In ‘The argument and structure of Plato’s Phaedrus’ (Proceedings of the
Cambridge Philological Society, 1986, pp. 106-125) Rowe says: ‘Finally,
some brief remarks about dating. There is at present no clear consensus on the
question: some regard the Phaedrus as belonging with the middle
dialogues; others group it with the late dialogues like the Theaetetus or
the Politicus [i.e. Statesman]. I make the following
observations. 1. Those who hold the first view usually at least implicitly rely
on the close resemblance between some of the main ideas contained in Socrates’
speech and those of the Republic, the Symposium, and the Phaedo:
including, most notably, the idea of separated Forms
and that of learning as recollection. What has not been sufficiently recognised
is that these ideas appear in the Phaedrus exclusively in the framework
of a muthos. If no muthos is to be taken as literally true (see
p. 116 above), the result will be to throw immediate
doubt on their status. In general, the Phaedrus seems to expound
middle-period ideas only to recommend them for scrutiny. If so, it has more in
common with the critical musings of the Parmenides than with the
optimistic constructions of the middle dialogues themselves.’
To begin
with, let me note that there is no ‘learning as recollection’ in the Republic
and in the Symposium.
In this post
I shall discuss Rowe’s claim that Plato in the Phaedrus presents ‘the
idea of separated Forms’ exclusively in the framework of a muthos, thus ‘throwing
immediate doubt on its status’. His related claim that ‘the Phaedrus
seems to expound middle-period ideas only to recommend them for scrutiny’ I
shall discuss in so far as it concerns the Phaedrus and the Republic.
In support
of these claims, on p. 116 of his article, Rowe quotes the words with which
Socrates reflects on his Palinode: ‘… by expressing the experience of love
through some kind of simile (ouk oid’ hopȇi to erȏtikon pathos apeikazontes), which allowed us perhaps to grasp
some truth (isȏs men alȇthous tinos ephaptomenoi), though may be it also took us in a wrong direction
(tacha d’ an allose parapheromenoi), and mixing together a not wholly
implausible speech (kerasantes ou pantapasin apithanon logon), we sang a playful hymn in the form of a story (muthikon
tina humnon prosepaisamen) … to my master, and yours (ton emon te
kai ton son despotȇn), Phaedrus (ȏ Phaidre) – Love (Erȏta),
watcher over beautiful boys (kalȏn paidȏn ephoron, 265b6-c3)’.
Socrates
says that in his mythical hymn he ‘perhaps grasped some truth’. To me it sounds
as an understatement with which Socrates refers to the way in which he
introduced ‘the Forms’ in his Palinode: ‘The region above the heavens (Ton
de huperouranion topon) has never yet been celebrated as it deserves by an
earthly poet (oute tis humnȇse pȏ tȏn tȇide poiȇtȇs),
nor will it ever be (oute pote humnȇsei kat’ axian). But it is like this (echei de hȏde)
– for one must be bold enough to say what is true (tolmȇteon gar oun to ge alȇthes eipein), especially when speaking about truth
(allȏs te kai peri alȇtheias legonta). This region is occupied by being which
really is, which is without colour or shape, intangible, observable by the
steersman of the sole alone, by intellect, and to which the class of true
knowledge relates (hȇ gar achrȏmatos te kai aschȇmatistos kai anaphȇs ousia ontȏs ousa, psuchȇs kubernȇtȇi monȏi theatȇ nȏi, peri hȇs to tȇs alȇthous epistȇmȇs genos, touton echei ton topon).’ (247c3d1)
The ancient
tradition according to which the Phaedrus is Plato’s first dialogue
allows us to fully appreciate the enthusiasm with which Plato presents to the
reader his great discovery. Furthermore, it allows us to appreciate Plato’s
reference to it in the Laws: ‘Truth (alȇtheia dȇ) is the guiding principle of
everything good for gods (pantȏn men agathȏn theois hȇgeitai) and of everything good for men (pantȏn de anthrȏpois); a man who is to be blessed and
happy would partake of it straight at the beginning (hȇs ho genȇsesthai mellȏn makarios te kai eudaimȏn ex archȇs metochos eiȇ), so that he might live as a man of truth as long time as
possible (hina hȏs pleiston chronon alȇthȇs diabioi); for he can be trusted (pistos
gar). (730c1-4)
But let me
return to Rowe’s claims. Is he right when he says that since Plato in the Phaedrus
presents ‘the idea of separated Forms’ exclusively in the framework of a muthos,
he is thus ‘throwing immediate doubt on its status’? In an effort to get an
objective answer to this question, let me point to the Republic, in
which Plato too introduces the Forms within the framework of a muthos,
namely the muthos by which he creates the republic (hȇ politeia hȇn muthologoumen logȏi,
501e4).
The occasion
for introducing the Forms in the Republic is as follows. Socrates says
that ‘until philosophers are kings in their cities (Ean mȇ ȇ hoi philosophoi basileusȏsin en tais polesin), or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and
power of philosophy (ȇ hoi basilȇs te nun legomenoi kai dunastai philosophȇsȏsi gnȇsiȏs kai hikanȏs)
… cities will never have rest from their evils … my dear Glaucon (ouk esti
kakȏn paula, ȏ phile Glaukȏn, tais polesi)’. At hearing this, Glaucon says: ‘Socrates (Ō Sȏkrates), consider that the word which you
have uttered is one at which numerous persons (toiouton
embeblȇkas rȇma te kai logon hon eipȏn hȇgou epi se panu pollous te), and very
respectable persons too (kai ou phaulous nun houtȏs), in a figure
pulling off their cloaks all in a moment and
seizing any weapon that comes to hand (hoion ripsantas ta himatia, gumnous
labontas hoti hekastȏi paretuchen
hoplon), will run at you might and main
before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what (thein
diatetamenous hȏs thaumasia ergasomenous); and if you don’t prepare an answer (hous ei mȇ amunȇi tȏi logȏi) and make good your escape (kai ekpheuxȇi), you will be “pared by their fine
wits”, and no mistake (tȏi onti tȏthazomenos dȏseis dikȇn).’ (473c11-474a4, translations from the Republic
are in this post B. Jowett’s)
To escape,
Socrates embarks on explaining the nature of philosophers who are to rule in
the state. He begins by defining them as ‘the lovers of the vision of truth’ (tous
tȇs alȇtheias philotheamonas, 475e4) and goes on to explain the
truth (tȇn alȇtheian) as the Forms (ta eidȇ,
476a5, idea, 479a1).
The
connection of the introduction of the Forms in the Republic with the
introduction of ‘the Forms’ in the Phaedrus appears to be unmistakable –
I put the Phaedran ‘Forms‘ in quotation marks, for in the Phaedrus Plato
does not use the terms eidos and idea with reference to the
Forms; instead, he uses the terms truth (alȇtheia) and being which really is (ousia ontȏs ousa). On Rowe’s interpretation, presumably, it is this
introduction of the Forms in the Republic that Plato ‘throws in doubt’
with his vision of Truth in the Phaedrus. On my interpretation, introducing
the Forms in the Republic, Plato looks back on his
vision of Truth in the Phaedrus, bringing in the terms eidos and idea
– translated as Forms or Ideas – as terms that best express the act of
intellectual vision, with which we comprehend true being, to on ontȏs, ousian ontȏs ousan.
When Glaucon
asked what Socrates meant by ‘the lovers of the vision of truth’, Socrates said:
‘To another I might have a difficulty in explaining (Oudamȏs raidiȏs pros ge allon) [Glaucon is Plato’s younger
brother]; but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to
make (su de oimai homologȇsein moi to toionde).’ – Glaucon: ‘What is the
proposition (To poion;)?’ – S.: ‘That since beauty is the opposite of
ugliness (Epeidȇ estin enantion kalon aischrȏi),
they are two (duo autȏ einai;)?’ – G.: ‘Certainly (Pȏs d’ ou;).’ – S.: ‘And inasmuch as they are two (Oukoun epeidȇ duo), each of them is one (kai hen hekateron;)?’ – G.: ’True again (Kai
touto).’ – S.: ‘And of just (Kai peri dikaiou) and unjust (kai
adikou), good (kai agathou) and evil (kai kakou), and of
every other Form (kai pantȏn tȏn eidȏn peri), the same remark holds (ho autos
logos); taken singly, each of them is one (auto men hen hekaston einai);
but from various combinations of them with actions and bodies and with one
another (tȇi de tȏn praxeȏn kai sȏmatȏn kai allȇlȏn koinȏniai), they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many (pantachou
phantazomena polla phainesthai hekaston)?’ – G.: ‘Very true (Orthȏs legeis).’
Adam notes
in his commentary: ‘This is the first appearance of the Theory of “Ideas”
properly so called in the Republic.’
Socrates
continues: ‘And this is the distinction which I draw (Tautȇi toinun diairȏ) between the sight-loving,
art-loving, practical class which you have mentioned (chȏris men hous nundȇ eleges philotheamonas te kai
philotechnas kai praktikous), and those of whom I am speaking (kai chȏris au peri hȏn ho logos), and who are alone worthy of the
name of philosophers (hous monous an tis orthȏs proseipoi philosophous).’ – G.: ‘How do you distinguish them (Pȏs legeis;)?’ – S.: ‘The lovers of sounds and sights (Hoi men pou philȇkooi kai philotheamones) … their mind is incapable of seeing or loving
absolute beauty (autou de tou kalou adunatos autȏn hȇ dianoia tȇn phusin idein te kai aspasasthai [‘to see and to love’,
Jowett’s “or” is wrong]).’
The editors
of Jowett’s translation say in the footnote: ‘Both “absolute beauty” and ‘Idea
of beauty” are attempts to render the Greek phrase “the beautiful itself” (auto
to kalon). The noun idea does not occur here.’
Glaucon.:
‘The fact is plain (Echei gar oun dȇ houtȏs).’
– S.: ‘Few are they who are able to attain to this ideal beauty and contemplate
it (Hoi de dȇ ep’ auto to kalon dunatoi
ienai te kai horan kath’ hauto ara ou spanioi an eien;).’ – G. ‘Very true (Kai mala).’
– S.: 'And he who, having a sense of beautiful things (Ho oun kala men
pragmata nomizȏn), has no sense of absolute beauty (auto
de to kallos mȇte nomizȏn),
or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty, is unable to follow (mȇte, an tis hȇgȇtai epi tȇn gnȏsin autou, dunamenos hepesthai) – of such a one I ask, Is he awake
or in a dream only (onar ȇ hupar dokei soi zȇn;)?
Reflect (skopei de): is not the dreamer (to oneirȏttein ara ou tode estin), sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar
things, who puts the copy in place of the real object (eante en hupnȏi tis eant’ egrȇgorȏs to homoion tȏi mȇ homoion all’ auto hȇgȇtai hȏi eoiken;)?’ – G.: ‘I should certainly say (Egȏ g’oun an phaiȇn) that such a one is dreaming (oneirȏttein ton toiouton).’ – S.: ‘But (Ti de;) he who, on the contrary,
recognizes the existence of absolute beauty (ho t’anantia toutȏn hȇgoumenos te ti auto to kalon) and is able to contemplate both the
Idea (kai dunamenos kathoran kai auto) and the objects which
participate in it (kai ta ekeinou metechonta), neither putting the
objects in the place of the Idea nor the Idea in the place of the objects (kai
oute ta metechonta auto oute auto ta metechonta hȇgoumenos) – is he a dreamer, or is he awake (hupar ȇ onar au kai houtos dokei soi zȇn;)?
– G.: ‘He is wide awake (Kai mala hupar).’ – S. ‘And since he knows, it
would be right to describe his state of mind as knowledge (Oukoun toutou men
tȇn dianoian hȏs gignȏskontos gnȏmȇn an orthȏs phaimen einai)?’ – G.: ‘Certainly (Panu men oun).’
(475e6-476d7) … Socrates: ‘And have we not a right to say in his defence (Ar’
oun dȇ ou metriȏs apologȇsometha) that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being –
that is his nature (hoti pros to on pephukȏs eiȇ hamillasthai ho ge ontȏs philomathȇs); he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals
which is an appearance only (kai ouk epimenoi epi tois doxazomenois einai
pollois hekastois), but will go on (all’ ioi) – the keen edge will
not be blunted (kai ouk amblunoito) nor the force
of his desire abate (oud apolȇgoi tou erȏtos) until he has attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence
(prin autou ho estin hekastou tȇs phuseȏs hapsasthai) by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul (hȏi prosȇkei
ephaptesthai tou toioutou, prosȇkei de sungenei), and by that power drawing near and
mingling and becoming incorporate with very being (hȏi plȇsiasas kai migeis tȏi onti ontȏs), having begotten mind and truth (gennȇsas noun kai alȇtheian), he will have knowledge (gnoiȇ te)
and will truly live (kai alȇthȏs zȏiȇ) and grow (kai trephoito); and
then and not till then will he cease from his travail (kai houtȏ lȇgoi ȏdinos, prin d’ou, 490a8-b7). – Jowett’s ‘travail’ for Plato’s ȏdinȇ obscures the connection to ȏdinai
‘philosopher-lover’s pains’ (Rowe: ‘birth-pains’, Hackforth: ‘sufferings’) at Phaedrus
251e5.
After some more
explanation, Socrates ends his defence against those ‘numerous persons and very
respectable persons too’ who were ready to attack him ‘pulling off their cloaks
and seizing any weapon that comes to hand running at him might and main’ (cf. Glaucon’s
warning at 473e6-474a4): ‘Then will they still be angry (Eti oun agrianousi)
at our saying (legontȏn hȇmȏn) that until philosophers bear rule (hoti prin an
poleȏs to philosophon genos enkrates genȇtai),
States and individuals have no rest from evil (oute polei oute politais kakȏn paula estai), nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized
(oude hȇ politeia hȇn muthologoumen logȏi ergȏi telos lȇpsetai)?’ – Adeimantos [Plato’s older brother] replied: ‘I think they will be
less angry (Isȏs hȇtton).’ (501e2-6)
There appears to be no connection between Rowe’s ‘we sang a
playful hymn in the form of a story’ in the Phaedrus and Jowett’s ‘this our
imaginary State’ in the Republic. The connection becomes nevertheless obvious if we realise
that Rowe’s ‘we sang a playful hymn in the form of a story’ stands for muthikon
tina humnon prosepaisamen and Jowett’s ‘this our imaginary State’ stands
for hȇ politeia hȇn muthologoumen logȏi.
In the Phaedrus Socrates views the Palinode, in which he introduced ‘the
Forms’, as a myth (265b6-8)’, in the Republic Socrates introduced the
Forms in the myth with which he was creating the ideal State. Socrates’
depiction of a true philosopher in Republic 473c 11-501e5 has much in
common with the depiction of the true philosopher-lover in the Phaedran
Palinode. In both cases the true philosopher is the one who can see the truth (tȇn alȇtheian, Phdr. 247c, Rep.
475e4), and in both cases the truth is identified with being that truly is (ousia
ontȏs ousa, Phdr. 247c7, to on ontȏs, Rep. 490b5). In the Phaedran Palinode the
attention is focussed on true beauty, on ‘beauty itself’ (auto to kallos.
250e2); correspondingly, the Form on which Plato focusses attention in the Republic
is ‘the beautiful itself’ (auto to kalon, 476a10, auto kallos, 476c2).
Finally,
note the correspondence between ‘touching on some truth’ (alȇthous tinos ephaptomenoi) in the passage in which the Palinode
is characterized as a muthos, in the Phaedrus, and the passage in
the Republic in which Socrates says that the true philosopher’s ‘desire
won’t abate (oud apolȇgoi tou erȏtos) until he has touched on the true nature of every
essence (prin autou ho estin hekastou tȇs phuseȏs hapsasthai) by that part of him that is fit to touch on it (hȏi prosȇkei ephaptesthai tou toioutou,
490b2-4)’. In the
Phaedran Palinode Socrates maintains that ‘the mind of the philosopher (hȇ tou philosophou dianoia) is always as close as possible, through memory, to those
things (pros ekeinois aei estin mnȇmȇi kata dunamin), to which his closeness gives god his divinity (pros
hoisper theos ȏn theios estin, 249c4-6). By ‘those things’
Socrates refers to ‘being that truly is’ (to on ontȏs,
249c4), which the soul saw in its pre-incarnation state, when it still had its
wings.
Plato in the
Republic goes further than in the Phaedrus, where the philosopher’s
mind can be with the ’being that truly is’ only through memory; the philosopher
who is to rule the State must have a direct knowledge of the Forms, that is of ‘that
which truly is’.
No comments:
Post a Comment