The Cratylus
After the
soul, Hermogenes asked Socrates to analyse the name of body (sw~ma). Socrates found it an easy task:
‘Some say that the body is the grave (sh=ma) of the soul, which may be thought buried in our present
life, or that it has the name it has because with it (dio/ti tou/tw|) the soul (h9 yuxh/) signifies (shmai/nei) whatever the soul signifies (o9 a2n shmai/nh|
h9 yuxh/). It seems to
me most probable (dokou=si me/ntoi moi ma/lista) that this name (tou=to to\ o1noma) was invented (qe/sqai) by the Orphic poets (oi9 a0mfi\
O)rfe/a); the soul
suffering penalty (w(j di/khj didou/shj th=j psuxh/j) for whatever (w(n de\ e3neka) it is punished ([di/khn] di/dwsin), and that it has this enclosure (tou/ton de\
peri/bolon e1xousa) to
be saved (i3na sw&|zetai); the image of a prison (desmwthri/ou ei0ko/na), as the name implies (w3sper au0to\ onoma/zetai),
until the penalty is paid (e3wj
a2n e0ktei/sh| ta o0feilo/mena), “sw~ma”; and not even a letter in the name need be
changed (kai\
ou0de/n dei=n para/gein ou0d’ e4n gra/mma).’ (400c)
Happy with
this analysis, Hermogenes asked Socrates to analyse the names of the gods, as
he had analysed the name of Zeus (see the first post on ‘Euthyphro in the Cratylus’).
Socrates: ‘Yes,
indeed, Hermogenes (Nai\ ma\ Di/a h9mei=j ge, w} E(rmo/genej); and there is one excellent
principle which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge (ei1per ge nou=n
e1xoimen, e3na me\n to\n ka/lliston tro/pon), – that of the gods (o3ti peri\ qew~n) we know nothing (ou0de\n i1smen), either of their natures (ou1te peri\
au0tw~n) or of the names
(ou1te
peri\ tw~n o0noma/twn) which
they give themselves (a3tta pote\ e9autou\j kalou=sin); but we are sure that the names by
which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are true (dh=lon ga\r o3ti
e0kei=noi/ ge ta0lhqh= kalou=sin). And this is the best of all principles; and the next best
is to say (deu/teroj d’ au] tro/poj o0rqo/thtoj), as is customary in prayers (w3sper e0n tai=j
eu0xai=j no/moj e0sti\n h9mi=n eu1xesqai), that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or
patronymics in which they rejoice (oi9tine/j te kai\ o9po/qen xai/rousin
o0nomazo/menoi, tau=ta kai\ h9ma=j au0tou\j kalei=n), because we do not know of any
other (w(j
a1llo mhde\n ei0do/taj).
That custom is, in my opinion, a good one (kalw~j ga\r dh\ e1moige dokei= nenomi/sqai). Let us, then, if you please, in the first place
announce to them that we are not enquiring about them (ei0 ou]n bou/lei,
skopw~men w#sper proeipo/ntej toi=j qeoi=j o3ti peri\ au0tw~n ou0de\n h9mei=j
skeyo/meqa); we do not
presume that we are able to do so (ou0 ga\r a0ciou=men oi[oi/ t’ a2n ei]nai
skopei=n); but we are
enquiring about the meaning of men (a0lla\ peri\ tw~n a)nqrw&pwn h3n pote/
tina do/can e1xonej) in
giving them these names (e0ti/qento au0toi~j ta\ o0no/mata), – in this there can be small blame
(tou=to
ga\r a0neme/shton).’
Hermogenes:
‘’I think, Socrates, that you are quite right (A0lla/ moi dokei=j, w}
Sw&kratej, metri/wj le/gein), and let us do as you say (kai\ ou3tw
poiw~men).’
(400d6-401a7, tr. B. Jowett )
The Euthyphro
Socrates: ‘And what is your suit, Euthyphro (E1stin de\ dh\ soi/, w} Eu0qu/frwn, ti/j h9 dikh/;)? are you the defendant (feu/geij au0th\n) or the pursuer (h2 diw&keij;)?’
Euthyhro: ‘I
am the pursuer (Diw&kw).’
Socrates:
‘Of whom (Ti/na;)?’
Euthyphro:
‘You will think me mad when I tell you (O$n diw&kwn au] dokw~ mai/nesqai).’
Socrates:
‘Why (Ti/
de/;)? Has the fugitive
wings (peto/meno/n
tina diw&keij)?’
Euthyphro:
‘Nay, he is not very volatile (Pollou= ge dei= pe/tesqai) at his time of life (o3j ge tunxa/nei
w$n eu] ma/la presbu/thj).’
Socrates:
‘Who is he (Ti/j ou3toj)?’
Euthyphro:
‘My father (O( e0mo\j path/r).’
Socrates:
‘Your father (O( so/j)! My
good man (w} be/ltiste;)?’
Euthyphro:
‘Yes (Pa/nu
me\n ou]n).’
Socrates:
‘And of what is he accused (E!stin de ti/ to\ e1gklhma kai\ ti/noj h9 di/kh;)?’
Euthyphro:
‘Of murder (Fo/nou),
Socrates (w} Sw&kratej).’
Socrates:
‘By the powers (H(ra/kleij), Euthyphro! How little does the common heard know (h] pou, w}
Eu0qu/frwn, a0gnoei=tai u9po\ tw~n pollw~n, 4a11-12) of the nature of right and truth (o3ph| pote\
o0rqw~j e1xei). A man
must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he
could have seen his way to bring such an action (ou0 ga\r oi]mai/ ge tou=
e0pituxo/ntoj au0to\ pra=cai a0lla\ po/rrw pou h1dh sofi/aj e0lau/nontoj).’
Euthyphro:
‘Indeed, Socrates, he must (Po/rrw me/ntoi nh\ Di/a, w} Sw&kratej).’
Socrates: ‘I
suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives (E!stin de\ dh\
tw~n oi0kei/wn tij o9 teqnew\j u9po\ tou= sou= patro/j;) – clearly has (h2 dh=la dh/;); for if he had been a stranger you
would never have thought of prosecuting him (ou0 ga\r a1n pou u9pe/r ge
a0llotri/ou e0pech=|sqa fo/nou au0tw~|).’ (3e7-4b6, tr. B. Jowett)
***
Jowett’s ‘how
little does the common heard know’ is a travesty of Socrates’ a0gnoei=tai u9po\
tw~n pollw~n (at 4a11-12). John Burnet translates: ‘Most
people must be in the dark as to what is the right thing’ (Plato, Euthyphro,
Apology of Socrates, Crito, Edited with notes by John Burnet, Clarendon
Paperbacks, Reprinted 2002, note on 4a12, p. 101) Jowett puts here into
Socrates’ mouth his own thoughts, willy-nilly reminding one of the Master of
Biblioll in Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure.
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