2 C. J. Rowe’s arguments for a late dating of the Phaedrus – with a digression: Plato on writing – Laws X, the Phaedrus, and the Timaeus

In my first post I discussed the first part of point 3 of Rowe’s arguments, that is his claim that ‘the Phaedrus rejects the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body (246c-d)’, and that ‘such a conception of them is present in the Timaeus (38e, 41a-b)’. In this post I shall discuss the second part of it, that is his claim that the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body ‘is absent from Laws X’.

In the opening paragraph of Laws X an Athenian Stranger (Athȇnaios xenos) says: ‘The penalty for offensive remarks about the gods or outrageous actions against their interests should be prefaced by these words of exhortation (hosa de logȏi kai hosa ergȏi peri theous hubrizei tis legȏn ȇ prattȏn, to paramuthion hupothemenȏi rȇteon ha dei paschein. estȏ de tode): “No one who believes in gods as the law directs ever voluntarily commits an unholy act (Theous hȇgoumenos einai kata nomous oudeis pȏpote oute ergon asebes ȇrgasato hekȏn) or lets any lawless word pass his lips (oute logon aphȇken anomon). If he does, it is because of one of three possible misapprehensions (alla hen dȇ ti tȏn triȏn paschȏn): either, as I said (ȇ touto, hoper eipon) , he believes (1) the gods do not exist (ouch hȇgoumenos), or (2) (ȇ to deuteron) that they exist (ontas) but take no thought for the human race (ou phrontizein anthrȏpȏn), or (3) (ȇ triton) that they are influenced by sacrifices and supplications and can easily be won over (euparamuthȇtous einai thusiais te kai euchais paragomenous).” (885b2-9, translations from Laws X are by Trevor J. Saunders)

Cleinias, a Cretan, says to the Athenian: ‘Well sir, don’t you think that the god’s existence is an easy truth to explain (Oukoun ȏ xene, dokei raidion einai alȇtheuontas legein hȏs eisin theoi;)?’ – Athenian: ‘How (Pȏs;)? – Cleinias: ‘Well, just look at the earth and the sun and the stars and the universe in general (Prȏton men gȇ kai hȇlios astra te kai ta sumpanta); look at the wonderful procession of the seasons (kai ta tȏn hȏrȏn diakekosmȇmena kalȏs houtȏs) and its articulation into years and months (eniautois kai mȇsin diakekosmȇmena)! Anyway, you know that all Greeks and all foreigners are unanimous in recognizing the existence of gods (kai hoti pantes Hellȇnes te kai barbaroi nomizousin einai theous).’ (885e7-886a5) – Athenian: ‘When you and I present our proofs for the existence of gods (emou gar kai sou, hotan tekmȇria legȏmen hȏs eisin theoi) and adduce what you adduced (tauta auta propherontes) – sun (hȇlion te), moon (kai selȇnȇn), stars (kai astra) and earth (kai gȇn) – that they are gods and divine beings (hȏs theous kai theia onta), the proselytes of these clever fellows will say (hupo tȏn sophȏn toutȏn anapepeismenoi an legoien) that these things are just earth and stones (hȏs gȇn te kai lithous onta tauta), and are incapable of caring for human affairs (kai ouden tȏn anthrȏpeiȏn pragmatȏn phrontizein dunamena).’ (886d4-e1)

The Athenian stranger asks his two companions, Cleinias, a Cretan, and Megillos, a Spartan, what should he do. Shouldn’t they simply pass the law that the gods exist, ‘so that the mere preface (mȇ kai to prooimion) doesn’t turn out longer than the actual code (hȇmin makroteron gignetai tȏn nomȏn; 887a2-3)? Cleinias replies that there is no reason to prefer a brief explanation to a full one: ‘It’s vital that somehow or other we should make out a plausible case for supposing (diapherei d’ ou smikron hamȏs ge pȏs pithanotȇta tina tous logous hȇmȏn echein) that gods do exist (hȏs theoi t’ eisin), that they are good (kai agathoi), and that they respect justice more than men do (dikȇn timȏntes diapherontȏs anthrȏpȏn). Such a demonstration would constitute just about the best and finest preamble our penal code could have (schedon gar touto hȇmin huper hapantȏn tȏn nomȏn kalliston te kai ariston prooimion an eiȇ, 887b5-c2).’

And so the Athenian explains to his companions the views of the atheists, so that they might comprehend what a task it would be to try to persuade them of their error: ‘They maintain that fire, water, earth and air owe their existence to nature and chance (pur kai hudȏr kai gȇn kai aera phusei panta einai kai tuchȇi phasin), and that it is by means of these entirely inanimate substances that the secondary physical bodies – the earth, sun, moon and stars – have been produced (kai ta meta tauta au sȏmata, gȇs te kai hȇliou kai selȇnȇs astrȏn te peri, dia toutȏn gegonenai pantelȏs ontȏn apsuchȏn, 889b1-5) … the first thing these people say about gods is that they are artificial concepts (theous einai prȏton phasin houtoi technȇi) corresponding to nothing in nature (ou phusei); they are legal fictions (alla tisin nomois), which moreover vary very widely (kai toutous allous allȇi) according to the different conventions people agree on when they produce a legal code (hopȇi hekastoi heautoisi sunȏmologȇsan nomothetoumenoi, 889e3-5).’

So Cleinias makes a passionate plea: ‘Well (Ti de), sir (ȏ xene;), we put up with one long discussion, about inebriation in the cause of culture (peri methȇs kai mousikȇs houtȏ makra legontas hȇmas autous periemeinamen), so surely we can tolerate another, about theology and so forth (peri theȏn de kai tȏn toioutȏn ouch hupomenoumen;). And of course (kai mȇn kai) this helps intelligent legislation tremendously (nomothesiai ge estin pou tȇi meta phronȇseȏs megistȇ boȇtheia), because legal instructions (dio ta peri nomous prostagmata), once written down (en grammasi tethenta), remain fixed and permanent, ready to stand up to scrutiny for ever (hȏs dȏsonta eis panta chronon elenchon, pantȏs ȇremei). So there’s no reason for alarm if at first they make difficult listening (hȏste out’ ei chalepa kat’ archas akouein estin phobȇteon), because your slow learner will be able to go back again and again and examine them (ha g’ estai kai tȏi dusmathei pollakis epanionti skopein). Nor does their length (oute ei makra), provided they’re useful (ȏphelima de), justify any man in committing what seems to me (dia tauta logon oudamȇi echei), at least, an impiety (oude hosion emoige einai phainetai): I mean refusing to facilitate these explanations as best he can (to mȇ ou boȇthein toutois tois logois panta andra kata dunamin).’ – Megillus, the Spartan: ‘Yes, sir, I entirely approve of what Cleinias says (Arista, ȏ xene, dokei moi legein Kleinias).’ (890e4-891a7)

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Here I must digress, for Cleinias’ words stand in contrast to everything that Plato said in the last section of the Phaedrus about writing. At Phaedrus 275c5-7 Socrates says: ‘anyone who leaves behind a written manual, and likewise anyone who takes it over from him, on the supposition that such writing will provide something reliable and permanent (ho technȇn oiomenos en grammasi katalipein, kai au ho paradechomenos hȏs ti saphes kai bebaion ek grammatȏn esomenon), must be exceedingly simple-minded (pollȇs an euȇtheias gemoi, tr. Hackforrth).’ Cleinias maintains that writing down the legal instructions is of the greatest help (megistȇ boȇtheia). Socrates maintains that the written text ‘is incapable of defending and helping itself’ (out’ amunasthai oute boȇthȇsai dunatos hautȏi, 275e5). Cleinias says that the written legal instructions, ‘once written down (en grammasi tethenta), remain fixed and permanent (pantȏs ȇremei), ready to stand up to scrutiny for ever (hȏs dȏsonta eis panta chronon elenchon). Socrates in the Phaedrus maintains that ‘the written words speak as if they were thinking something (hȏs ti phronountas autous legein), but if you ask them something about anything they say (ean de ti erȇi tȏn legomenȏn), wanting to learn (boulomenos mathein), they always point to just one and the same thing (hen ti sȇmainei monon t’auton aei, 275d7-9)’. Cleinias points out that it is because the written instructions ‘remain completely fixed and permanent’ (pantȏs ȇremei), ‘even a slow learner will be able to go back again and again and examine them (ha g’ estai kai tȏi dusmathei pollakis epanionti skopein)’.

Cleinias’ speech points out what Plato rejected in the Phaedrus as wrong, and thus prepares the reader for what he views as true and permanent in it. For the speech is followed by the Athenian’s proof of the existence of the gods, which depends on the conception of the soul defined as ‘motion capable of moving itself (autȇn hautȇn kinein kinȇsin, 896a1-2), which is central to Plato’s proof of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedrus (245c5-246a2).

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In this post I’ll skip the Athenian’s lengthy proof of the god’s existence, for I shall devote to it my next post (in which I shall discuss Rowe’s point 4: ‘Other clear connections with Laws 10, as has long been noticed, are to be found in the arguments for immortality (245c-246a)’. In the following I shall present just the final stage of the Athenian’s proof.

Athenian: ‘If, in principle, soul drives round the sun, moon, and the other heavenly bodies (Hȇlion kai selȇnȇn kai ta alla astra, eiper psuchȇ periagei panta), does it not impel each individually (ar’ ou kai hen hekaston;)?’ – Cleinias: ‘Of course (Ti mȇn;).’ – Ath.: ‘Let’s take a single example (Peri henos dȇ poiȇsȏmetha logous): our results will then obviously apply to all the other heavenly bodies (hoi kai epi panta hȇmin astra harmottontes phanountai).’ – Cl.: ‘And your example is … (Tinos;)? – Ath.: ‘… the sun. Everyone can see its body (Hȇliou pas anthrȏpos sȏma men horai), but no one can see its soul (psuchȇn de oudeis) – not that you could see the soul of any other creature, living or dying (oude gar allou sȏmatos oudenos oute zȏntos oute apothnȇiskontos tȏn zȏiȏn). Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing that we are in fact held in the embrace of some such thing though it is totally below the level of our bodily senses (alla elpis de pollȇ to parapan to genos hȇmin touto anaisthȇton pasais tais tou sȏmatos aisthȇsesi peripephukenai), and is perceptible by reason alone (noȇton d’ einai). So by reason and understanding (nȏi monȏi dȇ kai dianoȇmati) let’s get hold of a new point about the soul (labȏmen autou peri to toionde).’ – Cl.: ‘What (Poion;)?’ – Ath.: ‘If soul drives the sun (Hȇlion eiper agei psuchȇ), we shan’t go far wrong if we say that it operates in one of three ways (triȏn autȇn hen legontes dran schedon ouk apoteuxometha). – Cl.: ‘And what are they (Tinȏn;)? – Ath.: ‘Either (a) the soul resides within this visible spherical body and carries it wherever it goes (Hȏs ȇ enousa entos tȏi peripherei toutȏi phainomenȏi sȏmati pantȇi diakomizei to toiouton), just as our soul takes us around from one place to another (kathaper hȇmas hȇ par’ hȇmin psuchȇ pantȇi peripherei), or (b) it acquires its own body of fire or air of some kind (ȇ pothen exȏthen sȏma hautȇi porisamenȇ puros ȇ tinos aeros), as certain people maintain (hȏs logos esti tinȏn), and impels the sun by the external contact of body with body (ȏthei biai sȏmati sȏma), or (c) it is entirely immaterial (ȇ triton autȇ psilȇ sȏmatos ousa), but guides the sun along its path by virtue of possessing some other prodigious and wonderful powers (echousa de dunameis allas tinas huperballousas thaumati, podȇgei).’ – Cl.: ‘Yes (Nai), it must necessarily be one of these methods that the soul manages the universe (touto men anankȇ, toutȏn hen ti drȏsan psuchȇn panta diagein).’ – Ath. ‘Now, just wait a minute (Autou dȇ ameinon). Whether we find that it is by stationing itself in the sun and driving it like a chariot, or moving it from outside, or by some other means, that this soul provides us all with light, every single one of us is bound to regard it as a god (tautȇn tȇn psuchȇn, eite en harmasin echousa hȇmin hȇlion agei phȏs tois hapasin, eite exȏthen, eith’ hopȏs eith’ hopȇi, theon hȇgeisthai chreȏn panta andra). Isn’t that right (ȇ pȏs;)? – Cl.: ‘Yes (Nai), one would be absolutely stupid not to (ton ge pou mȇ epi to eschaton aphigmenon anoias).’ – Ath.: Now consider all the stars and the moon and the years and months and all the seasons (Astrȏn dȇ peri pantȏn kai selȇnȇs eniautȏn te kai mȇnȏn kai pasȏn hȏrȏn peri): what can we do but repeat the same story (tina allon logon eroumen ȇ ton auton touton)? A soul or souls – and perfectly virtuous souls at that – have been shown to be the cause of all these phenomena (hȏs epeidȇ psuchȇ men ȇ psuchai pantȏn toutȏn aitiai ephanȇsan, agathai de pasan aretȇn), and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we shall insist that these souls are gods (theous autas einai phȇsomen, eite en sȏmasin enousai, zȏia onta, kosmousin panta ouranon, eite hopȇi kai hopȏs;). Can anybody admit all this (esth’ hostis tauta homologȏn) and still put up with people who deny that ‘everything is full of gods (hupomenei mȇ theȏn einai plȇrȇ panta;)’? – Cl.: ‘No sir, nobody could be so mad (Ouk estin houtȏs, ȏ xene, paraphronȏn oudeis). (898d3-899b9)

Point 3 of Rowe’s arguments is as follows: ‘The Phaedrus rejects the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body (246c-d): such a conception of them is present in the Timaeus (38e, 41a-b), but – pace Cornford – absent from Laws 10.’ Was he right in claiming that the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body is present in the Timaeus but absent from Laws 10?

To answer this question, let us recapitulate the last stage of the Athenians proof of the existence of the gods. Plato opened it by maintaining that it is the soul that drives the sun, moon, and the other heavenly bodies. He went on to say that every man can see the body of the sun, but nobody can see its soul; for no soul can be seen by ‘the bodily senses’ (tais tou sȏmatos aisthȇsesi), and is perceptible by reason alone (noȇton d’ einai). Then he pointed out three possibilities in which the soul can drive the sun: 1) by residing in its body, 2) or from outside, providing itself with some other body, of fire or air, and thus pushing the sun by force (ȏthei biai), body by body (sȏmati sȏma), 3) ‘soul itself being without body’ (autȇ psilȇ sȏmatos ousa, Saunders’ ‘it is entirely immaterial’ is misleading, for in all these three cases the divine soul as such ‘is entirely immaterial’), but in possession of some other powers (echousa de dunameis allas tinas) that are more wonderful than one can imagine (huperballousas thaumati), it leads the sun (podȇgei). (898e5-899a4}

With this passage in mind, I believe, Rowe claims that the conception of gods as a combination of soul and body is absent from Laws 10.

But at 899b3-9 Plato reformulated the three possibilities, when he pointed out that they equally applied to all stars and to the moon. There he says that ‘since soul or souls (epeidȇ psuchȇ men ȇ psuchai) have been shown to be the cause of all these phenomena (pantȏn toutȏn aitiai ephanȇsan), we shall maintain that they are gods’ (theous autas einai phȇsomen, 899b7), and then he reformulates the first possibility: ‘either being in bodies [of the stars] (eite en sȏmasi enousai), thus being living beings (zȏia onta, 899b7-8)’. It must have been this reformulation that prompted Cornford to maintain that the concept of gods as living beings composed of soul and body is present in Laws X. For Plato’s ‘being in bodies (en sȏmasi enousai), thus being living beings (zȏia onta)’ in Laws 899b7-8 recalls Timaeus 38e3-6: ‘When each of the stars which were necessary for the creation of time had come to its proper orbit (epeidȇ dȇ oun eis tȇn heautȏi prepousan hekaston aphiketo phoran tȏn hosa edei sunapergazesthai chronon), they had become living creatures having bodies fastened by ensouled chains (desmois empsuchois sȏmata dethenta zȏia egennȇthȇ).’ Pace Rowe, Cornford was right.

Saunders’ ‘whether it is by their living presence in matter’ for Plato’s eite en sȏmasi enousai, zȏia onta obscures the matter.

My claims ‘It must have been this reformulation that prompted Cornford …’ and ‘Pace Rowe, Cornford was right’ depend on Rowe’s ‘pace Cornford’ and the accompanying note 70. ‘F. Cornford, Plato's cosmology (1937) 112 n. 1.’ For I don’t have this book of Cornford, although I read it in the Bodleian Library, of which I am reminded by quotations from it on the margins of my Oxford edition of Plato.