3 C. J. Rowe’s arguments for a late dating of the Phaedrus – the Phaedrus and Laws X

In point 4 Rowe says: ‘4. Other clear connections with Laws 10, as has long been noticed, are to be found in the arguments for immortality (245c-246a).’

The connections are undeniable, but do they offer us any reasons for the late dating of the Phaedrus? Let me begin with the arguments for immortality in Phaedrus 245c-246a.

Having defined Love (Erȏs) as madness (mania, 244a), Socrates is going to prove ‘that this sort of madness is a gift of the gods, fraught with the highest bliss (hȏs ep’ eutuchiai tȇi megistȇi para theȏn hȇ toiautȇ mania didotai). The proof (hȇ apodeixis) … must begin (dei oun prȏton) with comprehending the truth about the nature of the soul, both divine and human, by observing its experiences and actions (psuchȇs phuseȏs peri theias te kai anthrȏpinȇs idonta pathȇ te kai erga t’alȇthes noȇsai). The beginning of the proof is this (archȇ de apodeixeȏs hȇde):

‘All soul is immortal (Psuchȇ pasa athanatos). For that which is always in movement is immortal (to gar aeikinȇton athanaton); that which moves something else (to d’ allo kinoun) and is moved by something else (kai hup’ allou kinoumenon), in ceasing from movement (paulan echon kinȇseȏs), ceases from living (paulan echei zȏȇs). Only that which moves itself (monon dȇ to hauto kinoun), because it does not abandon itself (hate ouk apoleipon heauto), never stops moving (oupote lȇgei kinoumenon). It is also source and first principle of movement for the other things which move (alla kai tois allois hosa kineitai touto pȇgȇ kai archȇ kinȇseȏs). A first principle is something which does not come into being (Archȇ de agenȇton). For all that comes into being must come into being from a first principle (ex archȇs gar anankȇ pan to gignomenon gignesthai), but a first principle itself cannot come into being from anything at all (autȇn de mȇd’ ex henos); for if a first principle came into being from anything (ei gar ek tou archȇ gignoito), it would not do so from a first principle (ouk an ex archȇs gignoito). Since it does not come into being (epeidȇ de agenȇton estin), it must also be something which does not perish (kai adiaphthoron auto anankȇ einai). For if a first principle is destroyed (archȇs gar dȇ apolomenȇs), neither will it ever come into being from anything nor anything else from it (oute autȇ pote ek tou oute allo ex ekeinȇs genȇsetai), given that all things must come into being from a first principle (eiper ex archȇs dei ta panta gignesthai). It is in this way, then (houtȏ dȇ), that that which moves itself is first principle of movement (kinȇseȏs men archȇ to auto hauto kinoun). It is not possible for this either to be destroyed or to come into being (touto de out’ apollusthai oute gignesthai dunaton), or else the whole universe (ȇ panta te ouranon) and the whole of that which comes to be (pasan te genesin) might collapse together (sumpesousan) and come to a halt (stȇnai), and never again have (kai mȇpote authis echein) a source from which things will come to be moved (hothen kinȇthenta genȇsetai). And since that which is moved by itself has been shown to be immortal (athanatou de pephasmenou tou huph’ heautou kinoumenou), it will incur no shame to say that this is the essence and the definition of soul (psuchȇs ousian te kai logon touton auton tis legȏn ouk aischuneitai). For all body (pan gar sȏma) which has its source of motion outside itself (hȏi men exȏthen to kineisthai) is soulless (apsuchon), whereas that which has it within itself and from itself (hȏi de endothen autȏi ex hautou) is ensoled (empsuchon), this being the nature of soul (hȏs tautȇs ousȇs phuseȏs psuchȇs); and if this is so (ei d’ estin touto houtȏs echon) – that that which moves itself is nothing other than soul (mȇ allo ti einai to auto heauto kinoun ȇ psuchȇn), soul will be necessarily something which never comes into being nor dies (ex anankȇs agenȇton te kai athanaton psuchȇ an eiȇ).’ (245b7-246a2, translation C.J. Rowe)

In Laws X the Athenian stranger undertakes to prove the existence of gods (hȏs eisin theoi, 891b4). He begins by pointing out that the impious talks have their root in the doctrine according to which ‘fire and water, earth and air are the first of all things (pur kai hudȏr kai gȇn kai aera prȏta hȇgeisthai tȏn pantȏn einai), and these very things they call nature (kai tȇn phusin onomazein tauta auta), and that the soul came out of them later (psuchȇn de ek toutȏn husteron, 891c2-4) … It’s the soul (psuchȇn), my good friend (ȏ hetaire)’ – he says to Cleinias, the Cretan – ‘that nearly everybody seems to have misunderstood (ȇgnoȇkenai kinduneuousi men oligou sumpantes), not realizing its nature (hoion te on tunchanei) and power (kai dunamin hȇn echei). Quite apart from the other points about it (tȏn te allȏn autȇs peri), people are particularly ignorant about its birth (kai dȇ kai geneseȏs). It is one of the first creations (hȏs en prȏtois esti), born before all bodies (sȏmatȏn emprosthen pantȏn genomenȇ), and is the chief cause of all their alterations and transformations (kai metabolȇs te autȏn kai metakosmȇseȏs hapasȇs archei pantos mallon). (892a2-7, translation Saunders, with some changes; since I am giving the Greek original, it compels me and enables me to be closer to the original.)

The Athenian is going to define the soul as ‘motion capable of moving itself’ (tȇn dunamenȇn autȇn hautȇn kinein kinȇsin, 896a1-2). In the Phaedrus Plato defined the soul as ‘that which moves itself‘ (to auto heauto kinoun, 245e7-8). The connection between the two is obvious. This fundamental similarity forms the basis for referring to Laws X in dating the Phaedrus late, by Rowe and others.

But note a fundamental difference between the two. In the Phaedrus Plato emphasises again and again that the soul ‘does not come into being’: it is agenȇton (245d1, d3, 246a1), it is not possible for it to come into being (touto de oute gignesthai dunaton, 245d7-8). But in Laws X he speaks about its birth (autȇs peri geneseȏs 892a4): it was born before all bodies (sȏmatȏn emprosthen pantȏn genomenȇ 892a5).

Presumably, the creation of the soul in the Timaeus provided the basis for Plato’s revision of the Phaedran conception of the soul in Laws X.

Let me go through the relevant passages in Laws X. ‘All things related to the soul will necessarily have been created before things related to the body (ex anankȇs ta psuchȇs sungenȇ protera an eiȇ gegonota tȏn sȏmati prosȇkontȏn), since soul itself is older than body (ousȇs autȇs presbuteras tou sȏmatos, 892a8-b1).’ He says that those who deny the existence of the gods, ‘when they use the word “nature”, they mean the process by which the first things came into being (phusin boulontai legein genesin tȇn peri ta prȏta). But if it can be shown that the soul came first (ei de phanȇsetai psuchȇ prȏton), not fire (ou pur) or air (oude aȇr), and that it was one of the first things to be created (psuchȇ d’ en prȏtois gegenȇmenȇ), it will be quite correct to say that soul is pre-eminently by nature (schedon orthotat’ legoit’ an einai diapherontȏs phusei). This is true (taut’ esth’ houtȏs echonta), provided you can demonstrate that soul is older than body (an psuchȇn tis epideixȇi presbuteran einai sȏmatos), but not otherwise (allȏs de oudamȏs).’ (892c2-7)

It can be shown that ‘the motion (kinȇsis) that moves both itself and other things (tȇn te hautȇn te kinousan kai heteron, 894c4-5) is the first by birth (prȏton genesei te estin) as well as in power (kai rȏmȇi kata logon, 894d10)’. And it can be shown that it is archȇ, the first principle of motion: ‘When that which moves itself by itself effects an alteration in something (hotan ara auto hauto kinȇsan heteron alloiȏsȇi), and that in turn in something else (to d’ heteron allo), so that motion is transmitted to thousands upon thousands of things (kai houtȏ chilia dȇ epi muriois gignetai ta kinȇthenta), will there be any other initial principle of the entire sequence of their movements (mȏn archȇ tis autȏn estai tȇs kinȇseȏs hapasȇs allȇ) than the change that moves itself by itself (plȇn hȇ tȇs autȇs hautȇn kinȇsasȇs metabolȇ;)?’ (894e4-895a3).

‘Now let’s put the point in a different way (Eti dȇ kai tȇide eipȏmen). Suppose the whole universe were somehow to coalesce and come to a standstill (ei staiȇ pȏs panta homou genomena), which of the motions we have enumerated would inevitably be the first to arise in it (tin’ ara en autois anankȇ prȏtȇn genesthai tȏn eirȇmenȏn;)? The one that moves itself by itself, surely (tȇn autȇn heautȇn dȇpou kinȇsan), because no antecedent impulse can ever be transmitted from something else (hup’ allou gar ou mȇpote emprosthen metapesȇi) in a situation where no antecedent impulse exists (mȇdemias ge en autois ousȇs emprosthen metaptȏseȏs). The first principle of all motions (archȇn ara kinȇseȏn pasȏn), which is the first born among things that stand still (kai prȏtȇn en te hestȏsi genomenȇn), and is the first among things that move (kai en hestȏsi ousan), is the motion that moves itself by itself (tȇn hautȇn kinousan); we shall say (phȇsomen) that it is necessarily (anankaiȏs einai) the oldest (presbutatȇn) and most potent of all changes (kai kratistȇn metabolȇn pasȏn).’ (895a5-b6; E.B. England notes on the last sentence: ‘prȏtȇn with genomenȇn has a different meaning from that which it has with ousan; it is the first to come into being, and when in being (ousan) it ranks highest. These two expressions correspond to the following presbutatȇn and kratistȇn respectively’.)

In Laws X Plato views 'the motion that moves itself by itself’ (tȇn hautȇn kinousan kinȇsin) as archȇ, the first principle of motion and change, just as he viewed motion ‘that moves itself’ (to hauto kinoun) as archȇ in the Phaedrus. But the notion of archȇ is profoundly different. In the Phaedrus the archȇ is agenȇton, it ’does not come into being’, whereas in Laws X it is the first principle (archȇn) that came into being (genomenȇn). To this difference corresponds the different outcome of the thought experiments in which all that moves came to a standstill. In the Phaedrus if ‘the whole universe (panta te ouranon) and the whole of that which comes to be (pasan te genesin) collapsed together (sumpesousan) and come to a halt (stȇnai), it would never again have (kai mȇpote authis echein) a source from which things will come to be moved (hothen kinȇthenta genȇsetai)’; in Laws X, if all came to standstill, it would be the motion that moves itself, which of necessity would be the first to come into being.

The Athenian then asks: ‘If we ever saw this (Ean idȏmen pou tautȇn)’ – i.e. the motion moving itself – ‘arise in something made of earth (genomenȇn en tȏi gȇinȏi) or water (ȇ enudrȏi) or fire (ȇ puroeidei), alone (kechȏrismenȏi) or in combination (ȇ kai summigei), what state we would say it to be in (ti pote phȇsomen en tȏi toioutȏi pathos einai;)?’ – Cleinias: ‘Don’t you really ask me (Mȏn ara me erȏtais), whether we shall say it to be alive (ei zȇn auto proseroumen) when it moves itself by itself (hotan auto hauto kinȇi;)?’ – Ath. ‘Yes (Nai). – Cl. ‘To be alive (Zȇn), of course (pȏs gar ou).’ (895c4-10)

The Athenian then gives Cleinias an elementary lecture in philosophy: ‘Now, hold on a minute (Eche dȇ), for heaven’s sake (pros Dios). Aren’t you prepared to recognize three elements concerning each thing (ar’ ouk an ethelois peri hekaston tria noein;)?’ Cl.: ‘What do you mean (Pȏs legeis;)?’ – Ath.: ‘The first point is what the object actually is (Hen men tȇn ousian), the second is its definition (hen de tȇs ousias ton logon), and the third is its name (hen de onoma). And, in addition, there are two questions to be asked about every existing thing (kai dȇ kai erȏtȇseis einai peri to on hapan duo).’ – Cl. ‘Two (Pȏs duo;)?’ – Ath.: ‘Sometimes we put forward the mere name (Tote men hȇmȏn hekaston t’ounoma proteinomenon auto) and want to know the definition (ton logon apaitein), and sometimes we put forward the definition (tote de ton logon auton proteinomenon) and ask for the name (erȏtan d’ au t’ounoma) … a number has the name “even” (tȏi kath’ arithmon onoma men artion) and its definition is (logos de) “a number divisible into two equal parts (arithmos diairoumenos eis isa duo merȇ)” … when we call it “even” and define it as “a number divisible in two, it’s the same thing we’re talking about (artion onomati, kai logȏi dicha diairoumenon arithmon, prosagoreuontes t’auton on).’ (895d1-e8)

After this preparation, the Athenian asks: ‘So what’s the definition of the thing we call soul (Hȏi dȇ psuchȇ t’ounoma, tis toutou logos;)? Do we have any other than the one we said a moment ago [at 895c4-10] (echomen allon plȇn ton nundȇ rȇthenta): “the motion capable of moving itself by itself” (tȇn dunamenȇn autȇn hautȇn kinein kinȇsin;)? – Cl.: ‘Do you mean that the motion that moves itself is the definition of the same entity (To heauto kinein phȇis logon echein tȇn autȇn ousian), which we all call by the name soul (hȇnper t’ounoma ho dȇ pantes psuchȇn prosagoreuomen)?’ – Ath.: ‘I do (Phȇmi ge). And if this is true (ei d’ esti touto houtȏs echon), are we still dissatisfied? Haven’t we got ourselves a satisfactory proof (ara eti pothoumen mȇ hikanȏs dedeichthai) that soul is identical (psuchȇn t’auton on) with the first generation (kai tȇn prȏtȇn genesin) and motion (kai kinȇsin) of all past, present and future things (tȏn te ontȏn kai gegonotȏn kai esomenȏn) and their contraries (kai pantȏn au tȏn enantiȏn toutois;)? When it has been shown (epeidȇ ge anephanȇ) to be the cause of all change and motion in everything (metabolȇs te kai kinȇseȏs hapasȇs aitia hapasin;)?’ – Cl.: ’Dissatisfied? No! (Ouk), On the contrary (alla), it has been proved most sufficiently (hikanȏtata dedeichthai) that soul is the oldest of all things (psuchȇ tȏn pantȏn presbutatȇ), the first principle of motion that was generated (genomenȇ ge archȇ kinȇseȏs) … Ath.: ‘So it was equally correct, final and complete statement of the truth (Orthȏs ara kai kuriȏs alȇthestata te kai teleȏtata eirȇkotes an eimen), when we said that soul was generated prior to body (psuchȇn men proteran gegonenai sȏmatos hȇmin), and that body came second (sȏma de deuteron te) and later (kai husteron), soul being the master (psuchȇs archousȇs), and body its natural subject (archomenon kata phusin).’ (895e10-896c3)

Let me compare to this ‘final and complete statement of the truth’ in Laws X the concluding statement of the proof of immortality of soul in the Phaedrus: ‘All body (pan gar sȏma) which has its source of motion outside itself (hȏi men exȏthen to kineisthai) is soulless (apsuchon), whereas that which has it within itself and from itself (hȏi de endothen autȏi ex hautou) is ensoled (empsuchon), this being the nature of soul (hȏs tautȇs ousȇs phuseȏs psuchȇs); and if this is so (ei d’ estin touto houtȏs echon) – that that which moves itself is nothing other than soul (mȇ allo ti einai to auto heauto kinoun ȇ psuchȇn), soul will be necessarily something which never comes into being nor dies (ex anankȇs agenȇton te kai athanaton psuchȇ an eiȇ).’

The similarity is undeniable, but so is the difference. In Laws X the soul was generated (genomenȇ), it was brought into being prior to the body, the body came second, in the Phaedrus the soul has never come into being, it was ‘of necessity (ex anankȇs) agenȇton’.