Writing scientifically

Phaedrus: What way is this (Ti/na tou=ton;)?

Socrates: To give the actual words (Au0ta\ me\n ta\ r9h/mata ei0pei=n) would not be easy (ou0k eu0pete/j); but I’m willing to say how one should write, if it is to be as scientific as it is possible to be (w(j de\ dei= gra/fein, ei0 me/llei texnikw_j e1xein kaq’ o3son e0nde/xetai, le/gein e0qe/lw).

Phaedrus: Say then (Le/ge dh/).

Socrates: Since the power of speech (E)peidh\ lo/gou du/namij) is in fact a leading of the soul (tugxa/nei yuxagwgi/a ou]sa), the man who is going to be an expert in rhetoric (to\n me/llonta r9htoriko\n e1sesqai) must know how many forms soul has (a0na/gkh ei0de/nai yuxh\ o3sa ei1dh e1xei). Their number is so and so (e1stin ou]n to/sa kai\ to/sa), and they are of such and such kinds (kai\ toi=a kai\ toi=a), which is why some people are like this, and others like that (o3qen oi9 me\n toioi/de, oi9 de\ toioi/de gi/gnontai); and since these have been distinguished in this way (tou/twn de\ dh\ ou3tw dih|rhme/nwn), then again there are so many forms of speeches (lo/gwn au] to/sa kai\ to/sa e0stin ei1dh), each one of such and such a kind (toio/nde e3kaston). So people of one kind (oi9 me\n ou]n toioi/de) are easily persuaded for this reason by one kind of speech to hold one kind of opinion (u9po\ tw~n toiw&nde dia\ th/nde th\n ai0ti/an e0j ta\ toia/de eu0peiqei=j), while people of another kind (oi9 de\ toioi/de) are for these reasons (dia\ ta/de) difficult to persuade (duspeiqei=j); having then grasped these things satisfactorily, after that the student must observe them as they are in real life, and actually being put into practice, and be able to follow them with keen perception (dei= dh\ tau=ta i9kanw~j noh/santa, me/ta tau=ta qew&menon au0ta\ e0n tai=j pra/cesi o1nta te kai\ pratto/mena, o0ce/wj th=| ai0sqh/sei du/nasqai e0pakoloqei=n), or otherwise get no advantage, as yet, from the things he heard earlier when he was with me (h2 mhde\n ei]nai/ pw ple/on au0tw~| w{n to/te h1kouen lo/gwn sunw&n). But when he both has sufficient ability to say what sort of man is persuaded by what sort of things (o3tande\ ei0pei=n te i9kanw~j e1xh| oi[oj u9f’ oi3wn pei/qetai), and is capable of telling himself when he sees him there that this is the man and this is the nature which was discussed before (paragigno/meno/n te dunato\j h2|  diaisqano/menoj e9autw|~ e0ndei/knusqai o3ti ou[to/j e0sti kai\ au3th h9 fu/sij peri\ h[j to/te h]san oi9 lo/goi), now actually present in front of him (nu=n e1rgw| parou=sa/ oi9), to whom he must now apply these kinds of speeches in this way to persuade him of this kind of thing (h[| prosoiste/on tou/sde w{de tou\j lo/gouj e0pi\ th\n tw~nde peiqw&); when he now has all of this (tau=ta d’ h1dh pa/nta e1xonti), and has also grasped the occasions for speaking (proslabo/nti kairou\j tou= po/te lekte/on) and for holding back (kai\ e0pisxete/on), and for speaking concisely (braxulogi/aj te au]) and piteously (kai\ e0leinologi/aj) and in exaggerated fashion (kai\ deinw&sewj), and for all the forms of speeches he may learn (e9ka/stwn te o3sa a2n ei1dh ma/qh| lo/gwn), recognising the right and wrong time for these (tou/twn th\n eu0kairi/an te kai\ a0kairi/an diagno/nti), then his grasp of the science will be well and completely finished (kalw~j kai\ tele/wj e0sti\n h9 te/xnh a0peirgasme/nh), but not before that (pro/teron d’ ou1); but in whichever of these things someone is lacking (a1ll’ o3ti a2n au0tw~n tij e0llei/ph|) when he speaks (le/gwn) or teaches (h2 dida/skwn) or writes (h2 gra/fwn), and says he speaks scientifically (fh=| de\ te/xnh| le/gein), the person who disbelieves him is in the stronger position (o9 mh\ peiqo/menoj kratei=).

  

First, in the second place, thirdly

Socrates: In that case it is clear (Dh=lon a1ra) that both Thrasymachus and anyone else who seriously teaches a science of rhetoric (o3ti Qrasu/maxo/j te kai\ o4j a2n a1lloj spoudh=| te/xnhn r9htorikh\n didw~|) will first write with complete accuracy and enable us to see whether soul is something which is one and uniform in nature (prw~ton pa/sh| a0kribei/a| gra/yei te kai\ poih/sei yuxh\n i0dei=n, po/teron e4n kai\ o3moion pe/fuken) or complex like the form of the body (h2 kata\ sw&matoj formh\n polueide/j); for this is what we say is to reveal the nature of something (tou=to ga/r famen fu/sin ei]nai deiknu/nai).

Phaedrus: Absolutely (Panta/pasi me\n ou]n).

Socrates: And in the second place (Deu/teron de/ ge), he will make clear with which of its forms it is its nature to do what, or to have what done to it by what (o3tw| ti/ poiei=n h2 paqei=n u9po\ tou= pe/fuken).

Phaedrus: Of course (Ti/ mh/n;).

Socrates: And then, thirdly (Tri/ton de\ dh/), having classified the kinds of speeches and of soul (diataca/menoj ta\ lo/gwn te kai\ yuxh=j ge/nh), and the ways in which these are affected (kai\ ta\ tou/twn paqh/mata), he will go through all the causes (di/eisi pa/saj ai0ti/aj), fitting each to each (prosarmo/ttwn e3kaston e9ka/stw|) and explaining what sort of soul’s being subjected to what sorts of speeches necessarily results in one being convinced and other not, giving the cause in each case (kai\ dida/skwn oi3a ou]sa u9f’ oi3wn lo/gwn di0 h4n ai0ti/an e0c a0na/gkhj h9 me\n pei/qetai, h9 de\ a0peiqei=).

Phaedrus: It would certainly seem to be best like that (Ka/llista gou=n a1n, w(j e1oik’, e1xoi ou3twj).

Socrates: Indeed, my friend, if a model speech is written or a speech actually given on a subject in any other way than this, it will never be given or written scientifically (Ou1toi me\n ou]n, w} fi/le, a1llwj e0ndeiknu/menon h2 lego/menon te/xnh| pote lexqh/setai h2 grafh/setai) – not on any other subject (ou1te ti a1llo), and not on this one (ou1te tou=to). But those who now write manuals of rhetoric, the people you have listened to (A0ll’ oi9 nu=n gra/fontej, w{n su\ a0kh/koaj, te/xnaj lo/gwn), are cunning (panou=rgoi ei0sin), and keep the secret to themselves (kai\ a0pokru/ptontai), although they know perfectly well about soul (ei0do/tej yuxh=j pe/ri pagka/lwj); so until they both speak and write in this way (pri\n a2n ou]n to\n tro/pon tou=ton le/gwsi/ te kai\ gra/fwsi), let us not believe their claim (mh\ peiqw&meqa au0toi=j) that they write scientifically (te/xnh| gra/fein).

  

Proceeding scientifically

 

Socrates: Well then (To\ toi/nun), on the subject of nature (peri\ fu/sewj), see (sko/pei) what Hippocrates and the true account say about it (ti/ pote le/gei I9ppokra/thj te kai\ o9 a0lhqh\j lo/goj). Shouldn’t one reflect about the nature of anything like this (a]r’ ou0x w{de dei= dianoei=sqai peri\ o9touou=n fu/sewj): first (prw~ton me/n), is the thing about which we will want to be experts ourselves and be capable of making others expert simple or complex (a9plou=n h2 polueide/j e0stin ou[ pe/ri boulhso/meqa ei]nai au0toi\ texnikoi\ kai\ a1llon dunatoi\ poiei=n)? Next (e1peita de/), if it is simple (a2n me\n a9plou=n h]|), we should consider, shouldn’t we, what natural capacity it has for acting and on what (skopei=n th\n du/namin au0tou=, ti/na pro\j ti/ pe/fuken ei0j to\ dra=n e1xon), or what capacity it has for being acted upon, and by what (h2 ti/na ei0j to\ paqei=n u9po\ tou=); and if it has more forms than one (e0a\n de\ plei/w ei1dh e1xh|), we should count these (tau=ta a0riqmhsa/menon), and see in the case of each, as in the case where it had only one (o3per e0f’ e9no/j, tou=t’ i0dei=n e0f’ e9ka/stou), with which of them it is its nature to do what (tw~| ti/ poiei=n au0to\ pe/fuken), or with which to have what done to it by what (h2 tw~| ti/ paqei=n u9po\ tou=;)?

Phaedrus: Probably (Kinduneu/ei), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: At any rate proceeding without doing these things (H( gou=n a1neu tou/twn me/qodoj) would be just like a blind man’s progress (e0oi/koi a2n w#sper tuflou= porei/a|). But on no account must we represent the man who pursues anything scientifically (a0ll’ ou0 mh\n a0peikaste/on to/n ge te/xnh| metio/nta o9tiou=n) as like someone blind or deaf (tuflw~| ou0de\ kwfw~|); rather it is clear (a0lla\ dh=lon w(j) that if anyone teaches anyone rhetoric in a scientific way (a1n tw&| tij te/xnh| lo/gouj didw~|), he will reveal precisely the essential nature of that thing (th\n ou0si/an dei/cei a0kribw~j th=j fu/sewj tou/tou) to which his pupil will apply his speeches (pro\j o4 tou\j lo/gouj prosoi/sei); and that, I think, is soul (e1stai de/ pou yuxh\ tou=to).

Phaedrus: Of course (Ti/ mh/n;).

Socrates: Then all his effort is concentrated on that (Ou0kou=n h9 a3milla au0tw~| te/tatai pro\j tou=to pa=sa); for it is in the soul that he tries to produce conviction (peiqw_ ga\r e0n tou/tw| poiei=n e0pixeirei=), True (h] ga/r;)?

Phaedrus: Yes (Nai/).

 

The science of medicine and the science of rhetoric

 

Socrates: The method of the science of medicine is, I suppose (O9 au0to/j pou tro/poj te/xnhj i0atrikh=j), the same as that of the science of rhetoric (o3sper kai\ r9htorikh=j).

Phaedrus: How is that (Pw~j dh/;)?

Socrates: In both it is necessary to determine the nature of something (E0n a0mfote/raij dei= diele/sqai fu/sin), in the one the nature of body (sw&matoj me\n e0n th=| e9te/ra|), in the other the nature of soul (yuxh=j de\ e0n th=| e9te/ra|), if you are to proceed scientifically, and not merely by knack and experience (ei0 me/lleij, mh\ tribh=| mo/non kai\ e0mpeiri/a| a0lla\ te/xnh|), to produce health and strength in the one by applying medicines and diet to it (tw| me\n fa/rmaka kai\ trofh\n prosfe/rwn u9gi/eian kai\ r9w&mhn e0mpoih/sein), and to pass on to the other whatever virtuous conviction you wish by applying words and practices in conformance with law and custom (th=| de\ lo/gouj te kai\ e0pithdeu/seij nomi/mouj peiqw_ h4n a2n bou/lh| kai\ a0reth\n paradw&sein).

Phaedrus: Probably it is like that, Socrates (To\ gou=n ei0ko/j, w} Sw&kratej, ou3twj).

Socrates: Then do you think it is possible to understand the nature of soul satisfactorily (Yuxh=j ou]n fu/sin a0ci/wj lo/gou katanoh=sai oi1ei dunato\n ei]nai) without understanding the nature of the whole (a1neu th=j tou= o3lou fu/sewj;)?

Phaedrus: If one is to place any reliance in Hippocrates the Asclepiad (Ei0 me\n I9ppokra/tei ge tw~| tw~n A0sklhpiadw~n dei= ti piqe/stai), one can’t understand about the body either without this procedure (ou0de\ peri\ sw&matoj a1neu th=j meqo/dou tau/thj).

Socrates: And he’s right, my friend (Kalw~j ga/r, w} e9tai=re, le/gei); but besides Hippocrates the Asclepiad we should examine our account (xrh\ me/ntoi pro\j tw~| I9ppokra/tei to\n lo/gon e0ceta/zonta) to see (skopei=n) if it agrees with him (ei0 sumfwnei=).

Phaedrus: Agreed (Fhmi/).

 

Pericles and Anaxagoras

 

Socrates: And what do we think, if the ‘honey-toned Adrastus’ (Ti/ de\ to\n meli/ghrun A1draston oi0o/meqa), or Pericles (h2 kai\ Perikle/a), heard of those really fine techniques we were going through just now (ei0 a0kou/seian w{n nundh\ h9mei=j dih|=men tw~n pagka/lwn texnhma/twn) – things like ‘speaking with brevity’ (braxulogiw~n te) and ‘speaking with images’ (kai\ ei0konologiw~n), and all the other things which we went through (kai\ o3sa a1lla dielqo/ntej) and said we should look at under the light (u9p’ au0ga\j e1famen ei]nai skepte/a) – do we think that they, like you and me, would coarsely utter some uneducated expression (po/teron xalepw~j a2n au0tou/j, w#sper e0gw& te kai\ su/, u9p’ a0groiki/aj r9h=ma/ ti ei0pei=n a0pai/deuton) at those who have written these things up (ei0j tou\j tau=ta gegrafo/taj te) and teach them (kai\ dida/skontaj) as a science of rhetoric (w(j r9htorikh\n te/xnhn), or because they are wiser than us (h2 a3te h9mw~n o1ntaj sofwte/rouj), do we think they would reproach us too (ka2n nw~|n e0piplh=cai), and say (ei0po/ntaj) ‘Phaedrus and Socrates (W] Faidre/ te kai\ Sw~kratej), one should not get angry (ou0 xrh\ xalepai/nein), but be forgiving (a0lla\ suggignw&skein), if some people (ei1 tinej) who are ignorant of dialectic (mh\ e0pista/menoi diale/gesqai) prove unable to give a definition (a0du/natoi e0ge/nonto o9ri/sasqai) of what rhetoric is (ti/ pot’ e1stin r9htorikh/), and as a result of being in this state (e0k de\ tou&tou tou= pa/qouj) think that they have discovered rhetoric when they have learned necessary preliminaries to the science (ta\ pro\ th=j te/xnhj a0nagkai=a maqh/mata e1xontej r9htorikh\n w)|h/qhsan hu9rhke/nai), and believe that when they teach these things to other people (kai\ tau=ta dh\ dida/skontej a1llouj) they have given them a complete course in rhetoric (h9gou=ntai/ sfisin tele/wj r9htorikh\n dedida/xqai), and that the matter of putting all these things persuasively and of arranging the whole (to\ de\ e3kasta tou/twn piqanw~j le/gein te kai\ to\ o3lon suni/stasqai), as something involving no difficulty (ou0de\n e1rgon o1n), their pupils must supply in their speeches from their own resources (au0tou\j dei=n par’ e9autw~n tou\j maqhta/j sfwn pori/zesqai e0n toi=j lo/goij)’?

Phaedrus: I rather think (A0lla\ mh/n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), that the substance of the science which these men teach and write up as rhetoric is something like that (kinduneu/ei ge toiou=to/n ti ei]nai to\ th=j te/xnhj h4n ou]toi oi9 a1ndrej w(j r9htorikh\n dida/skousin te kai\ gra/fousin), and to me, at any rate, you seem to be right (kai\ e1moige dokei=j a0lhqh= ei0rhke/nai); but how and from where can one acquire for oneself the science which belongs to the real expert in rhetoric and the really persuasive speaker (a0lla\ dh\ th\n tou= tw~| o1nti r9htorikou= te kai\ piqanou= te/xnhn pw~j kai\ po/qen a1n tij du/naito pori/sasqai;)?

Socrates: As for the ability to acquire it (To\ me\n du/nasqai), Phaedrus (w} Fai=dre), so as to become a complete performer (w#ste a0gwnisth\n te/leon gene/sqai), probably (ei0ko/j) – perhaps even necessarily (i1swj de\ kai\ a0nagkai=on) – the matter is as it is in all other cases (e1xein w#sper ta]lla): if it is naturally in you to become a good orator (ei0 me/n soi u9pa/rxei fu/sei r9htoikw|~ ei]nai), a notable orator you will be (e1sh| r9h/twr e0llo/gimoj), when you have got knowledge and practice besides (proslabw_n e0pisth/mhn te kai\ mele/thn), and whatever you lack of these (o3tou d’ a2n e0llei/ph|j tou/twn), you will be incomplete in this respect (tau/th| d’ a0telh\j e1sh|). But as for the part of it which is a science (o3son de\ au0tou= te/xnh), the way of proceeding seems not to be the one that Lysias and Thrasymachus choose (ou0x h[| Lusi/aj te kai\ Qrasu/maxoj poreu/etai dokei= moi fai/nesqai h9 me/qodoj).

Phaedrus: Well how, then (A0lla\ ph=| dh/;)?

Socrates: It is not surprising, I suppose, my good fellow, that Pericles turned out to be the most complete of all with respect to rhetoric (Kinduneu/ei, w} a1riste, ei0ko/twj o9 Periklh=j pa/ntwn telew&tatoj ei0j th\n r9htorikh\n gene/sqai).

Phaedrus: Why do you say that (Ti/ dh/;)?

Socrates: All sciences of importance (Pa=sai o3sai mega/lai tw~n texnw~n) require the addition (prosde/ontai) of babbling and lofty talk about nature (a0dolesxi/aj kai\ metewrologi/aj fu/sewj pe/ri); for the relevant high-mindedness and effectiveness in all directions seem to come to a man from some such source as that (to\ ga\r u9yhlo/noun tou=to kai\ pa/nth| telesiourgo\n e1oiken e0nteuqe/n poqen ei0sie/nai). This is something that Pericles acquired in addition to his natural ability (o4 kai\ Periklh=j pro\j tw~| eu0fuh\j ei]nai e0kth/sato); for I think because he fell with Anaxagoras, who was just such a person (prospesw_n ga\r oi]mai toiou/tw| o1nti A0naxago/ra|), and became filled with such lofty talk (metewrologi/aj e0mplhsqei\j), and arrived at the nature of mind and of absence of mind (kai\ e0pi\ fu/sin nou= te kai\ a0noi/aj a0fiko/menoj), which were the very subjects about which Anaxagoras used to talk so much (w{n dh\ pe/ri to\n polu\n lo/gon e0poiei=to A0nacago/raj), he was able to draw from there and apply to the science of speaking (e0nteu=qen ei3lkusen e0pi\ th\n tw~n lo/gwn te/xnhn) what was applicable to it (to\ pro/sforon au0th=|).

Phaedrus: What do you mean by that (Pw~j tou=to le/geij;)?

And what again?

 

Socrates: And what again if someone came up to Sophocles or Euripides (Ti/ d’ ei0 Sofoklei= au] proselqw_n kai\ Eu0ripi/dh| tij) and said (le/goi) that he knew how to compose very long passages about a small subject (o3ti e0pi/statai peri\ smikrou= pra/gmatoj r9h/seij pammh/keij poiei=n) and very short ones about a large subject (kai\ peri\ mega/lou pa/nu smikra/j), and piteous speeches, when he wished (o3tan te bou/lhtai oi0ktra/j), or conversely (kai\ tou0nanti/on au]), frightening (fobera/j) and threatening ones (kai\ a0peilhtika/j), and everything else like that (o3sa t’ a1lla toiau=ta), and that he thought that by teaching these things he was passing on the making of tragedy (kai\ dida/skwn au0ta\ tragw|di/aj poi/hsin oi1etai paradido/nai;)?

Phaedrus: They too, I think, Socrates (Kai\ ou[toi a1n, w} Sw&kratej, oi]mai), would laugh (katagelw|~en) if someone thought (ei1 tij oi1etai) that tragedy was anything other than (tragw|di/an a1llo ti ei]nai h1) the arrangement of these things – their being put together so as to fit both each other and the whole (th\n tou/twn su/stasin pre/pousan a0llh/loij te kai\ tw~| o3lw| sunistame/nhn).

Socrates: But I don’t think they would abuse him coarsely (A0ll’ ou0k a2n a0groi/kwj ge oi]mai loidorh/seian); just as  a musical expert (a0ll’ w#sper a2n mousiko/j), if he met someone who thought he knew all about harmony (e0ntuxw_n a0ndri\ oi0ome/nw| a9rmonikw|~ ei]nai) just because he happened to know how to produce the highest and the lowest notes on a string (o3ti dh\ tugxa/nei e0pista/menoj w(j oi[o/n te o0cuta/thn kai\ baruta/thn xordh\n poiei=n), would not say fiercely (ou0k a0gri/wj ei1poi a1n) ‘You’re off your head, you wretch’ (W] moxqhre/, melagxola=|j), but, being a musician (a0ll/ a3te mousiko\j w!n), more gently (pra|o/teron o3ti), ‘My dear fellow (W} a1riste), the person who is going to be an expert in harmony must certainly know that (a0na/gkh me\n kai\ tau=ta e0pi/stasqai to\n me/llonta a9rmoniko\n e1sesqai), but there is nothing to prevent someone in your condition from having not the slightest understanding of harmony (ou0de\n mh\n kwlu/ei mhde\ smikro\n a9rmoni/aj e0pai+/ein to\n th\n sh\n e3cin e1xonta); for what you know is what has to be learned before harmony itself (ta\ ga\r pro\ a9rmoni/aj a0nagkai=a maqh/mata e0pi/stasai), not the elements of harmony as such (a0ll’ ou0 ta\ a9rmonika/).’

Phaedrus: Quite right (O)qo/tata/ ge).

Socrates: Then Sophocles too (Ou0kou=n kai\ o9 Sofoklh=j) would say that the man displaying himself to him and to Euripides (to/n sfisin e0pideiknu/menon) knew the preliminaries to tragedy (ta\ pro\ tragw|di/aj a2n fai/h) and not its elements (a0ll’ ou0 ta\ tragika/), and Acumenus (kai\ o9 A0koumeno/j) that the individual in his case knew the preliminaries to medicine but not the elements of medicine (ta\ pro\ i0atrikh=j a0ll’ ou0 ta\ i0atrika/).

Phaedrus: Absolutely (Panta/pasi me\n ou]n).

Let’s leave the small points

 

Socrates: Then let’s leave the small points (E0w~men dh\ ta/ ge smikra/); let’s hold what we have more closely up to the light (tau=ta de\ u9p’ au0ga\j ma=llon i1dwmen), and see just what the power of the science is which is contained in them (ti/na kai/ pot’ e1xei th\n th=j te/xnhj du/namin).

Phaedrus: A very forceful power it is (Kai\ ma/la e0rrwme/nhn), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), when it’s a question of mass gatherings (e1n ge dh\ plh/qouj suno/doij).

Socrates: You’re right (E1xei ga/r). But see, my fine fellow, whether after all you don’t think, as I do, that their warp has some gaps in it (a0ll’, w} dimo/nie, i0de\ kai\ su\ ei0 a1ra kai\ soi\ fai/netai diesthko\j au0tw~n to\ h1trion w#sper e0moi/).

Phaedrus: Do show me (Dei/knue mo/non).

Socrates: Tell me then (Ei0pe\ dh/ moi): if someone came to your friend Eryximachus (ei1 tij proselqw_n tw~| e9tai/rw| sou E0rucima/xw|) or his father Acumenus (h2 tw~| patri\ au0tou= A0koumenw~|) and said (ei1poi o3ti) ‘I know how to apply certain things to people’s bodies (E0gw_ e0pi/stamai toiau=t’ a1tta sw&masi prosfe/rein) so as to make them warm (w#ste qermai/nein t’), if I want to (e0a\n bou/lwmai), and to cool them down (kai\ yu/xein), and if I see fit (kai\ e0a\n me\n do/ch| moi), to make them vomit (e0mei=n poiei=n), or again (e0a\n d’ au]) make their bowels move (ka/tw diaxwrei=n), and all sorts of things like that (kai\ a1lla pa/mpolla toiau=ta); and because I know all that (kai\ e0pista/menoj au0ta/), I claim to be an expert doctor (a0ciw~ i0atriko\j ei]nai) and to be able to make an expert of anyone else (kai\ a1llon poiei=n) to whom I impart knowledge of these things (w{| a2n tou=twn e0pisth/mhn paradw~)’ – when they heard him, what do you think they would say (ti/ a2n oi1ei a0kou/santaj ei0pei=n;)?

Phaedrus: What else (Ti/ d’ a1llo ge) but to ask him (h2 e0re/sqai) whether he also knew (ei0 prosepi/statai) both to whom he should do all these things and when (kai\ ou3stinaj dei= kai\ o9po/te e3kasta tou/twn poiei=n), and to what extent (kai\ me/xri o9po/sou;)?

Socrates: So if he said (Ei0 ou]n ei1poi o3ti) ‘No, not at all (Ou0damw~j); but I expect (a0ll’ a0ciw~) the person who has learned these things from me (to\n tau=ta par’ e0mou= maqo/nta) to be able to do the things you ask about for himself (au0to\n oi[o/n t’ ei]nai poiei=n a4 e0rwta=|j;)’?

Phaedrus: I think they would say (Ei1poien a2n oi]mai) that the man was mad (o3ti mai/netai a3nqrwpoj), and thought he had become a doctor from having heard something somewhere from a book or from having stumbled across some common or garden remedies (kai\ e0k bibli/ou poqe\n a0kou/saj h2 perituxw_n farmaki/oij i0atro\j oi1etai gegone/nai), when he had no knowledge of the science itself (ou0de\n e0pai+/wn th=j te/xnhj).