Socrates opens his speech with an invocation to the muses:
Come then (A!gete dh/), you Muses (w} Mou=sai), clear-voiced, whether you are
called that from the nature of your song (ei1te di’ w)|dh=j ei]doj
li/geiai), or whether you
acquired this name because of the musical race of the Ligurians (ei1te dia\ ge/noj
mousiko\n to\ Ligu/wn tau/thn e1sxet’ e0pwnumi/an), ‘take part with me’ (“cu/m moi la/besqe”) in the story (tou= mu/qou) which this excellent fellow here forces
me to tell (o3n me a0nagka/zei
o9 be/ltistoj ou9tosi\ le/gein), so that his friend (i3n’ o9 e9tai=roj au0tou=), who seemed to him to be wise even
before (kai\ pro/teron
au0tw~| dokw~n sofo\j ei]nai), may seem to him even more so now (nu=n e1ti ma=lln do/ch).
Once upon a
time, then, there was a boy (H}n
ou3tw dh\ pai=j), or rather
a young lad (ma=llon
de\ meiraki/skoj), and
very beautiful he was (ma/la
kalo/j); and he had a
large number of lovers (tou/tw|
de\ h]san e0rastai\ pa/nu polloi/). And one of them was cunning (ei[j de/ tij au0tw~n ai9mu/loj h]n), because although he was as much in
love as any of them (o4j
ou0deno\j h[tton e0rw~n),
he had convinced the boy (e0pepei/kei
to\n pai=da) that he was
not in love with him (w(j
ou0k e0rw&|h). And once in pressing his claims (kai/ pote au0to\n ai0tw~n) he tried to convince him of just this
(e1peiqen tou=t’ au0to/), that one ought to grant favours to the man who was
not in love rather than to the man with love (w(j mh\ e0rw~nti pro\ tou= e0rw~ntoj de/oi
xari/zesqai); and he
spoke like this (e1legen
de\ w{de):
***
As can be seen, trying to seduce a
young lad, Socrates could not imagine doing so, unless one has been in love
with him.
***
‘In everything (Peri\ panto/j), my boy (w} pai=), there is one
starting-point (mi/a
a0rxh/) for anyone who is going to
deliberate successfully (toi=j
me/llousi kalw~j bouleu/esqai): he must
know what it is he is deliberating about (ei0de/nai dei= peri\ ou[ a2n h]| h9 boulh/), or he will inevitably miss everything (h2 panto\j a9marta/nein a0na/gkh). Most people are unaware (tou\j de\ pollou\j le/lhqen) that they do not know (o3ti ou0k i1sasi) what each thing really is (th\n ou0si/an e9ka/stou). So they fail to reach agreement about it at
the beginning of their enquiry, assuming that they know what it is (w(j ou]n ei0do/tej ou0 diomologou=ntai
e0n a0rxh=| th=j ske/yewj), and having
proceeded on this basis they pay the penalty one would expect (proelqo/ntej de\ to\ ei0ko\j a0podido/asin); they agree neither with themselves nor with
each other (ou1te
ga\r e9autoi=j ou1te a0llh/loij o9mologou=sin).
So let us, you and I, avoid having happen to us what we find fault in with
others (e0gw_ ou]n kai\
su\ mh\ pa/qwmen o4 a1lloij e0pitimw~men):
since the question before you and me is whether one should rather enter in
friendship with lover or non-lover (a1ll’ e0peidh\ soi/ te kai\ e0moi/ lo/goj pro/keitai po/tera e0rw~nti
h2 mh\ ma=llon ei0j fili/an i0te/on),
let us establish an agreed definition of love, about what sort of thing it is
and what power it possesses (peri\
e1rwtoj oi[o/n t’ e1sti kai\ h3n e1xei du/namin, o9mologi/a| qe/menoi o3ron), and look to this (ei0j tou=to ble/pontej) as our point of reference (kai\ a0nafe/rontej) while we make our enquiry whether it brings
advantage or harm (th\n
ske/yin poiw&meqa ei1te w)feli/an ei1te bla/bhn pare/xei). Well then, that love is some sort of desire
(o3ti me\n ou]n dh\
e0piqumi/a tij o9 e1rwj) is clear to everyone
(a3panti dh=lon); and again we know that men desire the
beautiful even if they are not in love (o3ti d’ au] kai\ mh\ e0rw~ntej e0piqumou=si tw~n kalw~n, i1smen). By what then shall we distinguish the man
in love and the man who is not (tw~| dh\ to\n e0rw~nta/ te kai\ mh\ krinou=men;)? We must next observe (dei= au] noh=sai) that in each of us (o3ti h9mw~n e0n e9ka/stw|) there are two kinds of thing which rule (du/o tine/ e0ston i0de/a a1rxonte) and lead us (kai\ a1gonte),
which we follow wherever they may lead us (oi[n e9po/meqa h[| a2n a1ghton),
the one an inborn desire for pleasures (h9 me\n e1mfutoj ou]sa e0piqumi/a h9donw~n), another an acquired judgement (a1llh de\ e0pi/kthtoj do/ca) that aims at the best (e0fieme/nh tou= a0ri/stou). These two things in us are sometimes in
accord (tou/tw de\ e0n
h9mi=n o9te\ me\n o9monoei=ton), but there
are times when they are at variance (e1sti de\ o3te stasia/zeton);
and sometimes the one (kai\
to/te me\n h9 e9te/ra), at other times
the other has control (a1llote
de\ h9 e9te/ra kratei=). Now when
judgement leads us by means of reason towards the best (do/chj me\n ou]n e0pi\ to\ a1riston
lo/gw| a0gou/shj) and is in
control (kai\
kratou/shj), its control over us has the name of
restraint (tw~|
kra/tei swfrosu/nh o1noma); when desire
drags us irrationally towards pleasures (e0piqumi/aj de\ a0lo/gwj e9lkou/shj e0pi\ h9dona/j) and rules in us (kai\ a0rca/shj), its rule is called by the name of excess (e0n h9mi=n th=| a0rxh=| u3brij e0pwnoma/sqh). Excess is something which has many names (u3brij de\ dh\ poluw&numon), for it has many limbs (polumele\j ga/r) and many forms (kai\ polumere/j); and whichever of these forms happens to
stand out in any case (kai\
tou/twn tw~n i0dew~n e0kpreph\j h4 a2n tu/xh| genome/nh), it gives its possessor its own name (th\n au9th=j e0pwnumi/an
o0nomazo/menon to\n e1xonta pare/xetai),
which is neither an admirable one nor worth the acquisition (ou1te tina\ kalh\n ou1t’ e0paci/an kekth=sqai). When it is in connection with food (peri\ ga\r e0dwdh/n) that desire has achieved control over both
reasoning for the best and the other desires (kratou/sa tou= lo/gou te a0ri/stou kai\ tw~n
a1llwn e0piqumiw~n e0piqumi/a), it is
called gluttony, and will give its possessor this same name (gastrimargi/a te kai\ to\n e1xonta tau0to\n
tou=to keklhme/non pare/cetai) ; again,
when it has achieved tyranny in connection with drink (peri\ d’ au] me/qaj turanneu/sasa), leading the man who has it in this direction
(to\n kekthme/non tau/th|
a1gousa), it is plain (dh=lon)
what appellation he will receive (ou4 teu/cetai prosrh/matoj);
and as for the other related names, of related desires (kai\ ta]lla dh\ ta\ tou/twn a0delfa\
kai\ a0delfw~n e0piqumiw~n o0no/mata),
we can see already that he will be called by the appropriate one, whatever
desire happens at any time to be in power (th=j a0ei\ dunasteuou/shj h[| prosh/kei kalei=sqai pro/dhlon). As for the desire for the sake of which all
the foregoing has been said (h[j
d’ e3neka pa/nta ta\ pro/sqen ei1rhtai), it is already pretty evident what one
should say (sxedo\n me\n
h1dh fanero/n); but everything is perhaps clearer
when said than when unsaid (lexqe\n
de\ h2 mh\ lexqe\n pa/ntwj safe/steron):
the irrational desire which has gained control over judgement which urges a man
towards the right (h9
ga\r a1neu lo/gou do/chj e0pi\ to\ o0rqo\n o9rmw&shj krath/sasa e0piqumi/a), borne towards pleasure in beauty (pro\j h9fonh\n a0xqei=sa ka/llouj), and which is forcefully reinforced by the
desires related to it in its pursuit of bodily beauty (kai\ u9po\ au] tw~n e9auth=j suggenw~n
e0piqumiw~n e0pi\ swma/twn ka/lloj e0rrwme/nwj r9wsqei=sa), overcoming them in its course (nikh/sasa a0gwgh=|), and takes its name from its very force (a0p’ au0th=j th=j r9w&mhj e0pwnumi/an
labou=sa) – this is called love (e1rwj e0klh/qh).’
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