Plato’s Phaedrus, Alcidamas’ On Sophists and Plato’s Protagoras

Alcidamas in his On Sophists misrepresented Plato’s view on the authentic philosopher’s word expressed in the Phaedrus; Plato corrected the misrepresentation in the Protagoras.

In the last section of the Phaedrus Plato deprecates the art of writing: ‘Writing has this strange feature (Deinon tout’ echei graphȇ), which makes it truly like painting (kai hȏs alȇthȏs homoion zȏgraphiai). For its offspring as well (kai gar ta ekeinȇs ekgona) stand there as if alive (hestȇke men hȏs zȏnta), but if you ask them something (ean d’ anerȇi ti), they maintain a most solemn silence (semnȏs panu sigai). It is the same with written speeches (t’auton de kai hoi logoi). You would think (doxais men an) that they talk as if they were thinking something (hȏs ti phronountas autous legein), but if you ask them about anything they say (ean de ti erȇi tȏn legomenȏn), from a desire to learn (boulomenos mathein), they say one and the same for ever (hen ti sȇmainei monon t’auton aei) (275d4-9) … And when it is ill-treated (plȇmmeloumenos de) and unjustly abused (kai ouk en dikȇi loidorȇtheis) it always needs its father’s help (tou patros aei deitai boȇthou), for it is unable to defend or help itself (autos gar out’ amunasthai oute boȇthȇsai dunatos hautȏi, 275e3-5).’

This he contrasts with ‘another word that we can see (allon horȏmen logon), the lawfully begotten brother of that one (toutou adelphon gnȇsion), how it comes into being (tȏi tropȏi te gignetai), and how much better (kai hosȏi ameinȏn) and more powerful (kai dunatȏteros) it is than the other (toutou phuetai; 276a1-3).’ It is the word ‘which is written with knowledge (hos met’ epistȇmȇs graphetai) in the soul of the learner (en tȇi tou manthanontos psuchȇi), is capable to defend itself (dunatos men amunai heautȏi), and knows to whom it should speak and to whom it should say nothing (kai epistȇmȏn de legein te kai sigan pros hous dei, 276a5-7) … it is the word of a man who knows (Ton tou eidotos logon legeis), which is living and has soul (zȏnta kai empsuchon), of which the written speech (hou ho gegrammenos) would rightly be called a kind of phantom (eidȏlon an ti legoito dikaiȏs, 276a8-9).’

Alcidamas in his ‘accusation of written speeches’ (katȇgoria tȏn graprȏn logȏn) appropriated Plato’s deprecation of the written word and his praise of the spoken word ‘which is living and has soul’; he presented the latter as a praise of extempore speeches of which he was the exponent: ‘And I think (hȇgoumai d’) that it is not even right to call ‘speeches’ the written pieces (oude logous dikaion einai kaleisthai tous gegramenous), but phantoms (all hȏsper eidȏla), and figurines (kai schȇmata), and imitations of speeches (kai mimȇmata logȏn). And the fairest opinion I would have about them is the same (kai tȇn autȇn kat’ autȏn eikotȏs an doxan echoimi) as about the bronze sculptures (hȇnper kai kata tȏn chalkȏn andriantȏn) and statues of stone (kai lithinȏn agalmatȏn) and painted living beings (kai gegrammenȏn zȏiȏn). For just as these (hȏsper gar tauta) are imitations of true bodies (mimȇmata tȏn alȇthinȏn sȏmatȏn esti), and it is pleasurable to see them (kai terpsin men epi tȇs theȏrias echei), but they are of no use in human life (chrȇsin d’ oudemian tȏi tȏn anthrȏpȏn biȏi paradidȏsi), it is the same with the written speech (ton auton tropon ho gegrammenos logos). Being of one and the same form and arrangement (heni schȇmati kai taxei kechrȇmenos), seen in a book it may astound (ek bibliou men theȏroumenos echei tinas ekplȇxeis), but when opportune moments come (epi de tȏn kairȏn), being immobile (akinȇtos ȏn), it gives no advantage to its owners (oudemian ȏpheleian tois kektȇmenois paradidȏsin). And just as real bodies look much worse than beautiful statues (all’ hȏsper andriantȏn kalȏn alȇthina sȏmata polu cheirous tas theȏrias echonta) but when at work provide us with much greater profits (pollaplasious epi tȏn ergȏn tas ȏphelias paradidȏsin), so the speech spoken at the given moment from the mind itself (houtȏ kai logos ho men ap’ autȇs tȇs dianoias en tȏi parautika legomenos) has soul and is living (empsuchos esti kai zȇi) and follows the matter in hand (kai tois pragmasin hepetai) and resembles the real bodies (kai tois alȇthesin aphȏmoiȏtai sȏmasin), but the written one (ho de gegrammenos), in its nature a semblance of speech (eikoni logou tȇn phusin homoian echȏn), is bereft of all well-doing (hapasȇs euergesias amoiros kathestȇken). (On Sophists 27-28)

Alcidamas did not pretend that these thoughts came out of his own head; he extolled the ability of an extempore speaker to lay his hands on arguments suiting his purpose and to incorporate them in his own speech. He pointed his finger at Plato as the author of thoughts expressed in paragraphs 27-28, distancing himself from the radical deprecation of the art of writing. In paragraph 29-30 he wrote: ‘Perhaps, someone might say (isȏs an oun eipoi tis) that it is absurd to disparage the power of writing (hȏs alogon esti katȇgorein men tȇs graphikȇs dunameȏs) when one appears to be displaying his talent by the means of it (auton de dia tautȇs tas epideixeis poioumenon), and to begin by inciting prejudice against the very occupation (kai prodiaballein tȇn pragmateian tautȇn) through which one is getting ready to become famous among the Greeks (di’ hȇs eudokimein paraskeuazetai para tois Hellȇsin), and when one devotes his time to philosophy (eti de peri philosophian diatribonta) to commend extempore speeches (tous autoschediastikous logous epainein) … But firstly (egȏ de prȏton men), not because I completely disapprove of writing (ou pantelȏs apodokimazȏn tȇn graphikȇn dunamin) … I said these words (toutous eirȇka tous logous)’.

By appropriating Plato’s praise of the spoken word ‘which is living and has soul, of which the written speech would rightly be called a kind of phantom’ in his praise of extempore speeches Alcidamas misrepresented Plato’s views. This had to be corrected. Plato had to show that extempore speeches deserved the same criticism to which he exposed the written speeches.

In the Protagoras Socrates came to Protagoras with Hippocrates and told him that the young man would like to become his pupil: ‘he says that he would be glad to know what benefit he will derive from associating with you’ (hoti oun autȏi apobȇsetai, ean soi sunȇi, hȇdeȏs an phȇsi puthesthai, 318a3-4). Protagoras explained: ‘What I teach is the proper management of public affairs (to de mathȇma estin euboulia peri tȏn oikeiȏn), how best to run one’s household (hopȏs an arista tȇn heautou oikian dioikoi), and the management of public affairs (kai peri tȏn tȇs poleȏs), how to make the most effective contribution to the affairs of the city both by word and action (hopȏs ta tȇs poleȏs dunatȏtatos an eiȇ kai prattein kai legein, 318e5-319a2).’ In response, Socrates gave him his reasons for doubting that ‘the political art’ (politikȇ technȇ, 319a4) can be taught (319a8-320b8), and asked: ‘So if you can show us more clearly (ei oun echeis enargesteron hȇmin epideixai) that excellence can be taught (hȏs didakton estin hȇ aretȇ), please don’t grudge us your proof, but proceed (mȇ phthonȇsȇis all’ epideixon, 320b8-c1))’.

In response, Protagoras gave a long speech. Socrates, having reproduced the speech in his narration, went on to say: ‘So Protagoras concluded this lengthy exhibition of his skill as a speaker (Prȏtagoras men tosauta kai toiauta epideixamenos apepausato tou logou, 328d3-4) … Now if you went to any of the orators about this question (ei men tis peri autȏn toutȏn [‘concerning these things’] sungenoito hotȏioun tȏn dȇmȇgorȏn), you would perhaps get a similar speech from Pericles (tach’ an kai toioutous logous akouseien ȇ Perikleous), or some other able speaker (ȇ allou tinos tȏn hikanȏn eipein); but if you asked them any question (ei de epaneroito tina ti), they are no more capable of answering or asking anything themselves than a book is (hȏsper biblia ouden echousin oute apokrinasthai oute autoi eresthai, 328e6-329a4, translation from Protagoras C.C.W. Taylor).