Euthyphro 6

Socrates: Now tell me (Le/ge dh/ moi), is a thing which is carried (po/teron to\ fero/menon) a carried thing because one carries it (dio/ti fe/retai, fero/meno/n e0stin), or for some other reason (h2 di’ a1llo ti;)?

Euthyphro: No, for that reason (Ou1k, a0lla\ dia\ tou=to).

Socrates: And a thing which is led is lead (Kai\ to\ a0go/menon dh/) because one leads it (dio/ti a1getai), and a thing which is seen is so (kai\ to o9rw~menon) because one sees it (dio/ti o9ra=tai)?

Euthyphro: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: Then one does not see it because it is a seen thing (Ou0k a1ra dio/ti o9rw&meno/n ge/ e0stin, dia\ tou=to o9ra=tai), but, on the contrary (a0lla\ to\ e0nanti/on), it is a seen thing because one sees it (dio/ti o9ra=tai, dia\ tou=to o9rw~menon); and one does not lead it because it is a led thing (ou0de\ dio/ti a0go/meno/n e0stin, dia\ tou=to a1getai), but it is a led thing because one leads it (a0lla\ dio/ti a1getai, dia\ tou=to a0go/menon); and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing (ou0de\ dio/ti fero/menon, fe/retai), but it is a carried thing because one carries it (a0lla\ dio/ti fe/retai, fero/menon). Is it clear (a]ra kata/dhlon), Euthyphro (w} Eu0qu/fron), what I am trying to say (o4 bou/lomai le/gein;)? I am trying to say this (bou/lomai de\ to/de), that (o3ti) if anything becomes or undergoes (ei1 ti gi/gnetai h2 pa/sxei), it does not become because it is in a state of becoming (ou0x o3ti gignomeno/n e0sti, gi/gntai) but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes (a0lla\ dio/ti gi/gnetai, gigno/meno/n e0stin), and it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes (ou0d’ o3ti pasxo/menon e0sti, pa/sxei), but because it undergoes (a0ll’ o3ti pa/sxei) it is a thing which undergoes (pa/sxon e0sti/n); or do you not agree to this (h2 ou0 cugxwrei=j ou3tw;)?

Euthyphro: I agree (E!gwge).

Socrates: Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something (Ou0kou=n kai\ to\ filou/menon h2 gigno/meno/n ti/ e0stin h2 pa/sxon ti u9po/ tou;)?

Euthyphro: Certainly (Pa/nu ge)

Socrates: And is this case (Kai\ tou=to a1ra ou3twj e1xei) like the former ones (w#sper ta\ pro/tera;): those who love it do not love it because it is a loved thing (ou0x o3ti filou/meno/n e0stin, filei=tai u9po\ w{n filei=tai), but it is a beloved thing because they love it (a0ll o2ti filei=tai, filou/menon;)?

Euthyphro: Obviously (A0na/gkh).

Socrates: Now what do you say about that which is holy (Ti/ dh\ ou]n le/gomen peri\ tou= o9si/ou;), Euthyphro (w} Eu0qu/fron;)? It is loved by all the gods, is it not (a1llo ti filei=tai u9po\ qew~n pa/ntwn), according to what you said (w(j o9 so\j lo/goj;)?

Euthyphro: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: For this reason (A]ra dia\ tou=to), because it is holy (o3ti o3sio/n e0stin), or for some other reason (h2 di’ a1llo ti;)?

Euthyphro: No, for this reason (Ou0k, a0lla\ dia\ tou=to).

Socrates: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved (Dio/ti a1ra o3sio/n e0stin, filei=tai, a0ll’ ou0x o3ti filei=tai, dia/ tou=to o9sio/n e0stin;)?

Euthyphro: I think so (E!oiken).

Socrates: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it (A0lla\ me\n dh\ dio/ti ge filei=tai u9po\ qew~n, filou=meno/n e0sti kai\ qeofile\j to\ qeofile/j).

 Euthyphro: Of course (Pw~j ga\r ou1;).

Socrates: Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ from one another (Ou0k a1ra to qeofile\j o(sio/n e0stin, w} Eu0qu/fron, ou0de/ to/ o3sion qeofile/j, w(j su\ le/geij, a0ll’ e3teron tou=to tou/tou).

Euthyphro: How so, Socrates (Pw~j dh/, w} Sw&kratej;)?

Socrates: Because we are agreed (O#ti o9mologou=men) that the holy is loved because it is holy (to\ me\n o3sion dia\ tou=to filei=sqai, o3ti o9sio/n e0stin) and that it is not holy because it is loved (a0ll’ ou0 dio/ti filei=tai, o3sion ei]nai); are we not (h] ga/r;)?

Euthyphro: Yes (Nai/).

Socrates: But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear (To\ de/ ge qeofile\j o3ti filei=tai u9po\ qew~n, au0tw~| tou/tw| tw~| filei=sqai qeofile\j ei]nai, a0ll’ ou0x o3ti qeofile/j, dia\ tou=to filei=sqai).

Euthyphro: Very true (A0lhqh= le/geij).

Socrates: But if that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy were identical, my dear Euthyphro (A0ll’ ei1 ge tau0to\n h]n, w} fi/le Eu0qu/fron, to\ qeofile\j kai\ to\ o3sion), then if the holy were loved because it is holy (ei0 me\n dia\ to\ o3sion ei]nai e0filei=to to\ o3sion), that which is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear (kai\ dia\ to\ qeofile\j ei]nai e0filei=to a2n to\ qeofile/j), and if that which is dear to the gods is dear because it is loved (ei0 de\ dia\ to\ filei=sqai u9po\ qew~n to\ qeofile\j qeofile\j h]n), then that which is holy would be holy because it is loved (kai\ to\ o3sion a1n dia\ to\ filei=sqai o3sion h]n); but now you see (nu=n de\ o9ra=|j) that the opposite is the case (o3ti e0nanti/wj e1xeton), showing that the two are entirely different from each other (w(j panta/pasin e3te/rw o1nte a0llh/lwn). For the one becomes lovable from the fact that it is loved (to\ me\n ga/r, o3ti filei=tai, e0sti\n oi[on filei=sqai), whereas the other is loved because it is in itself lovable (to\ d’ o3ti e0sti\n oi[on filei=sqai, dia\ tou=to filei=tai). And Euthyphro, it seems that when you were asked (kai\ kinduneu/eij, w} Eu0qu/fron, e0rwtw&menoj) what holiness is (to\ o3sion, o3 ti/ pot’ e1stin) you were unwilling to make plain its essence (th\n me\n ou0si/an moi au0tou= ou0 bou/lesqai dhlw~sai), but you mentioned something that has happened to this holiness (pa/qoj de/ ti peri\ au0tou= le/gein, o3 ti pe/ponqe tou=to to\ o3sion), namely, that it is loved by the gods (filei=sqai u9po\ pa/ntwn qew~n). But you did not tell us yet, what it really is (o3 ti de\ o1n, ou1pw ei]pej). So, if you please (ei0 ou]n soi fi/lon), do not hide it from me (mh/ me a0pokru/yh|), but begin over again and tell me (a1lla\ pa/lin ei0pe\ e0c a0rxh=j) what holiness is (ti/ pote o2n to\ o3sion), no matter whether it is loved by the gods or anything else happens to it (ei1te filei=tai u9po\ tw~n qew~n ei1te o9tidh\ pa/sxei); for we shall not quarrel about that (ou0 ga\r peri\ tou/tou dioiso/meqa). But tell me frankly (a0ll’ ei0pe\ proqu/mwj), What is (ti/ e0stin) holiness, and what is unholiness (to/ te o3sion kai\ to\ a0no/sion)?

Euthyphro: But, Socrates, I do not know how to say what I mean (A0ll’, w} Sw&kratej, ou0k e1xw e1gwge, o3pwj soi ei1pw o4 now~). For whatever statement we advance, somehow or other it moves about (perie/rxetai ga/r pw~j h9mi=n a0ei\ o4 a2n proqw&meqa) and won’t stay where we put it (kai\ ou0k e0qe/lei me\nein o3pou a2n i9drusw&meqa au0to/).

Socrates: Your statements, Euthyphro, are like works of my ancestor Daedalus (Tou= h9mete/rou progo/nou, w} Eu0qu/fron, e1oiken ei]nai Daida/lou ta\ u9po\ sou= lego/mena),

***

H.N. Fowler comments: Socrates was the son of a sculptor and was himself educated to be a sculptor. This is doubtless the reason for his reference to Daedalus as an ancestor. Daedalus was a half mythical personage whose statues were said to have been so lifelike that they moved their eyes and walked about.

***

and if I were the one who made or advanced them (kai\ ei0 me\n au0ta\ e0gw_ e1legon kai\ e0tiqe/mhn), you might laugh at me and say (i1swj a1n me e0skw&ptej) that on account of my relationship to him my works in words run away (w(j a1ra e0moi\ kata\ th\n e0kei/nou cugge/neian ta\ e0n toi=j lo/goij e1rga a0podidra/skei) and won’t stay where they are put (kai\ ou0k e0qelei\ me/nein o3pou a1n tij au0ta\ qh=|). But now (nu=n de/ ge) – well, the statements are yours (sai\ ga\r ai9 u9poqe/seij ei0si/n); so some other jest is demanded (a1llou dh/ tinoj dei= skw&mmatoj); for they won’t stay fixed (ou0 ga\r e0qe/lousi soi\ me/nein), as you yourself see (w(j au0tw~| soi dokei=).

Euthyphro: I think (E)moi\ de\ dokei=) the jest does very well as it is; for I am not the one who makes these statements move about and not stay in the same place, but you are the Daedalus (sxedo/n ti tou= a0tou= skw&mmatoj, w} Sw&kratej, dei=sqai ta\ lego/mena, to\ ga\r periie/nai tou/toij tou=to kai\ mh\ me/nein e0n tw~| au0tw~| ou0k ei]mi e0gw_ o9 e0ntiqei/j, a\lla\ su/ moi dokei=j o9 Dai/daloj); for they would have stayed, so far as I am concerned (e0pei\ e0mou= ge e3neka e1menen a2n au0ta\ ou3twj).

Socrates: Apparently then, my friend (Kinduneu/w a1ra, w} e9tai=re), I am a more clever artist than Daedalus (e0kei/nou tou= a1ndro\j deino/teroj gegone/nai th\n te/xnhn), inasmuch as he made only his own works move (tosou/tw| o3sw| o9 me\n ta\ au9tou= mo/na e0poi/ei ou0 me/nonta), whereas I, as it seems, give motion to the works of others as well as to my own (e0gw_ de\ pro\j toi=j e0mautou=, w(j e1oike, kai\ ta\ a0llo/tria). And the most exquisite thing about my art is (kai\ dh=ta tou=to/ moi th=j te/xnhj e0sti\ komyo/taton) that I am clever against my will (o3ti a1kwn ei]mi sofo/j); for I would rather have my words have fixed and stable (e0boulo/mhn a1n moi tou\j lo/gouj me/nein kai\ a0kinh=twj i9dru=sqai ma=llon) than possess the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus besides (h2 pro\j th|= Daida/lou sofi/a| ta\ Tanta/lou xrh/mata gene/sqai). But enough of this (kai\ tou/twn me\n a3dhn). Since you seem to be indolent (e0peidh\ de/ moi dokei=j su\ trufa=n), I will aid you myself (au0to/j soi cumproqumh/somai), so that you may instruct me (o3pwj a1n me dida/ch|j) about holiness (peri\ tou= o9si/ou). And do not give it up beforehand (kai\ mh\ proapoka/mh|j). Just see whether you do not think that everything that is holy is right (i0de\ ga/r, ei0 ou0k a0nagkai=o/n soi dokei= di/kaion ei]nai pa=n to\ o3sion).

Euthyphro: I do (E!moige).

What next?

My toilet is still blocked, but at about 4:00pm, Saturday March 23, 2024, a policeman and a policewoman came, looked at the toilet, full of black, presumably disinfectant water. In consequence, I ceased sending Oxford classicists any further emails about the blockage, I went for my usual three quarter of an hour walk on a near-by hill, then went to sleep.

When I woke up, I wanted to have a bath and shave; I entered the bathroom: ‘welcomed’ by the blocked toilet. No bath, no shaving.

I can understand that on Saturday and Sunday it is almost impossible to find the office manager and the handy man, so that the blockage could be removed. I shall resume my blocked-toilet emails to Oxford classicists, if the blockage is not removed by Tuesday morning, March 26.

The question is what next.

***

Two years ago, on March 31, I discovered in Diogenes Laertius a passage, which indicates that Plato wrote the Meno prior to Socrates’ trial and death:

‘Socrates would take to task those who thought highly of themselves, proving them to be fools, as to be sure he treated Anytus, according to Plato’s Meno. For Anytus could not endure to be ridiculed by Socrates, and so in the first place stirred up against him Aristophanes and his friends [writers of comedies (tou\j peri\ A0ristofa/nhn); then afterwards he helped to persuade Meletus to indict him on a charge of impiety and corrupting the youth.’ (Diog. Laert. II. 38)

I informed 18 Oxford classicists – Professor Allan, Rebecca Amstrong, professor Bown, Professor Coop, professor Crisp, Charles Crowther, Olivia Elder, Constanze Gűthenke, Alison John, Jane Lightfoot, Nino Luraghi, Tosca Lynch, Anna Marmodoro, Andrew Meadows, Jonathan Prag, Richard Rutherford, Karolina Sekita, Kathryn Stevens – about the discovery: ‘Allow me to inform you that in Diogenes Laertius I discovered a passage according to which Anytus was bent on prosecuting Socrates, incensed by the mockery and disparagement to which Socrates subjected him in Plato's Meno. See 'Socrates - Meletus and Anytus' on my blog, published on April 1. 2022.’

Two years elapsed and all those who are interested in Plato and go to Google for information are left blissfully unaware of the passage in Diogenes Laertius, which shows that the Meno must have been written before Meno became general of the army of the Thessalian mercenaries.

 

In the Anabasis Xenophon records ‘the facts which everybody knows’ (a4 pa/ntej i1sasi) about Meno: ‘From Aristippus he secured, while still in the bloom of youth, an appointment as general of his mercenaries – cf. the Meno 70b, where Socrates speaks of Aristippus as Meno’s lover (e0rasth/j) – Now when his fellow generals were put to death for joining Cyrus in his expedition against the King, he, who had done the same thing, was not so treated, but it was after the execution of the other generals that the king visited the punishment of death upon him; and he was not, like Clearchus and the rest of generals, beheaded – a manner of death which is counted speediest – but, report says, was tortured alive for a year and so met the death of a scoundrel.’ (II. vi. 8-29)

Xenophon does not say why was Meno treated in this manner, but he records an episode which allows the reader to surmise what the main reason was.

When Cyrus’ army came to the river Euphrates, the Greek mercenaries refused to go any further, for at that point it became clear that Cyrus went against the King, his older brother: ‘Clearchus [the unelected leader of the Greek mercenaries] was the first to try to force his men to go on, but they pelted him and his pack animals with stones as often as they began to go forward. At that time Clearchus narrowly escaped being stoned to death; but afterwards, when he realized that he could not accomplish anything by force, he called a meeting of his own troops.’ (I.iii.1-2)

‘But as for Menon, before it was clear what the rest of the soldiers would do, that is, whether they would follow Cyrus or not, he gathered together his own troops apart from the others and spoke as follows: “Soldiers, if you will obey me, you will, without either danger or toil, be honoured by Cyrus above and beyond the rest of the troops. At this moment Cyrus is begging the Greeks to follow him against the King; my own plan, then, is that you should cross Euphrates river before it is clear what answer the rest of the Greeks will make to Cyrus. For if they vote to follow him, it is you who will get the credit for the decision because you began the crossing … Upon hearing these words the soldiers were persuaded, and made the crossing before the rest gave their answer … When Cyrus learned that they had crossed, he was delighted … to Menon himself Cyrus was said to have sent magnificent gifts.’ (I.iv.13-17)

But for Meno, Cyrus might never have succeeded in making the soldiers cross the Euphrates.

A few words about Meno’s betrayal. Since the Persians did not dare to fight the Greek soldiers, their leader Tissaphernes and Clearchus agreed to march ‘together’, but the mutual suspicions were growing from day to day. Clearchus surmised that it was Meno who was feeding the suspicions, hoping to supplant Clearchus as the leader of the Greek army. So, Clearchus asked Tissaphernes for a meeting, desiring to make an end to the suspicions. Tissaphernes agreed and offered Clearchus a meeting, to which Clearchus would bring the leading generals and captains; in front of all of them Tissaphernes would reveal the culprit. Clearchus accepted the offer; when they came to the tent of Tissaphernes, the Greek generals were asked to come in, and arrested; the Greek captains were butchered in front of the tent.

After this event, a delegation of Persians came to speak to the Greeks. Ariaeus, formerly the most trusted friend of Cyrus, said: ‘Clearchus, men of Greece, inasmuch as he was shown to be perjuring himself and violating the truce, has received his deserts and is dead, but Proxenus and Menon, because they gave information of his plotting, are held in high honour. For yourselves, the King demands his arms; for he says that they belong to him, since they belonged to Cyrus, his slave.’

‘Xenophon said in his turn: “Well, then, if Clearchus was really transgressing the truce in violation of his oaths, he has his deserts, for it is right that perjurers should perish; but as for Proxenus and Meno, since they are your benefactors and our generals, send them hither, for it is clear that, being friends of both parties, they will endeavour to give both you and ourselves the best advice.’ To this the barbarians made no answer, but, after talking for a long time with one another, they departed.’ (II.v.38-42)

During the previous night, under the leadership of Xenophon, the Greek army reorganized itself, electing new captains. Xenophon replaced Proxenus as a general of the Thessalian army, but in fact he became the unelected leader of the Greek army. Xenophon led the Greek army over the mountains, where the Persians did not dare to tread.

I can’t help thinking that without Meno’s betrayal the Greek army’s anabasis under Xenophon’s leadership would never have happened, and Xenophon’s Anabasis, a gem of Ancient Greek literature, would never have been written.

***

Captivated by Xenophon, I left aside ‘What next?’

On Monday, April the 1^st, i.e. on the second anniversary of my discovery of the Diogenes Laertius passage (II. 38), which indicates that the Meno was written prior to the death of Socrates, I shall protest at Balliol: LET US DISCUSS PLATO.

Diogenes writes: ‘Xenophon took part in the expedition of Cyrus in the archonship of Xenaenetus (401-400 B.C.) in the year before the death of Socrates (Diog. Laert. II. 55).’ Diogenes again makes no reference to the source of this information; naturally, for the Greeks in all Greek settlements had relatives, or someone they knew, among the mercenaries.

Let me end this article with the words with which Socrates ends the Meno: ‘It is time for me to go my way, but do you persuade our friend Anytus (to\n ce/non to/nde A1nuton) of that whereof you are now yourself persuaded, so as to put him in a gentler mood; for if you can persuade him, you will do a good turn to the people of Athens also.’

Punishment

My protest at Balliol – LET US DISCUSS PLATO – took place on March 21, as intended. First year students of philosophy wanted to hear what I had to say on Plato. The students were genuinely interested; I enjoyed every minute of our discussion. But then a lady came – a Balliol teacher? – she came to tell us that a Balliol officer insists that we must stop. I protested: ‘As you can see, I am protesting. Protest is not supposed to be welcome by those, against whom the protest is directed.’ But the lady insisted, we stopped.

Obviously, I had to be punished: My toilet has been blocked.

Not for the first time. It happened twice before, each time clearly connected to Balliol, a clear warning: ‘Don’t you dare to go to Balliol with your LET US DISCUSS PLATO.’

When it happened the first time, I reported the crime to the local police Headquarters. When I came home, the toilet was unblocked. Of course I was left with cleaning the toilet, but I was confident that it would not happen again. I was wrong.

Next, I informed the Oxford classicists at the Department of Classics of my protest. I sent the information emails, went to the toilet; blocked again.

Next day I went to the Stroud Police Headquarters. I reported the crime; when I came home, I found my toilet unblocked.

Yesterday, i.e. a day after my LET US DISCUSS PLATO protest, my toilet was blocked again. I phoned 101, the Gloucestershire Constabulary. As far as I know, police work on Saturdays. It’s Sunday March 24, 2024; my toilet remains blocked.

Euthyphro 5

Euthyphro: But I think (A9ll’ oi]mai), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), that none of the gods disagrees with any other about this (peri/ ge tou/tou tw~n qew~n ou0de/na e3teron e9te/rw| diafe/resqai), or holds that who kills anyone wrongfully, ought not to pay the penalty (w(j ou0 dei= di/khn dido/nai e0kei=non, o4j a2n a0di/kwj tina\ a0poktei/nh|).

Socrates: Well, Euthyphro, to return to men (Ti/ de/; a0nqrw&pwn, w} Eu0qu/fron), did you ever hear anybody arguing (h1dh tino\j h1kousaj a0mfisbhtou=ntoj) that he who had killed anyone wrongfully, or had done anything else whatever wrongfully (w(j to\n a0di/kwj a0poktei/nanta h2 a1llo a0di/kwj poiou=nta o9tiou=n), ought not to pay the penalty (ou0 dei= di/khn dido/nai;)?

Euthyphro: Why, they are always arguing these points (Ou0de\n me\n ou]n pau/ontai tau=ta a0mfisbhtou=ntej), especially in the law courts (kai\ a1lloqi kai\ e0n toi=j dikasthri/oij). For they do many wrong things (a0dikou=ntej ga\r pa/mpolla); and then there is nothing they will not do (pa/nta poiou=si) or say (kai\ le/gousi), in defending themselves, to avoid penalty (feu/gontej th\n di/khn).                                                                                                                                                                              Socrates: Yes, but do they acknowledge, Euthyphro (H} kai\ o9mologou=sin, w} Eu0qu/fron), that they have done wrong (a0dikei=n) and, although they acknowledge it (kai\ o9mologou=ntej), nevertheless say they ought not pay the penalty (o3mwj ou0 dei=n fasi sfa=j dido/nai di/khn;)?

Euthyphro: Oh, no, they don’t do that (Ou0damw~j tou=to/ ge).

Socrates: Then there is something they do not do and say (Ou0k a1ra pa=n ge poiou=si kai\ le/gousi). For they do not, I fancy, dare to say and argue (tou=to ga/r, oi]mai, ou0 tolmw~si le/gein ou0d’ a0mfisbhtei=n) that, if they have really done wrong, they ought not to pay the penalty (w(j ou=xi/, ei1per a0dikou=si/ ge, dote/on di/khn); but, I think, they say they have not done wrong; do they not  (a0ll’, oi]mai, ou1 fasin a0dikei=n)?

Euthyphro: You are right (A0lhqh= le/geij).

Socrates: Then they do not argue this point (Ou0k a1ra e0kei=no/ ge a=mfisbhtou=sin), that the wrongdoer must not pay the penalty (w(j ou0 to\n a0dikou=nta dei= dido/nai di/khn); but perhaps they argue about this (a0ll’ e0kei=no i1swj a0mfisbhtou=si), who is a wrongdoer (to\ ti/j e0stin o9 a0dikw~n), and what he did (kai\ ti/ drw~n), and when (kai\ po/te).

Euthyphro: You are right (A0lhqh= le/geij).

Socrates: Then is not the same thing true of the gods (Ou0kou=n au0ta/ ge tau=ta kai\ oi9 qeoi\ pepo/nqasin), if they quarrel about right and wrong (ei1per stasia/zousi peri\ tw~n dikai/wn kai\ a0dikw~n), as you say (w(j o9 so\j lo/goj), and some say others have done wrong (kai\ oi9 me/n fasin a0llh/louj a0dikei=n), and some say they have not (oi9 de\ ou1 fasin)? For surely, my friend, no one, either of gods or men, has the face to say (e0pei\ e0keino/ ge dh/pou, w} qauma/sie, ou0dei\j ou1te qew~n ou1te a0nqrw&pwn tolma=| le/gein) that he who does wrong ought not to pay the penalty (w(j ou0 tw~| ge a0dikou=nti dote/on di/khn).

Euthyphro: Yes (Nai/), you are right about this (tou=to me\n a0lhqe\j le/geij), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), in the main (to\ kefa/laion).

Socrates: But I think, Euthyphro, those who dispute, both men and gods, if the gods do dispute, dispute about each separate act (A0ll’ e3kasto/n ge oi]mai, w} Eu0qu/fron, tw~n praxqe/ntwn a0mfisbhtou=sin oi9 a0mfisbhtou=ntej, kai\ a1nqrwpoi kai\ qeoi/, ei1per a0mfsbhtou=sin qeoi/). When they differ with one another about any act (pra/cew&j tinoj pe/ri diafero/menoi), some say it was right (oi9 me\n dikai/wj fasi\n au0th\n pepra=xqai) and others that it was wrong (oi9 de\ a0di/kwj). Is it not so (a]r’ ou0x ou3tw;)?

Euthyphro: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: Come now (I!qu nu=n), my dear Euthyphro (w} fi/le Eu0qu/fron), inform me (di/dacon kai\ e0me/), that I may be made wiser (i3na sofw&teroj ge/nwmai), what proof you have (ti/ soi tekmh/rio/n e0stin) that all the gods think (w(j pa/ntej qeoi\ h9gou=ntai) that the man lost his life wrongfully (e0kei=non a0di/kwj teqna/nai), who (o4j a2n), when he was a servant, committed a murder (qhteu/wn a0ndrofo/noj geno/menoj), was bound by the master of the man he killed (cundeqei\j u9po\ tou= despo/tou tou= a0poqano/ntoj), and died as a result of his bonds (fqa/sh| teleuth/saj dia\ ta\ desma/) before the master who had bound him found out from the advisers (pri\n to\n cundh/santa para\ tw~n e0chghtw~n peri\ au0tou= puqe/sqai) what he ought to do with him (ti/ xrh\ poiei=n), and that it is right on account of such a man for a son to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder (kai\ u9pe\r tou= toiou/tou dh\ o0rqw~j e1xei e0pecie/nai kai\ e0piskh/ptesqai fo/nou to\n ui9o\n tw~| patri/). Come (i1qi), try to show me clearly about this (peri\ tou/twn peirw~ ti/ moi safe\j e0ndei/casqai), that the gods surely believe that this conduct is right; (w(j panto\j ma=llon pa/ntej qeoi\ h9gou=ntai o0rqw~j e1xein tau/thn th\n pra=cin) and if you show it to my satisfaction (ka1n moi i9kanw~j e0ndei/ch|), I will glorify your wisdom as long as I live (e0gkwmia/zwn se e0pi\ sofi/a| ou0de/pote pau/somai).

Euthyphron: But perhaps this is no small task (A0ll’ i1swj ou0k o0li/gon e1rgon e0sti/n), Socrates (w} Sw&kratej), though I could show you quite clearly (e0pei\ pa/nu ge safw~j e1xoimi a2n e0pidei=cai/ soi).

Socrates: I understand (Manqa/nw); it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges (o3ti soi dokw~ tw~n dikastw~n dusmaqe/steroj ei]nai); since it is plain that you will show them (e0pei\ e0kei/noij ge e0ndei/cei dh=lon o3ti) that such acts are wrong  (w(j a1dika/ te/ e0stin) and that all the gods hate them (kai\ oi9 qeoi\ a3pantej ta\ toiau=ta misou=sin).

Euthyphro: Quite clearly, Socrates (Pa/nu ge safw~j, w} Sw&kratej); that is, if they listen to me (e0a/n per a0kou/wsi/ ge/ mou le/gontoj).

Socrates: They will listen (A0ll’ a0kou/sontai), if they find that you are a good speaker (e0a/n per eu] dokh=|j le/gein). But this occurred to me while you were talking (to/de de/ sou e0neno/hsa a3ma le/gontoj), and I said to myself (kai\ pro\j e0mauto\n skopw~): “If Euthyphro should prove to me no matter how clearly that all the gods think such a death is wrongful (ei0 o3ti ma/lista/ me Eu0qu/frwn dida/ceie w(j oi9 qeoi\ a3pantej to\n toiou=ton qa/naton h9gou=ntai a1dikon ei]nai), what have I learned from Euthyphro about the question (ti/ ma=llon e0gw_ mema/qhka par’ Eu0qu/fronoj), what is holiness and what is unholiness (ti/ pot’ e0sti\n to\ o9sio/n te kai\ to\ a0no/sion)? For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods (qeomise\j me\n ga\r tou=to to\ e1rgon, w(j e1oiken, ei1h a1n); but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way (a0lla\ ga\r ou0 tou/tw| e0fa/nh a1rti w(risme/na to\ o3sion kai\ mh/); for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them (to\ ga\r qeomise\j o2n kai\ qeofile\j e0fa/nh); and so I let you off any discussion of this point, Euthyphro (w#ste tou/tou a0fi/hmi/ se, w} Eu0qu/fron). If you like (ei0 bou/lei), all the gods may think it wrong and may hate it (pa/ntej au0to\ h9gei/sqwn qeoi\ a1dikon kai\ pa/ntej misou/ntwn). But shall we now emend our definition (A0ll’ a]ra tou=to nu=n e0panorqw&meqa e0n tw~| lo/gw|) and say that whatever all the gods hate (w(j o4 me\n a2n pa/ntej oi9 qeoi\ misw~sin) is unholy (a0no/sio/n e0stin) and whatever they all love (o4 d’ a2n filw~sin) is holy (o3sion), and what some love (o4 d’ a2n oi9 me\n filw~sin) and others hate (oi9 de\ misw&sin) is neither (ou0de/tera) or both (h2 a0mfo/tera;)? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholiness (a]r’ ou3tw bou/lei h9mi=n w(ri/sqai nu=n peri\ tou= o9si/ou kai\ tou= a0nosi/ou;)?

Euthyphro: What is to hinder, Socrates (Ti/ ga\r kwlu/ei, w} Sw&kratej;)?

Socrates: Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro (Ou9de\n e0me/ ge, w} Eu0qu/fron), but consider your own position (a0lla\ su\ dh\ to\ so\n sko/pei), whether by adopting this definition (ei0 tou=to u9poqe/menoj) you will most easily teach me (ou3tw r9a=|sta/ me dida/ceij) what you promised (o4 u9pe/sxou).

Euthyphro: Well, I should say (A0ll’ e1gwge fai/hn a2n) that what all the gods love is holy (tou=to ei]nai to\ o3sion, o4 a2n pa/ntej oi9 qeoi\ filw~sin) and, on the other hand (kai\ to\ e0na/ntion), what they all hate (o4 a2n pa/ntej oi9 qeoi\ misw~sin) is unholy (a0no/sion).

Socrates: Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro (Ou0kou=n e0piskopw~men au] tou=to, w} Eu0qu/fron), to see if it is correct (ei0 kalw~j le/getai), or shall we let it go (h2 e0w~men) and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is (kai\ ou3tw h9mw~n te au0tw~n a0podexw&meqa kai\ tw~n a1llwn, e0a\n mo/non fh=| ti/j ti e1xein ou3tw, cugxwrou=ntej e1xein;)? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement (h2 skepte/on, ti/ le/gei o9 le/gwn;)?

Euthyphro: We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct (Skepte/on, oi]mai me/ntoi e1gwge tou=to nuni\ kalw~j le/gesqai).

Socrates: We shall soon know more about this, my friend (Ta/x’, w}gaqe/, be/ltion ei0so/meqa). Just consider this question (e0nno/hson ga\r to\ toio/nde): – Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy (a]ra to\ o3sion, o3ti o9sio/n e0stin, filei=tai u9po\ tw~n qew~n), or is it holy because it is loved by gods (h2 o3ti filei=tai o9sio/n e0stin;)?

Euthyphro: I don’t know what you mean, Socrates (Ou0k oi]d’ o3 ti le/geij, w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: Then I will try to speak more clearly (A0ll’ e0gw_ peira/somai safe/steron fra/sai). We speak of being carried and of carrying (le/gome/n ti fero/menon kai\ fe/ron), of being led and of leading (kai\ a0go/menon kai\ a1gon), of being seen and of seeing (kai\ o9rw&menon kai\ o9rw~n); and you understand – do you not? – that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning (kai\ pa/nta ta\ toiau=ta manqa/neij o3ti e3tera a0llh/lwn e0sti/), and how they differ (kai\ h[| e3tera)?

Euthyphro: I think I understand (E!gwge/ moi dokw~ manqa/nein).

Socrates: Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different (Ou0kou=n kai\ filou/meno/n ti/ e0stin kai\ tou/tou e3teron to\ filou=n;)?

Euthyphro: Of course (Pw~j ga\r ou1;).

 

Euthyphro 4

Socrates: Come then (Fe/re dh/), let us examine (e0piskeyw&meqa) our words (ti/ le/gomen). The thing and the person that are dear to the gods are holy (to\ me\n qeofile/j te kai\ o9 qeofilh\j a1nqrwpoj o3sioj), and the thing and the person that are hateful to the gods are unholy (to\ de\ qeomise\j kai\ o9 qeomish\j a0no/sioj); and the two are not the same (ou0 tau0to\n d’ e0sti/n), but the holy and the unholy are the exact opposite of each other (a0lla\ to\ e0nantiw&taton to\ o3sion tw~| a0nosi/w|). Is not this what we have said (ou0x ou3twj;)?

Euthyphro: Yes, just this (Ou3tw me\n ou]n).

Socrates: And it seems to be correct (Kai\ eu] ge fai/netai ei0rh=sqai;)?

Euthyphro: I think so, Socrates (Dokw~, w} Sw&kratej).

Socrates: Well then (Ou0kou=n), have we said this also, that the gods, Euthyphro, quarrel and disagree with each other, and that there is enmity between them (kai\ o3ti stasia/zousin oi9 qeoi/ w} Eu0qu/fron, kai\ diafe/rontai a0llh/loij kai\ e1xqra e0sti\n e0n a0llh/loij, kai\ tou=to ei1rhtai;)?

Euthyphro: Yes, we have said that (Ei1rhtai ga/r).

Socrates: But what things is the disagreement about, which causes enmity and anger (E!xqran de\ kai\ o0rga/j, w} a1riste, h9 peri\ ti/nwn diafora\ poiei=;)? Let us look at it this way (w{|de de\ skopw~men). If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance (a]r’ a2n ei0 diaferoi/meqa e0gw& te kai\ su\ peri\ a0riqmou=), which of two numbers were the greater (o9po/tera plei/w), would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies (h9 peri\ tou/twn diafora\ e0xqrou\j a2n h9ma=j poioi=) and make us angry with each other (kai\ o0rgi/zesqai a0llh/loij), or should we not quickly settle it by resorting to arithmetic (h2 e0pi\ logismo\n e0lqo/ntej peri/ ge tw~n toiou/twn taxu\ a2n a0pallagei=men;)?

Euthyphro: Of course we should (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: Then, too (Ou0kou=n kai/), if we were to disagree about the relative size of things (peri\ tou= mei/zonoj kai\ e0la/ttonoj ei0 diaferoi/meqa), we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring (e0pi\ to\ me/tron e0lqo/ntej taxu\ pausai/meq’ a2n th=j diafora=j;)?

Euthyphro: Yes (E!sti tau=ta).

Socrates: And we should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing (Kai\ e0pi/ ge to\ i9sta/nai e0lqontej, w(j e0gw}|mai, peri\ tou= barute/rou te kai\ koufote/rou diakriqei=men a1n)?

Euthyphro: Of course (Pw~j ga\r ou1).

Socrates: But about what would a disagreement be (Peri\ ti/noj de\ dh\ dienexqe/ntej), which we could not settle (kai\ e0pi\ ti/na kri/sin ou0 duna/menoi a0fike/sqai) and which would cause us to be enemies (e0xqroi/ ge a2n a0llh/loij ei]men) and be angry with each other (kai\ o0rgizoi/meqa;)? Perhaps you cannot give an answer offhand (i1swj ou0 pro/xeiro/n soi/ e0stin); but let me suggest it (a0ll’ e0mou= le/gontoj). Is it not about right and wrong (sko/pei ei0 ta/de e0sti\ to/ te di/kaion kai\ to\ a1dikon), and noble and disgraceful (kai\ kalo\n kai\ ai0sxro/n), and good (kai\ a0gaqo/n) and bad (kai\ kako/n)? Are not those the questions (a]ra ou0 tau=ta/ e0stin) about which you and I and other people become enemies, because we differ about them and cannot reach any satisfactory agreement (w{n dienexqe/ntej kai\ ou0 duna/menoi e0pi\ i9kanh\n kri/sin au0tw~n e0lqei=n e0xqroi\ a0llh/loij gigno/meqa, o3tan gignw&meqa, kai\ e0gw_ kai\ su\ kai\ oi9 a1lloi a1nqrwpoi pa/ntej;)?

Euthyphro: Yes, Socrates, these are the questions about which we should become enemies (A0ll’ e1stin au3th h9 diafora/, w} Sw&kratej, kai\ peri\ tou/twn).

Socrates: And how about the gods Euthyphro (Ti/ de/; oi9 qeoi/, w} Eu0qu/fron)? If they disagree (ou0k ei1per ti diafe/rontai), would not they disagree about these questions (dia\ tau=ta diafe/roint’ a1n;)?

Euthyphro: Necessarily (Pollh\ a0na/gkh).

Socrates: Then, my noble Euthyphro, according to what you say, some of the gods too think some things are right or wrong and noble or disgraceful, and good or bad, and others disagree (Kai\ tw~n qew~n a1ra, w} gennai=e Eu0qu/fron, a1lloi a1lla di/kaia kai\ a1dika h9gou=ntai kata\ to\n so\n lo/gon, kai\ kala\ kai\ ai0sxra\ kai\ a0gaqa\ kai\ kaka/); for they would not quarrel with each other (ou0 ga\r a1n pou e0stasi/azon a0llh/loij) if they did not disagree about these matters (ei0 mh\ peri\ tou/twn diefe/ronto). Is that the case (h] ga/r;)?

Euthyphro: You are right (O0rqw~j le/geij).

Socrates: Then the gods in each group love the things which they consider good and right and hate the opposites of these things (Ou0kou=n a3per kala\ h9gou=ntai e3kastoi kai\ a0gaqa\ kai\ di/kaia, tau=ta kai\ filou/sin, ta\ de\ e0nanti/a tou/twn misou=sin;)?

Euthyphro: Certainly (Pa/nu ge).

Socrates: But you say that the same things (Tau0ta\ de/ ge, w(j su\ fh/|j) are considered right by some of them (oi9 me\n di/kaia h9gou=ntai,) and wrong by others (oi9 de\ a1dika); and it is because they disagree about these things (peri\ a4 kai\ a0mfisbhtou=ntej) that they quarrel (stasia/zousi/ te) and wage war with each other (kai\ polemou=sin a0llh/loij). Is not this what you said (a]ra ou0x ou3tw;)?

Euthyphro: It is (Ou3tw).

Socrates: Then, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods (Tau1t’ a1ra, w(j e1oiken, misei=tai u9po\ tw~n qew~n kai\ filei=tai, kai\ qeomish= te kai\ qeofilh= tau1t’ a2n ei1h.).

Euthyphro: So it seems (E!oiken).

Socrates: And then the same things would be both holy and unholy (Kai\ o3sia a1ra kai\ a0no/sia ta\ au0ta\ a2n ei1h), Euthyphro (w} Eu0qu/fron), according to this statement (tou/tw| tw~| lo/gw|).

Euthyphro: I suppose so (Kinduneu/ei).

Socrates: Then you did not answer my question (ou0k a1ra o4 h0ro/mhn a0pekri/nw), my friend (w} qauma/sie). For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy (ou0 ga\r tou=to/ ge h0rw&twn, o4 tugxa/nei tau0to\n o2n o3sio/n te kai\ a0no/sion); but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods (o4 d’ a2n qeofile/j h]|, kai\ qeomise/j e0stin, w(j e1oiken). And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if, in punishing your father as you are doing, you were performing an act that is pleasing to Zeus (w#ste, w} Eu0qu/fron, o4 su\ nu=n poiei=j to\n pate/ra kola/zwn, ou0de\n qaumasto/n, ei0 tou=to drw~n tw~| me\n Dii\ prosfile\j poiei=j), but hateful to Cronus and Uranus (tw~| de\ Kro/nw| kai\ Ou0ranw~| e0xqro/n), and pleasing to Hephaestus (kai\ tw~| me\n H(fai/stw| fi/lon), but hateful to Hera (th=| de\ H!ra| e0xqro/n), and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagree with any other about it (kai\ ei1 tij a1lloj tw~n qew~n e3teroj e9te/rw| diafe/retai peri\ au0tou=, kai\ e0kei/noij kata\ ta\ au0ta/).

***

Burnet notes on tw~| me\n H(fai/stw| fi/lon (‘pleasing to Hephaestus’): ‘This is an allusion to the H#raj desmou\ju9po\ u9e/oj (Rep. 378d3).’ Rep. 378d takes us away from the story in Euthyphro 8b, but it concurs with Socrates’ broader sentiments about such stories about the gods, expressed by him in the Euthyphro: ‘Hera’s fetterings (H#raj de\ desmou/j) by her son (u9po\ ui9e/oj) and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus by his father (kai\ H(fai/stou r9i/yeij u9po\ patro/j) when he was trying to save his mother from a beating (Ilias I. 586-594) (mello/ntoj th=| mhtri\ tuptome/nh| a0mu/nein), and the battles of the gods in Homer’s verse (Il. Xx. 1-74, xxi. 385-513) (kai\ qeomaxi/aj o3saj O!mhroj pepoi/hken) are things that we must not admit into our city (ou0 paradekte/on ei0j th\n po/lin).’

But let me return to Burnet’s note on our story in the Euthyphro: ‘The story was that, when Hera had thrown Hephaestus out of heaven, he took his revenge by sending her a golden thrown with invisible bonds, so that, when she sat upon it, she was fast bound. At last Dionysus reconciled Hephaestus to his mother. Having made him drunk he brought him back to heaven against his will on a donkey.’