Rowe dates the Phaedrus late, ‘certainly later than the Republic and other middle dialogues like the Phaedo and the Symposium; certainly later than the Timaeus; possibly or probably later than the Parmenides, the Theaetetus, the Sophist and the Statesman; and probably earlier than the Philebus’. (Plato Phaedrus, with translation and commentary by C. J. Rowe, 2nd ed., p. 14.) In ‘The argument and structure of Plato’s Phaedrus’ (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 1986, pp. 106-125) he says at point (1) that those who regard the Phaedrus as belonging with the middle dialogues ‘rely on the close resemblance between some of the main ideas contained in Socrates’ speech and those of the Republic, the Symposium, and the Phaedo: including, most notably, the idea of separated Forms and that of learning as recollection. What has not been sufficiently recognised is that these ideas appear in the Phaedrus exclusively in the framework of a muthos. If no muthos is to be taken as literally true, the result will be to throw immediate doubt on their status.’ (p. 120-121). In support of his argument he quotes Socrates’ reference to his second speech, the Palinode, as a muthos (265c1): ‘a playful hymn in the form of a story’ (muthikon tina humnon). (p. 116)
Concerning
Rowe’s point (1) I must ask: does Plato want to ‘throw immediate doubt’ on the Republic
when he speaks of the State in which philosophers are to be rulers as a muthos?
At Republic 501e2-5 he says that ‘until philosophers bear rule, States
and individuals have no rest from evil, nor will this our imaginary State
ever be realized (oude hȇ politeia hȇn muthologoumen logȏi ergȏi telos lȇpsetai)?’ (Tr. B. Jowett) Rowe’s ‘playful hymn in the form of a story’ has
nothing in common with Jowett’s ‘our imaginary State’; we must go
to the original in order to see the connection. In the Phaedrus Socrates
views his Palinode as a muthos, in the Republic he views his
whole narrative as a muthos. The reader might object that I twisted
Socrates’ words in the Republic by emphasizing mutho while
deemphasizing logoumen logȏi ‘narrate by logos’. But if in the light of this
objection we return to the Phaedrus, the connection will be intensified,
for in it, as in the Republic, Socrates combines the notion of muthos
with the conception of logos: ‘mixing together a not wholly implausible
speech (logon), we sang a playful hymn in the form of a story (muthikon,
265b8-c1)’.
At point (2)
Rowe says that in the Phaedrus ‘Socrates argues that skilfully
constructed logoi will be based on the procedures of collection and
division (264e-266c, 277b-c). If, as I suggest, Plato has in mind his own works
as models, this will connect the Phaedrus especially with the Sophist
and the Politicus. (p. 121) He found this connection outlined in ‘the
short but excellent introduction to Thompson’s edition of the Phaedrus,
published in 1868’: ‘The key point of Thompson’s interpretation is that
Socrates’ second speech is to be understood as an example of the kind of
oratory which is described in the Politicus: “that part of oratory which
persuades people of what is right, and so helps to guide behaviour in cities in
partnership with the art of kingship”, and which “persuades the mass of people,
the crowd, through muthologia rather than teaching” … This rhetoric, as
understood by the Politicus and the Phaedrus, “was to be the handmaid
at once of Philosophy and Political, or what in the ancient view was the same
thing, of Ethical Science”.’ (pp. 107-8)
Thompson’s and
Rowe’s interpretation corresponds to Plato’s view of rhetoric in the Politicus
(i.e. the Statesman). The Stranger asks: ‘To what science do we assign
the power of persuading a multitude by pleasing tale and not by teaching?’ –
The younger Socrates answers: ‘That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to
rhetoric.’ – Stranger: ‘And to what science do we give the power of determining
whether we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or to refrain
altogether?’ – Y. Socrates: ‘To that science which governs the arts of speech
and persuasion.’ – Stranger: ‘Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics.’ –
Y. Socrates: ‘Very good.’ – Stranger: ‘Rhetoric seems to be quickly
distinguished from politics, being a different species, yet ministering to it.’
(304c10-e2, tr. B. Jowett)
In contrast,
in the Phaedrus the rhetoric and politics are in unity. In response to
Phaedrus’ statement that ‘one of our politicians was railing at Lysias and reproaching
him on the score of writing speeches, constantly calling him a speech-writer’
Socrates replied: ‘An absurd idea, young man … the proudest of politicians have
the strongest desire to write speeches and bequeath compositions; why, whenever
they write a speech, they are so pleased to have admirers that they put in a
special clause at the beginning with the names of the persons who admire the
speech in question.’ – Phaedrus: ‘What do you mean? I don’t understand.’ –
Socrates: ‘You don’t understand that when a politician begins a composition the
first thing he writes is the name of his admirer. – Ph.: ’Is it?’ – S.: ‘Yes,
he says may be “Resolved by the Council” or “by the People” or both: and then
“Proposed by so-and-so” – a pompous self-advertisement on the part of the
author; after which he proceeds with what he has to say, showing off his own
wisdom to his admirers, sometimes in a very lengthy composition; or does such a
thing seem to you to differ from a written speech?’ – Ph.: ‘Not to me.’ – S.:
‘Then if the speech holds its ground, the author leaves the ground rejoicing;
but if it is blotted out, and he loses his status as a recognised
speech-writer, he goes into mourning, and his friends with him.’ – Ph.: ‘Quite
so.’ – S.: ‘Which clearly implies that their attitude to the profession is not
one of disdain, but of admiration.’ – Ph. ‘To be sure.’ – S.: ‘Well then – when
he becomes an orator or king (rȇtȏr ȇ basileus) capable of acquiring the power of a
Lycurgus, a Solon, or a Darius, and achieving immortality as a speech-writer in
a city, doesn’t he think himself equal to the gods even while he is alive, and
don’t those who come later think the same of him, when they observe his
compositions?’ – P.: ‘Indeed so.’ (257c8-258c6)
At point (3)
Rowe says: ‘The Phaedrus rejects the conception of gods as a combination
of soul and body (246c-d): such a conception of them is present in the Timaeus
(38e, 41a-b), but – pace Cornford – absent from Laws 10.’
To answer
Rowes point (3), let me begin by contrasting Phaedrus 246c-d with the
related Timaeus passages.
In Phaedrus
246c-d Socrates explains how it is that some living creatures are called mortal
and some immortal: ’All soul has the care of all that is soulless, and ranges
about the whole universe, coming now to be in one form, now in another. Now
when it is perfectly winged, it travels above the earth and governs the whole
cosmos; but the one that has lost its wings is swept along until it lays hold
of something solid, where it settles down, taking on an earthy body, which
seems to move itself because of the power of the soul, and the whole is called
a living creature, soul and body fixed together, and acquires the name “mortal”;
immortal it is not, on the basis of any argument which has been reasoned
through, but because we have not seen or adequately conceived a god we
imagine a kind of immortal living creature which has both a soul
and body, combined for all time.’ (246b5-d2, tr. Rowe)
In Timaeus
38e Plato says: ‘Now, when each of the stars which were necessary to the
creation of time had come to its proper orbit, and they had become living
creatures having bodies fastened by ensouled chains, and learnt their
appointed task …’
In 41a-b
Plato says: ‘Now, when all of them, both those who visibly appear in their
revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a more retiring nature (kai
hosoi phainontai kath’ hoson an ethelȏsin theoi ‘and those gods who appear whenever
they wish’), had come into being, the creator of the universe addressed them in
these words: “Gods, who are my works, and of whom I am the artificer and
father, my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound may be
undone, but only an evil being would wish to undo that which is harmonious and
happy. Wherefore, since ye are but creatures, ye are not altogether immortal
and indissoluble, but ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable to the
fate of death, having in my will a greater and mightier bond than those with
which ye were bound at the time of your birth.” (Timaeus 41a-b, tr. B.
Jowett)
When Row
argues at (3) that ‘The Phaedrus rejects the conception of gods as a combination
of soul and body (246c-d): such a conception of them is present in the Timaeus
(38e, 41a-b),’ he takes Phaedrus 34c-d as a rejection of Timaeus
38e, 41a-b. But how can the argument in the Phaedrus – that the
conception of gods as immortal living beings composed of body and soul has not
been reasoned through by any argument – refer to the stars, the divine beings
whose creation was seen by Plato as necessary to create time (38b-39e)? In the Timaeus
Plato employs all his knowledge of astronomy to reason through the necessary
creation of the stars as divine beings composed of body and soul.
Furthermore,
there is a passage in the Timaeus in which Plato appears to refer
directly to Phaedrus 246c-d, when he says that the gods ‘who appear
whenever they wish’, i.e. the gods of Greek mythology, are conceived ‘without
any probable or necessary proofs’ as immortal beings composed of body and soul.
But while in Phaedrus 246c-d Plato pays only a perfunctory lip service
to the established religion – ‘but let this, and our account of it, be as is
pleasing to god’ (246d2-3) – in the Timaeus he is much more circumspect:
‘To know or tell the origin of the other divinities is beyond us, and we must
accept the tradition of the men of old time who affirm themselves to be the
offspring of the gods – that is what
they say – and they must surely have known their own ancestors. How can we
doubt the word of the children of the gods? Although they give no probable
or certain proofs (kaiper aneu te eikotȏn kai anankaiȏn apodixeȏn legousin, 40e1-2), still, as they declare
that they are speaking of what took place in their own family, we must conform
to custom and believe them. In this manner, then, according to them, the
genealogy of these gods is to be received and set forth. Oceanus and Thetys
were the children of Earth and Heaven, and from these sprang Phorkys and Cronos
and Rhea, and all that generation; and from Cronos and Rhea sprang Zeus and
Hera, and all those who are said to be their brethren, and others who were the
children of these.’ (Timaeus 40d6-41a3, tr. B. Jowett)
In answer to
Rowe’s contention in point (3) that the conception of god’s as a combination of
soul and boy ‘is absent from Laws 10’ I shall quote the relevant arguments
of the Athenian Stranger, marking Cleinias’ responses by three dots.
Athenian: ‘If, in principle, soul drives round the sun,
moon, and the other heavenly bodies, does it not impel each individually?’ …
‘Let’s take a single example: our results will then obviously apply to all the
other heavenly bodies … the sun. Everyone can see its body, but no one can see
its soul – not that you could see the soul of any other creature, living or
dying. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing that we are in fact
held in the embrace of some such thing though it is totally below the level of
our bodily senses, and is perceptible by reason alone. So by reason and
understanding let’s get hold of a new point about the soul. … If soul drives
the sun, we shan’t go far wrong if we say that it operates in one of three
ways. … Either (a) the soul resides within this visible spherical body and
carries it wherever it goes, just as our soul takes us around from one place to
another, or (b) it acquires its own body of fire or air of some kind, as
certain people maintain, and impels the sun by the external contact of body
with body, or (c) it is entirely separate from body, but guides the sun along
its path by virtue of possessing some other prodigious and wonderful powers. … Now,
just wait a minute. Whether we find that it is by stationing itself in the sun
and driving it like a chariot, or moving it from outside, or by some other
means, that this soul provides us all with light, every single one of us is
bound to regard it as a god. Isn’t that right? … Now consider all the stars and
the moon and the years and months and all the seasons: what can we do but
repeat the same story? A soul or souls – and perfectly virtuous souls at that –
have been shown to be the cause of all these phenomena, and whether it is by
their living presence in the bodies (eite en sȏmasin enousai, 899b7)
that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we shall insist
that these souls are gods.’ (898d3-899b8)
In Laws 10 Plato leaves
undecided the question whether the souls of the sun and all the other heavenly
bodies direct all the heavens (kosmousi panta ouranon, 899b8) ‘by
their living presence in the bodies, or by some other means’. Pace
Rowe, the possibility that the souls of the gods are in the heavenly
bodies is not ‘absent
from Laws 10’.
What remains
to be discussed is Rowe’s point (4): ‘Other clear connections with Laws
10, as has long been noticed, are to be found in the arguments for immortality
(245c-246a)’.
The
reference Rowe gives at point (4) is to Plato’s proof of the immortality of the
soul, which is as follows:
‘All soul is
immortal. For that which is always in movement is immortal; that which moves
something else and is moved by something else, in ceasing from movement, ceases
from living. Only that which moves itself (to hauto kinoun), because it
does not abandon itself, never stops moving. It is also source and first
principle of movement (archȇ kinȇseȏs) for the other things which move. A first principle
is something which does not come into being (Archȇ de agenȇton). For all that comes into being must
come into being from a first principle, but a first principle itself cannot
come into being from anything at all; for if a first principle came into being
from anything, it would not do so from a first principle. Since it does not
come into being (agenȇton estin), it must also be something which
does not perish. For if a first principle is destroyed, neither will it ever
come into being from anything nor anything else from it, given that all things
must come into being from a first principle. It is in this way, then, that that
which moves itself is first principle of movement (kinȇseȏs men archȇ to auto hauto kinoun). It is not possible for this either to be destroyed or to
come into being (touto de out’ apollusthai oute gignesthai dunaton),
or else the whole universe and the whole of that which comes to be might
collapse [‘would collapse’, Hackforth] together and come to a halt, and never
again have a source from which things will come to be moved. And since that
which is moved by itself has been shown to be immortal (athanatou de
pephasmenou tou huph’ heautou kinoumenou), it will incur no shame to say
that this is the essence and the definition of soul. For all body which has its
source of motion outside itself is soulless, whereas that which has it within
itself and from itself is ensoled, this being the nature of soul; and if this
is so – that that which moves itself is nothing other than soul (mȇ allo ti einai to auto heauto kinoun ȇ psuchȇn), soul will be necessarily something which never
comes into being nor dies (ex anankȇs agenȇton te kai athanaton psuchȇ an eiȇ).’ (245b7-246a2, translation C.J. Rowe)
In Laws X the Athenian Stranger defines the soul as ‘motion
capable of moving itself’ (tȇn dunamenȇn autȇn hautȇn kinein kinȇsin, 896a1-2). In the Phaedrus Plato defined the
soul as ‘that which moves itself‘ (to auto heauto kinoun, 245e7-8). The
connection between the two is obvious. This similarity forms the basis for dating
the Phaedrus late with reference to Laws 10 by Rowe and others. But
there is a difference between the two. In the Phaedrus Plato emphasises
again and again that the soul ‘does not come into being’, it is agenȇton (245d1,
d3, 246a1), it is not possible for it to come into being (touto de oute
gignesthai dunaton, 245d7-8). But in Laws 10 he speaks about its
birth (autȇs peri geneseȏs 892a4): ‘it was born before all bodies’ (sȏmatȏn emprosthen pantȏn genomenȇ 892a5).
Presumably, the creation of the soul in the Timaeus
provided the basis for Plato’s revision of the Phaedran soul in Laws X.
Let me go through the relevant passages in Laws X. At 892a8-b1
Plato days that ‘all things related to the soul will necessarily have been created
before (protera an eiȇ gegonota) things related to the body, since soul itself is older than
body.’ He goes on to say that those who deny the existence of the gods, ‘when
they use the word “nature”, they mean the process by which the first things
came into being. But if it can be shown that the soul came first, not fire or
air, and that it was one of the first things created (psuchȇ d’ en prȏtois gegenȇmenȇ), it will be quite correct to say that soul
is pre-eminently by nature. This is true, provided you can demonstrate that
soul is older than body, but not otherwise.’ (892c2-7)
In
the Timaeus Plato demonstrated that God created the soul of the universe
before its body: ‘Now God did not make the soul after the body, although we are
speaking of them in this order; for when he put them together he would never
have allowed that the elder should be ruled by the younger … he made the soul
in origin (genesei) and excellence prior (proteran) to and older
than the body, to be the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the
subject.’ (34b10-c5, tr. B. Jowett)
In
Laws 10 he maintains that it can be shown that ‘the motion (kinȇsis)
that moves both itself and other things’ (tȇn te hautȇn te kinousan kai
heteron, 894c4-5) ‘is the first by birth (prȏton genesei
te estin) as well as in power’ (894d10)’, and that it can be shown that it
is archȇ, the first principle of motion: ‘When that which moves itself
by itself (auto hauto kinȇsan) effects an alteration in something, and
that in turn in something else, so that motion is transmitted to thousands upon
thousands of things, will there be any other initial principle of the entire
sequence of their movements than the change that moves itself by itself (plȇn
hȇ tȇs autȇs hautȇn kinȇsasȇs metabolȇ;)? Now let’s put the point in a
different way. Suppose the whole universe were somehow to coalesce and come to
a standstill, which of the motions we have enumerated would inevitably be the
first to arise (prȏtȇn genesthai) in it? The one that
moves itself by itself (tȇn autȇn heautȇn kinȇsan), surely, because no
antecedent impulse can ever be transmitted from something else in a situation
where no antecedent impulse exists. The first principle of all motions (archȇn
ara kinȇseȏn pasȏn), which is the first born among things that stand
still (kai prȏtȇn en te hestȏsi genomenȇn), and is the
first among things that move, is the motion that moves itself by itself (tȇn
hautȇn kinousan); we shall say that it is necessarily the oldest (presbutatȇn)
and most potent of all changes.’ (894e4-895b6)
In
Laws 10 Plato views ’the motion that moves itself by itself’ (tȇn
hautȇn kinousan kinȇsin) as archȇ, the first principle of motion and
change, just as he viewed motion ‘that moves itself’ (to hauto kinoun) as archȇ
in the Phaedrus. But the notion of archȇ is different. In the Phaedrus
the archȇ is agenȇton, it ’does not come into being’,
whereas in Laws 10 it is the first principle (archȇ) that came into being (genomenȇ). To this difference corresponds the different
outcome of the thought experiments, in which all that moves came to a
standstill. In the Phaedrus if ‘the whole universe, the whole of that
which comes to be, would collapse into immobility, and never find another
source of motion to bring it back into being (tr. Hackforth)’; in Laws
10, if all came to standstill, it would be the motion that moves itself, which
of necessity would be the first to come into being.
In Laws 10 the Athenian then asks: ‘If we ever saw
this’ – i.e. the motion moving itself – ‘in something made of earth (genomenȇn en tȏi gȇinȏi ‘that came into being in something made of earth’) or
water or fire, alone or in combination, what state we would say it to be in?’ –
Cleinias: ‘Don’t you really ask me, whether we shall say it to be alive when it
moves itself by itself (hotan auto hauto kinȇi;)?’
– Ath. ‘Yes’. – Cl. ‘To be alive (Zȇn), of course.’ (895c4-10)
Allow me a joke: Cleinias could answer the intentionally
obscure question for he happened to have read the Phaedrus and
remembered the passage in which the soul that loses its wings ‘is swept along
until it lays hold of something solid, where it settles down, taking on an
earthy body, which seems to move itself because of the power of the soul, and
the whole is called a living creature (zȏion), soul and body fixed together.’
(246c2-5)
The Athenian Stranger then gives Cleinias an elementary lesson
in philosophy: ‘Now, hold on a minute, for heaven’s sake. Aren’t you prepared
to recognize three elements concerning each thing?’ Cl.: ‘What do you mean?’ –
Ath.: ‘The first point is what the object actually is, the second is its
definition, and the third is its name. And, in addition, there are two question
to be asked about every existing thing.’ – Cl. ‘Two?’ – Ath.: ‘Sometimes we put
forward the mere name and want to know the definition, and sometimes we put
forward the definition and ask for the name … a number has the name “even” and
its definition is “a number divisible into two equal parts” … when we call it
“even” and define it as “a number divisible in two”, it’s the same thing we’re
talking about.’ (895d1-e8)
After this preparation, the Athenian asks: ‘So what’s the
definition of the thing we call soul? Do we have any other than the one we said
a moment ago [at 895c4-10]: “the motion capable of moving itself by itself” (tȇn dunamenȇn autȇn hautȇn kinein kinȇsin;)? – Cl.: ‘Do you mean that the motion that moves itself (to heauto
kinein) is the definition of the same entity, which we all call by the name
soul?’ – Ath.: ‘I do. And if this is true, are we still dissatisfied? Haven’t
we got ourselves a satisfactory proof that soul is identical (psuchȇn t’auton on) with the first generation (kai tȇn prȏtȇn genesin) and motion of all past, present and future things and their
contraries? When it has been shown to be the cause of all change and motion in
everything?’ – Cl.: ’Dissatisfied? No! (Ouk), On the contrary, it has
been proved most sufficiently that soul is the oldest of all things (psuchȇ tȏn pantȏn presbutatȇ), the first principle of motion that
was generated (genomenȇ ge archȇ kinȇseȏs)
… Ath.: ‘So it was equally correct, final and complete statement of the truth,
when we said that soul was generated prior to body (psuchȇn men proteran gegonenai sȏmatos), and that body came second and later, soul being the master, and body
its natural subject.’ (895e10-896c3)
Let me compare to this ‘final and complete statement of the
truth’ in Laws X the concluding statement of the proof of immortality of
soul in the Phaedrus: ‘All body which has its source of motion outside
itself is soulless, whereas that which has it within itself and from itself is
ensoled (empsuchon), this being the nature of soul; and if this is so –
that that which moves itself is nothing other than soul, soul will be necessarily
something which never comes into being (agenȇton) nor dies.’
The similarity is undeniable, but so is the difference. In Laws
X the soul was generated (genomenȇ); it was brought into being prior to
body, body came second, in the Phaedrus the soul has never come into
being, it was ‘of necessity agenȇton’.
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