Socrates and Meletus

I ended my preceding post, ‘The dating of the Cratylus’, by quoting Socrates’ parting words in the Euthyphro as an indication that Socrates was confident that he would win his case against Meletus. But someone might argue that Socrates’ words suggest the opposite. For as Euthyphro was departing, Socrates exclaimed: ‘Oh my friend, what are you doing? You go away and leave me cast down from the high hope I had that I should learn from you what is holy, and what is not, and should get rid of Meletus’s indictment by showing him that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters and am no longer through ignorance acting carelessly and making innovations in respect of them, and that I shall live a better life henceforth.’ (Translation H.N. Fowler.)

But Socrates never intended to refer to Euthyphro at his trial. All those things he in the Euthyphro says he would do with reference to Euthyphro, as his teacher, he actually did, or attempted to do, better to say, with Meletus, asking him to be his teacher. In the Apology he says:

‘What then (Ti/ dh=ta), Meletus (w} Me/lhte;}? Are you at your age so much wiser than I at my age (tosou=ton su\ e0mou= sofw&teroj ei] thlikou/tou o1ntoj thliko/sde w!n), that you have recognized (w#ste su\ me\n e1gnwkaj) that the evil (o3ti oi9 me\n kakoi/) always do some evil (kako/n ti e0rga/zontai a0ei/) to those nearest them (tou\j ma/lista plhsi/on e9autw~n), and the good (oi9 de\ a0gaqoi/) some good (a0gaqo/n); whereas I (e0gw_ de\ dh/) have reached such a depth of ignorance (ei0j tosou=ton a0maqi/aj h3kw) that I do not even know this (w#ste kai\ tou=t’ a0gnow~), that (o3ti) if I make any of my associates bad (e0a/n tina moxqhro\n poih/sw tw~n cuno/ntwn) I am in danger (kinduneu/sw) of getting some harm (kako/n ti labei=n) from him (a0p’ au0tou=), so that I am doing this great evil voluntarily (w#ste tou=to to\ tosou=ton kako\n e9kw_n poiw~), as you say (w(j fh\|j su/;)? I don’t believe you this (tau=ta e0gw&? soi ou0 pei/qomai), Meletus (w} Me/lhte), nor anyone else in the world does (oi]mai de\ ou0de\ a1llon a0nqrw&pwn ou0de/na)! but either I do not corrupt them (a0ll’ h2 ou0 diafqei/rw), or if I corrupt them (h2 ei0 diafqei/rw), I do it involuntarily (a1kwn), so that you are lying in both accounts (w#ste su/ ge kat’ a0mfo/tera yeu/dei). But if I corrupt them involuntarily (ei0 de\ a1kwn diafqei/rw), for such involuntary errors (tw~n toiou/twn kai\ a0kousi/wn a9marthma/twn) the law is not to hale people into court (ou0 deu=ro no/moj ei0sa/gein e0sti/n), but to take them and instruct and admonish them in private (a0ll’ i0di/a| labo/nta dida/skein kai\ nouqetei=n). For it is clear (dh=lon ga/r) that (o3ti) if I am told about it (e0a\n ma/qw), I shall stop doing (pau/somai) that which I do involuntarily (o3 ge a1kwn poiw~). But you avoided associating with me and instructing me (su\ de\ cuggene/sqai me/n moi kai\ dida/cai e1fugej), and were unwilling to do so (kai\ ou0k e0qe/lhsaj), but you hale me in here (deu=ro de\ ei0sa/geij), where it is the law to hale in those who need punishment (oi[ no/moj e0sti\n eisa/gein tou\j kola/sewj deome/nouj), not instruction (a0ll ou0 maqh/sewj). (25d8-26a7)

The dating of the Cratylus

I ended my preceding post, ‘The Seventh Letter and the Cratylus’, by stating that Plato’s intention to write the Cratylus was the reason for his turning the attention to Cratylus and Hermogenes after his return to Athens from Megara, and that the Cratylus is the result of Plato’s cooperation with the two. Can it be corroborated?

The dialogue opens with Hermogenes asking Cratylus: ‘Would you agree (bou/lei ou]n) to share the argument with Socrates here (kai\ Swkra/tei tw~|de a0nakoinwsw&meqa to\n lo/gon;)? Cratylos has no objections: ‘If you please (Ei1 soi dokei=). So Hermogenes turns to Socrates, who just came: ‘Cratylus here maintains (Kratu/loj fh/sin o3de) that everything that is has a right name (o0no/matoj o0rqo/thta ei]nai e9ka/stw| tw~n o1ntwn) by nature (fu/sei pefuki=an) … both for Hellenes and barbarians (kai\ E3llhsi kai\ ba/rbaroij th\n au0th/n). Whereupon I ask him (e0rwtw~ ou]n au0to\n e0gw&) whether his own name is truly Cratylus, or not (ei0 ou]n au0tw~| Kratu/loj th=| a0lhqei/a| o1noma), and he answers “Yes” (o9 de\ o9mologei=). And what about Socrates (ti/ de\ Swkra/tei; e1fhn)? “Socrates” (Swkra/thj), he said (h] d’ o3j). I tell him: “Then every man’s name is what he is called” (Ou0kou=n kai\ toi=j a1lloij a0nqrw&poij pa=sin, o3per kalou=men o1noma e3kaston, tou=to/ e0stin e9ka/stw| o1noma). And he (o9 de/): “But your name is not Hermogenes”, he said (h] d’ o3j), “if all the world were to call you Hermogenes (ou0de\ a2n pa/ntej kalw~sin a1nqrwpoi)”. And when I ask him (kai\ e0mou= e0rwtw~ntoj), anxious to know (kai\ proqumoume/nou ei0de/nai) what he means (o3ti pote\ le/gei), he does not clarify anything (ou1te a0posafei= ou0de/n) and is ironical (ei0rwneu/etai/ te) towards me (pro/j me), pretending to think something in himself (prospoiou/meno/j ti au0to\j e0n e9autw~| dianoei=sqai) as having knowledge (w(j ei0dw&j) about the matter (peri\ au0tou~), of which, if he wanted to speak clearly (o9  ei0 bou/loito safw~j ei0pei=n), he could entirely convince me (poih/seien a2n kai\ e0me\ o9mologei=n), and make me agree with him entirely (kai\ le/gein a3per au0to\j le/gei). If you can have some conjecture, Socrates (ei0 ou]n ph| e1xeij sumbalei=n), about this oracle of Cratylos (th\n Kratu/lou mantei/an), I would love to hear it (h9de/wj a2n a0kou/saimi); or rather (ma=llon de/), what is your own view (au0tw~| soi o3ph| dokei=) of the truth or correctness of names (peri\ o0noma/twn o0rqo/thtoj), I would far sooner hear (e1ti a2n h3dion puqoi/mhn).’ (383a1-b2)

Socrates opens his response to the plea of Hermogenes by emphasizing the importance of the enquiry concerning names: ‘Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying that “hard is the knowledge of the good” (xalepa\ ta\ kala/ e0stin o3ph| e1xei maqei=n).’ He then pleads his ignorance concerning the matter, and he does so with a reference to Prodicos: ‘Had I already heard (ei0 me\n ou]n e0gw_ h1dh a0khko/h) Prodicus’ fifty-drachma course (para\ Prodi/kou th\n penthkonta/draxmon e0pi/deicin), which makes one thoroughly educated about it (h4n a0kou/santi u9pa/rxei peri\ tou=to pepaideu=sqai), as he says (w#(j fhsin e0kei=noj), then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names (ou0de\n a2n e0kw&lue/n se au0ti/ka ma/la ei0de/nai th\n a0lh/qeian peri\ o0noma/twn o0rqo/thtoj).’ But as it stands (nu=n de/), I haven’t heard it (ou0k a0kh/koa), I have only heard the single-drachma course (a0lla\ th\n draxmiai/an). I therefore do not know (ou1koun oi]da) what is the truth (ph=| pote to\ a0lhqe\j e1xei) about such matters (peri\ tw~n toiou/twn).’

What Socrates says to Hermogenes, his having heard only the single-drachma course of Prodicos, deserves to be compared to what he says about his encounter with Prodicus in his discussion on rhetoric in Phaedrus 267a6-b5: ‘And shall we leave Tisias and Gorgias to their sleep (Teisi/an de\ Gorgi/an te e0a/somen eu3dein) … who discovered conciseness of speech and infinite length on every subject (suntomi/an te lo/gwn kai\ a1peira mh/kh peri\ pa/ntwn a9neu=ron;)? When Prodicus heard me saying once this (tau=ta de\ a0kou/wn pote/ mou Pro/dikoj), he laughed (e0ge/lasen), and said that he alone had discovered of what kind of speeches the art of rhetoric is needed (kai\ mo/noj au0to\j hu9rhke/nai e1fh w{n dei= lo/gwn te/xnhn): what are needed are neither long speeches nor short ones (dei=n de\ ou1te makrw~n ou1te braxe/wn), but ones of a fitting length (a0lla\ metri/wn).’ Socrates appears to have enjoyed his discussions with Prodicos.

But back to the Cratylus. Having thus expressed his ignorance concerning the matter, he expresses his readiness to enquire into it jointly with Hermogenes and with Cratylos (suzhtei=n me/ntoi e9toimo/j ei0mi kai\ soi\ kai\ Kratu/lw| koinh=|). (384a8-c3).

Let me focus attention on Socrates’ ‘Had I already heard (ei0 me\n ou]n e0gw_ h1dh a0khko/h) Prodicus’ fifty-drachma course’. I think that these words express Socrates’ wish to hear Prodicus’ fifty-drachma course, and his conviction that it will be possible for him to hear it. In other words, he appears to be fairly confident that he will get through the court-trial unscathed.

Let us consider these words in the light of the dating of the dialogue which I have proposed. From Plato’s Apology we may infer that Prodicus is still alive, teaching his courses to the young who are ready to pay him money and be grateful to him, in some Greek city (19e-20a). The city of Athens has barely recovered from the defeat in the Peloponnesian War and from the subsequent reign of the Thirty, the reign of terror; it is impoverished. But Socrates appears to be optimistic concerning its further recovery, which would make Athens once again a place to which the sophists would flock. The verve with which he undertakes, with Hermogenes and with Kratylus, their joint enquiry into the correctness of names indicates that he was looking forward to his encounter with Prodicus; this time he was not going to miss the fifty-drachma course on the correctness of names.

***

What did Socrates think about his chances, as he was about to enter the Hall of the King Archon to face the charges brought against him by Meletus?

Euthyphro asked Socrates: ‘What is the charge that Meletus brings against you’ (ti/na grafh/n se ge/graptai;)?

Socrates replied: ‘What is the charge (H#ntina;)? No mean one (ou0k a0gennh=), it seems to me (e1moige dokei=), for the fact that, young as he is (to\ ga\r ne/on o1nta), he has apprehended so important a matter (tosou=ton pra=gma e0gnwke/nai) reflects no small credit upon him (ou0 faulo/n e0stin).

***

Socrates’ emphasis on his accuser’s youth deserves attention. The question is, how such a young man could take it to his head to accuse Socrates of impiety?

There are good reasons to believe that behind Meletus’ indictment of Socrates stood Anytus, a leading Athenian politician, whose pomposity and ignorance Socrates subjected to his irony, as Plato recorded it in the Meno, some 4 years prior to Meletus’ indictment of Socrates. See ‘Enters Anytus’, posted on my blog on September 22, 2020.

***

For he (e0kei=noj ga/r), as he says (w#j fhsin), knows (oi]de) in what way (ti/na tro/pon) the youth are corrupted (oi3 ne/oi diafqei/rontai) and who are those (kai\ ti/nej oi9) corrupting (diafqei/rontej) them (au0tou/j). He must be a wise man (kai\ kinduneu/ei sofo/j tij ei]nai); who, seeing my lack of wisdom (kai\ th\n e0mh\n a0maqi/an katidw&n) and that I am corrupting men who are young like himself (w(j diafqei/rontoj tou\j h9likiw&taj au0tou=), comes to the State, as a boy runs to his mother, to accuse me (e2rxetai kathgorh/swn mou w(j pro\j mhte/ra pro\j th\n po/lin). And he seems to me (kai\ fainetai/ moi) to be the only one of politicians (tw~n politikw~n mo/noj) who begins in the right way (a1rxesqai o0rqw~j); for the right way is (o0rqw&j ga/r e0sti) e0pimelhqh=nai take care of the young men first (tw~n ne/wn prw~ton e0pimelhqh=nai), to make them as good as possible (o3pwj e1sontai o3 ti a1ristoi), just as a good husbandman (w#sper gewrgo\n a0gaqo/n) will naturally take care of the young plants first (tw~n ne/wn futw~n ei0ko\j prw~ton e0pimelhqh/nai) and afterwards (meta\ de\ tou=to) of the rest as well (kai\ tw~n a1llwn). And so Meletus (kai\ dh\ kai\ Me/lhtoj), perhaps (i1swj), is first clearing away us (prw~ton me\n h9ma=j e0kkaqai/rei) who corrupt the young plants (tou\j tw~n ne/wn ta\j bla/staj diafqei/rontaj), as he says (w#j fhsin); then after this (e1peita meta\ tou=to), clearly (dh=lon), when he has turned his attention to the older men (o3ti tw~n presbute/rwn e0pimelhqei/j), he will bring countless most precious blessings upon the State (plei/stwn kai\ megi/stwn a0gaqw~n ai1tioj th=| po/lei genh/setai; Jowett: ‘he will become a very great public benefactor'), – at least, that is the natural outcome (w#(j ge to\ ei0ko\j cumbh=nai) of the beginning he has made (e0k toiau/thj a0rxh=j a0rcame/nw|).’

Euthyphro: ‘I’d wish it to be so (bouloi/mhn a1n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), but I fear (a0ll’ o0rrwdw~) the opposite (mh\ tou0nanti/on ge/nhtai). For he simply (a0texnw~j ga/r, 3a7), I think (moi dokei=), is aiming a blow at the heart of the State (a0f’ e9sti/aj a1rxesqai kakourgei=n th\n po/lin), when he undertakes to harm you (e0pixeirw~n a0dikei=n se).’ (2b12-3a8)

***

Euthyphro chose to overhear the biting irony in Socrates’ play with Meletus’ name – who after discussing Meletus’ e0pimelhqh=nai, taking care of, the young (2d2 and 2d3), highlights Me/lhtoj, the caring man (2d4), who after taking care of the young is going to turn his caring attention (e0pimelhqei/j, 3a3) to the elderly, and thus become a very great public benefactor (plei/stwn kai\ megi/stwn a0gaqw~n ai1tioj th=| po/lei genh/setai, 3a3-4). This ‘overhearing’ was necessary, for only thus he could say ‘I’d wish it to be so, but I fear the opposite. Meletus is simply aiming a blow at the heart of the State, when he undertakes to harm you’.

John Burnett says in his note on Euthyphro’s simply (a0texnw~j): ‘The enthusiastic admiration of Euthyphro for Socrates must not be missed.’

***

Euthyphro: ‘Now tell me (kai/ moi le/ge), what does he say you do (ti/ kai\ poiou=nta/ se/ fhsi) that corrupts the young (diafqei/rein tou\j ne/ouj;)?

Socrates: ‘Absurd things (A!topa), my friend (w} qauma/sie), at first hearing (w(j ou3tw g’ a0kou=sai). For he says I am a maker of gods (fhsi\ ga/r me poihth\n ei]nai qew~n); and because I make new gods (kai\ w(j kainou\j poiou=nta qeou/j) and do not believe in the old ones (tou\j d’ a0rxai/ouj ou0 nomi/zonta), he indicts me for the sake of these old ones (e0gra/yato tou/twn au0tw~n e3neka, w#j fhsin), as he says.’

Euthyphro: ‘I understand (Manqa/nw), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej); it is because you say the divine sign keeps coming to you (o3ti dh\ su\ to\ daimo/nion fh=|j sautw~| e9ka/stote gi/gnesqai) … and he is going to court to slander you (kai\ w(j diabalw~n dh\ e1rxetai ei0j to\ dikasth/rion), knowing (ei0dw&j) that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted (o3ti eu0dia/bola ta\ tiau=ta) by the people (pro\j tou\j pollou/j). Why, they even laugh at me (kai\ e0mou= ga/r toi katagelw~sin) and say I am crazy (w)j mainome/nou) when I say anything (o3tan ti le/gw) in the assembly (e0n th=| e0kklhsi/a|) about divine things (peri\ tw~n qei/wn) and foretell the future to them (prole/gwn au0toi=j ta\ me/llonta). And yet there is not one of the things I have foretold that is not true (kai/toi ou0de\n o3 ti ou0k a0lhqe\j ei1rhka w{n proei=pon)’

Socrates: ‘My dear Euthyphro (W! fi/le Eu0qu/fron), their ridicule (a0lla\ to\ me\n katagelasqh=nai) is perhaps (i1swj) of no consequence (ou0de\n pra=gma) … Now if (ei0 me\n ou]n), as I was saying just now (o4 nu=n dh\ e1legon), they were to laugh at me (me/lloie/n mou katagela=n), as you say they do at you (w#sper su\ fh\|j sautou=), it would not be at all unpleasant (ou0de\n a1n ei1h a0hde/j) to pass the time in the court with jests and laughter (pai/zontaj kai\ gelw~ntaj e0n tw~| dikasthri/w| diagagei=n); but if they are in earnest (ei0 de\ spouda/sontai), how this will end (tou=t’ h1dh o3ph| a0pobh/setai) is unclear (a1dhlon), except to you the soothsayers (plh\n u9mi=n toi=j ma/ntesin).’

Euthyphro: ‘Well, perhaps it won’t amount to much (a0ll’ i1swj ou0de\n e1stai pra=gma), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), and you will bring your case to a satisfactory ending (a0lla\ su/ te kata\ nou=n a0gwniei= th\n di/khn), as I think I shall mine (oi]mai de\ kai\ e0me\ th\n e0mh/n).’ (3a8-e6)

***

I began by taking Socrates’ h1dh  in the Cratylus – ‘Had I already heard (ei0 me\n ou]n e0gw_ h1dh a0khko/h) Prodicus’ fifty-drachma course on the correctness of names – as an indication that he was fairly confident that he would get through the court-trial unscathed. There is a similar indication in the Euthyphro, yet more strongly expressed. When Euthyphro excused himself from any further discussion on holiness – ‘Now I am in a hurry to go somewhere’ (nu=n ga\r speu/dw poi) – Socrates exclaimed: ‘Oh my friend, what are you doing (Oi3a poiei=j, w} e9tai=re!)? You go away (a0pe/rxei) casting me down from the high hope (a0p’ e0lpi/doj me katabalw~n mega/lhj) I had (h4n ei]xon) that I should learn from you (w(j para\ sou= maqw&n) what is holy (ta/ te o3sia), and what is not (kai\ mh/), and should get rid of Meletus’ indictment (kai\ th=j pro\j Me/lhton grafh\j a0palla/comai) by showing him (e0ndeica/menoj e0kei/nw|) that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters (o3ti sofo\j h1dh par’ Eu0qu/fronoj ta\ qei=a ge/gona) and am no longer (kai\ o3ti ou0ke/ti) through ignorance (u9p’ a0gnoi/aj) improvising (au0tosxedia/zomai) and making innovations (ou0de\ kainotomw~) in respect of them (peri\ au0ta/), and that I shall live a better life henceforth (kai\ dh\ kai\ to\n a1llon bi/on a1meinon biwsoi/mhn).’

 

The Seventh Letter and the Cratylus

 

In the Seventh Letter Plato says that from his early days he wanted to engage in politics, in Athens. He abandoned this desire during the reign of the Thirty, after they attempted to involve Socrates in their nefarious activities (e0dusxe/rana/ te kai\ e0mauto\n e0panh/gagon a0po tw~n to/te kakw~n ‘I was indignant and withdrew myself from those evils’, 325a4-5). But after the restoration of democracy, he began again (pa/lin de/), though less urgently (bradu/teron me/n), to be moved by a desire to engage in political affairs (ei3lken de/ me o3mwj h9 peri\ to\ pra/ttein ta\ koina\ kai\ politika\ e0piqumi/a, 325a7-b1).

Socrates’ trial, imprisonment, and death in the hands of democrats, seriously affected Plato’s desire to do politics: ‘Consequently (w#ste me/), although at first (to\ prw~ton) I was filled with an ardent desire (pollh=j mesto\n o1nta o9rmh=j) to engage in public affairs (e0pi\ to\ pra/ttein ta\ koina/), when I considered all this (ble/ponta ei0j tau=ta) and saw how things were shifting about anyhow in all directions (kai\ fero/mena o9rw~nta pa/nth| pa/ntwj), I finally became dizzy (teleutw~nta i0liggia=n); but I continued to consider (kai\ tou= me\n skopei=n mh\ a0posth=nai) by what means some betterment could be brought about (mh/ pote a1meinon a2n gi/gnoito) in these matters (peri/ te au0ta\ tau=ta) and in the government as a whole (kai\ dh\ kai\ peri\ th\n pa=san politei/an), and as regards political action I kept constantly waiting for an opportune moment (tou= de\ pra/ttein au] perimenei=n a0ei\ kairou/j).’ (325d6-326a2)

All this is rather vague, but perhaps we can make it more definite, if we consider dialogues that Plato wrote in those days, beginning with the Cratylus. For there are reasons to suppose that Cratylus was the first dialogue that Plato wrote after he returned to Athens from Megara, where he and other close friends of Socrates took refuge after the death of Socrates, ‘alarmed as they were at the cruelty of the tyrants’ (dei/santaj th\n w)mo/thta tw~n tura/nnwn, Diog. Laert. II. 106). Diogenes Laertius says that ‘when Socrates was gone (e0kei/nou d’ a0pelqo/ntoj), Plato turned his attention to Cratylus the Heraclitean (prosei=xe Kratu/lw| te tw~| H(rakleitei/w|), and to Hermogenes (kai\ E((rmoge/nei) who professed the philosophy of Parmenides (tw~| ta\ Parmeni/dou filosofou/nti)’ (III. 6).

In my view, Plato’s intention to write the Cratylus was the reason for his turning the attention to Cratylus and Hermogenes after his return to Athens from Megara, and the Cratylus is the result of Plato’s cooperation with the two.

Můj sen o Ukrajině

Dnes ráno jsem se probudil trochu unavený, a tak jsem si řekl, že si ještě na chvilku lehnu, jen na chvilku, abych se mentálně i fyzicky připravil pro každodenní ranní koupel s důkladnou masáží. Z toho chvilkového poležení se stala hodina, já usnul, a měl jsem sen o Ukrajině. Byl jsem v Kyjevě s manželkou a synem, abych tam přednášel dějiny filozofie. Jak už to ve snech bývá, moje první manželka Zdena se propojila v jedno s mou druhou ženou Doinou, můj syn Lukáš z prvního manželství se spojil v jedno se synem Danem z druhého manželství. Celý ten sen byl nesporně spojen s mými dvěma přednáškami pro Ústav východoevropských studí, které budu mít na Filozofické fakultě počátkem května.

Jak došlo k tomu, že budu moci mít dvě přednášky na Filozofické fakultě, když veškeré mé předchozí pokusy o takovou možnost selhaly? Na závěr korespondence týkající se Vaculíkova Českého snáře jsem Haně Kosákové napsal: ‚Ještě k Vám mám prosbu. Rád bych se ještě jednou podíval do Prahy. Zvažte, zda by nebylo možné, aby mě Váš ústav pozval k přednášce o Platonovi.‘

Hana Kosáková odpověděla, že přednášku na FFUK může zajistit organizačně: ‚a hodí se nám, filosofických témat se nám nedostává; potíž je ale ve finanční stránce. Obávám se, že ústav nebude schopen Vám nabídnout nic na dopravu ani ubytování, maximálně jen symbolický honorář. Zní to jako výmluva, ale taková je bohužel současná realita.‘

Odpověděl jsem: ‚To mi vyhovuje. Nekouřím, nepiju, něco jsem si našetřil. K stáří je člověk sentimentální; v Praze jsem se narodil.’

Hana Kosáková mi napsala: ‚Ještě jsem Vám chtěla dopředu říct, že naši studenti nejsou příliš obeznámeni s dějinami filosofie, značnou část jich tvoří studenti z Východu (Rusko, Ukrajina, Bělorusko) - možná by pro ně tedy byla zajímavá a inspirativní i Vaše disidentská zkušenost.‘

Haně Kosákové jsem odepsal:

‚Vzhledem ke složení Vašich studentů bude nejlepší, když obě přednášky budou v angličtině. Tu první přednášku chci nazvat Pursuit of Philosophy. Tak se totiž jmenuje stať, kterou jsem v History of Political Thought publikoval v zimním čtvrtletí roku 1984. Stať si lze otevřít na mé Webové stránce. Je v podstatě věnovaná Dr Kennyho (Master of Ballilol) vstupu do mého semináře. Z dané stati bych se věnoval kapitole I., nazvané ‚To Resume an Interrupted Discussion‘, a pak závěrečným dvěma kapitolám, tedy kapitole III. A IV.

Ta první kapitola začíná příjezdem Kennyho a jeho manželky k nám do Keramické a končí vtrhnutím policie do našeho bytu.

Ta třetí kapitola nazvaná When the Classical Tradition of Philosophy Meets Actuality se odehrává na policejní stanici v Bartolomějské. Policie mě a studenty zavezla do velké místnosti, zřejmě určené pro shromáždění policistů. Tam nás nechali o samotě. Já studentům nabídl úvodní přednášku o Aristotelovi. Ti byli pro, a tak jsem jim svůj úvod do Aristotela přednesl. Chtěl jsem otevřít diskusi, když tu vešel tajnej (v civilu), zeptal se, co děláme, já řek ‚Filosofii, chcete si přisednout‘, - přivedl si řadu dalších tajných, všichni musili ke zdi, a to bylo naposledy, co jsem mohl vidět své studenty.

Kapitola IV. nese název Can Philosophy Become worthy of Unrelenting Pursuit, kterou jedinou bych četl celou, aspoň část jejího závěru, pokud by na to byl čas. Cituju:

Not long ago I came unexpectedly across Patocka‘s memory. I visited my uncle Joseph Brozek in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. In an issue of an emigrant journal Free Czechoslovakia from September 1944 I read Brozek’s article about Patocka‘s pamphlet Czech Cilization in Europe which Patocka published in the late summer of 1939. Brozek emphasizes that Patocka’s was the last free voice of the Czech ‚philosophers-statesmen‘. In his pamphlet Patocka called for a renewal of the drive for moral perfection which Christianity introduced, a revival of intellectual courage which was the heritage of the Enlightenment and he demanded due attention to the almost missing contemplative element which Europe inherited from the Greeks: ‘Against this background every nation which strives to be a member of the cultural and spiritual “concert” of Western civilization must erect its ideals and measure its achievements … What does it matter that Europe does not know and does not acknowledge the depth of our love for that which is most deep and most holy in it. Having turned its back on us, it made us experience the most bitter lot and march on the hardest road. Yet we shall continue in this struggle as long as we have the slightest chance to do so.’

Tímto způsobem budu moci studenty seznámit jak se Sokratem a Platonem, tak i s Aristotelem, aniž bych je unavil. Oba texty se hodí k tomu, abych k vybranému kousku textu zmínil řadu věcí z ‘dneška’. Tak ku příkladu ten kousek, který jsem právě citoval, si vyžádá pár slov o Patočkovi, jedním ze zakladatelů Charty 77 a jedním z jejích prvních třech mluvčích.‘

Zpět k mému snu. Po ukončení bojů na Ukrajině se na Kyjevskou univerzitu obrátím s návrhem přednášek o Sokratovi, Platonovi a Aristotelovi.

 

 

 

  

The Cratylus and the Euthyphro, continuation

The Euthyphro

Euthyphro: ‘I am amused (Geloi=on, ‘Ridiculous’), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), at your making a distinction (o3ti oi1ei ti diafe/rein) between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation (ei1te a0llo/trioj ei1te oi0kei=oj o9 teqnew&j); for surely the pollution is the same in either case (i1son ga\r to\ mi/asma gi/gnetai), if you knowingly associate with the murderer (e0a\n sunh=|j tw~| toiou/tw| suneidw&j) when you ought to clear yourself (kai\ mh\ a0fosioi=j seauto/n te) and him (kai\ e0kei=non) by proceeding against him (th=| di/kh| e0peciw&n). The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain (a0ll’ ou0 tou=to mo/non dei=n fula/ttein, ei1te e0n di/kh| e1kteinen o( ktei/naj ei1te mh/). If justly (kai\ ei0 me\n e0n di/kh|), then your duty is to let the matter alone (e0a=n); but if unjustly (ei0 de\ mh/), then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you (e0a/nper o9 ktei/naj sune/stio/j soi gi/gnetai) and eats at the same table (kai\ o9motra/pezoj h]|), proceed against him (e0pecie/nai).

***

Jowett’s translation get’s the meaning of the Greek very well, I just had to restructure the Greek text so as to illuminate the connection between Jowett’s English and Socrates’ Greek. There is just one serious mistake in Jowett’s translation; his ‘then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you’ stands for Socrates’ e0a/nper o9 ktei/naj sune/stio/j soi gi/gnetai. Denniston explains that the ‘even if’ meaning is common in Homer, but that ‘this use is not to be found outside Homer’. He then quotes the Euthyphro 4b e0pecie/nai, e0a/nper o9 ktei/naj sune/stio/j soi gi/gnetai kai\ o9motra/pezoj h]|, and says that it ‘means that you must prosecute homicide if, and only if, he shares house and board with you’. (The Greek Particles, Second Edition, revised by K.J. Dover, p. 488 (ii).)

The Cratylus and the Euthyphro

The Cratylus

After the soul, Hermogenes asked Socrates to analyse the name of body (sw~ma). Socrates found it an easy task: ‘Some say that the body is the grave (sh=ma) of the soul, which may be thought buried in our present life, or that it has the name it has because with it (dio/ti tou/tw|) the soul (h9 yuxh/) signifies (shmai/nei) whatever the soul signifies (o9 a2n shmai/nh| h9 yuxh/). It seems to me most probable (dokou=si me/ntoi moi ma/lista) that this name (tou=to to\ o1noma) was invented (qe/sqai) by the Orphic poets (oi9 a0mfi\ O)rfe/a); the soul suffering penalty (w(j di/khj didou/shj th=j psuxh/j) for whatever (w(n de\ e3neka) it is punished ([di/khn] di/dwsin), and that it has this enclosure (tou/ton de\ peri/bolon e1xousa) to be saved (i3na sw&|zetai); the image of a prison (desmwthri/ou ei0ko/na), as the name implies (w3sper au0to\ onoma/zetai), until the penalty is paid (e3wj a2n e0ktei/sh| ta o0feilo/mena), “sw~ma”; and not even a letter in the name need be changed (kai\ ou0de/n dei=n para/gein ou0d’ e4n gra/mma).’ (400c)

Happy with this analysis, Hermogenes asked Socrates to analyse the names of the gods, as he had analysed the name of Zeus (see the first post on ‘Euthyphro in the Cratylus’).

Socrates: ‘Yes, indeed, Hermogenes (Nai\ ma\ Di/a h9mei=j ge, w} E(rmo/genej); and there is one excellent principle which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge (ei1per ge nou=n e1xoimen, e3na me\n to\n ka/lliston tro/pon), – that of the gods (o3ti peri\ qew~n) we know nothing (ou0de\n i1smen), either of their natures (ou1te peri\ au0tw~n) or of the names (ou1te peri\ tw~n o0noma/twn) which they give themselves (a3tta pote\ e9autou\j kalou=sin); but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are true (dh=lon ga\r o3ti e0kei=noi/ ge ta0lhqh= kalou=sin). And this is the best of all principles; and the next best is to say (deu/teroj d’ au] tro/poj o0rqo/thtoj), as is customary in prayers (w3sper e0n tai=j eu0xai=j no/moj e0sti\n h9mi=n eu1xesqai), that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics in which they rejoice (oi9tine/j te kai\ o9po/qen xai/rousin o0nomazo/menoi, tau=ta kai\ h9ma=j au0tou\j kalei=n), because we do not know of any other (w(j a1llo mhde\n ei0do/taj). That custom is, in my opinion, a good one (kalw~j ga\r dh\ e1moige dokei=  nenomi/sqai). Let us, then, if you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them (ei0 ou]n bou/lei, skopw~men w#sper proeipo/ntej toi=j qeoi=j o3ti peri\ au0tw~n ou0de\n h9mei=j skeyo/meqa); we do not presume that we are able to do so (ou0 ga\r a0ciou=men oi[oi/ t’ a2n ei]nai skopei=n); but we are enquiring about the meaning of men (a0lla\ peri\ tw~n a)nqrw&pwn h3n pote/ tina do/can e1xonej) in giving them these names (e0ti/qento au0toi~j ta\ o0no/mata), – in this there can be small blame (tou=to ga\r a0neme/shton).’

Hermogenes: ‘’I think, Socrates, that you are quite right (A0lla/ moi dokei=j, w} Sw&kratej,  metri/wj le/gein), and let us do as you say (kai\ ou3tw poiw~men).’ (400d6-401a7, tr. B. Jowett )

The Euthyphro

Socrates: ‘And what is your suit, Euthyphro (E1stin de\ dh\ soi/, w} Eu0qu/frwn, ti/j h9 dikh/;)? are you the defendant (feu/geij au0th\n) or the pursuer (h2 diw&keij;)?’

Euthyhro: ‘I am the pursuer (Diw&kw).’

Socrates: ‘Of whom (Ti/na;)?’

Euthyphro: ‘You will think me mad when I tell you (O$n diw&kwn au] dokw~ mai/nesqai).’

Socrates: ‘Why (Ti/ de/;)? Has the fugitive wings (peto/meno/n tina diw&keij)?’

Euthyphro: ‘Nay, he is not very volatile (Pollou= ge dei= pe/tesqai) at his time of life (o3j ge tunxa/nei w$n eu] ma/la presbu/thj).’

Socrates: ‘Who is he (Ti/j ou3toj)?’

Euthyphro: ‘My father (O( e0mo\j path/r).’

Socrates: ‘Your father (O( so/j)! My good man (w} be/ltiste;)?’

Euthyphro: ‘Yes (Pa/nu me\n ou]n).’

Socrates: ‘And of what is he accused (E!stin de ti/ to\ e1gklhma kai\ ti/noj h9 di/kh;)?’

Euthyphro: ‘Of murder (Fo/nou), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej).’

Socrates: ‘By the powers (H(ra/kleij), Euthyphro! How little does the common heard know (h] pou, w} Eu0qu/frwn, a0gnoei=tai u9po\ tw~n pollw~n, 4a11-12) of the nature of right and truth (o3ph| pote\ o0rqw~j e1xei). A man must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such an action (ou0 ga\r oi]mai/ ge tou= e0pituxo/ntoj au0to\ pra=cai a0lla\ po/rrw pou h1dh sofi/aj e0lau/nontoj).’

Euthyphro: ‘Indeed, Socrates, he must (Po/rrw me/ntoi nh\ Di/a, w} Sw&kratej).’

Socrates: ‘I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives (E!stin de\ dh\ tw~n oi0kei/wn tij o9 teqnew\j u9po\ tou= sou= patro/j;) – clearly has (h2 dh=la dh/;); for if he had been a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting him (ou0 ga\r a1n pou u9pe/r ge a0llotri/ou e0pech=|sqa fo/nou au0tw~|).’ (3e7-4b6, tr. B. Jowett)

***

Jowett’s ‘how little does the common heard know’ is a travesty of Socrates’ a0gnoei=tai u9po\ tw~n pollw~n (at 4a11-12). John Burnet translates: ‘Most people must be in the dark as to what is the right thing’ (Plato, Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito, Edited with notes by John Burnet, Clarendon Paperbacks, Reprinted 2002, note on 4a12, p. 101) Jowett puts here into Socrates’ mouth his own thoughts, willy-nilly reminding one of the Master of Biblioll in Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure.

Euthyphro in the Cratylus – third continuation

Socrates says that Hermogenes is right when he trusts the inspiration of Euthyphro (o0rqw&j ge su\ pisteu/wn): ‘For at this moment (w(j kai\ nu=n) a new and ingenious thought strikes me (ge/ moi fai/nomai komyw_j e0nnenohk/nai).’ But Socrates is chary of his own enthusiasm: ‘and I am going to be in danger (kai\ kinduneu/sw) if I am not careful (e0a\n mh\ eu0labw~mai), before tomorrow’s dawn (e1ti th/meron) I shall be wiser than I ought to be (sofw&teroj tou= de/ontoj gene/sqai),’

What’s that new and ingenious thought? Hermogenes wanted to obtain an explanation of why men (a1nqrwpoi) are called “men” (“a1nqrwpoi”), and Socrates said that it was ’difficult to think out’ (xalepo/n e0stin e0nnoh=sai, 398e3): ‘Examine carefully what I am going to say (sko/pei dh\ o4 le/gw). And first (prw&ton me\n ga/r), one must understand this concerning the names (to\ toio/nde dei= e0nnoh=sai peri\ o0noma/twn), that we often put some letters in (o3ti polla/kij e0pemba/llomen gra/mmata) and pull other letters out (ta\ d’ e0cairou=men), and change accents (kai\ ta\j o0cu/thtaj metaba/llomen, 399a9).’ Socrates maintains that this is ‘what happened concerning the name of men’ (to\ tw~n a0nqrw&pwn o1noma pe/ponqen). ‘For from a phrase (e0k ga\r r9h/matoj) it became a name (o1noma ge/gonen), one letter (e9no\j gra/mmatoj), which is the a (tou= a), having been omitted (e0caireqe/ntoj) and the acute on the last syllable changed to a grave (kai\ barute/raj th=j teleuth=j genome/nhj, 399a8-9).’

Hermogenes does not understand: ‘How do you mean (Pw~j le/geij;)?’

Socrates: ‘Thus (W{de). The name “man” signifies this (shmai/nei tou=to to o1noma o9 a1nqrwpoj), that other animals (o3ti ta\ me\n a1lla qhri/a) don’t examine anything (ou0de\n e0piskopei=), or consider (ou0de\ a0nalogi/zetai), or look up at (ou0de\ a0naqrei=) what they see (w{n o9ra=|), but that man (o9 de\ a1nqrwpoj), as he can see something (a3ma e9w&raken) – and this is o1pwpe – he looks up (\a0naqrei=) and considers (kai\ logi/zetai) that which he can see (tou=to o4 o1pwpen), and hence (e0nteu=qen dh/) he alone of all animals (mo/non tw~n qhri/wn) is rightly called (o0rqw=j w)noma/sqh) a1nqrwpoj, examining what he can see (a0naqrw~n a4 o1pwpe).’ (399a3c6)

Hermogenes does not say anything in response to Socrates’ inspired explanation of a1nqrwpoj. And indeed, Socrates’ explanation is difficult to grasp and to reflect upon.

***

I always type Jowett’s translation, and then I compare it with the ‘corresponding’ Greek text, which often forces me to fundamentally transform Jowett’s translation, or abandon it and substitute my own translation. Nevertheless, I have kept intact Jowett’s ‘the acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave’, which stands for Socrates’ kai\ barute/raj th=j teleuth=j genome/nhj ('the ending having become barytone’, 399a8-9). By ‘the acute on the last syllable’ Jowett must mean the circumflex accent on a0naqrw~n, which Socrates views as acute (cf. o0cei/aj at 399b2, and o0cu/thtaj at 399a9).

***

Hermogenes asks Socrates to analyse (dielei=n) what comes next (to\ meta\ tou=to), that is ‘soul’ (yuxh/) and ‘body’ (sw~ma).

Socrates: ‘If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment (w(j me\n toi/nun e0k tou= paraxrh=ma le/gein), I should imagine that those who first used the name "psyche" (yuxh/) meant to express something like this (oi]mai/ ti toiou=ton noei=n tou\j th\n yuxh\n o0noma/santaj), that this (the soul) (w(j tou=to a1ra), when it is in the body (o9ta\n parh=| tw~| sw&mati), is the source of life to it [i.e. to the body] (ai1tio/n e0sti tou= zh=n au0tw~|), and gives the power of breath (th=n tou= a0napnei=n du/namin pare/xon) and revival (kai\ a0nayu=xon), and when this reviving power fails (a3ma de\ e0klei/pontoj tou= a0napsu/xontoj) then the body (to\ sw~ma) perishes and dies (a0po/llutai/ te kai\ teleuta=|), and this is why (o3qen dh/), if I am not mistaken (moi dokou=sin), they called it psyche (au0to\ psuxh\n kale/sai).’ (399d10-e3).

But at that moment Socrates envisages something more refined: ‘But please (ei0 de\ bou/lei) stay a moment (e1xe h0re/ma); I fancy (dokw~ ga/r) that I can discover something (moi/ ti kaqora=n) that will be more acceptable than this (piqanw&teron tou/tou) to the disciples of Euthyphro (toi=j a0mfi\ Eu0qu/frona), for I am afraid that they will scorn this explanation (tou/tou me\n ga/r, w(j e0moi\ dokei=, katafronh/saien a1n), and think it banal (kai\ h9gh/sainto fortiko\n ei]nai). What do you say to another (to/de de\ sko/pei e0a\n kai\ soi\ a0re/sh=|;)?’

Hermogenes: ‘Let me hear (Le/ge mo/non).’

Socrates: ‘What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body? What else but soul (th\n fu/sin pa/ntoj tou= sw&matoj, w3ste kai\ zh=n kai\ periie/nai, ti/ soi dokei= e1xein te kai\ o0xei=n a1llo h2 yuxh/;)?’

Hermogenes: ‘Just that (Ou0de\n a1llo).’

Socrates: ‘And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things (Ti/ de/; kai\ th\n tw~n a1llwn a9pa/ntwn fu/sin ou0 pisteu/eij A)nacago/ra| nou=n kai yuxh\n ei]nai th\n diakosmou=san kai\ e1xousan;)?’

Hermogenes: ‘Yes; I do (E1gwge).’

Socrates: ‘Then you may well call that power fuse/xh which carries and holds nature (kalw~j a1ra a2n to\ o1noma tou=to e1xoi th=| duna/mei tau/th| h4 fu/sin o0xei= kai\ e1xei “fuse/xhn” o0noma/zein), and this may be refined away into yuxh/ (e0ce/sti de\ kai\ “yuxh\n” komyeuo/menon le/gein).’

Hermogenes: ‘Certainly (Pa/nu me\n ou]n); and this derivation is, I think, more scientific than the other (kai\ dokei= ge/ moi tou=to e0kei/nou texnikw&teron ei]nai).’

Socrates: ‘It is so (Kai\ ga\r e1stin); although the name in its original form was assuredly a quaint one (geloi=on me/ntoi fai/netai w(j a0lhqw~j o0nomazo/men w(j e0te/qh).’ (399e3-400b7, tr. B. Jowett)