do as you say,’ said Charmides, ‘and begin this very day (Poih/sw toi/nun, e1fh, a0po\ tauthsi\ th=j h9me/raj a0rca/menoj).’ (176b5-c4)

 ***

Critias’ magnanimity shines bright as against Socrates’ harsh criticism of him; the two are separated by the section in which the latter outlines a well-functioning state built on swfrosu/nh.

Socrates: And I (ka0gw_), so that our discussion might continue (h9mi=n i3na o9 lo/goj proi/+oi), said (ei]pon): ‘But, if you like, Critias, let’s grant now that it is possible for there to be (A)ll’ ei0 dokei=, w} Kriti/a, nu=n me\n tou=to sugxwrh/swmen, du/naton ei]nai gene/sqai) a knowledge of knowledge (e0pisth/mhn e0pisth/mhj, 169d2-4) … If self-control is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance (ei0 h9 swfrosu/nh e0pisth/mhj e0pisth/mh mo/non e1stin kai\ a0nepisthmosu/nhj), it won’t be able to distinguish the doctor who knows his art from one who doesn’t (ou1te i0atro\n diakri=nai oi3a te e1stai e0pista/menon ta\ th=j te/xnhj h2 mh\ e0pista/menon), but pretends he does (prospoiou/menon de/) or thinks he does (h2 oi0o/menon), or any other of those people (ou1te a1llon ou0de/na) who know (tw~n e0pistame/nwn) anything at all (kai\ o9tiou]n), except for the man who practices the same art as himself (plh/n ge to\n au9tou= o9mo/texnon), in the way other craftsmen do (w#sper oi9 a1lloi dhmiourgoi/).’

‘So it seems,’ Critias said (Fai/netai, e1fh). (171c4-10)

‘What benefit would we get from self-control in that case, Critias,’ I said, ‘if it is like that (Ti/j ou]n, h]n d’ e0gw&, w} Kriti/a, w)feli/a h9mi=n e1ti a2n ei1h a0po\ th=j swfrosu/nhj toiau/thj ou1shj;)’? For if indeed (ei0 me\n ga/r), as we assumed in the beginning [at 167a1-7] (o4 e0c a0rxh=j u9petiqe/meqa), the self-controlled man knew (h|1dei o9 sqfrwn) what he knew (a3 te h2dei) and what he didn’t know (kai\ a4 mh\ h1|dei) – that he knew the former (ta\ me\n o3ti oi]den) and didn’t know the latter (ta\ d’ o3ti ou0k oi]den) – and was able to examine anyone else in the same position (kai\ a1llon tau0to\ tou=to peponqo/ta e0piske/yasqai oi3o/j t’ h]n), it would be to us a great benefit, we maintain (megalwsti\ a2n h9mi=n w)fe/limon h]n, fame/n), to be self-controlled (sw&frosin ei]nai). We’d live all our lives without making any mistakes (a0nama/rthtoi ga\r a2n to\n bi/on diezw~men), and not just those of us who possessed self-control, but all those other people who were governed by us as well (au0toi/ te oi9 th\n swfrosu/nhn e1xontej kai\ oi9 a1lloi pa/ntej o3soi u9f’ h9mw~n h1rxonto), because we’d neither try ourselves to do what we didn’t know (ou1te ga\r a2n au0toi\ e0pexeirou/men pra/ttein a4 mh\ h0pista/meqa), but would find those who knew (a0ll’ e0ceuri/skontej tou\j e0pistame/nouj) and hand the matter over to them (e0kei=noij a2n paredi/domen), nor trust those whom we governed (ou1te toi=j a1lloij e0petre/pomen, w{n h1rxomen) to do anything except what they were likely to do properly (a1llo ti pra/ttein h2 o3ti pra/ttontej o0rqw~j e1mellon pra/cein) – and that would be (tou=to d’ h]n a2n) what they possessed knowledge of (ou[ e0pisth/mhn ei1xon). And in that way (kai\ ou3tw dh/) a house run on the principle of self-control (u9po\ swfrosu/nhj oi0ki/a te oi0koume/nh) would be likely to be run admirably (e1mellen kalw~j oi0kei=sqai), as would a state that was run on that principle (po/lij te politeuome/nh) and everything else (kai\ a1llo pa=n) that self-control governed (ou[ swfrosu/nh a1rxoi). When error has been removed (a9marti/aj ga\r e0ch|rhme/nhj) and correctness leads the way (o0rqo/thtoj de\ h9goume/nhj), in every activity (e0n pa/sh| pra/cei) must do admirably and well (kalw~j kai\ eu] pra/ttein a0nagkai=on) people in such circumstances (tou\j ou3tw diakeime/nouj), and those who do well (tou\j de\ e0u] pra/ttontaj) to be happy (eu0dai/monaj ei]nai). Isn’t that what we said about self-control, Critias,’ I asked (a]r’ ou1x ou3twj, h]n d’ e0gw&, w} Kriti/a, e0le/gomen peri\ swfrosu/nhj), ‘when we said (le/gontej) what a good thing it was (o3son a0gaqo\n ei1h) to know (to\ ei0de/nai) what one knows (a3 te oi]de/n tij) and what one doesn’t know (kai\ a4 mh\ oi]den;)?’

‘It certainly was,’ Critias replied (Pa/nu me\n ou]n, e1fh, ou3twj)(171c4-172a6)

Critias confirms that this is what they were saying about knowing what one knows and what one doesn’t know, which serves Socrates as an invitation to his raising difficulties about it: ‘But now (Nu=n de/),’ I said (h]n d’ e0gw&), ‘you can see (o9ra=|j) that there is obviously no knowledge like that anywhere (o3ti ou0damou= e0pisth/mh ou0demi/a toiau/th ou]sa pe/fantai).’ ‘I can (o9rw~),’ he said (e1fh). (172a7-8)

To save the discussion, Socrates makes a new move: ‘Well perhaps (A}r’ ou]n),’ I said (h]n d’ e0gw&), it is this good that self-control – what we are now finding self-control to be, knowing knowledge and ignorance – has (tou=t’ e1xei to\ a0gaqo\n h4n nu=n eu9ri/skomen swfrosu/nhn ou]san, to\ e0pisth/mhn e0pi/stasqai kai\ a0nepisthmosu/nhn), that the man who possesses it (o3ti o9 au0th\n e1xwn), whatever else he may learn (o3ti a2n a1llo manqa/nh|), he will learn more easily (r9a=|o/n te maqh/setai), and everything will appear clearer to him (kai\ e0narge/stera pa/nta au0tw~| fanei=tai), inasmuch as in addition to each thing he learns, he will in addition see knowledge (a3te pro\j e9ka/stw| w(| a2n manqa/nh| proskaqorw~nti th\n e0pisth/mhn)? And he will examine other people better in things he has learned himself (kai\ tou\j a1llouj dh\ ka/llion e0ceta/sei peri\ w#n a2n kai\ au0to\j ma/qh|), whereas people who examine others without it (oi9 de\ a1neu tou/tou e0ceta/zontej) will do so more feebly and incompetently (a0sqene/steron kai\ faulo/teron tou=to dra/sousin;)? Aren’t those the sorts of benefit we’ll derive from self-control, my friend (a=r’, w] fi/le, toiau=ta a1tta e1stin a3 a0polauso/meqa th=j swfrosu/nhj;)? Haven’t we got our eyes on something grander (h9mei=j de\ mei=zo/n ti ble/pomen), and aren’t we demanding that it should be something more than it actually is (kai\ zhtou=men au0to\ mei=zo/n ti ei]nai h2 o3son e0sti/n;)?’

‘That may perhaps be so,’ Critias replied (Ta/xa d’ a2n, e1fh, ou3twj e1xoi). (172b1-c3)

***

Socrates abandoned this less ambitious picture of self-control as soon as he raised it and went on to find self-control useless even in its most ambitious manifestation.

***

‘Possibly,’ I said, but possibly what we demanded it should be isn’t anything useful (I!swj, h]n d’ e0gw&, i1swj de/ ge h9mei=j ou0de\n xrhsto\n e0zhth/samen, 172c4-5) … Supposing self-control were as we now define it, and did govern us completely (ei0 ga\r o3ti ma/lista h9mw~n a1rxoi h9 swfrosu/nh, ou]sa oi3an nu=n o9rizo/meqa, 173a8-9) … I agree that the human race, given this, would do things and live as knowledge directed (kateskeuasme/non dh\ ou3tw to\ a0nqrw/pinon ge/noj o3ti me\n e0pisthmo/nwj a2n pra/ttoi kai\ zw~|h, e3pomai) – because self-control would mount guard (h9 ga\r swfrosu/nh fula/ttousa) and wouldn’t let (ou0k a2n e0w~|h) ignorance creep in and be a partner in our work (parempi/ptousan th\n a0nepisthmosu/nhn su/nergon h9mi=n ei]nai). But that by doing things as knowledge directed we’d do well and be happy (o3ti d’ e0pisthmo/nwj a2n pra/ttontej eu] a2n pra/ttoimen kai\ eu0daimonoi=men), that is something we can’t as yet be sure of, my dear Critias (tou=to de\ ou1pw duna/meqa maqei=n, w} fi/le Kriti/a).

Critias replied: ‘On the other hand,’ he said, ‘you won’t easily find any other complete form of success, if you disregard doing things as knowledge directs (A)lla\ me/ntoi, h] d’ o3j, ou0 r9a|di/w~j eu9rh/seij a1llo ti te/loj tou= eu] pra/ttein, e0a\n to\ e0pisthmo/nwj a0tima/sh|j).’ (173c7-d7)

Socrates does not reject Critias’ reply, he merely subjects him to a barrage of questions concerning knowledge: ‘There’s just one more little thing I’d like you to explain to me in addition to what you said,’ I said (Smikro\n e1ti me, h]n d’ e0gw&, e1ti prosdi/dacon), ‘knowledge of what do you mean (ti/noj e0pisthmo/nwj le/geij;)? Of cutting leather for shoes (h] skutw~n tomh/j)?’

‘Heavens, no (Ma\ Di/’ ou0k e1gwge)!’

‘Of working in bronze (A)lla\ xalkou= e0rgasi/aj)? … is it the knowledge by which he knows what is healthy (A)ll’ h9| to\ u9gieino/n;)?’

‘You’re getting closer,’ said Critias (Ma=llon, e1fh).

‘The closest one I can get to is the one by which he knows – what? (E0kei=nh h4n le/gw ma/lista, h]n d’ e0gw&, h[| ti/;)  

‘By which he knows good and bad,’ Critias replied (H|{ to\ a0gaqo/n, e1fh, kai\ to\ kako/n).’

‘You wretch, I said, ‘you’ve been leading me round in a circle all this time, keeping from me (W) miare/, e1fhn e0gw&, pa/lai me perie/lkeij ku/klw|, a0pokrupto/menoj) that it was not living as knowledge directed (o3ti ou0 to\ e0pisthmo/nwj h]n zh\n) that made one do well and happy (to\ eu] pra/ttein te kai\ eu0daimonei=n poiou=n), not even if it were knowledge of all the other knowledges put together (ou0de\ sumpasw~n tw~n a1llwn e0pisthmw~n), but only if it were knowledge of this one alone (a0lla\ mia=j ou1shj tau/th\j mo/non), that of good and bad (th=j peri\ to\ a0gaqo/n te kai\ kako/n). Because, Critias, if it’s your intention to remove that knowledge from the other knowledges (e0pei/, w} Kriti/a, ei0 ‘qe/leij e0celei=n tau/thn th\n e0pisth/mhn e0k tw~n a1llwn e0pisthmw~n), will the medicine make us healthy any the less; shoemaking make shoes any the less; weaving make clothes any the less)? Will piloting prevent death at sea any the less, or generalship death in war (h3tto/n ti h9 me\n i0atrikh\ u9giai/nein poih/sei, h9 de\ skutikh\ u9podede/sqai, h9 de\ u9fantikh\ h0mfie/sqai, h9 de\ kubernhtikh\ kwlu/sei e0n th=| qala/tth| a0poqnh|/skein kai\ h9 strathgikh\ e0n pole/mw|;)?

‘No he said (Ou0de\n h[tton, e1fh).

‘But, my dear Critias, we’ll be unable to ensure that each of these is performed well and beneficially, if that knowledge is absent (A)ll’, w] fi/le Kriti/a, to/ eu] ge tou/twn e3kasta gi/gnesqai kai\ w)feli/mwj a0poleloipo\j h9ma=j e1stai tau/thj a0pou/shj).’

‘That’s true (A)lhqh= le/geij).’

‘But it would appear that that knowledge isn’t self-control (Ou0x au3th de/ ge, w(j e1oiken, e0sti\n h9 swfrosu/nh) but rather the knowledge whose function is to benefit us (a0ll’ h[j e1rgon e0sti\n to\ w)felei=n h9ma=j). It’s not the knowledge of knowledges and ignorances (ou0 ga\r e0pisthmw~n ge kai\ a0nepisthmosu/nwn h9 e0pisth/mh e0sti/n), but of good and bad (a0lla\ a0gaqou= te kai\ kakou=); so that if that knowledge is beneficial (w#ste ei0 au3th e0sti\n w)fe/limoj), our self-control must be something else (h9 swfrosu/nh a1llo ti a2n ei1h h9mi=n).’

Why wouldn’t self-control benefit us (Ti/ d’, h] d’ o3j, ou0k a2n au9th\ w)feloi=;)?’ he asked. ‘If self-control is in the fullest sense knowledge of knowledges (ei0 ga\r o3ti ma/lista tw~n e0pisthmw~n e0pisth/mh e0sti\n h9 swfrosu/nh) and presides over the other knowledges too (e0pistatei= de\ kai\ tai=j a1llaij e0pisth/maij), it would certainly govern the knowledge of good too and consequently benefit us (kai\ tau=thj dh=pou a2n a1rxousa th=j peri\ t’a0gaqo\n e0pisth/mhj w)feloi= a2n h9ma=j).’

‘Would it make us healthy too,’ I asked, ‘not medicine? (E} ka2n u9giai/nein poioi=, h]n d’ e0gw&, au3th, a0ll ou0x h9 i0atrikh/;)’ Would it make the products of the other arts (kai\ ta]lla ta\ tw~n texnw~n au3th a2n poioi=), instead of each of them making its own (kai\ ou0x ai9 a1llai to\ au9th=j e1rgon e9ka/sth;)? Weren’t we solemnly declaring all this time (h2 ou0 pa/lai diemarturo/meqa) that it was knowledge only of knowledge and ignorance and nothing else? Isn’t that so? (o3ti e0pisth/mhj mo/non e0sti\n kai\ a0nepisthmosu/nhj e0pisth/mh, a1llou de\ ou0deno/j, ou0x ou3tw;)’

‘Apparently (Fai/netai/ ge).’

‘So it won’t be the producer of health (Ou0k a1ra u9giei/aj e1stai dhmiourgo/j)?’

‘Certainly not (Ou0 dh=ta).’

‘Because health belonged to another art, didn’t it? (A!llhj ga\r h]n te/xnhj u9gi/eia, h2 ou0;)’

‘Yes (A!llhj).’

‘So it won’t be the producer of benefit either, my friend (Ou0d’ a1ra w}feli/aj, w} e9tai=re), since we allocated that product to another art a minute ago, didn’t we? (a1llh ga\r au] a0pe/domen tou=to to\ e1rgon te/xnh| nundh/, h] ga/r;)’

‘Yes (Pa/nu ge).’

‘How will self-control be beneficial, then, when it is the producer of no benefit? (Pw~j ou]n w)fe/limoj e1stai h( swfrosu/nh, ou0demi/aj w)feli/aj ou]sa dhmiou/rgoj; }’

‘It won’t at all, it would appear, Socrates (Ou0damw~j, w{ Sw&kraej, e1oike/n ge).’ (173d8-175a8)

On this admission of Critias, Socrates embarks on his final lament about his incompetence: ‘Do you see, Critias, how all this time I had good reason to be apprehensive (O(ra|=j ou]n, w} Kriti/a, w(j e0gw_ pa/lai ei0ko/twj e0dedoi/kh), and was quite right to accuse myself (kai\ dikai/wj e0mauto\n h0|tiw~mhn) of not conducting a worthwhile inquiry into self-control? (o3ti ou0de\n xrhsto\n peri\ swfrosu/nhj skopw~;) Something that is agreed to be the most admirable of all things wouldn’t have seemed to us to be of no benefit (ou0 ga\r a1n pou o3 ge ka/lliston pa/ntwn o9mologei=tai ei]nai, tou=to h9mi=n a0nwfele\j e0fa/nh) if I had been any use in making a proper investigation (ei1 ti e0mou= o1feloj h]n pro\j to\ kalw~j zhtei=n) (175a9-b2) ... I’m not annoyed so much for myself (to\ me\n ou]n e0mo\n kai\ h[tton a0ganaktw~), but concerning you,’ I said, ‘Charmides, I lament very much (u9pe\r de\ sou=, h]n d’ e0gw&, w] Xarmi/dh, pa/nu a0ganaktw~), if you, who have such good looks and are in addition very self-controlled of soul (ei0 su\ toiou=toj w}n th\n i0de/an, kai\ pro\j tou=tw| th\n yuxh\n swfrone/statoj), will not profit from this self-control, and because despite its presence in you, it won’t bring you any benefit at all in life! (mhde\n o0nh/sh| a0po\ tau/thj th=j swfrosu/nhj mhde/ ti/ s’ w)felh/sei e0n tw~| bi/w| parou=sa) I’m even more annoyed about the charm I learned from the Thracian (e1ti de\ ma=llon a0ganaktw~ u9pe\r th=j e\pw|dh=j h4n para\ tou= Qra|ko\j e1maqon) – that I went on taking great pains to learn the charm for a thing which is worth nothing (ei0 mhdeno\j a0ci/ou pra/gmatoj ou]san au0th\n meta\ pollh=j spoudh=j e0ma/nqanon). In fact, I really don’t think that this is the case at all (tau=t’ ou]n pa/nu me\n ou0k oi1omai ou3twj e1xein), but that I am an awful investigator (a1ll’ e0me\ fau=lon ei]nai zhthth/n) – because I do think that self-control is a great good (e0pei\ th/n ge swfrosu/nhn me/ga ti a0gaqo\n ei]nai), and that if you do possess it, you are fortunate (kai\ ei1per ge e1xeij au0to/, maka/rion ei]nai/ se). See whether you do possess it and have no need of the charm (a1ll’ o3ra ei0 e1xeij te kai\ mhde\n de/h| th=j e0pw|dh/j) – because if you do possess it (ei0 ga\r e1xeij), I’d advise you to consider me a fool (ma=llon a2n e1gwge/ soi sumbouleu/saimi e0me\ me\n lh=ron h9gei=sqai ei]nai), and incapable of investigating anything in a reasoned argument (kai\ a0du/naton lo/gw| o9tiou=n zhtei=n), and yourself the more self-controlled you are, the happier to be (seauto\n de/, o3sw|per swfrone/steroj ei], tosou=tw| ei]nai kai\ eu0daimone/steron).’

And Charmides said (Kai\ o9 Xarmi/dhj): ‘But, dear God’, said he, I myself, Socrates, do not know whether I have or do not have it (A)lla\ ma\ Di/’, h] d’ o3j, e1gwge, w] Sw/kratej, ou0k oi]da ei0 e1xw ou0t’ ei0 mh\ e1xw); for how could I know, that which even you and Critias are unable to discover what it is (pw~j ga\r a2n ei0dei/hn o3 ge mhd’ u9mei=j oi[oi/ te/ e0ste e0ceurei=n o3ti pot’ e1stin), as you say (w$j fh|\j su/;)? But I do not really believe you (e0gw& me/ntoi ou0 pa/nu soi pei/qomai), and I think that I, Socrates, am very much in need of the charm (kai\ e0mauto/n, w} Sw&kratej, pa/nu oi]mai dei=sqai th=j e0pw|dh=j), and as far as I am concerned, nothing stands in the way of my being charmed by you daily (kai\ to/ g’ e0mo\n ou0de\n kwlu/ei e0pa|/desqai u9po\ sou\ o3sai h3merai), until you say that I have had enough (e3wj a2n fh|\j su\ i9kanw~j e1xein).’ (175d5-176b4)

The question is, on what ground could Charmides legitimately disbelieve Socrates and Critias? There ought to be more to it than just a hunch, which we, readers, are supposed to share.

Let us see once again on what ground Socrates rejects Critias’ identification of swfrosu/nh with ‘doing one’s own things’ (to\ ta\ e9autou= pra/ttein). Asked by Socrates to explain what he means by ‘doing one’s own things’: are those self-controlled (sw&fronej) who do other people’s things – the shoemakers make ‘other people’s shoes’, not just their own, and so do all the other artisans? Critias rejoined: ‘What objection is there?’ Socrates replied: ‘None as far as I am concerned. But watch that there is not one for the man who assumes that doing one’s own job is self-control, and then says that there is no objection to those who do other people’s things being self-controlled.’

To overcome this difficulty, Critias defines ‘self-control as doing the things that are good’ (th\n ga\r tw~n a0gaqw~n pra=cin swfrosu/nhn ei]nai safw~j soi diori/zomai, 163e10-11). Socrates does not reject this definition outright; he just wonders whether Critias thinks that self-controlled men don’t know they are self-controlled (qauma/zw, ei0 swfronou=ntaj a0nqrw~pouj h9gh|= su\ a0gnoei=n o3ti swfronou=sin). ‘But I don’t,’ Critias said (All’ ou0x h9gou=mai, e1fh). (164a2-4)

Socrates asked: ‘Then must a doctor know (H} ou]n kai\ gignw~skein a0na/gkh tw~| i0atrw~|) when his curing is beneficial and when it’s not (o3tan te w)feli/mwj i0a=tai kai\ o3tan mh/;)? Must every craftsman (kai\ e9ka/stw| tw~n dhmiourgw~n) know when he’s likely to profit from the work he does and when he’s not? (o3tan te me/llh| o0nh/sesqai a0po\ tou= e1rgou ou4 a2n pra/tth| kai\ o3tan m/;)’

Critias replied: ‘Perhaps not (i1swj ou1).’ (164b7-10)

Human activities are enveloped in uncertainty; Socrates’ rejection of self-control as useless (a0nwfele/j) on account of defining usefulness as knowledge of good and bad (e0pisth/mh a0gaqou= te kai\ kakou=, 174d 5-6), is wrong, and rightly rejected by Charmides as Socrates’ ‘way of talking’ (w(j fh\|j su/): ‘I don’t really believe you at all (e0gw& me\ntoi ou0 pa/nu soi pei/qomai).’ (176b1)

***

The uncertainty, in which human activities are enveloped, is indeterminate; it can be mitigated; the way it can be reduced to a minimum politically on a state level is outlined by Plato at 171d1-172a3, in his outline of an ideal state he hoped the Thirty aristocrats could accomplish.

On an individual level, in my own experience, sometimes, when I am determined to do something really good, it goes all wrong, but ‘it’s going all wrong’ can have unexpectedly positive aspects.

In 1970s I opened an unofficial seminar for young men and women who were deprived of all higher education by the communist regime, simply because their parents were involved in Prague Spring 1968, which was an attempt to give socialism ‘a human face’, i.e. to unite socialism with basic rights and freedoms.

I did my best for my students, but they deserved more; I invited Oxford academics to my seminar.

I hoped that I myself would greatly benefit from our encounters, which was true, as long as our encounters were taking place in Prague, in my seminar. I knew that I had one great advantage compared to my Oxford colleagues: I have been learning the Greek so as to understand it in Greek. My colleagues have learnt to translate the Greek into English in order to understand it. (When I’ve said ‘I have been learning the Greek’, I’ve meant it; in writing these articles on the Charmides, trying to shadow the English rendering of the text by the Geek original, I’ve worked on my Greek more intensely than ever before.)

I did expect that after coming to Oxford my colleagues might not be very enthusiastic about discussing Plato with me, but I did not expect that I would be prevented from presenting the results of my investigations to Oxford students and academics.

What is the positive side? I’ve had all my time at my disposal, and so I could read not only Plato and Aristotle again and again, not just one or two of their works, but all their works; not just Plato and Aristotle, but Homer and Hesiod, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and Aristophanes; Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon … Plotinus and Proclus. I’m 84 years old, and the Greeks continue to make every day of my life worth living; I am still improving my understanding Greek language, Greek thinking, Greek ways of life; and I am enjoying every bit of it.