Můj sen o Ukrajině

Dnes ráno jsem se probudil trochu unavený, a tak jsem si řekl, že si ještě na chvilku lehnu, jen na chvilku, abych se mentálně i fyzicky připravil pro každodenní ranní koupel s důkladnou masáží. Z toho chvilkového poležení se stala hodina, já usnul, a měl jsem sen o Ukrajině. Byl jsem v Kyjevě s manželkou a synem, abych tam přednášel dějiny filozofie. Jak už to ve snech bývá, moje první manželka Zdena se propojila v jedno s mou druhou ženou Doinou, můj syn Lukáš z prvního manželství se spojil v jedno se synem Danem z druhého manželství. Celý ten sen byl nesporně spojen s mými dvěma přednáškami pro Ústav východoevropských studí, které budu mít na Filozofické fakultě počátkem května.

Jak došlo k tomu, že budu moci mít dvě přednášky na Filozofické fakultě, když veškeré mé předchozí pokusy o takovou možnost selhaly? Na závěr korespondence týkající se Vaculíkova Českého snáře jsem Haně Kosákové napsal: ‚Ještě k Vám mám prosbu. Rád bych se ještě jednou podíval do Prahy. Zvažte, zda by nebylo možné, aby mě Váš ústav pozval k přednášce o Platonovi.‘

Hana Kosáková odpověděla, že přednášku na FFUK může zajistit organizačně: ‚a hodí se nám, filosofických témat se nám nedostává; potíž je ale ve finanční stránce. Obávám se, že ústav nebude schopen Vám nabídnout nic na dopravu ani ubytování, maximálně jen symbolický honorář. Zní to jako výmluva, ale taková je bohužel současná realita.‘

Odpověděl jsem: ‚To mi vyhovuje. Nekouřím, nepiju, něco jsem si našetřil. K stáří je člověk sentimentální; v Praze jsem se narodil.’

Hana Kosáková mi napsala: ‚Ještě jsem Vám chtěla dopředu říct, že naši studenti nejsou příliš obeznámeni s dějinami filosofie, značnou část jich tvoří studenti z Východu (Rusko, Ukrajina, Bělorusko) - možná by pro ně tedy byla zajímavá a inspirativní i Vaše disidentská zkušenost.‘

Haně Kosákové jsem odepsal:

‚Vzhledem ke složení Vašich studentů bude nejlepší, když obě přednášky budou v angličtině. Tu první přednášku chci nazvat Pursuit of Philosophy. Tak se totiž jmenuje stať, kterou jsem v History of Political Thought publikoval v zimním čtvrtletí roku 1984. Stať si lze otevřít na mé Webové stránce. Je v podstatě věnovaná Dr Kennyho (Master of Ballilol) vstupu do mého semináře. Z dané stati bych se věnoval kapitole I., nazvané ‚To Resume an Interrupted Discussion‘, a pak závěrečným dvěma kapitolám, tedy kapitole III. A IV.

Ta první kapitola začíná příjezdem Kennyho a jeho manželky k nám do Keramické a končí vtrhnutím policie do našeho bytu.

Ta třetí kapitola nazvaná When the Classical Tradition of Philosophy Meets Actuality se odehrává na policejní stanici v Bartolomějské. Policie mě a studenty zavezla do velké místnosti, zřejmě určené pro shromáždění policistů. Tam nás nechali o samotě. Já studentům nabídl úvodní přednášku o Aristotelovi. Ti byli pro, a tak jsem jim svůj úvod do Aristotela přednesl. Chtěl jsem otevřít diskusi, když tu vešel tajnej (v civilu), zeptal se, co děláme, já řek ‚Filosofii, chcete si přisednout‘, - přivedl si řadu dalších tajných, všichni musili ke zdi, a to bylo naposledy, co jsem mohl vidět své studenty.

Kapitola IV. nese název Can Philosophy Become worthy of Unrelenting Pursuit, kterou jedinou bych četl celou, aspoň část jejího závěru, pokud by na to byl čas. Cituju:

Not long ago I came unexpectedly across Patocka‘s memory. I visited my uncle Joseph Brozek in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. In an issue of an emigrant journal Free Czechoslovakia from September 1944 I read Brozek’s article about Patocka‘s pamphlet Czech Cilization in Europe which Patocka published in the late summer of 1939. Brozek emphasizes that Patocka’s was the last free voice of the Czech ‚philosophers-statesmen‘. In his pamphlet Patocka called for a renewal of the drive for moral perfection which Christianity introduced, a revival of intellectual courage which was the heritage of the Enlightenment and he demanded due attention to the almost missing contemplative element which Europe inherited from the Greeks: ‘Against this background every nation which strives to be a member of the cultural and spiritual “concert” of Western civilization must erect its ideals and measure its achievements … What does it matter that Europe does not know and does not acknowledge the depth of our love for that which is most deep and most holy in it. Having turned its back on us, it made us experience the most bitter lot and march on the hardest road. Yet we shall continue in this struggle as long as we have the slightest chance to do so.’

Tímto způsobem budu moci studenty seznámit jak se Sokratem a Platonem, tak i s Aristotelem, aniž bych je unavil. Oba texty se hodí k tomu, abych k vybranému kousku textu zmínil řadu věcí z ‘dneška’. Tak ku příkladu ten kousek, který jsem právě citoval, si vyžádá pár slov o Patočkovi, jedním ze zakladatelů Charty 77 a jedním z jejích prvních třech mluvčích.‘

Zpět k mému snu. Po ukončení bojů na Ukrajině se na Kyjevskou univerzitu obrátím s návrhem přednášek o Sokratovi, Platonovi a Aristotelovi.

 

 

 

  

The Cratylus and the Euthyphro, continuation

The Euthyphro

Euthyphro: ‘I am amused (Geloi=on, ‘Ridiculous’), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), at your making a distinction (o3ti oi1ei ti diafe/rein) between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation (ei1te a0llo/trioj ei1te oi0kei=oj o9 teqnew&j); for surely the pollution is the same in either case (i1son ga\r to\ mi/asma gi/gnetai), if you knowingly associate with the murderer (e0a\n sunh=|j tw~| toiou/tw| suneidw&j) when you ought to clear yourself (kai\ mh\ a0fosioi=j seauto/n te) and him (kai\ e0kei=non) by proceeding against him (th=| di/kh| e0peciw&n). The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain (a0ll’ ou0 tou=to mo/non dei=n fula/ttein, ei1te e0n di/kh| e1kteinen o( ktei/naj ei1te mh/). If justly (kai\ ei0 me\n e0n di/kh|), then your duty is to let the matter alone (e0a=n); but if unjustly (ei0 de\ mh/), then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you (e0a/nper o9 ktei/naj sune/stio/j soi gi/gnetai) and eats at the same table (kai\ o9motra/pezoj h]|), proceed against him (e0pecie/nai).

***

Jowett’s translation get’s the meaning of the Greek very well, I just had to restructure the Greek text so as to illuminate the connection between Jowett’s English and Socrates’ Greek. There is just one serious mistake in Jowett’s translation; his ‘then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you’ stands for Socrates’ e0a/nper o9 ktei/naj sune/stio/j soi gi/gnetai. Denniston explains that the ‘even if’ meaning is common in Homer, but that ‘this use is not to be found outside Homer’. He then quotes the Euthyphro 4b e0pecie/nai, e0a/nper o9 ktei/naj sune/stio/j soi gi/gnetai kai\ o9motra/pezoj h]|, and says that it ‘means that you must prosecute homicide if, and only if, he shares house and board with you’. (The Greek Particles, Second Edition, revised by K.J. Dover, p. 488 (ii).)

The Cratylus and the Euthyphro

The Cratylus

After the soul, Hermogenes asked Socrates to analyse the name of body (sw~ma). Socrates found it an easy task: ‘Some say that the body is the grave (sh=ma) of the soul, which may be thought buried in our present life, or that it has the name it has because with it (dio/ti tou/tw|) the soul (h9 yuxh/) signifies (shmai/nei) whatever the soul signifies (o9 a2n shmai/nh| h9 yuxh/). It seems to me most probable (dokou=si me/ntoi moi ma/lista) that this name (tou=to to\ o1noma) was invented (qe/sqai) by the Orphic poets (oi9 a0mfi\ O)rfe/a); the soul suffering penalty (w(j di/khj didou/shj th=j psuxh/j) for whatever (w(n de\ e3neka) it is punished ([di/khn] di/dwsin), and that it has this enclosure (tou/ton de\ peri/bolon e1xousa) to be saved (i3na sw&|zetai); the image of a prison (desmwthri/ou ei0ko/na), as the name implies (w3sper au0to\ onoma/zetai), until the penalty is paid (e3wj a2n e0ktei/sh| ta o0feilo/mena), “sw~ma”; and not even a letter in the name need be changed (kai\ ou0de/n dei=n para/gein ou0d’ e4n gra/mma).’ (400c)

Happy with this analysis, Hermogenes asked Socrates to analyse the names of the gods, as he had analysed the name of Zeus (see the first post on ‘Euthyphro in the Cratylus’).

Socrates: ‘Yes, indeed, Hermogenes (Nai\ ma\ Di/a h9mei=j ge, w} E(rmo/genej); and there is one excellent principle which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge (ei1per ge nou=n e1xoimen, e3na me\n to\n ka/lliston tro/pon), – that of the gods (o3ti peri\ qew~n) we know nothing (ou0de\n i1smen), either of their natures (ou1te peri\ au0tw~n) or of the names (ou1te peri\ tw~n o0noma/twn) which they give themselves (a3tta pote\ e9autou\j kalou=sin); but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are true (dh=lon ga\r o3ti e0kei=noi/ ge ta0lhqh= kalou=sin). And this is the best of all principles; and the next best is to say (deu/teroj d’ au] tro/poj o0rqo/thtoj), as is customary in prayers (w3sper e0n tai=j eu0xai=j no/moj e0sti\n h9mi=n eu1xesqai), that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics in which they rejoice (oi9tine/j te kai\ o9po/qen xai/rousin o0nomazo/menoi, tau=ta kai\ h9ma=j au0tou\j kalei=n), because we do not know of any other (w(j a1llo mhde\n ei0do/taj). That custom is, in my opinion, a good one (kalw~j ga\r dh\ e1moige dokei=  nenomi/sqai). Let us, then, if you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them (ei0 ou]n bou/lei, skopw~men w#sper proeipo/ntej toi=j qeoi=j o3ti peri\ au0tw~n ou0de\n h9mei=j skeyo/meqa); we do not presume that we are able to do so (ou0 ga\r a0ciou=men oi[oi/ t’ a2n ei]nai skopei=n); but we are enquiring about the meaning of men (a0lla\ peri\ tw~n a)nqrw&pwn h3n pote/ tina do/can e1xonej) in giving them these names (e0ti/qento au0toi~j ta\ o0no/mata), – in this there can be small blame (tou=to ga\r a0neme/shton).’

Hermogenes: ‘’I think, Socrates, that you are quite right (A0lla/ moi dokei=j, w} Sw&kratej,  metri/wj le/gein), and let us do as you say (kai\ ou3tw poiw~men).’ (400d6-401a7, tr. B. Jowett )

The Euthyphro

Socrates: ‘And what is your suit, Euthyphro (E1stin de\ dh\ soi/, w} Eu0qu/frwn, ti/j h9 dikh/;)? are you the defendant (feu/geij au0th\n) or the pursuer (h2 diw&keij;)?’

Euthyhro: ‘I am the pursuer (Diw&kw).’

Socrates: ‘Of whom (Ti/na;)?’

Euthyphro: ‘You will think me mad when I tell you (O$n diw&kwn au] dokw~ mai/nesqai).’

Socrates: ‘Why (Ti/ de/;)? Has the fugitive wings (peto/meno/n tina diw&keij)?’

Euthyphro: ‘Nay, he is not very volatile (Pollou= ge dei= pe/tesqai) at his time of life (o3j ge tunxa/nei w$n eu] ma/la presbu/thj).’

Socrates: ‘Who is he (Ti/j ou3toj)?’

Euthyphro: ‘My father (O( e0mo\j path/r).’

Socrates: ‘Your father (O( so/j)! My good man (w} be/ltiste;)?’

Euthyphro: ‘Yes (Pa/nu me\n ou]n).’

Socrates: ‘And of what is he accused (E!stin de ti/ to\ e1gklhma kai\ ti/noj h9 di/kh;)?’

Euthyphro: ‘Of murder (Fo/nou), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej).’

Socrates: ‘By the powers (H(ra/kleij), Euthyphro! How little does the common heard know (h] pou, w} Eu0qu/frwn, a0gnoei=tai u9po\ tw~n pollw~n, 4a11-12) of the nature of right and truth (o3ph| pote\ o0rqw~j e1xei). A man must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such an action (ou0 ga\r oi]mai/ ge tou= e0pituxo/ntoj au0to\ pra=cai a0lla\ po/rrw pou h1dh sofi/aj e0lau/nontoj).’

Euthyphro: ‘Indeed, Socrates, he must (Po/rrw me/ntoi nh\ Di/a, w} Sw&kratej).’

Socrates: ‘I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives (E!stin de\ dh\ tw~n oi0kei/wn tij o9 teqnew\j u9po\ tou= sou= patro/j;) – clearly has (h2 dh=la dh/;); for if he had been a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting him (ou0 ga\r a1n pou u9pe/r ge a0llotri/ou e0pech=|sqa fo/nou au0tw~|).’ (3e7-4b6, tr. B. Jowett)

***

Jowett’s ‘how little does the common heard know’ is a travesty of Socrates’ a0gnoei=tai u9po\ tw~n pollw~n (at 4a11-12). John Burnet translates: ‘Most people must be in the dark as to what is the right thing’ (Plato, Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito, Edited with notes by John Burnet, Clarendon Paperbacks, Reprinted 2002, note on 4a12, p. 101) Jowett puts here into Socrates’ mouth his own thoughts, willy-nilly reminding one of the Master of Biblioll in Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure.

Euthyphro in the Cratylus – third continuation

Socrates says that Hermogenes is right when he trusts the inspiration of Euthyphro (o0rqw&j ge su\ pisteu/wn): ‘For at this moment (w(j kai\ nu=n) a new and ingenious thought strikes me (ge/ moi fai/nomai komyw_j e0nnenohk/nai).’ But Socrates is chary of his own enthusiasm: ‘and I am going to be in danger (kai\ kinduneu/sw) if I am not careful (e0a\n mh\ eu0labw~mai), before tomorrow’s dawn (e1ti th/meron) I shall be wiser than I ought to be (sofw&teroj tou= de/ontoj gene/sqai),’

What’s that new and ingenious thought? Hermogenes wanted to obtain an explanation of why men (a1nqrwpoi) are called “men” (“a1nqrwpoi”), and Socrates said that it was ’difficult to think out’ (xalepo/n e0stin e0nnoh=sai, 398e3): ‘Examine carefully what I am going to say (sko/pei dh\ o4 le/gw). And first (prw&ton me\n ga/r), one must understand this concerning the names (to\ toio/nde dei= e0nnoh=sai peri\ o0noma/twn), that we often put some letters in (o3ti polla/kij e0pemba/llomen gra/mmata) and pull other letters out (ta\ d’ e0cairou=men), and change accents (kai\ ta\j o0cu/thtaj metaba/llomen, 399a9).’ Socrates maintains that this is ‘what happened concerning the name of men’ (to\ tw~n a0nqrw&pwn o1noma pe/ponqen). ‘For from a phrase (e0k ga\r r9h/matoj) it became a name (o1noma ge/gonen), one letter (e9no\j gra/mmatoj), which is the a (tou= a), having been omitted (e0caireqe/ntoj) and the acute on the last syllable changed to a grave (kai\ barute/raj th=j teleuth=j genome/nhj, 399a8-9).’

Hermogenes does not understand: ‘How do you mean (Pw~j le/geij;)?’

Socrates: ‘Thus (W{de). The name “man” signifies this (shmai/nei tou=to to o1noma o9 a1nqrwpoj), that other animals (o3ti ta\ me\n a1lla qhri/a) don’t examine anything (ou0de\n e0piskopei=), or consider (ou0de\ a0nalogi/zetai), or look up at (ou0de\ a0naqrei=) what they see (w{n o9ra=|), but that man (o9 de\ a1nqrwpoj), as he can see something (a3ma e9w&raken) – and this is o1pwpe – he looks up (\a0naqrei=) and considers (kai\ logi/zetai) that which he can see (tou=to o4 o1pwpen), and hence (e0nteu=qen dh/) he alone of all animals (mo/non tw~n qhri/wn) is rightly called (o0rqw=j w)noma/sqh) a1nqrwpoj, examining what he can see (a0naqrw~n a4 o1pwpe).’ (399a3c6)

Hermogenes does not say anything in response to Socrates’ inspired explanation of a1nqrwpoj. And indeed, Socrates’ explanation is difficult to grasp and to reflect upon.

***

I always type Jowett’s translation, and then I compare it with the ‘corresponding’ Greek text, which often forces me to fundamentally transform Jowett’s translation, or abandon it and substitute my own translation. Nevertheless, I have kept intact Jowett’s ‘the acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave’, which stands for Socrates’ kai\ barute/raj th=j teleuth=j genome/nhj ('the ending having become barytone’, 399a8-9). By ‘the acute on the last syllable’ Jowett must mean the circumflex accent on a0naqrw~n, which Socrates views as acute (cf. o0cei/aj at 399b2, and o0cu/thtaj at 399a9).

***

Hermogenes asks Socrates to analyse (dielei=n) what comes next (to\ meta\ tou=to), that is ‘soul’ (yuxh/) and ‘body’ (sw~ma).

Socrates: ‘If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment (w(j me\n toi/nun e0k tou= paraxrh=ma le/gein), I should imagine that those who first used the name "psyche" (yuxh/) meant to express something like this (oi]mai/ ti toiou=ton noei=n tou\j th\n yuxh\n o0noma/santaj), that this (the soul) (w(j tou=to a1ra), when it is in the body (o9ta\n parh=| tw~| sw&mati), is the source of life to it [i.e. to the body] (ai1tio/n e0sti tou= zh=n au0tw~|), and gives the power of breath (th=n tou= a0napnei=n du/namin pare/xon) and revival (kai\ a0nayu=xon), and when this reviving power fails (a3ma de\ e0klei/pontoj tou= a0napsu/xontoj) then the body (to\ sw~ma) perishes and dies (a0po/llutai/ te kai\ teleuta=|), and this is why (o3qen dh/), if I am not mistaken (moi dokou=sin), they called it psyche (au0to\ psuxh\n kale/sai).’ (399d10-e3).

But at that moment Socrates envisages something more refined: ‘But please (ei0 de\ bou/lei) stay a moment (e1xe h0re/ma); I fancy (dokw~ ga/r) that I can discover something (moi/ ti kaqora=n) that will be more acceptable than this (piqanw&teron tou/tou) to the disciples of Euthyphro (toi=j a0mfi\ Eu0qu/frona), for I am afraid that they will scorn this explanation (tou/tou me\n ga/r, w(j e0moi\ dokei=, katafronh/saien a1n), and think it banal (kai\ h9gh/sainto fortiko\n ei]nai). What do you say to another (to/de de\ sko/pei e0a\n kai\ soi\ a0re/sh=|;)?’

Hermogenes: ‘Let me hear (Le/ge mo/non).’

Socrates: ‘What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body? What else but soul (th\n fu/sin pa/ntoj tou= sw&matoj, w3ste kai\ zh=n kai\ periie/nai, ti/ soi dokei= e1xein te kai\ o0xei=n a1llo h2 yuxh/;)?’

Hermogenes: ‘Just that (Ou0de\n a1llo).’

Socrates: ‘And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things (Ti/ de/; kai\ th\n tw~n a1llwn a9pa/ntwn fu/sin ou0 pisteu/eij A)nacago/ra| nou=n kai yuxh\n ei]nai th\n diakosmou=san kai\ e1xousan;)?’

Hermogenes: ‘Yes; I do (E1gwge).’

Socrates: ‘Then you may well call that power fuse/xh which carries and holds nature (kalw~j a1ra a2n to\ o1noma tou=to e1xoi th=| duna/mei tau/th| h4 fu/sin o0xei= kai\ e1xei “fuse/xhn” o0noma/zein), and this may be refined away into yuxh/ (e0ce/sti de\ kai\ “yuxh\n” komyeuo/menon le/gein).’

Hermogenes: ‘Certainly (Pa/nu me\n ou]n); and this derivation is, I think, more scientific than the other (kai\ dokei= ge/ moi tou=to e0kei/nou texnikw&teron ei]nai).’

Socrates: ‘It is so (Kai\ ga\r e1stin); although the name in its original form was assuredly a quaint one (geloi=on me/ntoi fai/netai w(j a0lhqw~j o0nomazo/men w(j e0te/qh).’ (399e3-400b7, tr. B. Jowett)

Euthyphro in the Cratylus – second continuation

Socrates’ second reference to Euthyphro comes just two Stephanus pages after the first one, at 399a1. He says to Hermogenes: ‘That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.’ – Hermogenes: ‘Of course.’ (Tr. B. Jowett)

How did the two get to this second reference to Euthyphro??

After explaining the names of the gods, for which see the preceding post, Socrates asks, what next. Hermogenes suggests demons (dai/monaj), heroes (h3rwaj) and men (a0nqrw&pouj, 397d9). Socrates says that ‘Hesiod called them demons because they were dah/monej (knowing or wise), and in our older Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and poets say truly, that when a good man dies he has honour (timh/n) and a mighty portion (mega/lhn moi=ran) among the dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name signifying wisdom (kata\ th\n th=j fronh/sewj e0pwnumi/an). And I say too (tau/th| ou]n ti/qemai kai\ e0gw&), that every man (pa/nt’ a1ndra) that happens to be a good man (o3j a2n a0gaqo\j h]|) is more than human (daimo/nion ei]nai) both in life (kai\ zw~nta) and death (kai\ teleuth/santa), and is rightly (kai\ o0rqw~j) called a demon (dai/mona kalei=sqai).

Hermogenes: ‘Then I rather think (Kai\ e0gw& moi dokw~) that I am of one mind with you (pa/nu soi su/myhfoj ei]nai); but what is the meaning of the word “hero”?’ (h3rwj, in the old writing e3rwj.)

***

The explanation in brackets is misleading. The “new” writing was originated in Ionia, and was adopted in Athens in 403 B.C. Until then, the Athenians used the capital letters, E stood for e,h, O for o,w, and H for the rough breathing. In the pre-403 Athens h3rwj was written HEROS. (See Greek Grammar, by H.W. Smyth, revised by G.M. Messing, Harvard University Press, p. 8, par. 2.)

***

Socrates: ‘I think that there is no difficulty in explaining this (Tou=to de\ ou0 pa/nu xalepo\n e0nnoh=sai), for the name is not much altered (smikro\n ga\r parh=ktai au0tw~n to\ o1noma), and signifies (dhlou=n) that they were born of love (th\n e0k tou= e1rwtoj ge/nesin).’

Hermogenes does not understand: ‘What do you mean?’ (Pw=j le/geij;)

Socrates says, as Hermogenes well knows, that heroes (h3rwej) are demigods (h(mi/qeoi): ‘All of them (Pa/ntej dh/pou) sprang (gego/nasin) either from the love of a god for a mortal woman (e0rasqe/ntoj h2 qeou= qnhth=j), or of a mortal man (h2 qnhtou=) for a goddess (qea=j); if you consider (e0a\n ou]n skoph=|j) the word in the old Attic (kata\ th\n A)ttikh\n th\n palaia\n fwnh/n), you will see better (ma=llon ei1sh|) that the name heros [HEROS] is only a slight alteration of Eros [EROS].’

Then Socrates contemplates an alternative, different explanation: ‘either this is the meaning (kai\ h2toi tou=to le/gei tou\j h3rwaj), or that they were wise (h2 o3ti sofoi\ h]san) and skilful as rhetoricians (kai\ r9h/torej deinoi/) and dialecticians (kai\ dialektikoi/), and able to put the question (e0rwta=n), for ei2rein is equivalent to le/gein. And therefore, as I was saying (o3per ou]n a1rti le/gomen), in the Attic dialect (e0n th|= A)ttikh=| fwnh=| lego/menoi) the heroes (oi( h3rwej) turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners (r(h/tore/j tinej kai\ e0rwthtikoi\ sumbai/nousin); so that (w#ste ) the noble breed of heroes (to\ h9rwiko\n fu=lon) becomes (gi/gnetai) a kind of sophists and rhetors (r9hto/rwn kai\ sofistw~n ge/noj). But this is not difficult to come up with (a0lla\ ou0 tou=to xalepo/n e0stin e0nnoh=sai), but why men are called a1nqrwpoi, this is more difficult (a0lla\ ma=llon to\ tw~n a0nqrw&pwn, dia\ ti/ pote “a1nqrwpoi” kalou=ntai); can you tell me (su\ e1xeij ei0pei=n;)?

Hermogenes says he can’t, and would not try even if he could: ‘because I think (dia\ to\ h9gei=sqai) you are more likely to find out (se\ ma=llon eu9rh/sein) than myself (h2 e0mauto/n).’

Socrates: ‘You trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro (Th=| tou= Eu0qu/fronoj e0pipnoi/a| pisteu/eij), it seems (w(j e1oikaj),’

Hermogenes: ‘That’s clear (Dh=la dh/)). (398b5-399a2, tr. B. Jowett)

 

 

Euthyphro in the Cratylus – continuation

Having presented the etymological explanation of the names of Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus, Socrates says that if he remembered the genealogy of Hesiod, he would have gone on and tried the same sort of enquiry on the remoter ancestors of the gods ‘to make a trial (e3wj a0pepeira/qhn) of this wisdom (th=j sofi/aj tauthsi/) – which now (h9 nu=n), all in an instant (e0cai/fnhj), has come to me (e0moi\ prospe/ptwken), just at present (a3rti), I know not whence  (ou0k oi]d’ o9po/qen) – what it would do (ti/ poih/sei)’ (396c6-d1),

Hermogenes: ‘You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly inspired, and to be uttering oracles (xrhsmw|dei=n).’

Socrates: ‘Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul. I think that this will be the right course – today (to\ me\n th/meron) I shall let his superhuman power work and finish my investigation of names (kai\ ta\ loipa\ peri\ tw~n o0noma/twn e0piske/yasqai); but tomorrow (au1rion de/), if you (as the discussion goes, the “you” appears to refer simply to Hermogenes) are so disposed (a2n kai\ u9mi=n sundokh=|, Socrates’ u9mi=n indicates that he considers Cratylus, as well as himself and Hermogenes, as the one possessed by Euthyphro’s enchanting wisdom; so far, Cratylus has been a silent bystander, and will remain so, until the last discussion, in which Socrates assumes the role of the purifying sophist), we will conjure him away (a0podiopomphso/meqa au0th/n, 396e3-4; the feminine pronoun au0th/n refers to th=j sofi/aj tauthsi/, “this wisdom”, 396c6, in the last sentence in Socrates’ preceding speech), and make a purgation of him (“of it” au0th/n), if we can only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purification of this sort.’

Hermogenes: ‘With all my heart; for I am very curious to hear the rest of the inquiry about names.’ (396d2-397a3, Jowett’s translation, amended)

Is it just the chutzpah of investigating the names of the gods that requires purgation, or is there yet another train of thought involved, which deserves purgation?

Socrates: ‘Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the gods (a0po\ tw~n qew~n a1rxesqai), and show for what reason they are rightly so named?’

Hermogenes: ‘Yes, that will be well.’

Socrates: ‘My notion would be something of this sort; – I suspect that the sun, moon, earth, stars and heaven, were the only gods known to the original Hellenes, which is still the case with many barbarians. Seeing that they were always moving and running (i0o/nta dro/mw| kai\ qeo/nta), from this nature (a0po\ tau/thj th=j fu/sewj) of running (th=j tou= qei=n) they were called gods (“qeou/j” au0tou\j e0ponoma/sai); and when men became acquainted with the other gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to them all. Do you think that likely?’

Hermogenes: ‘I think it very likely indeed.’ (397c4-d7; Jowett’s translation, amended)

***

In the closing section of the dialogue Socrates says to Cratylos:

‘Let us now examine this (e1ti toi/nun to/de skeyw&meqa), that we are not misled by the appearance of such a multitude of names (o3pwj mh\ h9ma=j ta\ polla\ tau=ta o0no/mata e0capata=|), all tending in the same direction (e0j tau0to\n tei/nonta); if indeed (ei0 tw~| o1nti me/n) the givers (oi9 qe/menoi) of those names (au0ta/) gave them thinking (dianohqe/ntej ge e1qento) that all things are always in motion (w(j i0o/ntwn a9pa/ntwn a0ei/) and in flux (kai\ r9eo/ntwn). For they seem even to me (fai/nontai ga\r e1moige kai\ au0tw~|) that they were thinking that way (ou3tw dianohqh/nai); but that (to\ d’), perhaps (ei0 e1tuxen), is not happening that way (ou0x ou3twj e1xei), and they themselves (a0ll’ ou3toi au0toi/ te) are carried round (kukw~ntai), and drag us in after them (kai\ h9ma=j e0felko/menoi prosemba/llousin). For examine (ske/yai ga/r), master (w} qauma/sie) Cratylus (Kratu/le), that about which I often dream (o4 e1gwge polla/kij o0neirw&ttw), whether we are to maintain (po/teron fwme/n) that there is something (ti ei]nai) which is beautiful itself (au0to\ kalo/n) and good (kai\ a0gaqo/n), and each of the things that are (kai\ e4n e3kaston tw~n o1ntwn) in the same way (ou3tw), or not (h2 mh/)?’

Cratylus: ‘Certainly, Socrates, I think so (e1moige dokei=, w} Sw&kratej).’ (439b10-d2, Jowett’s translation, amended)