In the
‘Introduction’ to his edition and translation of the Phaedrus Rowe
writes: ‘The Phaedrus is certainly later than the Republic and
other middle dialogues like the Phaedo and the Symposium;
certainly later than the Timaeus; possibly or probably later than the Parmenides,
the Theaetetus, the Sophist and the Statesman; and
probably earlier than the Philebus. Some of the evidence for these
suggestions will be found implied in various parts of the commentary; their net
result would be to place the Phaedrus rather later than is commonly
assumed, and relatively near the end of Plato’s life. But for a direct
treatment of these matters, see my forthcoming article ‘The Structure and
argument of Plato’s Phaedrus’.’
In ‘The argument and structure of Plato’s Phaedrus’ (Proceedings of the
Cambridge Philological Society, 1986, pp. 106-125) he says: ‘Finally, some
brief remarks about dating. There is at present no clear consensus on the
question: some regard the Phaedrus as belonging with the middle
dialogues; others group it with the late dialogues like the Theaetetus
or the Politicus [i.e. Statesman]. I make the following
observations. 1. Those who hold the first view usually at least implicitly rely
on the close resemblance between some of the main ideas contained in Socrates’
speech and those of the Republic, the Symposium, and the Phaedo:
including, most notably, the idea of separated Forms and that of learning as
recollection. What has not been sufficiently recognised is that these ideas
appear in the Phaedrus exclusively in the framework of a muthos.
If no muthos is to be taken as literally true (see p. 116 above), the
result will be to throw immediate doubt on their status. In general, the Phaedrus
seems to expound middle-period ideas only to recommend them for scrutiny. If
so, it has more in common with the critical musings of the Parmenides
than with the optimistic constructions of the middle dialogues themselves. 2. Socrates
argues that skilfully constructed logoi will be based on the procedures
of collection and division (264e-266c, 277b-c). If, as I suggest, Plato has in
mind his own works as models, this will connect the Phaedrus especially
with the Sophist and the Politicus; and I believe that it
contains an actual parody of the sort of elaborate definition which results
from the division in both these dialogues (I refer to Socrates’ “dithyrambic”
definition of love at 238b-c, in his first speech). 3. The Phaedrus
rejects the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body (246c-d): such
a conception of them is present in the Timaeus (38e, 41a-b), but – pace
Cornford – absent from Laws 10. 4. Other clear connections with Laws
10, as has long been noticed, are to be found in the arguments for immortality (245c-246a).
5. But a comparison of the ways in which Plato introduces the figure called
Theuth in the Phaedrus (274c-275b) and in the Philebus (18b-d)
convinces me that the Philebus passage is later. I conclude that Plato
wrote the Phaedrus at a time relatively close to, but still some
distance from, the end of his life.’ (pp. 120-121)
In this post
I shall discuss Rowe’s point 3. I shall begin with his observation that ‘the Phaedrus
rejects the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body (264c-d)’. In
the given passage Socrates explains ‘how it is (pȇi dȇ oun) that some living creatures are called
mortal and some immortal (thnȇton te kai athanaton zȏion eklȇthȇ)’: ’All soul (psuchȇ pasa) has the care of all that is
soulless (pantos epimeleitai tou apsuchou), and ranges about the whole
universe (panta de ouranon peripolei), coming now to be in one form, now
in another (allot’ en allois eidesi gignomenȇ). Now when it is perfectly winged (telea men oun ousa kai
empterȏmenȇ), it travels above the earth (meteȏroporei te) and governs the whole cosmos (kai panta ton kosmon
dioikei); but the one that has lost its wings (hȇ de pterorruȇsasa) is swept along (pheretai) until
it lays hold of something solid (heȏs an stereou tinos antilabȇtai),
where it settles down (hou katoikistheisa), taking on an earthy body (sȏma gȇïnon labousa), which seems to move itself because
of the power of the soul (auto hauto
dokoun kinein dia tȇn ekeinȇs dunamin), and the whole is called a living creature (zȏion to sumpan eklȇthȇ), soul and body fixed together (psuchȇ kai sȏma pagen), and acquires the name “mortal” (thnȇton eschen epȏnumian); immortal it is not, on the
basis of any argument which has been reasoned through (athanaton de oud’
ex henos logou lelogismenou), but because we have not seen or adequately
conceived a god we imagine (alla plattomen oute idontes oute hikanȏs noȇsantes theon) a kind of immortal living
creature (athanaton ti zȏion) which has both a soul and body (echon men
psuchȇn, echon de sȏma), combined for all time (ton aei de chronon
tauta sumpephukota).’ (246b5-d2, tr. Rowe)
Can these
words refer to the Timaeus passages to which Rowe refers?
In Timaeus
38e Plato says: ‘Now, when each of the stars which were necessary to the creation of time had come to
its proper orbit (epeidȇ dȇ oun eis tȇn heautȏi prepousan hekaston aphiketo phoran tȏn hosa edei sunapergazesthai chronon), and they had become living
creatures having bodies fastened by ensouled chains (desmois
empsuchois sȏmata dethenta zȏia egennȇthȇ), and learnt their appointed task (to
te prostachthen emathen), moving in the motion of the diverse (kata de tȇn thaterou phoran), which is diagonal (plagian ousan, 38e3-39a1) and
passes …‘
Plato argues
– presents logon lelogismenon ‘argument reasoned through’ – that each
star (planet) must ‘learn its appointed task’, which is demanding and
complicated, as he begins to explain in what immediately follows: ‘[and passes]
through and is governed by the motion of the same (dia tȇs t’autou phoras iousan te kai kratoumenȇn), one in a larger and another in a lesser orbit (to men
meizona autȏn, to d’ elatton kuklon ion), – those which had the lesser orbit
revolving faster (thatton men ta ton elattȏ), and those which had the larger more slowly … (ta de ton
meizȏ braduteron periȇiein … 39a1-3).’
How could
Plato say in Phaedrus 246c6-7, with reference to ‘the stars that have
become living creatures having bodies fastened by ensouled chains’ in Timaeus
38e, that these are presented as immortal ‘on the basis of no argument which
has been reasoned through’? These two passages nevertheless appear to be
related. Presumably, when Plato wrote the Phaedrus there didn’t exist
any ‘reasoned argument’ for a divine being composed of body and soul. With Phaedrus
246c6-7 in mind, Plato in the Timaeus explains how and why the dȇmiourgos created the stars, divine beings composed of body and soul.
But perhaps
I am too hasty, rushing to see the given passages within the framework of my
dating of the Phaedrus. So let us see Rowe’s second reference to the Timaeus:
‘Now, when all of them (epei d’oun pantes), both those who visibly
appear in their revolutions (hosoi te peripolousin phanerȏs)
as well as those other gods who are of a more retiring nature (kai hosoi
phainontai kath’ hoson an ethelȏsin theoi ‘and those gods who appear whenever
they wish’), had come into being (genesin eschon), the creator of the
universe addressed them in these words (legei pros autous ho tode to pan
gennȇsas tade): “Gods, children of gods (Theoi theȏn,
‘the text is uncertain’ remark the Sphere Books editors (1970) of Jowett’s
translation), who are my works, and of whom I am the artificer and father (hȏn egȏ dȇmiourgos patȇr te ergȏn),
my creations (di’ emou genomena) are indissoluble (aluta), if so
I will (emou ge mȇ ethelontos). All that is bound may be undone (to
men oun dȇ dethen pan luton), but only an evil being would wish
to undo that which is harmonious and happy (to ge mȇn kalȏs harmosthen kai echon eu luein
ethelein kakou).
Wherefore (di ha kai), since ye are but creatures (epeiper gegenȇsthe), ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble (athanatoi men ouk
este oud’ alutoi to pamapan), but ye shall certainly not be dissolved (outi
men dȇ luthȇsesthe ge), nor be liable to the fate of death
(oude teuxesthe thanatou moiras), having in my will a greater and
mightier bond (tȇs emȇs boulȇseȏs meizonos eti desmou kai kuriȏterou lachontes) than those (ekeinȏn) with which ye were bound at the time of your birth (hois
hot’ egignesthe sunedeisthe).” (Timaeus 41a-b, tr. B. Jowett)
If the Phaedrus
is later than the Timaeus, it is surprising to see the former – with its
claim that there is no argument for immortality of gods composed of soul and
body – as referring to or as having any relevance in relation to Timaeus
41a-b. For in the Timaeus passage the demiurge does not say that the
gods he created are immortal. He says explicitly that they are ‘not altogether
immortal’ (athanatoi ou to pampan, 41b2-3), for they are composed (of
soul and body), and ‘all that is composed can be dissolved’ (to men oun dȇ dethen pan luton, 40a8-b1), although they shall not die, for he created them
well and therefore does not wish them to be dissolved and die.
But let us
see the text that immediately follows, for in it the demiurge explains why he
created other gods composed of soul and body – i.e. other than those that we
can see as the stars, the moon, the sun, and the planets, which it was
necessary to create to make time (‘Time then, and the heaven came into being …’
[Chronos d’ oun met’ ouranou gegonen …, 38b6 ff.])
The demiurge
continues: ‘And now listen to my instructions (nun oun ho legȏ pros humas endeiknumenos, mathete): – Three tribes of mortal beings
remain to be created (thnȇta eti genȇ loipa tria agennȇta) – without them the universe will be incomplete (toutȏn de mȇ genomenȏn ouranos atelȇs estai), for it will not contain every kind
of animal which it ought to contain (ta gar hapant’ en hautȏi genȇ zȏiȏn ouch hexei, dei de), if it is to be perfect (ei
mellei teleos hikanȏs einai). On the other hand, if they were
created by me (di’ emou de tauta genomena) and received life in my hands
(kai biou metaschonta), they would be on an equality with the gods (theois
isazoit’ an). In order then that that they may be mortal (hina oun thnȇta te ȇi), and that this universe may be truly universal (to
te pan tode ontȏs hapan ȇi),
do ye, according to your natures, betake yourselves to the formation of animals
(trepesthe kata phusin humeis epi tȇn tȏn zȏiȏn dȇmiourgian), imitating the power which was
shown by me in creating you (mimoumenoi tȇn emȇn dunamin peri tȇn humeteran genesin). The part of them worthy of the name immortal (kai
kath’ hoson men autois athanatois homȏnumon einai prosȇkei),
which is called divine (theion legomenon) and is the guiding principle
of those (hȇgemonoun te en autois tȏn)
who are willing to follow justice and you (aei dikȇi kai humin ethelontȏn hepesthai) – of that divine part I will myself
sow the seed (speiras), and having made a beginning (kai huparxamenos),
I will hand the work over to you (egȏ paradȏsȏ). And do ye then interweave the
mortal with the immortal (to de loipon humeis, athanatȏi thnȇton prosuphainontes), and make and beget living
creatures (apergazesthe zȏia kai gennate), and give them food (trophȇn te didontes), and make them to grow (auxanete), and receive them
again in death (kai phthinonta palin dechesthe).’ (41b6-d3, tr. B.
Jowett)
If we are to
view the Phaedrus as later than the Timaeus, as Rowe suggests,
then Plato must have come to the view that the Timaeus passage presented
no ‘reasoned argument’ (logos lelogismenos) ‘on the basis of which a god
could be seen as a kind of immortal living creature which has both a soul and
body’. Isn’t it more likely that when Plato wrote Timaeus 41b6-d3 he
reflected on the Phaedrus 246c6-d2 passage? And that’s why he argued, as
he did, that the demiurge created gods combined of body and soul out of necessity
and for a purpose?
The Timaeus
passage, which immediately precedes 41a-b referred to by Rowe, adds weight to my
last two questions: ‘To know or tell the origin of the other divinities (Peri
de tȏn allȏn daimonȏn eipein kai gnȏnai tȇn genesin) is beyond us (meizon ȇ kath’ hȇmas),
and we must accept the traditions of the men of old time (peisteon de tois
eirȇkosi emprosthen) who affirm themselves to be the offsprings of the gods (ekgonois
men theȏn ousin) – that is what they say (hȏs ephasan) – and they must surely have known their own ancestors (saphȏs de pou tous ge hautȏn progonous eidosin). How can we doubt the word of the
children of the gods (adunaton oun theȏn paisin apistein)? Although they give no probable
or certain proofs (kaiper aneu te eikotȏn kai anankaiȏn apodeixeȏn legousin, 40e1-2), still, as they declare
that they are speaking of what took place in their own family (all’ hȏs oikeia phaskontȏn apangellein), we must conform to custom and
believe them (hepomenous tȏi nomȏi pisteuteon). In this manner (houtȏs),
then (oun), according to them (kat’ ekeinous), the genealogy of
these gods is to be received (hȇmin hȇ genesis peri toutȏn tȏn theȏn echetȏ) and set forth (kai legesthȏ). Oceanus and Thetys were the children of Earth and Heaven (Gȇs te kai Ouranou paides Ōkeanos te kai Thetus egenesthȇn),
and from these sprang Phorkys (toutȏn de Phorkus) and Cronos (Kronos te) and
Rhea (kai Rhea), and all that generation (kai hosoi meta toutȏn);
and from Cronos (ek de Kronou) and Rhea (kai Rheas) sprang Zeus (Zeus)
and Hera (Hȇra te), and all those who are said to be
their brethren (kai pantes hosous ismen adelphous legomenous autȏn),
and others who were the children of these (eti te toutȏn allous ekgonous).’ (Timaeus 40d6-41a3, tr. B. Jowett)
Doesn’t
Plato’s ‘although they give no probable or certain proofs (kaiper aneu te
eikotȏn kai anankaiȏn apodeixeȏn legousin) in Timaeus 40e1-2 say the same as ‘on the basis of
no single reasoned argument (oud’ ex henos logou lelogismenou) in Phaedrus
246c6-7? But there is one difference; in the Phaedrus this verdict
concerns all gods composed of soul and body, whereas in the Timaeus it
concerns only the gods of the Greek mythology. Doesn’t it then mean that Plato
in the Timaeus indicated how he would want us to read the Phaedrus
passage, as I would suggest on my dating of the latter, or does it mean that in
the Phaedrus Plato generalised the Timaeus verdict so as to apply
it to all gods composed of soul and body, if it is later than the Timaeus
as Rowe suggests? Laws X, to which Rowe refers in the second part of
point 3 of his arguments may show some light on this problem. I shall discuss Laws
X, in so far as they are relevant to Rowe’s point 3, in the next post devoted
to Rowe’s arguments for the late dating of the Phaedrus.
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