R. E. Allen maintains
that the theory Socrates has outlined in the Parmenides ‘is substantially that of the Phaedo and the Republic.’
He says: ‘In the Phaedo (74a-c),
equal things are distinguished from Equality on the ground that they are equal
to one thing but not to another, whereas Equality cannot be Inequality, nor
things just equal unequal (cf. Symposium
211a, Epistle VII 343a-b). At Republic V 479a-c, the chief ground for
positing the existence of Ideas is that sensible objects are qualified by
opposites.’
These
considerations led Allen to the following hypothesis concerning the origin of
the Theory of Forms: ‘The structure of the Parmenides,
then, suggests that difficulties in explaining qualification by opposites, difficulties
of the sort Zeno’s paradox raises, were an important motive of origin for the
theory of Ideas. This is confirmed by the Phaedo
and the Republic.’ (Plato’s Parmenides, translated with Comment by
R.E. Allen, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 90)
In the
dialogue, Parmenides has a very different theory about the origin of Socrates’
Theory of Forms: ‘I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one
idea of each kind is as follows (Oimai se
ek tou toioude hen hekaston eidos oiesthai einai): – You see a number of
great objects (hotan poll’ atta megala
soi doxȇi einai), and when you look at them there seems to you to be one
and the same idea in them all (mia tis
isȏs dokei idea hȇ autȇ einai epi panta idonti); hence you conceive of
greatness as one (hothen hen to mega
hȇgȇi einai).’ – ‘Very true, said Socrates (Alȇthȇ legeis, phanai, 132a1-5, tr. Jowett).’
Allen
completely misses the importance of this short exchange between the aging Parmenides
and the young Socrates: ‘Abstracting for the moment from the reference to
Socrates’ beliefs, and examining the content of what it is he is said to
believe, the argument is that if a plurality of things is large, then there is
some one Idea that is the same over all of them; if there is some one Idea that
is the same over all of them, then Largeness is one. The function of the one
over many premise, in its context, is not to provide an argument to show that
Largeness exists; the existence of Ideas generally, and of Largeness
specifically, has already been assumed. The premise is used to provide a reason
for supposing not that Ideas are but that they are one.’ (Allen, p. 153)
Since Allen
assumes that Socrates in the dialogue is just Plato’s fiction, he is blind to
what Parmenides is asking Socrates about. He is making a conjecture that the basis
on which Socrates came to the assumption that there is some one Idea that is
the same over all of the many things that carry its name was his observing that
all those things carried that same Idea or Form.
Allen is
right when he sees a close resemblance concerning the theory of Forms developed
in the Phaedo and the theory of Forms
subjected to Parmenides’ criticism in the Parmenides.
I agree with Allen’s relative dating of these two dialogues: Plato wrote the Phaedo before writing the Parmenides. But as I have argued in a
number of entries on my blog devoted to this theme, and in ‘Plato’s defence of
the Forms in the Parmenides’ on my
website, Plato’s insistence that the set-up outlined in the dialogue is
historical is to be taken seriously, which means that we must view the Parmenides, as to its content, as preceding
the Phaedo.
In the Parmenides Socrates introduces the Forms
as follows: ‘But tell me, Zeno (tode de
moi eipe), do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in
itself (ou nomizeis einai auto kath’
hauto eidos ti homoiotȇtos), and another idea of unlikeness, which is the
opposite of likeness (kai tȏi toioutȏi au
allo ti enantion, ho esti anomoion), and that in these two (toutoin de duoin ontoin), you and I and
all other things (kai eme kai se kai
t’alla) to which we apply the term many (ha dȇ polla kaloumen), participate (metalambanein) – things which participate in likeness (kai ta men tȇs homoiotȇtos metalambanonta)
become in that degree and manner like (homoia
gignesthai tautȇi te kai kata tosouton hoson an metalambanȇi); and so far
as they participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike (ta de tȇs anomoiotȇtos anomoia), or both
like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both (ta de amphoterȏn amphotera)?’
(128e6-129a6)
Then
Parmenides asks Socrates: ‘And would you make an idea of man apart from us and
from all other human creatures, or fire and water (Ti d’, anthrȏpou eidos chȏris hȇmȏn kai tȏn hoioi hȇmeis esmen pantȏn,
auto ti eidos anthrȏpou ȇ puros ȇ kai hudatos)?’ – Socrates: ‘I am often
undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or not (En aporiai pollakis dȇ, ȏ Parmenidȇ, peri
autȏn gegona, potera chrȇ phanai hȏsper peri ekeinȏn ȇ allȏs).’ (130c1-4) …
Parmenides: ‘That is because you are still young (Neos gar ei eti); the time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy
will have a firmer grasp of you (kai oupȏ
sou anteilȇptai philosophia hȏs eti antilȇpsetai kat’ emȇn doxan), and then
you will not despise even the meanest things (hote ouden autȏn atimaseis, 130e1-3, tr. Jowett).’
In the Phaedo Socrates fulfilled Parmenides’
prophesy, pushed aside his quibbles concerning the Forms – just as Plato did in
the Parmenides (see the preceding
post on my blog) – and envisaged the Forms as true causes.
***
There is
another ‘prophecy’, if a doubt can be viewed as prophecy, which appears to be
fulfilled in the Phaedo. In Plato’s Symposium the wise Diotima says to
Socrates: ‘These are the lesser mysteries of love (Tauta men oun ta erȏtika isȏs), into which even you, Socrates, may
enter (ȏ Sȏkrates, k’an su muȇtheiȇs);
to the greater and more hidden ones (ta
de telea kai epoptika) which are the crown of these, and to which, if you
pursue them in a right spirit, they will lead (hȏn heneka kai tuta estin, ean tis orthȏs metiȇi), I know not whether
you will be able to attain (ouk oid’ ei
hoios t’ an eiȇs, 209e5-210a2, tr. Jowett).’
Jowett’s
‘the greater and more hidden ones’ is a very poor attempt of translating into
English Diotima’s ta de telea kai
epoptika. Telos means ‘the end or
purpose of action’, ‘fulfilment’, ‘attainment’; teleos is an adjective that expresses the perfections of telos. Epoptikos is explained in LSJ
as ‘initiated to the highest mysteries’, but the word suggests ‘seeing that
which is to be seen’; presumably, the initiated were supposed to actually see
the divine, which it certainly means in Plato’s Symposium. For in what follows, Diotima describes the assent to the
actual seeing of absolute Beauty: ‘He
who has been instructed thus far in the things of love (hos gar an mechri entautha pros ta erȏtika paidagȏgȇthȇi) and who
has learned to see the beautiful in due course and succession (theȏmenos ephexȇs te kai orthȏs ta kala),
when he comes towards the end (pros telos
ȇdȇ iȏn tȏn erȏtikȏn) will suddenly perceive
(exaiphnȇs katopsetai ti; ‘he
will suddenly see something’) a
nature of wondrous beauty (thaumaston tȇn
phusin kalon), and this (touto ekeino),
Socrates (ȏ Sȏkrates), is the final
cause of all our former toils (hou dȇ
heneken kai hoi emprosthen pantes ponoi ȇsan) – a nature which in the first
place is everlasting (prȏton men aei on),
knowing no birth or death (oute
gignomenon oute apollumenon), growth (oute
auxanomenon) or decay (oute phthinon),
secondly (epeita), not fair in one
point of view (ou tȇi de kalon) and
foul in another (tȇi d’ aischron), or at one time or in one relation or at one place
fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul (oude tote men, tote de ou, oude pros men to
kalon, pros de to aischron, oud’ entha men kalon, entha de aischron) as if
fair to some (hȏs tisi men kalon) and
foul to others (tisi de aischron), or
in likeness of a face (oud’ au
phantasthȇsetai autȏi to kalon hoion prosȏpon ti) or hands (oude cheires) or any other part of a
bodily frame (oude allo ouden hȏn sȏma
metechei), or in any form of speech or knowledge (oude tis logos oude tis epistȇmȇ), or existing in any individual
being (oude pou on en heterȏi tini),
as for example (hoion), in a living
creature (en zȏȏi), whether in
heaven, or in earth (ȇ en gȇi ȇ en
ouranȏi), or anywhere else (ȇ en tȏi
allȏi); but beauty absolute (all’
auto kath’ hauto), separate (meth’
hautou), simple (monoeides), and
everlasting (aei on), which is
imparted to the ever growing and perishable beauties of all other beautiful
things, without itself suffering diminution, or increase, or any change (ta de alla panta kala ekeinou metechonta
tropon tina toiouton, hoion gignomenȏn te tȏn allȏn kai apollumenȏn mȇden
ekeino mȇte ti pleon mȇte elatton gignesthai mȇde paschein mȇden). He who, ascending
from these earthly things under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that beauty (hotan dȇ tis apo tȏnde dia to orthȏs
paiderastein epaniȏn ekeino to kalon archȇtai kathoran [‘to see’]),
is not far from the end (schedon an ti haptoito tou telous).’ (210e2-211b7, tr. B.
Jowett)
As the Phaedo testifies to it, this vision of
Beauty itself was never given to Socrates. For him the Forms remained a
hypothesis: ‘Well, here is what I mean (All’
hȏde legȏ); it is nothing new (ouden
kainon, 100b1), but what I have constantly spoken of both in the talk
we have been having and at other times too (all’
haper aei te allote kai en tȏi parelȇluthoti logȏi ouden pepaumai legȏn). I
am going to attempt a formal account of the sort of cause that I have been concerned
with (erchomai dȇ epicheirȏn soi
epideixasthai tȇs aitias to eidos ho pepragmateumai), and I shall go back
to my well-worn theme (kai eimi palin ep’ ekeina ta poluthrulȇta) and make it my
starting-point (kai archomai ap’ ekeinȏn);
that is, I shall assume the
existence of a beautiful that is in and by itself (hupothemenos einai ti kalon auto kath’ hauto), and a
good (kai agathon), and a great (kai mega), and so on with the rest of
them (kai t’alla panta); and if you
grant me them (ha ei moi didȏs te)
and admit their existence (kai sunchȏreis
einai tauta), I hope (elpizȏ)
they will make it possible for me to discover and expound to you the cause of
the soul’s immortality (soi ek toutȏn tȇn
aitian epideixein kai aneurȇsein hȏs athanaton psychȇ).’ (100b1-9, tr. R.
Hackforth)
Socrates
considered it the best hypothesis, but hypothesis nevertheless: ‘And if anyone
were to fasten upon the hypothesis itself (ei
de tis autȇs tȇs hupotheseȏs echoito), you would disregard him (chairein eȏiȇs an), and refuse to answer
(kai ouk apokrinaio) until you could
consider the consequences of it (heȏs an
ta ap’ ekeinȇs hormȇthenta skepsaio), and see whether they agreed or
disagreed with each other (ei soi
allȇlois sumphȏnei ȇ diaphȏnei). But when the time came for you to
establish the hypothesis itself (epeidȇ
de ekeinȇs autȇs deoi se didonai logon), you would pursue the same method (hȏsautȏs an didoiȇs): you would assume
some more ultimate hypothesis (allȇn au
hupothesin hupothemenos), the best you could find (hȇtis tȏn anȏthen beltistȇ phainoito), and continue until you
reached something satisfactory (heȏs epi
ti hikanon elthois).’ (101d3-e1, tr. Hackforth)
With this Theory
of Forms, Plato could never have conceived the Republic.
***
In Republic V, 473c-d, Socrates tells
Glaucon that only true philosophers can properly rule the cities and states. To
justify this claim, Socrates characterizes the true philosophers as ‘those who
love seeing the truth’ (tous tȇs alȇtheias philotheamonas, 475e4). To see the truth meant seeing the Forms, as Socrates explained in the discussion that
followed.
Glaucon: ‘But
I should like to know what you mean (alla
pȏs auto legeis)?’ – Soc. ‘To another I might have a difficulty in
explaining (Oudamȏs raidiȏs pros ge allon);
but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make (se de oimai homologȇsein moi to toionde).’
– ‘That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness (Epeidȇ estin enantion kalon aischrȏi), they are two (duo autȏ einai)? … And inasmuch as they
are two (Oukoun epeidȇ duo), each of
them is one (kai hen hekateron)? …
And of just and unjust (Kai peri dȇ
dikaiou kai adikou), good and evil (kai
agathou kai kakou), and of every other form (kai pantȏn tȏn eidȏn peri), the same remark holds (ho autos logos): taken singly, each of
them is one (auto men hen hekaston einai);
but from the various combinations of them with actions and bodies and with one
another (tȇi de tȏn praxeȏn kai sȏmatȏn
kai allȇlȏn koinȏniai), they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear
many (pantachou phantazomena polla
phainesthai hekaston)? … And this is the distinction which I draw (Tautȇi toinun diairȏ) between the
sight-loving, art-loving, practical class which you have mentioned (chȏris men hous nundȇ eleges philotheamonas
te kai philotechnous kai praktikous), and those of whom I am speaking (kai chȏris au peri hȏn ho logos), and
who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers (hous monous an tis orthȏs proseipoi philosophous).’ – Glauc. ‘How
do you distinguish them (Pȏs legeis)?’
– Soc. ‘The lovers of sounds and sights (Hoi
men pou philȇkooi kai philotheamones) are, as I conceive, fond of fine
tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out
of them (tas te kalas phȏnas aspazontai
kai chroas kai schȇmata kai panta ta ek tȏn toioutȏn dȇmiourgoumena), but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty (autou de tou kalou adunatos autȏn hȇ dianoia tȇn phusin idein te kai aspazesthai) … Few are
they who are able to attain this ideal beauty and contemplate it (Hoi de dȇ ep’ auto to kalon dunatoi ienai te kai horan [‘able to see’] kath’ hauto ara ou spanioi an eien).’ (475e5-476b11,
tr. Jowett) – These few, and only these few are true philosophers; it is
because they can see the Forms that
they, and only they, can properly rule the cities and states, as Plato believed
when he finally came to the conclusion that the political situation in Athens
was incurable, and that there was no part for him in politics in his native
city. With this thought he left Athens for his first journey to Italy and
Sicily (Plato, Seventh Letter
326a-b); he was forty when he undertook it (schedon
etȇ tettarakonta gegonȏs, SL
324a6).
***
In the first
paragraph of this post I quoted Allen’s ‘At Republic
V 479a-c, the chief ground for positing the existence of Ideas is that sensible
objects are qualified by opposites.’ To consider or look for any ‘ground for positing
the existence of Ideas’ by Plato is fundamentally wrong: Plato was firmly
convinced that he could see the
Forms.
Let me end
this post by reviewing Republic V 479a-d,
to which Allen refers, and consider its import. Instead of finding there any ‘ground
for positing the existence of Ideas’, we shall find there Plato’s viewing the
totality of what we can perceive with our senses as posited between true being
(the Forms) and nothingness.
Soc. ‘I
would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or
unchangeable Idea of beauty (legetȏ moi
kai apokrinesthȏ ho chrȇstos hos auto men kalon kai idean tina autou kallous mȇdemian
hȇgeitai aei men kata t’auta hȏsautȏs echousan), but only a number of
beautiful things (polla de ta kala
nomizei) – he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights (ekeinos ho philotheamȏn), who cannot bear to be told that the
beautiful is one (kai oudamȇi anechomenos
an ti hen to kalon phȇi einai), and the just is one (kai diakion), or that anything is one (kai t’alla houtȏ) – to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so
very kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things (Toutȏn gar dȇ, ȏ ariste, phȇsome, tȏn pollȏn
kalȏn), there is one which will not be found ugly (mȏn ti estin ho ouk aischron phanȇsetai); or of the just (kai tȏn dikaiȏn), which will not be
found unjust (ho ouk adikon); or of
the holy (kai tȏn hosiȏn), which will
not also seem unholy (ho ouk anosion)?’
– Glauc. ‘No (Ouk); these things
must, from different points of view, be found both beautiful and ugly (all’ anankȇ kai kala pȏs auta kai aischra
phanȇnai); and the same is true of the rest (kai hosa alla erȏtais).’ (478e7-479b2) … Soc. ‘If so, can any one
of those many things be said to be rather than not to be (Poteron oun esti mallon ȇ ouk estin hekaston tȏn pollȏn), that which
we happen to have termed it (touto ho an
tis phȇi auto einai, b9-10)? … Can they have a better place than between
being and not-being (Echeis oun autois
hoti chrȇsȇi, ȇ hopoi thȇseis kalliȏ thesin tȇs metaxu ousias te kai tou mȇ
einai)? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than not-being
(oute gar pou skotȏdestera mȇ ontos pros
to mallon mȇ einai phanȇsetai), or more full of light and existence than
being (oute phanotera ontos pros to
mallon einai) … Thus then we seem to have discovered (Hȇurȇkamen ara, hȏs eoiken) that the many notions which the
multitude entertains about the beautiful (hoti
ta tȏn pollȏn polla nomima kalou te peri) and about all other things (kai tȏn allȏn) are tossing about in some
region which is half-way between pure being and pure not-being (metaxu pou kulindeitai tou te mȇ ontos kai
tou ontos eilikrinȏs)?’ – Glauc. ‘We have (Hȇurȇkamen).’ (479c6-d5, tr. Jowett)
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