There is one
more link between Laws X and the Phaedrus. In Laws X,
after proving a) that gods exist, b) that they care for every human being, and c)
that they can’t be influenced by sacrifices and supplications, the Athenian
stranger determines punishments imposed on these offences. The most severe
punishment is reserved jointly on these three classes if those involved are not
only impious, but try to lead the souls – psuchagȏgȏsi – of many others astray. In the Phaedrus
Plato defines rhetoric as psuchagȏgia, ‘a leading of the soul,’ as C.J. Rowe rightly
translates this term (at 261a8 and 271c10). If I am not mistaken, this
connection between Laws X and the Phaedrus has not been noticed
by Platonic scholars; in translation, no connection between the two can be
found. Saunders translates the Laws X passage as follows:
‘There are
others, however, who in addition to not recognizing the existence of gods, or
believing they are unconcerned about the world or can be bought off, become
sub-human (hosoi d’an thȇriȏdeis genȏntai pros tȏi theous mȇ nomizein ȇ ameleis
ȇ paraitȇtous einai). They take everybody for fools (kataphronountes de tȏn anthrȏpȏn),
and many a man they delude during his life (psuchagȏgȏsi men pollous tȏn zȏntȏn);
and then by saying after his death that they can conjure up his spirit (tous
de tethneȏtas phaskontes psuchagȏgein), and promising to influence the gods (kai theous
hupischnoumenoi peithein) through the alleged magic powers of sacrifices
and prayers and charms (hȏs thusiais te kai euchais kai epȏidais goȇteuontes), they try to wrack completely whole
homes and states for filthy lucre (idiȏtas te kai holas oikias kai poleis
chrȇmatȏn charin epicheirȏsin kat’ akras exairein). (909a8-b6)
This can’t
be right, for on this translation those who don’t recognize the existence of
gods … promise to influence the gods. The text is difficult, but perhaps we get
some clarity into it, if we translate the text as close to the original as
possible, instead of reconstructing it: ‘All those who become like beasts of
pray (hosoi d’an thȇriȏdeis genȏntai), and on top thinking that there are
no gods (pros tȏi theous mȇ nomizein), or that they don’t care (ȇ ameleis), or that they are placable (ȇ paraitȇtous einai), despising mankind (kataphronountes
de tȏn anthrȏpȏn),
they lead the souls of many living men (psuchagȏgȏsi men
pollous tȏn zȏntȏn); claiming to call the souls of the dead (tous de
tethneȏtas phaskontes psuchagȏgein), and promising to influence the gods (kai theous
hupischnoumenoi peithein) through the alleged magic powers of sacrifices
and prayers and charms (hȏs thusiais te kai euchais kai epȏidais goȇteuontes), they try to wrack completely whole
homes and states for filthy lucre (idiȏtas te kai holas oikias kai poleis
chrȇmatȏn charin epicheirȏsin kat’ akras exairein).’
E.B. England
notes: ‘psuchagȏgȏsi
is first used in its sense of “inveigle”, and in the following line in that of
“calling spirits from the vast deep,” i.e. this particular class of manteis
are nekromanteis.’ The second psuchagȏgȏsi was well known; it applied merely to those who
maintained that they can ‘call spirits from the vast deep’; with this second psuchagȏgȏsi Plato turned his attention to the third form of
impiety.
The first psuchagȏgȏsi applied to all three kinds of impiety, and as it
stands, it seems to be hanging in the air, unexplained. On purpose, I believe, for
the reader, reminded of the Phaedrus in the discussion on writing and in
the discussion of the nature of the soul, could not help thinking of psychagȏgia
in the Phaedrus. Viewed in the light of the Phaedran psychagȏgia,
the first psuchagȏgȏsi
is displayed and combatted in the introductory passages of Laws X.
To give a
taste of it to his fellow travellers – Cleinias, a Cretan, and Megillus, a
Spartan – the Athenian stranger (Athȇnaios xenos) transports them into the intellectual atmosphere of Athens: ‘You
think it’s just because people can’t resist temptation and desire that they are
attracted to the godless life (hȇgeisthe akrateiai monon hȇdonȏn te kai
epithumiȏn epi ton asebȇ bion hormasthai tas psuchas autȏn).’ – Cleinias:
‘What other reason could there be, sir (To de ti pros toutois aition an, ȏ
xene, eiȇ;)?’ – Athenian: ‘A reason which you two, living outside (Schedon
ho pantapasin humeis exȏ zȏntes), would know nothing about (ouk
an eideiȇte); it will have completely passed you by (alla humas an
lanthanoi).’ – Cl.: ‘What are you talking about now (Ti dȇ touto frazeis
ta nun;)?’ – Ath.: ‘A form of ignorance that causes no end of trouble (Amathia
tis mala chalepȇ), but which passes for the highest wisdom (dokousa
einai megistȇ phronȇsis).’ – Cl.: ‘How do you mean (Pȏs legeis;)?’ –
Ath.: ‘In Athens a number of written works are current (Eisin hȇmin en
grammasi logoi keimenoi) which are not found in your states (hoi par’
humin ouk eisin), which are, I understand, too well run to tolerate them (di’
aretȇn politeias, hȏs egȏ manthanȏ) (886a9-b11) … When you and I present our proofs for
the existence of gods (emou gar kai sou, hotan tekmȇria legȏmen hȏs eisin theoi) and adduce what you adduced (tauta auta propherontes)
– sun (hȇlion te), moon (kai selȇnȇn), stars (kai astra) and earth (kai gȇn)
– that they are gods and divine beings (hȏs theous kai theia onta), persuaded by the wise men they will say (hupo tȏn sophȏn toutȏn anapepeismenoi an legoien) that these things are just earth and stones (hȏs gȇn te kai lithous onta tauta), and are incapable of caring for
human affairs (kai ouden tȏn anthrȏpeiȏn pragmatȏn phrontizein dunamena, 886d4-e1).
In the Phaedrus
Socrates introduces psychagȏgia by asking Phaedrus: ‘Will not the science of rhetoric
as a whole be (Ar’ oun ou to men holon hȇ rȇtorikȇ an eiȇ technȇ) a kind of leading of the soul by means of things
said (psuchagȏgia tis dia logȏn),
not only in law-courts (ou monon en dikastȇriois) and all other kinds of public gatherings (kai hosoi alloi dȇmosioi sullogoi), but in private ones two (alla kai en idiois,
261a7-9)?’ Phaedrus replies: ‘No, I must say (Ou ma ton Di’), not
absolutely that (ou pantapasi houtȏs): a science of speaking and writing is perhaps
especially employed in lawsuits (alla malista men pȏs peri tas dikas legetai te kai graphetai technȇi),
though also in public addresses (legetai de kai peri dȇmȇgorias); I have not heard of any extension
of it beyond that (epi pleon de ouk akȇkoa, 261b3-5).’ – Socrates: ‘What is it that the opposing
parties in the law-courts do (en dikastȇriois hoi antidikoi ti drȏsin;)? Isn’t it just speaking in opposition to each other (ouk antilegousi
mentoi;)? – Ph.: ‘Just that (Tout’ auto)’ – S.: On the subject of
what is just (Peri tou dikaiou te) and unjust (kai adikou;)?’ –
Phaedrus: ‘Yes (Nai).’ – S.: ‘So the man who does this scientifically (Oukoun
ho technȇi touto drȏn)
will make the same thing appear (poiȇsei phanȇnai to auto) to the same people (tois autois) at one time just (tote
men dikaion), but at any other time he wishes (hotan de boulȇtai),
unjust (adikon;)?’ – Ph. ‘Certainly (Ti mȇn;).’
– S.: ‘And in public addresses (Kai en dȇmȇgoriai dȇ) he will make the same things appear at one time good (tȇi polei dokein ta auta tote men agatha), at another the opposite (tote
d’ au t’anantia;)?’ – Ph.: ‘Just so (Houtȏs).’
S.: ‘So do we not recognise that the Eleatic Palamedes [presumably Zeno] speaks
scientifically (Ton oun Eleatikon Palamȇdȇn legonta ouk ismen technȇi),
so as to make the same things appear to his hearers (hȏste phainesthai tois akouousi ta auta) to be like (homoia) and
unlike (kai anomoia), one (kai hen) and many (kai polla),
at rest (menonta te au) and in motion (kai pheromena;)?’ – Ph.:
‘Yes indeed (Mala ge).’ – S.: ‘Then the science of antilogic is not only
concerned with law-courts (Ouk ara monon peri dikastȇria te estin hȇ antilogikȇ) and public addresses (kai peri dȇmȇgorian), but (all’), so it seems (hȏs eoike), there will be this one science – if indeed there is one – in relation to everything that is said (peri panta ta legomena
mia tis technȇ, eiper
estin, hautȇ an eiȇ).’ (261c4-e2,
tr. C.J. Rowe)
The
introductory speech with which the impious address the Athenian and his two
fellow travellers can be seen as an example of psuchagȏgia
discussed in the Phaedrus: ‘Let’s listen to the ridicule and scorn with
which I imagine they put their case (epakousȏmen autȏn prȏton ha tȏi kataphronein hȇmȏn prospaizontas autous legein
manteuomai). They’ll
probably go in for bantering, and address us like this (Tauta tach’ an
ereschȇlountes eipoien): “Gentlemen of Athens, of Sparta and of Crete (Ō xene Athȇnaie kai Lakedaimonie kai Knȏsie),
you are quite right (alȇthȇ legete). Some of us are indeed absolute atheists (hȇmȏn gar hoi men to parapan theous oudamȏs nomizomen), whereas others (hoi de) do believe in such gods as
you describe (hoious humeis legete). So we demand of you (axioumen dȇ) what you yourselves demanded of the laws (kathaper
humeis ȇxiȏkate peri nomȏn),
that before you resort to threats and bullying (prin apeilein hȇmin sklȇrȏs),
you should try to convince us by arguments and cogent proofs that gods do exist
(humas proteron epicheirein peithein kai didaskein hȏs eisi theoi, tekmȇria legontes hikana), and that they are in fact above
being seduced by gifts into turning a blind eye to injustice (kai hoti
beltious ȇ para to dikaion hupo tinȏn dȏrȏn paratrepesthai kȇloumenoi). But you see, it’s precisely in
these and similar terms that we hear them spoken of (nun men gar tauta
akouontes te kai toiauth’ hetera) by the most highly thought-of poets (tȏn legomenȏn aristȏn einai poiȇtȏn te) and orators (kai rȇtorȏn)
and prophets (kai manteȏn) and priests (kai hiereȏn)
and thousands of other people too (kai allȏn muriakis muriȏn). That’s why most of us make little effort to avoid
crime (ouk epi to mȇ dran ta adika trepometha hoi
pleistoi), but
commit it first and try to put things right afterwards (drasantes exakeisthai
peirȏmetha). So from lawgivers (para de dȇ nomothetȏn) who profess to use the velvet glove rather than the
iron fist (phaskontȏn einai mȇ agriȏn alla hȇmerȏn) we claim the right to be tackled by persuasion first
(axioumen peithoi prȏton chrȇsthai pros hȇmas). Even if, when you state your case for the existence
of gods, your elegance of expression is only marginally superior to our
opponents’ (ei mȇ pollȏi beltiȏ tȏn allȏn legontas peri theȏn hȏs eisin), persuade us that your argument is
a better expression of the truth (all’ oun beltiȏ ge pros alȇtheian), and then perhaps we’ll believe you
(kai tacha peithoimeth’ an isȏs humin). Isn’t that fair enough? Well then,
try to reply to our challenge (all’ epicheireite, ei ti metrion legomen,
eipein ha prokaloumetha).”’ (885c2-e6, tr. Trevor J. Saunders)
When Plato
in the Phaedrus introduced the concept of psuchagȏgia
as ‘one science in relation to everything that is said (peri panta ta
legomena mia tis technȇ), he made a proviso eiper estin, ‘if it
exists’, for as he was going to argue, what the rhetoricians called technȇ (‘science’ as Plato understood it) did not deserve that
name: It must be based on dialectic, if it is to become technȇ.
But when he towards the end of his discussion on rhetoric presented his project
of psuchagȏgia as technȇ, he had no doubt about its power of
persuasion: ‘Since the power of speech is in fact a leading of the soul
(Epeidȇ logou dunamis tunchanei psuchagȏgia ousa), the man who is
going to be an expert in rhetoric (ton mellonta rȇtorikon esesthai) must
know how many forms soul has (anankȇ eidenai psuchȇ hosa eidȇ echei) …
So people of one kind (hoi men oun toioide) are easily persuaded for
this reason by one kind of speech to hold one kind of opinion (hupo tȏn
toiȏnde logȏn dia tȇnde tȇn aitian es ta toiade eupeitheis), while people
of another kind (hoi de toioide) are for these reasons (dia tade)
difficult to persuade (duspeitheis); having then grasped these things satisfactorily
(dei dȇ tauta hikanȏs noȇsanta), after that the student must observe
them as they are in real life, and actually being put into practice (meta
tauta theȏmenon auta en tais praxesin onta te kai prattomena), and be able
to follow them with keen perception (oxeȏs tȇi aisthȇsei dunasthai
epakolouthein) … But when he both has sufficient ability to say what sort
of man is persuaded by what sorts of things (hotan de eipein te hikanȏs
echȇi hoios huph’ hoiȏn peithetai), and is capable of telling himself when
he sees him there that this is the man (paragignomenon te dunatos ȇi
diaisthanomenos heautȏi endeiknusthasi hoti houtos esti) and this the
nature (kai hautȇ hȇ phusis) which was discussed before (peri hȇs
tote ȇsan hoi logoi), now actually present in front of him (nun ergȏi
parousa hoi), to whom he must now apply these kinds of speech in this way (hȇi
prosoisteon tousde hȏde tous logous) to persuade him of this kind of thing (epi
tȇn tȏnde peithȏ) … recognising the right and wrong time for these (toutȏn
tȇn eukairian te kai akairian diagnonti), then his grasp of the science
will be well and completely finished (kalȏs te kai teleȏs estin hȇ technȇ
apeirgasmenȇ).’ (271b10-272a8, tr. C.J. Rowe)
In Laws
X Plato does not have the Phaedran trust in the power of speech. The Athenian
does his best to refute the views of the impious, but in the end resorts to
punishing those that stick to their impiety. The punishment for those who were
leading the souls of others astray was the following: ‘If one of these people
is found guilty (toutȏn de hos an ophlȏn einai doxȇi), the court must sentence him (timatȏ to dikastȇrion autȏi)
to imprisonment as prescribed by law (kata nomon dedesthai men) in the
prison in the centre of the country (en tȏi tȏn mesogeȏn desmȏtȇriȏi)’ – [which is ‘in a solitary spot where the terrain
is at its wildest’ (hopȇiper an erȇmos te kai hȏs hoti malista agriȏtatos ȇi topos, 908a5-6)] – ‘no free man is to
visit them at any time (prosienai de autois mȇdena eleutheron mȇdepote), and slaves must hand them their
ration of food fixed by the Guardians of the Laws (taktȇn de hupo tȏn nomophulakȏn autous trophȇn para tȏn oiketȏn lambanein). And when such a man dies (apothanonta
de) he must be cast out over the borders of the state (exȏ tȏn horiȏn ekballein) unburied (ataphon).’ (909b6-c4)
***
The Phaedrus
can help us understand the transition from ‘they lead the souls of many
living men (psuchagȏgȏsi men pollous tȏn zȏntȏn)’ to ‘claiming that they can lead the souls of the
dead (tous de tethneȏtas phaskontes psuchagȏgein) at 909b2-3 in Laws X. In the Phaedrus, after sketching
an outline of the scientific psuchagȏgia founded on dialectic, Socrates realizes how demanding
the project is, and says that one must try to see whether an easier way to scientific
rhetoric could be found. So he evokes the teaching of the long dead Tisias, the
teacher of Gorgias, who claimed ‘that the man who is going to be competent at
rhetoric need have nothing to do with the truth about just or good things, or
indeed about people who are such by nature or upbringing (hoti ouden alȇtheias metechein deoi dikaiȏn ȇ agathȏn peri pragmatȏn, ȇ kai anthrȏpȏn ge toioutȏn phusei ontȏn ȇ trophȇi, ton mellonta hikanȏs rȇtorikon esesthai). For in the law-courts no one cares in the slightest for
the truth about these things (to parapan gar ouden en tois dikastȇriois toutȏn alȇtheias melein oudeni), but only for what is convincing (alla tou pithanou);
and this is what is probable (touto d’ einai to eikos), which is what
the man who is going to speak scientifically must pay attention to (hȏi dei prosechein ton mellonta technȇi erein, 272d4-e2).’ Then he asks Phaedrus: ‘Should we or should we not say to
him – ‘ – Phaedrus: ‘What?’ – Socrates: ‘This: “Tisias, we have for some time
been saying, before you came along, that this ‘probability’ comes about in the
minds of the ordinary people …’ Follows a discourse in which Socrates ‘leads
the soul of the dead Tisias’ (psuchagȏgei ton tethnȇkota Tisian) – if I may paraphrase Laws X – maintaining that
unless a man follows the outline of psuchagȏgia,
given in 271c10-b2, ‘he will never be an expert in the science of speaking (ou
pot’ estai technikos logȏn peri) to the degree possible for mankind
(kath’ hoson dunaton anthrȏpȏi).
This ability he will never acquire without a great deal of diligent study (tauta
de ou mȇ pote ktȇsȇtai aneu pollȇs pragmateias), which the sensible man ought to
work through not for the purpose of speaking and acting in relation to men (hȇn ouch heneka tou legein kai prattein pros anthrȏpous dei diaponeisthai ton sȏphrona), but in order to be able both to say what is gratifying to the gods (alla
tou theois kecharismena men legein dunasthai), and to act in everything, so
far as he can, in a way which is gratifying to them (kecharismenȏs de prattein to pan eis dunamin). For you see (ou gar dȇ ara), Tisias (ȏ Teisia) … if the way round is a long one (hȏst’ ei makra hȇ periodos), don’t be surprised (mȇ thaumasȇis); for it is for the sake of great things that the
journey is to be made (megalȏn gar heneka periiteon), not for those you have in mind (ouch
hȏs su dokeis). Yet these too (estai mȇn),
as our argument asserts (hȏs ho logos phȇsi),
if that is what one wants (ean tis ethelȇi),
will best come as a result of the others (kai tauta kallista ex ekeinȏn gignomena).’ (273d2-274a5, tr. C.J. Rowe)
***
With
Cleinias’ insistence that the Athenian should do his best to persuade the
impious of the existence of the gods for his words ‘once written down (en
grammasi tethenta), remain fixed and permanent, ready to stand up to
scrutiny for ever (hȏs dȏsonta eis panta chronon elenchon, pantȏs ȇremei, 891a1-2)’ corrects the negative
view on writing expressed in the closing section of the Phaedrus. Socrates
in the Phaedrus maintains that ‘the written
words speak as if they were thinking something (hȏs ti phronountas autous
legein), but if you ask them something about anything they say (ean de
ti erȇi tȏn legomenȏn), wanting to learn (boulomenos mathein), they
always point to just one and the same thing (hen ti sȇmainei monon t’auton
aei, 275d7-9)’. Cleinias in Laws X insists that the Athenian should
not be alarmed if his
arguments ‘at first they make difficult listening (ei chalepa kat’ archas
akouein estin), because your slow learner will be able to go back again and
again and examine them (ha g’ estai kai tȏi dusmathei pollakis epanionti skopein). Nor does their length (oute ei
makra), provided they’re useful (ȏphelima de), justify any man in committing what
seems to me (dia tauta logon oudamȇi echei), at least, an impiety (oude
hosion emoige einai phainetai): I mean refusing to facilitate these
explanations as best he can (to mȇ ou boȇthein toutois tois logois panta andra kata dunamin).’ (891a3-7) What Socrates saw as
the weakness of writings in the Phaedrus – the written word is unable
to defend itself 'when it is ill-treated and unjustly abused' (plȇmmeloumenos de kai ouk en dikȇi loidorȇtheis, 275e3-4) – Plato views in Laws
X as the strength of the written word: writings ‘stand
up to scrutiny for ever’.
In his
discussion of the nature of the soul in Laws X Plato reaffirmed a
revised view on this subject presented in the Phaedran Palinode.
Transporting
his interlocuters into the intellectual atmosphere in Athens in the opening
paragraphs of Laws X, where he can display the rhetorical acumen of the
impious, and then, towards the end of Laws X, reserving the severest
punishment for the impious who lead the souls of others astray (psuchagȏgȏsi), Plato reminds the reader of the second part of the Phaedrus,
which is devoted to rhetoric defined as psuchagȏgia,
and he says his no to it.
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