In ‘Three days in Prague devoted to philosophy – an
invitation’ (posted on July 8) I wrote: ‘The main uniting theme of the Three
days in Prague devoted to philosophy will be the question, how can philosophy contribute
to the optimal development of our HSN (human spiritual nature). It was this
question that has recently led me back to Kant (I devoted a lot of time to Kant
in my twenties), as can be seen from the entries on my blog devoted to him.
Kant has led me to thinking a lot about Hume, and Berkeley, and Locke, and so I
have decided to devote as much time to them before I go to Prague, as my work
on Aristotle and Kant will allow me.’
I was almost immediately rewarded for my decision to read
Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge.
In the ‘Elucidation’ (Erläuterung) to his exposition of time
Kant explains why ‘intelligent men’ (einsehende
Männer) expressed almost
unanimously objections against his theory, ‘which grants empirical reality to
time (welche der Zeit empirische Realität zugesteht), but denies to it
absolute and transcendental reality (aber
die absolute und transzendentale bestreitet)’ (B53) … men who cannot start
any intelligible arguments against the ideality of space (die gleichwohl gegen die Lehre von der Idealität
des Raumes nichts Einleuchtendes einzuwenden wissen).’ For this he gives
the following reason: ‘They have no hope of demonstrating apodeictically the
absolute reality of space, because the doctrine of idealism is against them,
according to which the reality of external objects is not capable of any strict
proof.’ (B54-55, tr. Meiklejohn) I highlighted this passage in my copy of the Critique and wrote on the margin:
‘Berkeley’. [In his Principles
Berkeley maintains ‘that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing
in the mind’ (par. 9).] As I did so, I remember being surprised that Berkeley
had had such a powerful influence on the minds of Kant’s contemporaries. And I
remember noticing a discrepancy between the idealism as Berkeley conceived of
it, and as Kant in the given passage reflected on it. For Berkeley did not think that ‘the reality
of external objects is not capable of any strict proof’; he believed that he
proved that there are no external objects, only ideas: ‘all place or extension
exists only in mind, as hath been already proved’ (par. 67).
Then, in the ‘Genral Remarks on Transcendental Aesthetic’ (Allgemeine Anmerkungen zur transzendentalen Ästhetik) I came across a passage
in which Kant refers to Berkeley: ‘If we ascribe objective reality to these
forms of representation [i.e. to space and time] (wenn man jenen Vorstellungsformen objektive Realität beilegt) it becomes impossible
to avoid changing everything into mere appearance (so kann man nicht vermeiden, dass nicht alles dadurch in blossen Schein
verwandelt werde.). For (Denn,) if
we regard space and time as properties (wenn
man den Raum und die Zeit als Beschaffenheiten ansieht,), which must be found
in objects as things in themselves, as sine quibus non of the possibility of
their existence (die ihrer Möglichkeit nach in Sachen an sich
angetroffen werden müssten,),
and reflect on the absurdities (und überdenkt die Ungereimheiten) in
which we then find ourselves involved (in
die man sich alsdann verwickelt,), inasmuch as we are compelled to admit
the existence of two infinite things, which are nevertheless not substances,
nor anything really inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary
conditions of the existence of all things, and moreover, that they must
continue to exist (indem zwei unendliche Dinge, die nicht Substanzen, auch nicht etwas
wirklich den Substanzen Inhärierendes,
dennoch Existierendes, ja die notwendige Bedingung der Existenz aller Dinge
sein müssen, auch übrig bleiben,), although all
existing things were annihilated (wenn gleich alle existierenden Dinge
aufgehoben werden;) – we cannot blame the good Berkeley (so kann man es dem guten Berkeley wohl nicht
verdenken,) for degrading bodies to mere illusory appearances (wenn er die Körper
zu blossem Schein herabsetzte.).’
At this point the discrepancy between Kant’s remark on ‘the
doctrine of idealism according to which the reality of external objects is not
capable of any strict proof’ and his remark on Berkeley became obvious. And so
I looked in the ‘Index of Names’ in my copy of the Critique, where I found another reference to Berkeley, which
referred me to Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’ from which I quote: ‘Idealism (Der Idealismus) – I mean material
idealism (ich verstehe den materialen)
– is the theory (ist die Theorie,) which
declares the existence of objects in space without us to be either (1) doubtful
and indemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible (welche das Dasein der Gegenstände
im Raum ausser uns entweder bloss für
zweifelhaft und unerweislich, oder für
falsch un unmöglich erklärt;). The first is the
problematical idealism of Descartes (der
erstere ist der problematische des Cartesius,), who admits the undoubted
certainty of only one empirical assertion (assertio), to wit, “I am” (der nur Eine empirische Behauptung
(assertio), nämlich: Ich bin, für ungezweifelt erklärt;). The second is the dogmatical
idealism of Berkeley (der zweite ist der
dogmatische des Berkeley,), who maintains that space, together with all the
objects of which it is the inseparable condition, is a thing which is in itself
impossible, and that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the
imagination (der den Raum, mit allen den
Dingen, welchen er als unabtrennliche Bedingung anhängt,
für etwas, was an sich selbst
unmöglich sei, und darum auch die
Dinge im Raum für
blosse Einbildungen erklärt.).
The dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable (Der dogmatische Idealismus ist unvermeidlich,), if we regard space
as a property of things in themselves (wenn
man den Raum als Eigenschaft, die den Dingen an sich selbst zukommen soll,
ansieht;); for in that case it is, with all to which it serves as condition
(denn da ist er mit allem, dem er zur
Bedingung dient,), a nonentity (ein
Unding). But the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already
destroyed in the transcendental aesthetic (Der
Grund zu diesem Idealismus aber ist von uns in der transzendentalen Ästhetik gehoben.). Problematical
idealism (Der problematische), which
makes no such assertion (der nichts hierüber behauptet), but only alleges
our incapacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by means of
immediate experience (sondern nur das
Unvermögen, ein Dasein ausser dem
unsrigen durch unmittelbare Erfahrung zu beweisen, vorgibt,), is a theory
rational and evidencing a thorough and philosophical mode of thinking (ist vernünftig
und einer gründlichen philosophischen
Denkungsart gemäss;),
for it observes the rule not to form a decisive judgement before sufficient
proof be shown (nämlich,
bevor ein hinreichender Beweis gefunden worden, kein entscheidendes Urteil zu
erlauben.). The desired proof must therefore demonstrate (Der verlangte Beweis muss also dartun,) that
we have experience of external things, and not mere fancies (dass wir von äusseren
Dingen auch Erfahrung und nicht bloss Einbildung haben;). For this purpose,
we must prove, that our internal and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is
itself possible only under the previous assumption of external experience (welches wohl nicht anders wird geshehen können, als wenn man beweisen kann, dass
selbst unsere innere, dem Cartesius unbezweifelte, Erfahrung nur unter
Voraussetzung äusserer Erfahrung möglich sei.).’ (B274, tr.
Meiklejohn)
***
To make the long story short, I should have written Descartes
instead of Berkeley on the margin of the highlighted passage in my copy of the Critique, to which I refer, and which I
quote, in the second paragraph of this post.
***
Those of my readers, who follow the German text, may have
noticed that in the text quoted in the third paragraph of this post Kant uses
the term Sache to denote ‘things in
themselves’ Sachen an sich. Cf. ‘A
Kant’s distinction I had missed’ with Alberto Vanzo’s comment, posted on August
2, and ‘A remark on Alberto Vanzo’s comment’, posted on August 17.
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