Kant in the Critique
of Pure Reason maintains that the limitation of all possible knowledge to
the realm of Erscheinungen, that is
to things not as they truly are, but as they appear to our senses, while
leaving things as they are in themselves, that is as they truly are, un-knowable,
is the only way in which morality can be safeguarded. For ‘morality necessarily
presupposes freedom (in the strictest sense) as a property of our will (die Moral setze notwendig Freiheit (im
strengsten Sinne) als Eigenschaft unseres Willens voraus, BXXVIII)’, but everything
that is in space and time is ruled by causal laws, which allow no freedom of
will. Kant maintains that had his critique not drawn the distinction between
things as objects of our experience (der
Dinge als Gegenstände
der Erfahrung), i. e. things as they appear to us (d. i. als Erscheinung), and the same things as things that are in
themselves (von eben denselben, als
Dingen an sich selbst), i. e. as they truly are, ‘the principle of
causality, and by consequence, the mechanism of nature as determined by
causality would then have absolute validity in relation to all things as
efficient causes (so müsste der Grundsatz der Kausalität und mithin der Naturmechanismus in
Bestimmung derselben durchaus von allen Dingen überhaupt
als wirkenden Ursachen gelten, BXXVII, tr. Meiklejohn).’
And so Kant offers the following solution: ‘The criticism
teaches us to take things in two senses (die
Kritik das Objekt in zweierlei Bedeutung nehmen lehrt), to wit as a
phenomenon (nämlich
als Erscheinung,), or as a thing in itself (oder als Ding an sich selbst) … the principle of causality has
reference only to things in the first sense, namely in so far as they are
objects of experience (der Grundsatz der
Kausalität nur auf Dinge im ersten
Sinne genommen, nämlich
sofern sie Gegenstände
der Erfahrung sind, geht) … and so one and the same will shall be thought
on the one hand, in the phenomenal sphere (in visible action), as necessarily
obedient to the law of nature, and, in so far, not free; and, on the other
hand, as belonging to the thing in itself, as not subject to that law, and,
accordingly, as free (so wird eben
derselbe Wille in der Erscheinung (den sichtbaren Handlungen) als dem
Natrugesetze notwendig gemäss
und sofern nicht frei, und doch andererseits, als einem Dinge an sich selbst
angehörig, jenem nicht unterworfen,
mithin als frei, gedacht, B XXVII-XXVIII, my translation.).’
Kant’s concept of free will belonging to the ‘thing in
itself’ does not mean that it is free from causation; he points out that ‘The
will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings (Der Wille ist eine Art von Kausalität
lebender Wesen) so far as they are rational (so fern sie vernünftig
sind,). Freedom would then be the property this causality has (und Freiheit würde
diejenige Eigenschaft dieser Kausalität
sein,) of being able to work independently of determination by alien causes
(da sie unabhängig
von fremden sie bestimmenden Ursachen wirkend sein kann;); just as natural
necessity is a property characterizing the causality of all non-rational beings
(so wie Naturnotwendigkeit die
Eigenschaft der Kausalität
aller vernunftlosen Wesen,) – the property of being determined by the
influence of alien causes (durch den
Einfluss fremder Ursachen zur Tätigkeit
bestimmt zu werden).’ (Groundwork of
the Metaphysic of Morals {Grundlegung
zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 80}, tr. H. J. Paton)
Will viewed as causality of rational living beings cannot be
separated from actions it causes. But how can one and the same will, and any
one of the actions it causes, be viewed on the one hand as Erscheinung, as phenomenon, and thus necessarily obedient to the
law of nature and not free, and on the other hand, as belonging to the ‘thing
in itself’, as not subject to that law and free? It might seem that Kant’s
solution is very similar to the solution offered by Hume: ‘He defines “liberty”
and “necessity” in a way that allows for a person’s being both free and
determined: “Liberty” is “a power of acting or not acting, according to the
determination of the will” (8.23) in circumstances in which an actor is not
constrained to choose one way or another. “Necessity” is causal necessity …
actions are determined – that is, necessitated – in all cases, because every
effect, including volitions and actions, has a cause.’ (Tom L. Beauchamp’s
‘Introduction’ to David Hume, An Enquiry
concerning Human Understanding, Oxford University Press 1999, pp. 39-40) But
free actions Hume talks about are in Kant’s view subject to necessity and
cannot be viewed as free.
Kant does not explain how one and the same action can be
viewed as free in the intelligible world, yet un-free in the phenomenal world,
yet he insists that this is the case: ‘A rational being (Das vernünftige
Wesen) counts himself, qua
intelligence (zählt
sich als Intelligenz), as belonging to the intelligible world (zur Verstandeswelt,), and solely qua efficient cause belonging to the
intelligible world (und, bloss als eine
zu dieser gehörende wirkende Ursache,) does
he give to his causality the name of ‘will’ (nennt es seine Kausalität
einen Willen.). On the other side (Von
der anderen Seite), however, he is conscious of himself as also a part of
the sensible world (ist es sich seiner
doch auch als eines Stücks
der Sinnenwelt bewusst,), where his actions (in welcher seine Handlungen) are encountered as mere appearances of
this causality (als blosse Erscheinungen
jener Kausalität, angetroffen werden,).
Yet the possibility of these actions cannot be made intelligible by means of
such causality, since with this we have no direct experience (deren Möglichkeit
aber aus dieser, die wir nicht kennen, nicht einsehen werden kann); and
instead these actions, as belonging to the sensible world, have to be
understood as determined by other appearances – namely, by desires and inclinations
(an deren Statt jene Handlungen als
bestimmt durch andere Erscheinungen, nämlich
Begierden und Neigungen, als zur Sinnenwelt gehörig,
eingesehen werden müssen.).’
(Grundlegung, p. 88, tr. Paton)
From Hume’s point of view, actions determined by our desires
and inclinations are free.
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