The dating of the Cratylus

I ended my preceding post, ‘The Seventh Letter and the Cratylus’, by stating that Plato’s intention to write the Cratylus was the reason for his turning the attention to Cratylus and Hermogenes after his return to Athens from Megara, and that the Cratylus is the result of Plato’s cooperation with the two. Can it be corroborated?

The dialogue opens with Hermogenes asking Cratylus: ‘Would you agree (bou/lei ou]n) to share the argument with Socrates here (kai\ Swkra/tei tw~|de a0nakoinwsw&meqa to\n lo/gon;)? Cratylos has no objections: ‘If you please (Ei1 soi dokei=). So Hermogenes turns to Socrates, who just came: ‘Cratylus here maintains (Kratu/loj fh/sin o3de) that everything that is has a right name (o0no/matoj o0rqo/thta ei]nai e9ka/stw| tw~n o1ntwn) by nature (fu/sei pefuki=an) … both for Hellenes and barbarians (kai\ E3llhsi kai\ ba/rbaroij th\n au0th/n). Whereupon I ask him (e0rwtw~ ou]n au0to\n e0gw&) whether his own name is truly Cratylus, or not (ei0 ou]n au0tw~| Kratu/loj th=| a0lhqei/a| o1noma), and he answers “Yes” (o9 de\ o9mologei=). And what about Socrates (ti/ de\ Swkra/tei; e1fhn)? “Socrates” (Swkra/thj), he said (h] d’ o3j). I tell him: “Then every man’s name is what he is called” (Ou0kou=n kai\ toi=j a1lloij a0nqrw&poij pa=sin, o3per kalou=men o1noma e3kaston, tou=to/ e0stin e9ka/stw| o1noma). And he (o9 de/): “But your name is not Hermogenes”, he said (h] d’ o3j), “if all the world were to call you Hermogenes (ou0de\ a2n pa/ntej kalw~sin a1nqrwpoi)”. And when I ask him (kai\ e0mou= e0rwtw~ntoj), anxious to know (kai\ proqumoume/nou ei0de/nai) what he means (o3ti pote\ le/gei), he does not clarify anything (ou1te a0posafei= ou0de/n) and is ironical (ei0rwneu/etai/ te) towards me (pro/j me), pretending to think something in himself (prospoiou/meno/j ti au0to\j e0n e9autw~| dianoei=sqai) as having knowledge (w(j ei0dw&j) about the matter (peri\ au0tou~), of which, if he wanted to speak clearly (o9  ei0 bou/loito safw~j ei0pei=n), he could entirely convince me (poih/seien a2n kai\ e0me\ o9mologei=n), and make me agree with him entirely (kai\ le/gein a3per au0to\j le/gei). If you can have some conjecture, Socrates (ei0 ou]n ph| e1xeij sumbalei=n), about this oracle of Cratylos (th\n Kratu/lou mantei/an), I would love to hear it (h9de/wj a2n a0kou/saimi); or rather (ma=llon de/), what is your own view (au0tw~| soi o3ph| dokei=) of the truth or correctness of names (peri\ o0noma/twn o0rqo/thtoj), I would far sooner hear (e1ti a2n h3dion puqoi/mhn).’ (383a1-b2)

Socrates opens his response to the plea of Hermogenes by emphasizing the importance of the enquiry concerning names: ‘Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying that “hard is the knowledge of the good” (xalepa\ ta\ kala/ e0stin o3ph| e1xei maqei=n).’ He then pleads his ignorance concerning the matter, and he does so with a reference to Prodicos: ‘Had I already heard (ei0 me\n ou]n e0gw_ h1dh a0khko/h) Prodicus’ fifty-drachma course (para\ Prodi/kou th\n penthkonta/draxmon e0pi/deicin), which makes one thoroughly educated about it (h4n a0kou/santi u9pa/rxei peri\ tou=to pepaideu=sqai), as he says (w#(j fhsin e0kei=noj), then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names (ou0de\n a2n e0kw&lue/n se au0ti/ka ma/la ei0de/nai th\n a0lh/qeian peri\ o0noma/twn o0rqo/thtoj).’ But as it stands (nu=n de/), I haven’t heard it (ou0k a0kh/koa), I have only heard the single-drachma course (a0lla\ th\n draxmiai/an). I therefore do not know (ou1koun oi]da) what is the truth (ph=| pote to\ a0lhqe\j e1xei) about such matters (peri\ tw~n toiou/twn).’

What Socrates says to Hermogenes, his having heard only the single-drachma course of Prodicos, deserves to be compared to what he says about his encounter with Prodicus in his discussion on rhetoric in Phaedrus 267a6-b5: ‘And shall we leave Tisias and Gorgias to their sleep (Teisi/an de\ Gorgi/an te e0a/somen eu3dein) … who discovered conciseness of speech and infinite length on every subject (suntomi/an te lo/gwn kai\ a1peira mh/kh peri\ pa/ntwn a9neu=ron;)? When Prodicus heard me saying once this (tau=ta de\ a0kou/wn pote/ mou Pro/dikoj), he laughed (e0ge/lasen), and said that he alone had discovered of what kind of speeches the art of rhetoric is needed (kai\ mo/noj au0to\j hu9rhke/nai e1fh w{n dei= lo/gwn te/xnhn): what are needed are neither long speeches nor short ones (dei=n de\ ou1te makrw~n ou1te braxe/wn), but ones of a fitting length (a0lla\ metri/wn).’ Socrates appears to have enjoyed his discussions with Prodicos.

But back to the Cratylus. Having thus expressed his ignorance concerning the matter, he expresses his readiness to enquire into it jointly with Hermogenes and with Cratylos (suzhtei=n me/ntoi e9toimo/j ei0mi kai\ soi\ kai\ Kratu/lw| koinh=|). (384a8-c3).

Let me focus attention on Socrates’ ‘Had I already heard (ei0 me\n ou]n e0gw_ h1dh a0khko/h) Prodicus’ fifty-drachma course’. I think that these words express Socrates’ wish to hear Prodicus’ fifty-drachma course, and his conviction that it will be possible for him to hear it. In other words, he appears to be fairly confident that he will get through the court-trial unscathed.

Let us consider these words in the light of the dating of the dialogue which I have proposed. From Plato’s Apology we may infer that Prodicus is still alive, teaching his courses to the young who are ready to pay him money and be grateful to him, in some Greek city (19e-20a). The city of Athens has barely recovered from the defeat in the Peloponnesian War and from the subsequent reign of the Thirty, the reign of terror; it is impoverished. But Socrates appears to be optimistic concerning its further recovery, which would make Athens once again a place to which the sophists would flock. The verve with which he undertakes, with Hermogenes and with Kratylus, their joint enquiry into the correctness of names indicates that he was looking forward to his encounter with Prodicus; this time he was not going to miss the fifty-drachma course on the correctness of names.

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What did Socrates think about his chances, as he was about to enter the Hall of the King Archon to face the charges brought against him by Meletus?

Euthyphro asked Socrates: ‘What is the charge that Meletus brings against you’ (ti/na grafh/n se ge/graptai;)?

Socrates replied: ‘What is the charge (H#ntina;)? No mean one (ou0k a0gennh=), it seems to me (e1moige dokei=), for the fact that, young as he is (to\ ga\r ne/on o1nta), he has apprehended so important a matter (tosou=ton pra=gma e0gnwke/nai) reflects no small credit upon him (ou0 faulo/n e0stin).

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Socrates’ emphasis on his accuser’s youth deserves attention. The question is, how such a young man could take it to his head to accuse Socrates of impiety?

There are good reasons to believe that behind Meletus’ indictment of Socrates stood Anytus, a leading Athenian politician, whose pomposity and ignorance Socrates subjected to his irony, as Plato recorded it in the Meno, some 4 years prior to Meletus’ indictment of Socrates. See ‘Enters Anytus’, posted on my blog on September 22, 2020.

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For he (e0kei=noj ga/r), as he says (w#j fhsin), knows (oi]de) in what way (ti/na tro/pon) the youth are corrupted (oi3 ne/oi diafqei/rontai) and who are those (kai\ ti/nej oi9) corrupting (diafqei/rontej) them (au0tou/j). He must be a wise man (kai\ kinduneu/ei sofo/j tij ei]nai); who, seeing my lack of wisdom (kai\ th\n e0mh\n a0maqi/an katidw&n) and that I am corrupting men who are young like himself (w(j diafqei/rontoj tou\j h9likiw&taj au0tou=), comes to the State, as a boy runs to his mother, to accuse me (e2rxetai kathgorh/swn mou w(j pro\j mhte/ra pro\j th\n po/lin). And he seems to me (kai\ fainetai/ moi) to be the only one of politicians (tw~n politikw~n mo/noj) who begins in the right way (a1rxesqai o0rqw~j); for the right way is (o0rqw&j ga/r e0sti) e0pimelhqh=nai take care of the young men first (tw~n ne/wn prw~ton e0pimelhqh=nai), to make them as good as possible (o3pwj e1sontai o3 ti a1ristoi), just as a good husbandman (w#sper gewrgo\n a0gaqo/n) will naturally take care of the young plants first (tw~n ne/wn futw~n ei0ko\j prw~ton e0pimelhqh/nai) and afterwards (meta\ de\ tou=to) of the rest as well (kai\ tw~n a1llwn). And so Meletus (kai\ dh\ kai\ Me/lhtoj), perhaps (i1swj), is first clearing away us (prw~ton me\n h9ma=j e0kkaqai/rei) who corrupt the young plants (tou\j tw~n ne/wn ta\j bla/staj diafqei/rontaj), as he says (w#j fhsin); then after this (e1peita meta\ tou=to), clearly (dh=lon), when he has turned his attention to the older men (o3ti tw~n presbute/rwn e0pimelhqei/j), he will bring countless most precious blessings upon the State (plei/stwn kai\ megi/stwn a0gaqw~n ai1tioj th=| po/lei genh/setai; Jowett: ‘he will become a very great public benefactor'), – at least, that is the natural outcome (w#(j ge to\ ei0ko\j cumbh=nai) of the beginning he has made (e0k toiau/thj a0rxh=j a0rcame/nw|).’

Euthyphro: ‘I’d wish it to be so (bouloi/mhn a1n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), but I fear (a0ll’ o0rrwdw~) the opposite (mh\ tou0nanti/on ge/nhtai). For he simply (a0texnw~j ga/r, 3a7), I think (moi dokei=), is aiming a blow at the heart of the State (a0f’ e9sti/aj a1rxesqai kakourgei=n th\n po/lin), when he undertakes to harm you (e0pixeirw~n a0dikei=n se).’ (2b12-3a8)

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Euthyphro chose to overhear the biting irony in Socrates’ play with Meletus’ name – who after discussing Meletus’ e0pimelhqh=nai, taking care of, the young (2d2 and 2d3), highlights Me/lhtoj, the caring man (2d4), who after taking care of the young is going to turn his caring attention (e0pimelhqei/j, 3a3) to the elderly, and thus become a very great public benefactor (plei/stwn kai\ megi/stwn a0gaqw~n ai1tioj th=| po/lei genh/setai, 3a3-4). This ‘overhearing’ was necessary, for only thus he could say ‘I’d wish it to be so, but I fear the opposite. Meletus is simply aiming a blow at the heart of the State, when he undertakes to harm you’.

John Burnett says in his note on Euthyphro’s simply (a0texnw~j): ‘The enthusiastic admiration of Euthyphro for Socrates must not be missed.’

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Euthyphro: ‘Now tell me (kai/ moi le/ge), what does he say you do (ti/ kai\ poiou=nta/ se/ fhsi) that corrupts the young (diafqei/rein tou\j ne/ouj;)?

Socrates: ‘Absurd things (A!topa), my friend (w} qauma/sie), at first hearing (w(j ou3tw g’ a0kou=sai). For he says I am a maker of gods (fhsi\ ga/r me poihth\n ei]nai qew~n); and because I make new gods (kai\ w(j kainou\j poiou=nta qeou/j) and do not believe in the old ones (tou\j d’ a0rxai/ouj ou0 nomi/zonta), he indicts me for the sake of these old ones (e0gra/yato tou/twn au0tw~n e3neka, w#j fhsin), as he says.’

Euthyphro: ‘I understand (Manqa/nw), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej); it is because you say the divine sign keeps coming to you (o3ti dh\ su\ to\ daimo/nion fh=|j sautw~| e9ka/stote gi/gnesqai) … and he is going to court to slander you (kai\ w(j diabalw~n dh\ e1rxetai ei0j to\ dikasth/rion), knowing (ei0dw&j) that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted (o3ti eu0dia/bola ta\ tiau=ta) by the people (pro\j tou\j pollou/j). Why, they even laugh at me (kai\ e0mou= ga/r toi katagelw~sin) and say I am crazy (w)j mainome/nou) when I say anything (o3tan ti le/gw) in the assembly (e0n th=| e0kklhsi/a|) about divine things (peri\ tw~n qei/wn) and foretell the future to them (prole/gwn au0toi=j ta\ me/llonta). And yet there is not one of the things I have foretold that is not true (kai/toi ou0de\n o3 ti ou0k a0lhqe\j ei1rhka w{n proei=pon)’

Socrates: ‘My dear Euthyphro (W! fi/le Eu0qu/fron), their ridicule (a0lla\ to\ me\n katagelasqh=nai) is perhaps (i1swj) of no consequence (ou0de\n pra=gma) … Now if (ei0 me\n ou]n), as I was saying just now (o4 nu=n dh\ e1legon), they were to laugh at me (me/lloie/n mou katagela=n), as you say they do at you (w#sper su\ fh\|j sautou=), it would not be at all unpleasant (ou0de\n a1n ei1h a0hde/j) to pass the time in the court with jests and laughter (pai/zontaj kai\ gelw~ntaj e0n tw~| dikasthri/w| diagagei=n); but if they are in earnest (ei0 de\ spouda/sontai), how this will end (tou=t’ h1dh o3ph| a0pobh/setai) is unclear (a1dhlon), except to you the soothsayers (plh\n u9mi=n toi=j ma/ntesin).’

Euthyphro: ‘Well, perhaps it won’t amount to much (a0ll’ i1swj ou0de\n e1stai pra=gma), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), and you will bring your case to a satisfactory ending (a0lla\ su/ te kata\ nou=n a0gwniei= th\n di/khn), as I think I shall mine (oi]mai de\ kai\ e0me\ th\n e0mh/n).’ (3a8-e6)

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I began by taking Socrates’ h1dh  in the Cratylus – ‘Had I already heard (ei0 me\n ou]n e0gw_ h1dh a0khko/h) Prodicus’ fifty-drachma course on the correctness of names – as an indication that he was fairly confident that he would get through the court-trial unscathed. There is a similar indication in the Euthyphro, yet more strongly expressed. When Euthyphro excused himself from any further discussion on holiness – ‘Now I am in a hurry to go somewhere’ (nu=n ga\r speu/dw poi) – Socrates exclaimed: ‘Oh my friend, what are you doing (Oi3a poiei=j, w} e9tai=re!)? You go away (a0pe/rxei) casting me down from the high hope (a0p’ e0lpi/doj me katabalw~n mega/lhj) I had (h4n ei]xon) that I should learn from you (w(j para\ sou= maqw&n) what is holy (ta/ te o3sia), and what is not (kai\ mh/), and should get rid of Meletus’ indictment (kai\ th=j pro\j Me/lhton grafh\j a0palla/comai) by showing him (e0ndeica/menoj e0kei/nw|) that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters (o3ti sofo\j h1dh par’ Eu0qu/fronoj ta\ qei=a ge/gona) and am no longer (kai\ o3ti ou0ke/ti) through ignorance (u9p’ a0gnoi/aj) improvising (au0tosxedia/zomai) and making innovations (ou0de\ kainotomw~) in respect of them (peri\ au0ta/), and that I shall live a better life henceforth (kai\ dh\ kai\ to\n a1llon bi/on a1meinon biwsoi/mhn).’